ORR RESEARCH PROGRAM - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 9, 1998
Sequence Number: 
7
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 12, 1952
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1.pdf1.34 MB
Body: 
TF 1 Sanitized - Approved For ReleA-RDP75-00 031 X007-1 5!WY 111r"tt..T!9;' tor for Research and Reports 12 August 1952 Special Assistant to AD ch Program ? Summaz7 and Conclusions 1. On the basis of ORR experience for the past two years Task has shown the gaps in our econo do intelligence information and research methods and techniques, The 3-% and 3-52 series projects wars intended to fill these gaps, but failed to do so. Moreover, they have demonstrated the fallacy of an economic intelligence research program by popular electionn$ rather than centralized direction and control.. 2. On the positive side? basic principles which could serve as a framework for a cos rlete research program have been de eloped and are contained in the following ORR publications and projectst (a) The Role of !RR in Economic Intelligence - 1 August 1951 (b) sted Check List for C~ty and Industry Studies - 13 i (c) Standard Classification of Economic Activities - 18 July 1952 (d) 110-510, (e) is -65, as for -r of USSR and Satellites Potential 1952 - (f) Appraisal of Foreign ononic Intelligence Requirements ...,. t b A) oo tJLppend= 15 3, It is recoamonded that all Branches be assigned broad subjects (based on selections aired; indicated from the standard Classification of Economic Activities) in accordance with their respective substantive respo s3bilities, a '"on the broader aspects ther at, as a basis for working papers comprising basic srtudies. These are to be coapleted in a limited time, to be followed shortly thereafter by definitive reports on the same broad subjects. The guiding principles of these reports will be t h e suggested Check List for C i and 1BLustEZ Studies. As part of this over ,l p specific ranch projects may be g oposed by the Branches for publication. These should be carefully appraised and considered subordinate to the main research objectives. I. Projects 110-51 and RIB comprise methods and techniques for the development and application of the basic economic information and the relevance of the latter are shown to problems of national security. These projects can be ended in connection with other ite;,s and problems relating to cold and hot war, Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 S. About 40 high priority special projects, based on careful study and selection, of which sots than ow-gird relate directly to the soviet }slot, and which coiariee comprehensive problems relating to nationAl security have been developed in an ORR paper on Foreign Economic Intel Requirements (Appendix B to Tab A). These should be used as a point of departure in the selection of broad economic intelligence projects. 6. The paper on The Role of ORR in Economic Intelligence up clearly the general priap 'sus 7h rh co d7% Sam u ul in connection with all of the resaarcb Of ))RR. 25X1A9a Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For ReleasbL RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 Assistant Director for Research and Reports 12 August 1952 Special Assistant to the AD ONR Research Program 1. introduction The object of this report is the development and/or selection of certain basic principles to serve as a guide or framework, as well as a concrete basis,, for a research program for ORR following the completion of the 3--51 and 3-52 series in September. This group of projects was a follow-up of Task Force Is and together with the latter was the major sector of the ORR Research Program for 1951 and 1952. The conclusions and experience gained from these two programs rhicch will have taken the better part of two years for completion,, even if largely of a negative character) are most useful as a baekgrourr1 and perspective for future research programs, Those conncl~usions were presented in a mernrandua dated 8 May, up briefly here an they are not only pertinent to the conclusions in thiai report, but it is also desirable that we avoid some of their pitfal'is. On the more constructive and positive side in connection with the develop- ment of a new program, are the principles developed and seed up from various office papers and special projects. These will be discussed below in connection with the principal conclusion of the present memorandums that the application of these principles, if care- fully selected and properly appraised, should servo as a framework and basis for a sound economic intelligence program. Another report, to follow the present one, will be directed to a discussion, including tables, of the basic economic data,, which are the "building blocks" of our economic intelligence reports and estimates. This is done with a view to their improvement rather than criticism of our present estimates* 2. Task Forme I Task Faroe is designated as "an inventory of ignorance," served its purpose in this respect emphasising particularly the weak areas of knowledge in (1RR which, however, were already known to exist. They included sparseness of use patterns and input data, and lack of or deficiencies of consumption s9and regaireAte a..'