THE LENINIST HERITAGE

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• Publication Date: November 1, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE LENINIST HERITAGE
November 1956
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THE LENINIST HERITAGE
Contents
INTRODUCTION
1. Opportunism and Force--Basic Elements of Leninism page 1
A. The Struggle: Morals, Means and Ends 1
B. War and Violence 4
C. Divide and Conquer 9
II. The Tactics of Opportunism 11
Ao Permanence of Doctrine, Flexibility of Tactics 11
B. Strategy and Tactics 12
C Alliances and Compromises 14
III. Rejection and Betrayal of Democratic Processes 19
A. Revolution and Evolution 19
B. Evolution and Reform 20
Co Voting and Democracy 22
D, Tactics Toward Democratic Institutions 24
E. The Constituent Assembly 27
IV. The Party is All 31
A. Party Organization and Discipline 31
B. Dictatorship of the Proletariat 33
C. Party Control over Government, Trade Unions, Press 34
D. Non-Communist Parties in the Soviet State 36
V . Nationalism -and Self-Determination 39
VI. Inevitability of Conflict Between the Communist and
Non-Communist Worlds 41
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A. The Dialectic:
No Third Force page 41
B. World Revolution
41
BIBLIOGRAPHY
45
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THE LENINIST HERITAGE
INTRODUCTION
Since Stalin's death in March 1953, references to Lenin
and. Leninism have multiplied, in the Soviet press and. in public
pronouncements of the Soviet leadership. With the downgrading
of Stalin, Lenin has become the object of a new veritable "cult
of the ind.ivid.ual," and Leninism has become increasingly the
body of unquestioned, doctrine accepted, expounded., and. propa-
gated. by Moscow..
It may be well, under these circumstances, to examine
Leninism--as shown in the writings and statements of Lenin
himself--so as to understand. some of the salient features of
what the present Soviet leadership accepts its ideological,
moral, and, political heritage to be.
I. Opportunism and Force--Basic Elements of Leninism
A. The Struggle: Morals, Means and Ends
The primacy of the "class struggle," as defined and inter-
preted. by Lenin, made every other consideration subordinate.
Moreover, the accepted concepts of morality and, decency, not
infrequently, were described, as part of the superstructure
growing out of the capitalist (bourgeois) economic and social
system, phenomena which, therefore, had no lasting, intrinsic,
respectable justification. As Lenin explained. in 1921, in
addressing a congress of Communist youth:
In what sense do we repudiate ethics and. morality?
In the sense that they were preached by the bour-
geoisie who declared that ethics were God.'s com-
mandments ... or they deduced. them from idealistic
or semi-idealistic phrases. ? , We repudiate all
morality. that is taken outside of human, class
concepts ... we say that our morality is entirely
subordinated, to the interests of the class struggle
of the proletariat. Our morality is deduced, from
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the class struggle of the proletariat. We say.-
morality is that which serves to destroy the old
exploiting society. and to unite all the toilers
around the proletariat.... Communist morality is
the morality which serves this struggle. (SW,
IX, 475-479.)
This outlook was shown by Lenin as early as 1902, when he
argued that "there are historical wrongs and historical wrongs,"
Scme deserve restitution and correction; others, on the contrary,
are conducive to the creation of a crisis, of a situation in
which the revolutionary proletariat, as defined by Lenin, would
have a better, a more powerful position to strike a blow against
its foes.
We do not justify our demand by whimpering over a
historical wrong, but by insisting on the necessity
a,o of clearing the road for the class struggle ....
We have in this case a different kind of historical
wrong, a wrong which directly retards 00o the class
struggle. (SW, II, 315.)
The same rejection of traditional morality implied likewise
a rejection of tolerance for the heterodox. As Lenin wrote,
again as early as 1902, even before his own political organiza-
t on had taken shape:
Is there a single drop of political sense in the
demand to make the political struggle flabby for
the sake of producing what your enemies call.
tolerance?
Lenin answered this question in the negative, (L (4), VI, 232.)
The revolutionary cause must take advantage of hardships as well
as of other opportunities. In 1917, for instance, Lenin felt
jubilant for the people are now very close to desperation, and
victory is assured to us." (Handbook, 802.) What one said in
the meanwhile was of little consequence as a matter of principle,
even if it mattered much in the way of propaganda. Lenin liked
to quote in the English original a favorite proverb of his:
"Promises are like pie crust -- made to be broken." (Wolfe, 281.
