Logistic Requirements and Capabilities of Communist China to Conduct Military Campaigns Against India

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70T00666R000100140004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 18, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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Sc-1/169/62.
18 ikplember 1962
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TIC R UIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES
CO T CHINA TO CONDUCT MILITARY CAMPAIGNS
AGAINST INDIA
la November 1962
of Res rob and Reports
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This paper presents tentative estimates of the supply requirement
for the forces of Communist China in combat units currently engaged
In the Sino-Indian conflict along the Tibet border. The paper also con-
siders the part of the capability of the road transportation routes in the
area currently in use, the sine of forces that can be supported by the
current capability of roads, and the speed with which additional forces
can be deployed for combat against India. In addition, it provides a
tentative estimate of the ability of Communist China to supply forces
In Tibet by an airlift.
These estimstes are based on the best information available to this
Office from all sources on IS November 1962. Work also is currently
underway on this problem by the Asa istant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Army; by the Deis-use Intelligence Agency; and by the
Rand Corporation under contract with the Department of Defense. The
definitive conclusions of the studies of these other organisations will
not be available for some time.
e
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CONTENTS
1. Supply of Troops in Tibet
Redeployment of Combat Troops to Tibet
_Page.
2
3. Potential Airlift Capabilities 4
Appendix
The Road System of Tibet 5
Maps
Figure 1. Himalayan Frontier
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Tibet: Number of Troops Currently Supported
and Roads Used for Supply Movements
Number of Troops in Front Line Combat Units
Supportable by Maximum Use of Present
Tibetan Road Capability
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LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABIJ4TZZS
OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO CONDUCT MILI'TARY
AGAINSf INDIA
Supply of Troops in Tibet
NS
At present, about 100,000 troops are currently estimated to be in the
Tibet Military Region, and 24,000 of these are believed to be in the combat
areas. The troops in the Region would require about 445 tons* of supplies
daily, including 270 tons delivered to the combat arm and the area north
of Sikkim.**
If maximum use were made of present Tibetan road capability. I, 440
tons of supplies could be delivered daily to troops in front-line combat
units out of a potential total of 2,000 tons deliverable daily by road to
Tibet. The 1,440 tons of supplies could sustain about 170,000 troops in
the front-line combat units, leaving 560 tons of supplies daily for use of
troops and civilians not in the front-line areas.
The present roads could support the daily resupply requirements of
seven times the number of troops now in the front-line combat units, and
five times as many supplies could be brought in compared with those now
required by the troops located in the whole of Tibet. On the average, all
roads in Tibet are being used to only slightly more than 20 percent of their
maximum capability, as shown in the tabulation on the following page.
Redeployment of Combat Troops to Tibet
The Chinese Communists could provide the resupply requirements
for 300, 000 troops in the Tibet Military Region. We estimate that the
Tibet internal road net and feeder lines would permit the deployment of
* Tonnages are given in short tons throughout this paper.
** For a description of the road system of Tibet, se* the Appendix and
the map, Figur* 1.
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Combat areas
Noncombat areas
Total Tibet Mili
Region
ent of
Present bility
.11equiremenIa
no Ili
175
445
18.8
31.3
22.3
a. g the map igure 2.
b. InoluAing supplies delive
about 170,000 troops to the border arose of Ladekh, the Northeastern
Frontier Agency (NEFA), and Tatting, north of Sikkim.* The remaining
130,000 Chinese forces would be used to resupply forward units, to pro-
vide for internal security, and to maintain internal lines of communica-
tions.
Theoretically, 170,000 combat troops could be positioned in the her
der areas in as little as 6 week., bet the buildup of rear area strength
would come much later. The buildup of combat troops could be accom-
plished by repositioning troops already in Tibet but not actually fighting
and by moving seven additional divisions into Tibet. Five of these seven
divisions probably would be brought in via the railheads north of the
Tibet Military Region from as far as the Peiping and Wu-ban Military
Regions.