-. S were also notable for the inclusion of large amounts of extrusoua irrelevant material of a text book and encyclopedic character. In addition, many of the contributions contained specific cases of unwarranted conclusions, and also in most casee, the analysts failed to disclose the methods and techniques employed to make the estimates. One of the principal positive contributions of Task Force Is in addition to an over-all review, was the excellent "Check List for Commodity and Industry Studies," which first appeared at that time in a preliminary way and lat6r was consolidated. Task Force III contributions to NIFO-33 were excellent as area studies of the Satellites. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For t4-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 3. 351 and 3-52 Seriex The principal purpose of the 3-51 and 3-52 series was to fill the gaps and remedy the deficiencise in Task Fore* I. With few excep- that in the majority of cases the analyst was allowed to be+ his judge of the gam and deficiencies in Task Force 11 also he was left free in general to chow his own subjects and the method of pursuing the sagas, This has resulted in the prograali, as a whole, cohesive, and the individual projects, especially' where they relate to specific subjects, are narrow in scope, are not of a definitive characters and in most cases lack critical aspects from the intelli- gence viewpoint. The lack of coordination and proper research direction of the program as a whole is highly evident in the result. Finally,, the sound principles developed in the office papers (referred to beelo) as a framework and guide to our basic research in economic intalli were largely overlooked in the 3-51 and 3-52 series program. 4. Sealeection and &ppraa-isal of Priac as a Guide and Framework .? _... _......_... ~..........~..~....... ,..,......... . or arrhiroems It is one of the most important conclusions of the 9vesra t memorandum that within the four corners of the following docualeent9 and projects (sad the extension thereof) will be found the basis of a sound framework for our research generally as well as for a concrete research program which will serve the requirements for foreign economic "The Role of ORR in Economic Intelligent.," 1 August 1,951 b. "Standard Classification of Economic Activities" (and previous indctstrial classifications,) 18 July 1952 c. "S ~sted Check List for Community and Indus 13 December 11951 d. 3,10-A. "Economic Capabilities for War of tom, and its Satellites" NI8-65.. "Soviet war Potential 1152--1957" to "Appraisal of Foreign Economic Intelligence Requireem ' All of the requirements for a good research program are __ _ _., -- forth in the above references, although they require selection and * Son* impaertant perinciples, e. g. balawo of Supplies against requirements and the determination of conraumfaetion and use patterns involved in these later papers and projects, have been developed in essence in reports made, as far back an 19!39 (an 239, spotrolen in the MMO and Sanitized - Approved P75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For 1ti? A-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 integrations Another problem for their implementation is a fug. a iei' s tandimg and acceptance of tom, and of their applications by all concerned in OM. The brief discussions below are intended to indicate the bearing which each may have on th* proposed general r ch progra From this a framework may be developed and specific research projects set up as desired. 5. The Rol s o Oi in Economic The main problem with which ORR is concerned are those foreign economic problems relating to national sec economic capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet Bloc. Some of the criteria inrolved are as follows e ?(l) to estimate t h e magnitude, of possible present or future military or other threats ourselves and a w allies . (2) to estimate the character and location of possible present or future military or Oth sate . . . to assist us in estimating, within the range of the poesible, the intontiaa3 the USSR or any other potential amor . .. (}4) to he4 makers decide that we can do to reduce pnsibl* or probable military or other threats by inp 1 as enemy s economic capabilities to carry them out . . . (5) to assist in estimating the probable development of the relative strength* of the Bast and the West over the next fear ,y"9' ~s if global hostilities are avoided." Some of the important factors developed in the report as a guide to the special problem involved in ORRrss research are shomm belowt The difference begin economic intelligence and infcer- nation, i.e. the latter does not become