When the editorial staff of Iskra the Russian Socialist
organ, slipped from Lenin?s control into the hands of his -
opponents, he was to write, in May 1904:
The old Iskra taught the verities of revolutionary
struggle. The new Iskra teaches all sorts of every
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day wisdom: how to yield and how to get along. The
old Iskra was an organ of militant orthodoxy. The
new Iskra offers us the hiccups of opportunism. (L
(4), VII3382--383,)
Epithets such as opportunism, petty bourgeois mentality,
and philistinism abound in Lenin's accusations against foes
and rivals who adhered to principles he saw no compunction to
share. In the middle of July 1917, Lenin wrote:
It would be a deep error to think that the revolutionary
proletariat is capable of refusing to support the
Social-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks out of "re-
venge for their action in raiding the Bolsheviks,
in shooting down soldiers at the front and in dis-
arming the workers. Such a statement of the question
would mean to ascribe to the proletariat philistine
conceptions of morality ("for the good of the cause"
the proletariat will support not only the petty bour-
geoisie but also the big bourgeoisie); second, and
this is the main thing, it would mean to substitute
philistine moralizing for an analysis of the political
essence of the matter. ("on Slogans," CW, XXI, Part 1,
45.)
And the following year, in addressing the Moscow Party officials,
Lenin reiterated his willingness tactically to cooperate with
the Russian "petty bourgeoisie," so long as this was necessary:
"That you are flabby we never doubted, But that we need you we
do not deny." (CW, XXIII, 336.)
In the same vein there was no sanctity in formalities or
treaties. During the debate on war and peace in 1918, Lenin
declared:
In war never tie your hands with considerations of
formality. It is ridiculous not to know the history
of war, not to know that a treaty is the means of
gaining strength .,. the history of war shows as
clearly as clear can be that the signing of a treaty
after defeat.is a means of gaining strength, (SW, VII
309.)
And when a few months later he was accused of failure to respect
his foreign obligations, Lenin replied frankly: "Yes, of course,
we are violating the treaty; we have violated it thirty or
forty times." (SW, VII, 300-301.)
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Under the circumstances, it was axiomatic that any means
were permissible for the attainment of a goal, As early as
1899 Lenin maintained that his program "speaks of the seizure
of political power, without specifying the means of that con-
quest, for the choice of these means depends on the future,
which cannot be predicted precisely in advance," (L, (4), IV5 2540)
And in 1902 he wrote in his newspapers that the "working class
would not in fact be revolutionary, were it not to take advan-
tage of every occasion to inflict a new blow upon its enemy."
(L (4), VI5 138.)
In other words, any means was permissible, as he was to
state in connection with the debate on the trade union question:
We must be able to withstand everything, to agree to
all and every sacrifice, and even if need be to resort
to various strategems, artifices, illegal methods, ev-
asion and subterfuges, only so as to get into the trade
unions, to remain in them, and to carry on Communist
work in them at all costs. (SW (1951), II, Part 2
3780)
B. War and Violence
We know that the transition from capitalism to
socialism involves an extremely difficult struggle.
But we are prepared ... to make a thousand at-
tempts; and having made a thousand attempts we
shall go on to the next attempt. (Speech, June 4
1918, CW, XXIII, 700
Lenin's insistence to fight and fight again was perpetual:
We shall act as we did in the Red Army: they may
beat us a hundred times, but the hundred and first
time we shall. beat them all. (Speech, December 22
1920, SW, IX, 255.)
The necessity as well as the primacy of the struggle was
never in doubt in Lenin's mind. A concomitant of his black-
white perception, which permitted of no intermediate shadings
or colors, which rejected anything but an either-or approach,
was the acceptance of violence and force as inevitable, in-
herent in the historical process, and insuperable and legi-
timate at the same time, "We shall tell the radical bour-
geois: you, gentlemen, chatter about the organ of popular power.
Power can only be force," (L (4), X, 52,) Such force was in
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evitably involved in the attainment of domestic and foreign
objectives. In both instances, at home and abroad, the basic
conflict was between communism and capitalism:
Until the final issue Zb-etween capitalism and com-
rnunisra7
is decided, the state of awful war will
continue. (Speech at the Third Congress of the
Comintern, July 5 1921, SW, IX, 242.)
During the First World War Lenin launched the slogan of "con-
verting the Imperialist War into Civil War" in all countries.
It was in line with this slogan that he wrote:
All consistent class struggle in time of war, all
mass action earnestly conducted must inevitably
lead to this producing civil wag. We cannot
know whether in the first or in the second Imper-
ialist War between the great nations, whether during
or after it, a strong revolutionary movement will
flare up. Whatever the case may be, it is our
absolute duty systematically and unflinchingly to
work in that particular direction. (Handbook, 683.)