In order to move seven new infantry divisions to the border area in
6 weeks, the Chinese Communists would have to operate their motor
transport units and organic motor transport at a greatly accelerated pace.**
See the map, Figure 3.
** If troops were to be moved at the normal rate used for resupply move-
ments, it would take, for example, as long as 18 days to move one division
from the railhead at Hatatung to Lhasa and 30 days to Burn La, a total dis-
tance of some 1,600 miles.
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Operating on a "crash basis." they could, for limited periods of 2 to
5 days. provide a capacity three to five times the normal sustained
capacity of the main roads into and within the Tibet Military Region.
It is unlikely, however, that the buildup could be accomplished so
rapidly, owing to the deterioration of roads, the difficult terrain, the
high altitudes, adverse weather, and the problem of gasoline supply
for the substantial number of trucks involved in the crash operation.
It would be reasonable to expect a more moderate buildup extending
over a period of several mouths. A more moderate tempo in the
buildup would provide ample time for necessary road maintenance
and stockpiling of gasoline along the supply routes, would lessen the
urgency of eliminating adverse conditions caused by weather, and
viouleconspensate for possible errors in the organisation of so vast
a movement in this area over such a relatively short period of time.
Computing on the basis of accepted logistic factors the time re-
quired for the redeployment of the seven additional divisions in specific
geographic areas, however, would be as follows:
a. Two weeks probably is about the shortest time that a division
now located outside of the Tibet Military Region could move into Tibet
and to a fighting front. The shortest route is from Ch'eng-tu to Li-ma
via Ch'itas-tu. At the present time, such a troop movement is underway
between Chieng-tu and Chiang-iv, and the time required for this part of
Lb. rout* may be about 6 days, In the meantime, troops that have been
located at Chang-tu could be moved to the fighting front at Li-ma in
about 7 day. after leaving Chang-t*.
b. In about ZO days a division imow at Hsi-ning could move into the
Burn La area, and in about 25 days another division could move from the
Wuhan area to the border area near Sikkim. Durigg this time, forces
already located in the Zhigatse-Gyangtse area could move forward to the
border, making a total of two divisions at Bum La and two divisions near
Sikkirn.
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c. In the Ladakh area the roads to the front would support four
ions in addition to the nearly two divisions already there. Because
relative route capacities, it is likely that on. division only would
move from the east via Urumchi and three divisions via Lhasa. All
four division, could be in the Ladakh area within about 6 weeks, the
longest period of time required for the deployment of combat forces to
Tibet.
. Pi).sntjai Airlift Capabilities
It is estimated that the Chinese Communists are currently moving
only a few military supplies to Tibet by air transport. The potential
airlift capability of the Chinese civil-military transport fleet to carry
supplies from the airfields at the railroad-served distribution centers
of Lan-chou, Chseng-tu. and Hei-ning to Lhasa, however, is estimated
to be about 240 tons per day. This daily rate can be maintained for a
period of approximately 1 month, after which the daily rate would be
cut at least in half over a sustained period.
The airlift capability therefore, is not sufficient to augment
rapidly the troop strength in Tibet, but the tonnage moved by air would
augment supplies transported by truck to Lhasa for the resupply a com-
bat and garrison troops under present conditions. Such augmentation
would be equivalent in magnitude to the support required for 28,000
troops in combat for 1 month and about half that number thereafter.
Because the road capacity south of Lhasa is less than that of the roads
northward to the railheads airlifted supplies would have to substitute
for, rather than augment, supplies moving to the border areas where
troops are in combat and also to troops located elsewhere in Tibet.
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APPENDIX
THE ROAD SYSTEM OF TIBET
A. Main Access Roadi to and Within Tibet
I. Tsixtghai-Tibet Highway
This highway starts at the railroad in northern China at Hung-
liu-yuan, or Hata-tung, and is the major supply route for troops in
Tibet. It goes south through An-hat, Ta-chat-tan, Golmo, An-to,
Nagchhu Dzcmg. and Yang-pa-ching, to Lhasa. The length of this high-
way is estimated to be about 1,300 miles. An alternate route is avail-
able from the railhead at Hsi-Mils in north-central China, then west to
Golmo and thereafter south to Lhasa as stated above. The alternate
route from Hat-Mug to Lhasa is about 70 miles longer, or an estimated
total of 1,370 miles.