economic intelligence its relevance to national security is made clear; also that a measuring rod must be devised to add up In J_neommeasurablesv and unlikas things and activities to an Index of capabilities. It is also a hasi zed that the foundations of our knowledge tit be improved to give better and quicker aura in response to day-fir day pressures on the question of determining basic research priorities. The bottleneck *fallacy* is eliminated as factor in the research program. ' reelevas a to toearrowts needs Mt be f amsm of the basic research selected f or our effoarta. The principle of selection or stressing of any particular subject to the exclusion of other necessary subjects, particularly fro a long-razes viewpoints in discarded on the bad that for a proper study to be made exclusively of a subject, e.g. , such. as requirements, techniques and methods of production,, etc., could conceivably utilize the energies of the entire staff of Sanitized - Approve eTAm-RDP75-00662ROO0300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For Re ease 'CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 (a) The need for more stud of organization s and (b) The need for more systematic study of Soviet military intentions as rerseea2.d in scono .c events (c) need for more study of the reIatior among itzdnstri*s (d) The need for More study of the eco ments of military operatic (e) The need for more study of particular ituastries, commodities, and services (f) The ned for more study of Soviet industry (g) The need for more study of the ependan (h) The need for more s problem. 6. Suited Check List for Cannodi and This check list is a carefully worked out study of the kind of inf c coati x it has been f cnmd reicessary to fully describe a particular commodity or industry in order to understand its relatiahip to the econou as a whole. In addition to a very brief introduction wits On the question of specific problem it is pointed out t in a study of current problem in foreign ecenno,#n iat?Ui bey for the National Sscwit yr Couxt . a very incomPlat aas yielded a list of 42 top priority probla ., This list is reviewed below with rogerd to those *iich id t have special interest in connection with the present program... Sanitized - Approved For RPlPaca -o^IA o^P75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For Rel regard to histry, location, ox industry, the study should also inc a. Production facilities and convertible) -RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 b. Supplies including outputs and production ccitiest stockpiles, inv entarioe? reserves c. Inputs and input requirements d. Use pattern and use requirements, su The techniques and methods eamploydd in arriving at be clearly stated in the appendix. 7. Standard Classification Industrial ssf`.~'"..??.. The detailed classification of economic activities furnishes a complete basis for the selection of those comsodities and industries with which CM is concerned. The present standard classification dated 18 July 1952 is an .argement, and develo t of the report of 18 April 1952. The most recent report co teizas about 500 itearae divisions and subdivisions of the following princip . activities med according to the table of contents a. Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing b. Vining and Quarrying c. Uenvfacturing d. (1) Basic Metal Products (2) Machinery (3) Transportation Equipment Construction Electricity, gas, waterr, and sanitary services f. Cie g. Transport, storage and communication h. Sexes i. Military item The above divisions are arbi careful selection must be made from the total of 5DO items practical as the basis of a research program. This sect .~ based on any one of a number of breakdoas al=ly mom, for according to the office maasarandun of 20 y 19, Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For R y , ,~ , -RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 zation of I)conc is Divisions, 010t,06 or according items resulting from the collapsing of subdivisions to fit bilities of the orr trnization by di ions, br , and which the writer drew up about the same date. The coati: here is that'there is a basis for an immediate point this reep.ct. 8. General Research Pry o Rwommendatioli From all of the foregoing we can clearly derive a proper approach to our major research activity nam*y the ce nation of basic data on a variety of industries, with respect to the Soviet Bloc. This activity must be a continuing process on a current basis,, as well as for the past and future by projection. f*z organization as well as its pens ll is set up pzim r ily at present to accomplish this objective. In fact,, these data are its primary product and. a]i. of its final products depend on this klixi of intelligence information. Efficiency and accuracy in the handling of special pro, the response to the day-by-day pressures for which MR depend upon improvement in the foundation of our information. It has been demonstrated