The use of force was axiomatic as far as the struggle with-
in Russia was concerned. In a pamphlet in March 1906, Lenin
affirmed:
Without duress with regard to the users of duress,
who have in their hands the arms and organs of
power, the people cannot be freed from their en-
slavers. (L (4), X, 219.)
Again he reiterated on a variety of occasions: "Great questions
in the life of nations are settled only by force." ("Two tactics
of Social Democracy," SW, III, 126.) 'It is well known that in
the long run the problems of social life are decided by ,
civil war (Article, August 17 1917, CW,. XXI, Part 1, 69.)
"The devotees of 'consistent democracy' .. imagine that serious
political questions can be decided by voting. As a matter of
fact, such questions are decided by civil war." (Article, Dec-
ember 1919, SW, VI, 477.)
During the revolution of 1905, Lenin affirmed that both a
revolutionary government and a revolutionary army weren't needed:.
A revolutionary army is necessary for the military
struggle and for the military guidance of the pop-
ular masses against the remnants of the military
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forces of autocracy. A revolutionary army is nec-
essary because only by force can great historical
.)
questions be solved. (-L77., VIII, 527
This remained his view to the end of his days, even though oc-
casionally, for reasons of utility and propaganda, Lenin felt it
necessary to deny his support of civil war -- as exemplified above
and to insist, as he did in May 1917:
Is there anything more absurd and ridiculous It than
this fairytale about our "fanning civil war, when
we have declared in the clearest, most formal and
unequivocal language that the main burden of our
work is the patient explaining of proletarian policy
as opposed to petty bourgeois, defensive obsession
of faith in capitalism? (Pravda, May 5 1917, CW,
XX, Book 1, 251.)
The willingness to resort to means of force against the
hostile government included, of course, a disregard for law and
legality.
These Social-Democratic Parties ... must do away
with a servile attitude towards legalism. ("Soc-
ialism and the War," Handbook, 685.)
In 1920, being in power, Lenin could advise his comrades abroad
with regard to the prosecution of their work:
It is necessary immediately for all legal Communist
Parties to form illegal organizations for the pur-
pose of systematically carrying on illegal work,
and of fully preparing for the moment when the bour=
geoisie resorts to persecution. Illegal work is par-
ticularly necessary in the army, the navy and police ....
("Theses on Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of
the Communist International," SW, X, 172-173.)
In similar fashion the basic attitudes towards violence
sanctioned the use of terror by the Soviet once
was in power, as well as morally allowed the app
terror in the conquest of power -- regardless of whether or not
under specific circumstances such application of terror was de-
sirable or not:
We must crush them the capitalists7 in order to free
humanity from wage-slavery; their resistance must be
broken by force; it is clear that where there is sup-
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pression there is also violence, there is no freedom,
no democracy. ("State and Revolution," 1917, SW, VII,
810)
As early as 1899.Lenin wrote in a project for the Party's
program that
In our personal view terror is at present not a useful
means of struggle. The Party, as a Party, must turn
it down (until a change of circumstances which might
require a change of tactics), (L (4), IV, 2180)
Again in 1901 he argued that
In principle we never declined and can never decline
the use of terror, It is a military means, which
may be entirely useful and even necessary at a certain
moment of battle, under certain conditions of the
troops and under certain circumstances, But ... in
view of the absence of central revolutionary organ-
izations and the weakness of local revolutionary
organizations,,,, we decidedly declare such a means
of action to be untimely, inappropriate, disor anizing
at the present time. (Article, May 1901, L (4),V, 7.)
That in principle his view had not changed was confirmed in
a letter he wrote in October 191.60
"Killing is no murder,." our old Iskra used to write
about attempts at assassination-. we are not at all
against political murders; but 000 as revolutionary
tactics individual assassinations are harmful. (L (4),
XXXV, 191.)
And years after he had seized power, Lenin still maintained
with regard to criticism of Bolshevik failure to observe
provisions in their own constitution for the Soviet Republic,
When we hear such declarations, coming from people
allegedly in sympathy with us, we say, "Yes,
terror by the Cheka is absolutely necessary.
(Schapiro, 1980)
The use of force was equally sanctioned and accepted in
regard to foreign affairs, As Lenin wrote in the spring of
19050
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Wars are inevitable so long as society is divided
into classes, so long as exploitation of man by
man exists. And for the destruction of this
exploitation we shall not be able to do without
a war ,,,. There are wars that are adventurous.