2. Szechwan-Tibet Highway
The Szechwan-Tibet Highway starts at the railhead at Chteng-tu
In Szechwan Province and runs generally west through Kiang-dug. Kan-tzu,
Ts-o, Chlang-tu (Chamdo), Pang-ta, and west to Sung-tsung and Lhasa,
approximately 1,210 miles.
3. Urumchi-Kasher-Rudog Highway
This highway originates in northwestern China at the railhead in
the Urumchi area. From Urtunchi it goes south to Ka,rashahr and then
west to Kucha, Asko-su, and Kashgar. It then turns southeast to Yarkand,
Karghalik, and Rudog. The estimated length of the road from Urumchi
to Rudog is about 1,335 miles. The southern section of this route from
Karghalik to Rudog is often referred to as the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway.
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4. Trana-Tibe
This highway connects the Itnkiang-TtbeL Htgbwsy with the
'rein 1-Tibet Highway and has tarreinal roads at two places on each
of these highways. Otk the. Sinkian.g Highway the terminal is at Taeltigoeg
and at a point about 30 miles north of Rados. From these two locations
the roads Tetsreeet about 110 mil** to dm east, forming one road which
travels oast approximately 475 mile*. Near Soling Tell. it divides with
one road goiag 110 roilse north to Aa-to and one going south 1110 miles
to Nagehhu Dsong, both on the Tainghai-Tibet Highway. The estimated
total distance over the Trans-Tibet Highway, therefore, is between
715 and 7115 miles.
S. Lhaaa-Gart Htgtwaj
This highway roughly parallels the southern border of Tibet.
starting at Lhasa and thence to Zhikatse, Lhatse Dsong, Saagsauj.,
aka. Traduce. Nakehak, Barkha. and Gartok. This distaste* is esti
mated to be approximately 765 miles. However the roast continues
150 more miles through Gar Dsong to most the Trans-Tibet Highway
at Tashigeng and the Sinkiang Highway at Rados, a total distance from
Lhasa to Redo& of about 915 miles.
B. Roads from Access Highways to the Borders a Tibet
. Ladakh Area
Th* roads in the Lsdekb area all
-Tibet Highway.
na
from
a. Chip Chap Valley Road
This road start. about 10 miles north of Haji Langar and
follows the Clara gash River to Mail Jilga and than goes west to the Chip
Chap River valley. The total distance is approximately 110 miles.
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b. Road to Nischu
This road Is the same as the Chip Chap Valley road (as above)
to Chsil Alga but then goes south through Debra La and west and south to
Nischu. a total distance of about 155 miles.
c. Road to Ningri
This road leaves the Sinkiang-Ti i way and goes west
rough Lanak La to Ningri. a distance of almost
0 miles.
d. Rudog to Chusul
This road runs west from Rudog to Chusul, about 55 mi
NLI'A Area
a. /...hasa-Bum
Starting at Lbaoa, this road travels south to Chhushu. ass
to Tsethang, and south agaitt to Lbuntse Dunn, Tsona Bisons. and Burn
The estimated distance is ZSO ratios.
h. Chang-11.1 Li-ma (Ri-ma) Road
This road goes south from Cla'ang- t u to Pang-ta and then
west and south to Sang-ang-cleu and Li-ma a total Warm* of approxi-
1 U0 miles.
3. Tibet
a. hasa-Sikki
ozn 1411111111 this road goes southwest to Nausbarts. Dying,
west to Cryangter and south to Khangmar, Phart Dsong, and Vatting. The
distance is estimated at 230 miles.
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b. Barkha-Taklakhar
This road runs from Satiate on the LbasG&rtok Highway
to Taklakhar near the northwestern corner of Nepal, about SO miles.
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