that the 3-a and 3-52 series, in gensrral* do not accomplish this purpose. Hance# it is recommaded that each branch and/or section be assigned the job of c limited time) a working pier cowering s scope of their responsibilities and fields of intereit. The a follow the principles elucidated in section 5# 6, and "1 report and siialfl take advantage of the criticism directs against tF* 3-.51 series, particularly, and any other questions raised in the preceding vections.e After completion the working paper is to be u set as a basis for a definitive report which will also fallow the princj , ss shown in the check list for commodity and industry a tudises ( ction 6 of this r sport) and in a~e nee will be a carefully edited (from both the substanti*e and *sema"tic* vie ts) cut,-down version of the working paper. A limited time will likewise be set on the de+-f initivr report which, why completed,, will be published as a formal re Special Wicautione should be WOW to aaoi4 "window tarimrdng* particularly in the historical and sections of the working paps 's and to include a search based on, e.g. Soviet publications. (and Scterna1 Research venerally), and the results of the Basic Intel full explanation of the basis of selection of the path leading to the official, estimate. 25X1A5a1 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For a g t. dIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 _7w 9 . Roc tf oas for SpocW_ '. Research cb Pro- cts ORR already has ua-y a group of special projects which are in lice-with correct procedures and objectives of our research off arts as outlined above. Zz ples of those are 11441 an ' --65, which were requested by the Joint dnisi'e and the motion. Board of Estimate respsctive4. Extensions-of these projects and similar oft will be necessary as outlined below, and they should also be included in the program, In the developnareut of a program involving special projects, the iroblsm is oft of =rrov zag down the selection the than in "dreaming u6l new projects, As has already been pointed out under section s on the question of specific problem, a study of current problems in foreign economic intelligence by O RR .for the National Security Coup yielded a list of 42 top priority problems from "a very incomplete aampIa." These problem which wore carefully drawn-up, as well as other problem previously considered should be revieved as part of the prose-it program, particularly a section bearing directly on the Soviet Bloc. A review should also be wine of the proposed program of the Board of National Estimates (*.go 22 April 1952) and its critique of its toss can the Wit, 13 February 192. Gonferre ,ce3 should be held on a continuing basis with the National Board of Estimates as well as with the C, IAC, and other groups which originate intelligence projects and requests so that have the besnetit of their thinking in our o field of economic intelligence to assist us in developing our own top priority problems, The following is a brief revise of some individual questions raised in section 9 to develop the relationship of the" questions to a research program for the immediate future. 1G, ial Pecta in ?rooess * ch Bear Direct x on Fe oseci Research egraa a. 1113--5i, "Eco is Capabilities o the Soviet Bloc to Support a General Jar" This is an extensive project covering the near i; sis of a large number of econ.c sectors in Irhich an attempt bag been to follow the suggested check list for c ty and industry studios. The complete outline of the study is givers in a oarandus dated 3 Dooember 1951. Because of the lack of basic economic information of the Id ad referred to under section 8, it has been necessary to develop this inf ormati.on especially for this project; axed c. tpletion of the first pb se of has consequently been delayed and postponed. In additioi t c pressures on the various analysts in connection with obtaining the required information on time has resulted in some questionable estimates, particularly on inputs and requirements. These deficiencies corm, in due course, be subjected to the principle *of sucasssivs approximations" to improve them. Despite these defects the project will represent a marked advance in the art; and the project represents the type of research that should be continued by R. Sanitized - Approved For "DP75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For Ruse : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 The cold war aspects of the project, which required about one year, will be completed shortly. After this is coiVleted the hot war estimates will be made. The principles of 1151 should be extended for both ciald and hot war to include other co oditi es and industries, e.g. Ferro-alloye, such as molybdenum, vanadium, tungsten, cobalt? nickel, and cbrom i um; xplo .ves such as Tffp Picric acid, Anatol, RDX, single and doable base propel ts; aoditiona2 non-ferrous metals ouch as z, lead and fix; precision and scientific instruc is and