There are other wars ,o, against the enslavers
of the people. Only utopians and philistines
can refuse to fight such a war on principle.
(L (4), VIII, 5290)
This remained an immutable conviction of Lenin, and as late
as December 1920 he insisted that history "teaches us that not
a. single big question has been settled and not a single revol-
ution accomplished without a series of wars." (SW, IX, 255;
L (3), XXIV, 12.) The political prospect of co-existence was
therefore rejected most firmly:
,oo the existence of the Soviet Republic side by
side with imperialist states for a long time is
unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the
end. And before that end supervenes, a series of
frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic
and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.
(Speech at the Eighth Party Congress, March 1:8, 1919,
SW, VIII, 330)
Time and again Lenin tried to explain that "the peace
slogan is in my judgment incorrect." He describes it as
A philistine, a preacher's slogan. The proletarian
slogan must be civil war. (CW, XVIII, 750)
To deny that war was a legitimate means is "philistine, pro-
vincial, small-state pacifism. It is un-Marxist0 One must
fight it," (L (4), XXXV, 155.)
Actually under many circumstances Lenin welcomed war, Just
as he applauded in 1914-15 when the First World War was, in his
mind, likely to increase the crises within the capitalist states,
so a year earlier, in 1913, he had written to Gorky about his
hopes of a Balkan war, which would precipitate revolution.
A war between Austria and Russia would be very
useful for the cause of the Revolution (in all
of Eastern Europe), but it is not very probable
that Francis Joseph and Nicholas will give us
this pleasure, (L (4), XXXV, 48,)
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Lenin, and after him his various followers, including
Stalin and Khrushchev, henceforth divided all wars into just
and unjust conflicts.
We are opposed to imperialist wars over the division
of spoils among the capitalists, but we have always
considered it absurd for the revolutionary prole-
tariat to disavow revolutionary wars that may prove
necessary in the interests of socialism. (Article,
April 8, 1917, CW, XX, Book 1, 85,)
C. Divide and Conquer
Theory as well as observation led Lenin to maintain that
his "class enemies" were bound to differ and split among them-
selves, and that such differences must be taken advantage of,
such splits incited and "sharpened" in the interests of his
cause.
The more powerful enemy can be conquered only
by exerting the utmost effort, and by necessarily,
thoroughly, carefully, attentively, skillfully taking
advantage of every, even the smallest, rift among
the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among
the bourgeoisie of various countries, and among
countries, and among various groups or types of
bourgeoisie within the various countries; by
taking advantage of every, even the smallest,
opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though
this ally may only be temporary, vacillating,
unstable, unreliable, or conditional. Those who
do not understand this do not understand a par-
ticle of Marxism, they understand nothing of
scientific modern socialism in general. (SW, X, 112.)
This injunction to take advantage of splits applied equally
within one country and among different countries. In 1920,
Lenin required of the Party that it
Accelerate the inevitable friction, quarrels,
conflicts, the complete dissension between the
Hendersons, the Lloyd Georges and the Churchills
(the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries, the
Kadets and Monarchists, the Bourgeoisie and the
Kapp people, etc.) and select the moment of great-
est conflict between all the "pillars of sacred
private property" in order to defeat them all ...
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and to seize power. ("Left-wing Communism, an
Infantile Disorder," Leites, 397.)
On an international level, "the practical task of Communist
policy is ... to incite one power against the other
We Communists must use one county against another." (Speech,
November 26, 1920, SW, VIII, 28)4,)
Thus at the end of 1920, Lenin told a group of Party officials:
America o,o is being more and more hated
All bourgeois literature testifies to a growing
hatred of America,,,, Thus we have before us the
greatest state in the world ... which is encountering
the growing enmity of the other capitalist countries.
America cannot come to terms with Europe: that is a
fact proved by history. (SW, VIII, 289.)
Further splits were considered axiomatic. "We must know how
to take advantage of the antagonisms.; and contradictions existing
among the imperialists. Had we not adhered to this rule, ever
one of us would have long ago been hanging from an aspen trees
This mandate remained valid "as long as we have not conquered
the whole world, as long as, from the economic and military
standpoint, we are weaker than the capitalist world." (SW, VIII,
2'(9-28o.)
