MEMO FOR (Sanitized) FROM (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00185A000100020123-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 123
• Publication Date: July 27, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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27 July 1966
I have reviewed the JIIRG Report on a comma and
period basis, as you requested, and most of my thoughts
are shown in the marked up copy attached. There are also
comments about the general tone and organization of the
Report, which I have included in remarks here. As you are
aware, I am completely opposed to some of the recommenda-
tions, and I have spelled out some details regarding this here
also.
Crnitre Sxs em
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In paragraph A, I feel that there is a little too
such of a sales job, and that the position of photography
particularly its importance, may be over-stressed. If
it really is important people understand it, and it isn't
necessary to make too much of it in the report. I have
slightly changed the emphasis to indicate that the increase
in cost arisen from the increased use, and the increased
use is because the product is really important.
on page 5, paragraph B, I made some changes in the
assumption which I think may make it a little less
subject to misinterpretation. This is reflected again in
the material which I have added to the third assumption.
On page 7 I have some problems with the way that the
d finding and conclusion are stated.
On page 7, paragraph 3, I wonder whether or not COMOR,
example, would concur in this. The report is primarily
particular the satellite reconnaissance effort, how much
addressed to national requirements, and considering in
?e has to be done to satisfy the requirements for
"comprehensive" and "more timely"?
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page 8, and in other areas, the frequent reference 25X1A
to missions and the potential of the
in so optimistic as to raise questions
o whether or not it represents fact, or in a continuing
promise in order to justify past decisions. With regard
to the findings on page 8, for example, what is it that
quarantees or even strongly indicates a significant capability
in a unit which in not yet operational? Have orders been
cut to transfer the cream of the crop in imagery interpreters
to the Does this organization have priorities
for new and better equipment which is not available to
other RT8' s?
On page 11 1 feel that item 23 might well be deleted.
The other findings might not be obvious to the people to
whom this report is addressed, but certainly 23 Is. It just
seems to be out of context at this point.
Also on page 11, item 22, whatever is supposed to be
said there Is sort of obscure. Are we trying to say that
photo Interpreters have varying degrees of capability because
some guys are more trained than the other, or because they
are used -differently, or both? I sort of suspect that it
is both, but as it is now stated it seems to hang in mid air.
Also on page 24, I don`t see why paragraph 24 should
be included. This can be picked up elsewhere it it is really
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needed, and this is supposed to be, as I understand it,
sunmary of findings and conclusions. I think the
abolition or restructuring of etc. 25X1A
falls no" in the lines of a recommendation which to
required in order to instrument and accomplish the new
look in imagery interpretation. The fact that
should 25X1 A
be dissolved, for example, does not directly comae out of
the findings and conclusions, I do;
of the matter is that within the present structure every-
body seems to think that in doing a pretty good job. 25X1 A
24 just presupposes the acceptance of the recommended plan.
sight be a little bit obnoxious to some readers.
On page 12, the DCI, of course, issues OCID's and
methodology for this need not be spelled out in this
report. They are Issued with concurrence of tYSIB, and in
both recommendations 1 and 2, 1 think it would be sufficient
to just indicate the appendix where the detailed description
of the recommendation in found.
In Recommendation No. 2, the inclusion of a description
of the committee is somewhat inappropriate unless all other
recommendations are going to be described also.
Recommendation No. 3 is rather redundant if the
functions of
in the OCID to the
are, in fact, explicitly given
X. The responsible management should
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take some initiative and not have to be directed by the
DCI or the Secretary of Defense to dissolve these redundant
functions.
An I as sure you are we
I that the
fourth reco endation is outside the scope and ground rules
for the whole JIIBG activity in that processing was not
going to be considered, and therefore this should be struck
entirety. The inclusion of this, and the stretching
of the guideline
results in the longest recommendation
of the entire group and given the appearance of a sweep-
up and patch job. The JIIRG has not been tasked to provide
this kind of a reco ndation, and, in fact, the NRO recommendation
is available to the Secretary of Defense and the DCI via
IISIB or as wenbers of the EXCtOK at this time if they wanted
to consider it. If you wish to look at the XRO recommendation
detail, I would be happy to discourse at length an to
why I think the recommendations of themselves are not very good.
recommend
ttion No. 5 is not very explicit, and a
adopt and refine a proposed methodology
is sort of a weak wicket it is almost like saying I am not
satisfied with what we're recommending that you adopt.