special equipment and machinery (other than moue tools., which is already included); atomic energy, raw materials as well as others,,* b. NI"5, #Sovio t War Potential V52-19,578 T is project involves a spacial index techniq f or combining heteroganeous items into a common expression far each component in the same ts- s. The product will consist of a time series of physical output levels frost 1927 to date and will be projected to 1957. Output estimates for various products will be combined into a total which will represent output and rate of growth for an industry as a sector or as a wholes for example,, individual non-ferrous metals (such as copper,, lead, zinc, tin and aluminum) and in combinabiun wit each, other to form a oup sector. These may then be combined with other groups or sectors such as iron, and steel and the Ferro-alloys to form larg It is obvious that this techniques while it may have certain l im tation*, may also be applicable to r3aW other large sectors; perhaps ` as an 'ad" (even if in appr ox.i mate f wz only) of the entire econoeay. The techuiqua, therefore,, be the basis alone or in combination with others of continuing research'ojects in a now program. e and ethers in the present proram were included in a project which was similar to I&-lul designated as the Munitions Bo rd Project entitled, #Soviet Production, Requirements, Purchases, Imports, etc6 . of Selected CQmmoditdee,# 19 lhw and 20 June 1950. The principle of balancing supplies against consamtion and requirements, and that of inputs, was also included in these projects. Ilk-3.31 was published. The Munitions Board Project was interrupted by the reorganization in 1950. The technique involves multiplying each physical output satiate by the permanent price of ile product, thus obtaining output estimates in value terms. The separate arithmetic products are then summed uda to obtain a value estimate of production for the industry as a whole. Usually the c rarisons are made in term of a percentage of a baser period; hence, the term index number. By projecting t iiis tce forwar production estimates for future years can be presented. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For ReI 9-RD P75-00662R000300130007-1 U. Other Sp Pro ecfis a. Appendix B to Tab A, Foreign Economic Require nte, etc. This paper developed in Olt after considerable thought and study amts f arth s ass 40 top priority projects Of foreign economic inteIlli.gence lowing a direct bearing on national amity'. At the outset it ehasi that first priority should be gig to economic analysis in support of policies relating to the conflict between the Soviet and .nor-Soviet worlds and requires in tellif nce relating to the capabilities, the Viabilities,, and the intentions ,or probable courses of actions (1) the USSR and its Satellites (including China); (2) the ; ri cipal European and Asiatic allies of the United States; and (3) a band of countries on the fringe of the iron curtain not now clearly in eitber c r, but potentially contributing to the strength of one or the other.* it one is to choose priorities among priorities in carder to limit the problem to a practical scope it is obvious that section B (of Appendix B to Tab A) of this r sport is most significant being limited to: "Economic Analysis Relating to Lim USSR and Satellites." The examples of high priority economic intelligence projects in this section have been selected as most pertinent to our present interests and are sh* n in Appendix A of this report. A further concantra- tion of this group bye tia~n of those of lesser priority,: or combinations within its would provide an exeellat SPacific research program in addition to the sectors of the proposed general program discussed above. b. Miscellaneous Projects As emphasized in the foregoing discascion the problems of a research program at present, particularly on specific projects, in mainly one of selection rather than of origination. For o, if one were to consider additional projects sow such as the following might be taken "out of the hat" s (1) The Separate and Combined Effects of the Overrunning of Various Areas by the Soviets; (2) various facets, in the important study of "Conversion and Rearmament" such as place, timing and ptWasing in the conversion from cold to hot war; (3) The Long,--fie Impact of Soviet Develop- ment and Technology on Soviet Military and Economic Capabilities; (I) he Decentralization of Indd try in the IZM,; (5) 111, ruinge Impact of Coamaauuis n on Soviet Military, and Econ bilities; (6) A Study of Soviet Planning (particularly the 1 Detailed Pin) in Relation to uali.tative and. quantitative Aspect of Soviet Iredustary; (7) A Map Study of Soviet Industrial. Capabilities and Vulnerabilities; (8) Expansion of UO$i to the whole Indust aa1 * It also re to resources in the rest of the sold, e. G. Africa, Latin America, etc. which may contribute significantly to the strength of either center of power. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For Relsil "IDP75-00662R000300130007-1 I Classification, etc. Obvio sl ', the list of probl r (which are undo-&Ied y :i t r. t) could be expar +d i c. i ra ch P'oJecto* As a matter o policy all :Lldivridua) ) s haul II be i v:idual re earch project.. Ia vr, if sue pr-or r:ay U?~1eotc c UAqy cool i 1Tu d al t by do ini in the warking papers and in the definitive reports t ovo. ';'Us tioa resolve-,! iLst l one of separsi,4 p'ablication o the proposed specific sabj which in special caste V have merit. .V oc1 ctiorn of thdi' tg*ta projects chow,. k cvar', ta;c Liao acecua- ha a. Whole, ibi Z as afro ` aaipha i d s` auld be c coxitrol.led. ar l direct Wo ar a ~ in objuctive results. 25X1A9a # Al des od diversified branch projects which co, gated with profit (an the basis of a substantial bearing the Soviet scone) a list of specific projects deal ng of about 5 subdivisions each was developed and reported by in parch 1950 goo Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized -Appruveu ase : UAITUP"- 662R000300130007-1 Appendix A Us= far the Executive Secretary, h : sub3ectt 'Appraisal of ?orei Economic Intelligence Requirements, FeeiUties and Ar~rangemo is to National Security dated 31 1951s May CIA 4M74., Appendix B to Tab A Be 'Ecox ,mi c 4s*es Re lato the USSR and its atollites a ' les of high priority economic intelligence projects are follows: puree aaad t the United Stat4s aneutralal a. Irlartims Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to Meet Essential cis and Military Requirements for Selected Critical Items (e.g., electronics equipment, copper, aviation fuels special machine tools, f ergo-al toy ng precision instxumente, natural rubber, etc.) b. "Economic Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to Develop and Produce Selected Military Items (e.g. atomic weapons, guided m i.ssiles, germ warfare agents, radar, long-range jet bombers, tanks, sub arines, et-c. ) c. 'Effect on Soviet Economic capabilities for Prolonged s v , V Yt41i pp a) Western Europe, b) the Middle East, c) Ja rs d) Southeast Asia d. ''Over-all Economic Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc a W ho]e Simultaneously to Conduct Specified Rili.tary and Maintain Essential Civilian and Iilitary Production e. 'Effect of the Korean Controls on the Catpabilities of the Chinese Econ r and Without Soviet Assistance* f. 'economic capability of the European Satellites Unassisted by the USSR to Wage War on Yugoslavia: Requir G. "C zl hies of th'io Soviet Bloc to Wage Eco Against Non-,Soviet Rations Saniti RUMIge---M-A-RDP75-00662ROO0300130007-1 of the economic capabilities of the USSR and its Sanitized - - 0662R000300130007-1 2. *Analysis of the economic vulnerability of t its Satel l3 messuonoed c wa~rf are kyalao a .1! s arts c ca; a. "vulnerability of the Soviet and Satellite Economi Including China's, to Strategic Bombing with particular to Their vulnerability to Ambomb Attack b. "vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc as a oleo to ; estern Program of Economic artare. Relative Vulnerability to Various Measures- Overt and Covert. ~' c. INy ability of the Chinese Ec nog yr Controls an a) Exportes to CBS (b) Shipping d. "vulnerability of the Soviet and Satellite Economies to a Program of Induced Defection of TAW Technical Personnel "e. "Vulnerability of the. Sovi? t and Satellite Food to Biological. Warfare upply 3. "Anal sis of economic indications of robabl~ Soviet and satell,iet and a. "Economic Activity Within the USSR and Its Satellites Which Might Reveal Their Intention to Resort to Military Action b. "atterna of Allocation of Economic Resources Productionrof Military Items Within the Soviet Bloc Which I Reveal the Kirvi of Military Operations Contemplate d co "Cournos of Action Like].,; to be Taken Response to an Effective Western Program of Export Control d. "Soviet Economic Measures With Respect to C Might Reveal the Extent of the Political, and Be of These Countries e.. "Evidence Which. Might Suggest What Air Target Systems they Soviets Auld be Likely to Adopt for Western op e- Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007-1 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-0092R000300130007-1 OFFICE Gi R.1 SI ARC:I A; . TETOR a, R po to Division 29 Aug t11951 x-0joet X51 (T.F. I) Rapers To Bs Issued as Provisional P.mpo.rts Sulp1ua c Acid Coke Chemicals Caustic Soda and Chlorine T.nduetriGs `$rnth tic Ammonia industry Gain and Grain Products A' amino Copper Industry :Lad Industry "'in Industry Zinc I. id try Coal ZQ Bail Txw_srorwW.ou Inland tutor : a part Highway Tr port PHLelines I: .lway Gauge Dtf'foential and tbn 1 nsic tiding Facilittios of the Wastarn S4viot antier l!~rc ':ant Shipping psr Production in tho is F ,j,rilat en and ut: r Dly Machinc3 Tool Industry Electron Tube Industry . n''i r fiction Bert ng's _-U-6 i on ,y an Initial solo-c- on, ;?c wi 1ik Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300130007~'1