When Russia found herself caught between different groups
of hostile powers, Lenin repeated his formula of "dividing and
conquering":
We are at present between two foes. If we are
unable to defeat them both, we must know how to
dispose our forces in such a way that they fall
out among themselves; because as is always the
case when thieves fall out, honest men come into
their own. But as soon as we are strong enough
to defeat capitalism as a whole, we shall im-
mediately take it by the scruff of the neck....
(Speech, November 26, 1920, SW, VIII, 282.)
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II. The Tactics of Opportunism
A. Permanence of Doctrines Flexibility of Tactics
A key to the application of Leninism is contained in Lenin's
repeated injunctions that the basic body of :Marxist thought, as
interpreted by Lenin, provides an infallible, immutable, complete,
and scientific answer and guide to action. A.t the same time, it
permits of complete flexibility in tactics, allowing for the use
of "any" means for the attainment of the rigid, permanently
defined, and inevitably successful end.
In January 1919, speaking before the Executive Committee
of the Congress of Soviets, Lenin confirmed that
..o we do have to. retreat from our policy now and
again; but from our policy as a whole we do not
retreat. or depart. (L CW, XXIII, 488.)
In his argument against the so-called left-wing deviation within
his Party, Lenin reaffirmed that
One must combine with the greatest fidelity to the
idea of Communism the capacity to enter into all
necessary, practical compromises ... to make agree-
ments. Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Dis-
order," Leites, p. 527.)
As Lenin put it on another occasion, and was cited as
authority at the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow in February
1956--
We have also learned -- at least we have to a certain
extent-learned -- another art essential in the revol-
ution: flexibility, the ability to change our tactics
sharply and rapidly, bearing in mind changed objective
conditions, choosing another path to our aim if the
previous path has turned out to be inexpedient at a
given period. (L (3), XXVII, 29.)
This notion was deeply imbedded in Lenin's entire approach. As
early as 1897, in exile, Lenin wrote in discussing the "Tasks of
the Russian Social-Democrats,,"
No practical alliances with other factions of revol-
utionaries can or may lead to compromises or con-
cessions in theory, in program, in our banner
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One must resist all and any attempts to connect the
young labor movement in Russia with any less
specific doctrine. (L(4), II, 3070
In August 1917,,,after, declaring his intention t.o make a
I At
revolutionary coup, Lenin, wrote On Compromises:
The task of a. truly revolutionary party i,s, not tode-
clarethe im.pessi.ble renunciation of all compromises,
but to be able through all compromises, as far as they
are unavoidable, to remain true to its principles, to
its class, to its revolutionary tasks, to its cause of
preparing :the revolution and educating, the masses of
the people for victory in the revolution (ow, XXI,
Part 1, 152.)
B. Strategy and Tactics
It is important to distinguish between the. long-range and,
permanent goals and principles, as outlined and repeatedly
elaborated by Lenin, and the frequent changes in political
tactics, ranging from major tactical reversals to minor propa-
gandistic switches, on his part, Not only did Lenin himself
insist on the permissibility of such inconsistencies, but he
insisted on their constant necessity. It was a constant element
in his writing to insist that his Party must not
tie its hands, restrict its activities by any plan
:invented in advance or by any single means of political,
struggle. It recognizes all means of struggle, pro-
vided they correspond to the available forces of the
Party and provide an opportunity to reach the maxi-
mum results under the given circumstances, (Article,
1900L () IV 3+6
In 1902, in his book, What To Do, he concluded that only a
rigid Party organization, as he was advocating it,
will assure the flexibility necessary for a Social-
Democratic combat organs a ion, that is, the ability
immediately to adjust to the most varied and rapidly
changing conditions of struggle. (L (4+), V, 4800)
In 1914, Lenin reiterated more generally: ".Marxist tactics
consist in connecting different methods of strug le,, in skill-
fully shifting from one to the'~othero000" (L (3 , XVII, 304.)
And another time Lenin insisted publicly that: '00,, the tactics
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of Social-Democracy must be calculated with reference to
various paths, for all possible situations.- both for the case
of a !quick:a#break' and for the case of a 'relatively immobile
situationoa (L (4), XVI, 1320)
Flexibility, he stressed, implied the Party's emancipation
from the need to be consistent in tactics:
We shall be called upon to make very frequent
changes in our line of conduct which to the
casual observer may appear strange and in-
comprehensibleo "How is that?" he will say. you were making promises to the petty bourgeoisie, while today Dzerzhinsky
announces that the Left Social-Revolutionaries
and the Nensheviks will be placed against the
wall. What an inconsistency"' (Speech, March
18, 1919, SW, VIII, 31.)