I would delete Recommendation No. 7 on page 13. The
new committee should, of course, be responsive to the VSIB,
the members of DSIB, the con ittees of USIB, etc., and if the
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Secretary of Defense or the I wish ' to have that Committee
worry about construction programs, as well. as imagery
interpretation, they can make an appropriate assignment
to the Committee. Compared to the other recommendations,
I think this is rather trivial and arbitrary. I also find
particular recommendation to be somewhat self-contradictory
in that the first sentence calls for a re-evaluation of the
construction plans for a building, while the second sentence
says to approve and accelerate such construction as may
be required.
I have difficulties also with Recommendation No. 8
it is redundant and unnecessary. It also presupposes
the guidelines that are going to be established by a now
DRIB Committee. I should think that this would fall out
veloped anywhere, I fail to see it. I agree that the
urally from Recommendations 1 and 2.
If the rationale behind Recommendation No. 9 was
ction equipment with which the RTS in presently associated
s have some multissenssory collection capability, but so
do some current Army aircraft. The Secretary of Defense
or The Director of Central Intelligence don't have to
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gig up on this one, at least I don't think so.
As I recall, the National Tanking Plan and the words
e wrapped around the COMEX both implicitly define
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the need for very close liaison with the collection
The National Trssking Plan and the COMEX implicitly
require that common basis for predicting needs be established,
and that this be based on the single collection estimate.
I think that Item 10 is laborious and redundant.
The filth recommendation is a real dandy. It's just
got to stay in. Good thinking.
On page 22 in paragraph 12, about half way down,
clear to me how the expansion of assigned intelligence
duplication.
esponsibilities directly leads to overlap and
usetion arises here an to why these
responsibilities are expanded.
25, paragraph 18, 1 find the first sentence
to be a rather controversial one. First of all, it
isn't true because additional tasssks, etc., could be under-
taken if some of the things that agar now being done were
stopped. The statement could very well be interpreted by
Bureau of the Budget and others as meaning that maximum
efficiency was now being achieved. We don't really keep,
for example, a large reserve in our military forces on
active duty. If the current organizations had such a reserve
capability, what would these people be doing? I as certain
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that they would find something with which to fill their
days.
Again on page 25, paragraph
little confused
as to why theI Ishould continually be advertised
an something great in the future. It would noes a sort
of a capability that night be developed in any one of the
g organizations, or parceled out among the existing
organizations, and unless these alternatives are considered
acted I don't see why the JIIRG should engage in
gazing on this point.
out the repor
Wound. Rare and elsewhere
t an essential ingredient is
overlooked,. The magnitude of the future imagery exploitation
effort is directly related to the amount of tams which are
required by the organizations that produce finished intelligence,
out, of course,, that ire types of imagery
Lon are becoming available, so there are a number
era that are involved. But if the customer doesnt
tap up to the door there aren't going to be any sales made.
Th* magnitude of the reconnaissance effort, for example,
might simply be to put film in the bank. Just because you
it doesn`t mean that you have to look at every bit of
act, any of it, I think here, and in a number
of places, the report might be strengthened by surmizing
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analyst and the people that produce in-
will want this kind of suupport, and that these are factors
25X1
isn't done, and I suspect that a good bit of the reason why
it isn't done is because the analyst doesn't appreciate it
and therefore doesn't ask for it. Until that changes, the
workload should not increase.
I have a little pro
with that prediction. First of all, the effort that has been
nducted so far bas provided a lot of base photography, etc.;
are well aware,, many things were done on a
basis because the management of the photography
in that area was not particularly good. With the establish-
atton of that area in general, I would anticipate
of the large Army facility there, and better management
a considerable improveme
the efficiency with which
film was both gathered and used *von though operations may
for quite some time. The prediction of a continuation
of chaos should be looked at rather eh
I would think.
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