This was entirely in keeping with his broader philosophy towards
the interdependence of advance and retreat. To him, offensive
and defensive moves were part of the same general development,
and one had to be able rapidly to switch from one to the other,
as circumstances required it, As he restated towards the end of
his life,
When it was necessary ... to advance, to attack
the enemy with supreme boldness, rapidity, de-
cisiveness, we did so attack 44 And when it
appeared that the advance guard of the Revolution
was threatened by the danger of becoming isolated
from the mass of the people ... then we resolved
unanimously and firmly to retreat Prole-
tarian revolutions will not be able to fulfill
their tasks without combining skill in at
tacking, with skill in retreating in revolutionary
order. (Speech, April 2, 1922, L (3), XXVII, 2710)
This view at the end of his life showed how consistent he had
remained throughout to the formula advocated at the beginning
of his political career in 1899:
One must recoil in order better to jump, (L (4),
II, 3150)
In substance then, any suitable switch was permissible
-- in line with the earlier view that no moral restrictions
must impede the successful pursuit of the political goals:
13
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Against the advance of the predatory Germans we
utilized the equally predatory counter-interests
of other imperialists. We resorted to maneuvering,
dodging, falling back, which are obligatory in all
wars, while waiting for the moment when the inter-
national revolution finally ripens. (L (3), XXIII, 182.)
And. as Lenin announced in his speech to the Secretaries of the
Moscow Party organization in November 1920:
We have correctly outlined the path towards
World Revolution, but this path is not straight
it goes in zigzags. We have made the ZR_ussiaLn7r"
bourgeoisie impotent, and it, will not beat us by
military strength They are now experiencing
disintegration in their own midst, and this
strengthens use We do not expect to beat the
world bourgeoisie by military means alone ....
(L (4), xxxl, 4o5a)
C. Alliances and Compromises
Given the willingness to engage in any tactics, however
contrary to the long-range goals of the movement, Lenin did not
hesitate to advocate among his followers and colleagues, a
policy of "utilizing" a willingness of other groups to colla-
borate with the Communists. Thus, the vacillations among the
"petty bourgeoisie" were to be taken advantage of by the Party:
The petty bourgeois democrats ... invariably vacil-
late between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat....
the proper tactics for the Communists are to utilize
these vacillations and not to ignore them. (IM.-f-.116.)
As earlas 1899, Lenin had criticized a colleague for having
written of support for an alliance" with the democratic op-
position to tsarism: "In my opinion, utilize is a"much more
accurate and appropriate term than support and alliance."
(Wolfe, 122.) And after the Revolution., he reaffirmed: "One
must combine with the greatest fidelity to the idea of Communism
the capacity to enter into all necessary, practical compromises
... to make agreements ...o" (Leiter, 213.)
The alliances thus to be concluded were to involve no
yielding of principle. Moreover, they were to be for a dis-
tinctly limited goal or time period.. As Lenin wrote in 1897,
Marx's Communist Manifesto had demanded the support of "pro-
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gressive" classes against the reactionaries. "This support
demands no compromises .... It Is the support of an ally ag-
ainst a i, ven enemy ... in order to precipitate the downfall
of the common foe.I In other words, the Party must "indicate
the solidarity of the workin class movement with these groups
in, these or other questions.' But the Party "must make clear
the temporary and conditional character of this solidarity," Any
day, tomorrow., the Part "may have to stand face to face against
today's allie,so" (L (2 , II, 309-3110)
The variety of possible tasks along this line was indicated
by Lenin as early as 19Olb
Today we face the relatively simple task of support-
ing the students demonstrating on the streets of the
large cities. Tomorrow perhaps we will have a more
difficult question., for instance, of supporting a
movement of the unemployed in a given province.
The day after we will have to be on the spot in order
to participate in a revolutionary fashion in a
peasant uprising .... (L.()4), v, 110)
At all times the specific purpose of the alliance had to be
kept clear. Just as in 1918, Lenin argued in favor of the nec-
essity of "trading space for time," when concluding the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans, so two years later, speaking
at the Congress of the Communist International., he reiterated-
"concessions mean paying tribute to capitalism. But we gain
time and gaining time means gaining everything,ooo" ( g9 X,
239j And when in the spring of 1.921, a number of domestic and
foreign problems complicated the maintenance of Bolshevik rule,
Lenin frankly stated his willingness to make tactical con-
cessions and deviations from the long-range line- "We shall
make every possible concession within the limit of retaining
power...." (SW, IX, 24+24)
A key object of such temporary alliances was the Russian
peasantry., or at least its poorer and middle elements. From a
long-range point of view, Lenin repeatedly stressed the neces-
sity of educating the peasant class., of splitting its poorer
from the richer elements and pitting one against the other, all
the while insisting on the superior., more genuinely revolutionary
mission and consciousness of the working class.
In order to abolish classes one must., first, over-
throw the landlords and capitalists.... one must.,
second., abolish the difference between workers and
peasants, one must make them all workers 0000 This
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task is incomparably more difficult and will of nec-
essity be a protracted one,,.. The proletariat must
separate, demarcate the peasant toiler from the
peasant owner, the peasant worker from the peasant
huckster, the peasant who labors from the peasant
who profiteers. In this demarcation lies the whole
essence of socialism, ("Economics and Politics," 1919,
Simon , VVIII, 8 -9 0 )
In 1918, Lenin insisted that "every intelligent socialist will
agree that socialism cannot be imposed upon the peasantry by force
and that we can rely only upon the force of example and on the
masses of peasants assimilating living experience;" (SW, VII, 268,)
However, he made clear the necessity of applying duress, if need
beg for the maintenance of the unilaterally imposed '"alliance"
with the poorer peasantry:
This is the only principle by which we are guided,,,.
We are helping the peasants because without an alliance
with them the political. power of the proletariat is
impossible, its preservation is inconceivable. It
was precisely this consideration of expediency and not
that of fair distribution that was decisive for us.
We are assisting the peasants because it is absolutely
necessary to do so in order that we may retain polit-
ical power. The supreme principle of the dictatorship
is the maintenance of the alliance between the prole-
tariat and the peasantry in order that the former may
retain ,,o its political. power, (Speech, July 5, 1921,
SW, IX, 235-237.)
In 1905, Lenin was willing to engage in "a temporary agree-
ment with the Social-Revolutionaries, and hence also with the
Liberals." (L (4), VII, 3050) In 1917-18, he was again pre ared
to have the Left Social-Revolutionaries es on his side, p
At other times however, Lenin was frank in explaining that
the "parliamentary" parties, and later his former. colleagues
and partners, non-Communist Socialists, were a greater danger
to his cause than right-wingers and reactionaries, As early
as 1906 he explained.
The parties of the parliamentary opposition are
perhaps more dangerous and harmful than the overtly
and fully reactionary parties: this situation can
seem paradoxical only to him who is unable to reason
dialectically.... Frank anti-parliamentarianism
5n the righ7 is harmless. It is doomed to fail.
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The only means of maintaining autocracy is "con-
stitutional autocracy," the formation and the spread
of constitutional illusions. ("The Victory of the
Kadets and the Tasks of a Labor Party," L 4}., X., 2074)
The alliances have to be made depending upon the circumstances
of the moment. However unpalatable a given deal might have been,
necessity dictated its support. In 1918 Lenin recalled his nego-
tiations with the Allies earlier in that year.-
When in February 1918, he German oo, led their
troops against immobilized Russia , , 4 I did not
hesitate.in the least to enter into a "compromise"
with French monarchists, ,,, The French monarchists
and I shook hands., knowing that each of us would
willingly have hanged his "partner." For a time,
our interests coincided, (CW, XXIII, 196,)
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III. Rejection and Bet,raal of Democratic Processes
A.? Revolution and Evolution
It follows with iron logic from the premise that the state
is a tool of the exploiting class--the capitalists--that the
exploited masses can wrest control of power, of the state
machinery, and effect their emancipation only by violent means.
Lenin liked to quote approvingly Marx's statement that "revolu-
tions are the locomotive of history," (L (4), IX, 93.) As far
back as 1906 Lenin insisted on perseverance on the revolutionary
path:
The Marxist is the last to leave the path of the
directly revolutionary struggle, He leaves this
path only when all possibilities have been ex-
hausted, when there is not even a trace of hope
for the shorter path, then the appeal to prepare
mass strikes and insurrections manifestly has lost
all basis. (L (3), X, 186x)
This view of revolution as a shortcut to'power, more direct
and less cumbersome than other, more "legitimate" means, per-
sists in Leninas view thereafter, Early in 1917, when about to
leave Switzerland to return to Russia, he wrote:
Marx teaches us, on the.basi.s of the'experience
of the Commune of 1871, that "the working class
cannot simply lay hold of a ready-made state
machinery and make it serve its own purposes,1t
The proletariat must smash this machine (the army,
the police, the bureaucracy). (CW9 XX, Book 1, 800)
At the same time, "the idea of the possibility of a.so-
called democratic peace without a series of revolutions is
deeply erroneous," (CW9 X'III, 1490) And in general "the
replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is im-
possible without a violent revolution.11 (SR, 200) As for
the seizure of power,
The people have a right and duty to decide such
questions not by voting but by force 000. The
main thing is to seize ower not against the
Soviets, but for them; pthe political objects
would be7 "clarified after the seizure,"
(Schapiro, 64.)
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Be Evolution and Reform
It follows from the acceptance of means of violence as
both inevitable and more expedient,, that a devotion to, or res-
triction to, gradual and legal processes was rejected by Lenin
as "opportunist, petty' bourgeois," or it philistine." Impli-
cit in this approach is a rejection of "reformism" and of regular
democratic political processes:
The devotees of "consistent democracy" imagine
that serious political questions can be decided by
voting. As a matter of fact, such questions are
decided by civil war .... (Article, December 1919,
SW, vi, 477.)
Part and parcel of this view was the rejection of equality
as an "inalienable" concept, a rejection buttressed by the view
of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the working class.
Bourgeois democracy because of its very nature
usually presents the question of e quality
including the question of national equality,
in an abstract or formal manner. In the guise
of equality of persons generally, the bourgeois
democracy proclaims the formal or juridical
equality between the property owner and the
proletarian, between the exploiter and the ex-
ploited, and thereby greatly deceives the op-
pressed classes. The bourgeoisie transforms
the idea of equality which is itself a reflection
of commodity production relations into a weapon
in the struggle against the abolition of classes
on the plea of alleged absolute equality between
individuals.. The real meaning of the demand for
equality lies exclusively in the demand for the
abolition of classes. ('Preliminary Draft of
Theses on the National and Colonial Questions,"
June 1920, SW, X, 231-2320)
A4.Lenin reiterated on another occasion,
We want to abolish classes, and in that respect
we are in favor of equality. But the claim that
we want to make all men equal to each other is
an empty phrase and a stupid invention of the
intellectual. ("On deceiving the people with
slogans of liberty and equality," L (3), XXIv,
293-294.)
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As early as 1901 Lenin refused a clear-cut endorsement
of the promotion of reform to alleviate the "evils" of
capitalist society. He insisted them as he was to insist
repeatedly thereafter, that under certain circumstances
such reforms might only delay the development of the inevitable
crisis, which was a necessary prerequisite for the victory
of his cause. Thus he argued,.
Revolutionaries will never refuse to fight for
reforms., for the seizure of even a tiny and indi-
vidual enemy position., rovided this position
strengthen'stheir presure do the enem and
facilitates total victory. But they will never
forget that there are situations when the enemy
yields a position willingly in order to split
the attackers and so more easily defeat them.
(L(4), V, 59.)
Again in 1903, arguing against Peter Struve, Lenin insisted that
his opponent had
Lost the ability to 'understand the dual char-
acter of reforms and their importance as a
means of strengthening the position of the
rulers .... Reforms can prevent reaction ....
(L,(4)., VI,, 322.)
The rejection of reformism and gradualism obtained even
after the problem had been solved for Russia itself. In
formulating his theses on the task of the Communist International,
Lenin wrote in July 1920:
The very thought about the capitalists' willingly
submitting to the will of the majority of the ex-
ploited, about a reformist transition to socialism,
is.not only philistine narrow-mindedness but plain
deceit of the workers ....
Only the forcible overthrow of the bourgeoisie,..
the confiscation of its property, the destruction
of the entire bourgeois state apparatus from top
to bottom -- parliament, courts, army, bureaucracy,
administration, municipalities, etc. -- ... can assure
the real suppression of the entire exploiting class.
(L (4), XxXI, 162-yl63. )
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C. Voting and Democracy
Time and again Lenin was full of bitterness against those
who argued kindly for "peace." During the First World War he
wrote:
A "socialist" who delivers speeches to the gov-
ernment about a nice little peace resembles the
clergyman who, seeing before him in the front pews
the mistress of a brothel and a police officer, who
are working hand in hand with each other, preaches
to them ... about loving one's neighbor and. keeping
the Christian commandments. (ow'. XIX, 317,)
In general, freedom -- or "bourgeois freedom.," as Lenin
ordinarily calls it -- had no permanent, transcending value:
Freedom of trade ... is just as thoroughly false and as much of a cover for capitalist fraud -- as
the other "freedoms" proclaimed and implemented by
the bourgeoisie .... (L (4), XXXI, 103.)
Perhaps the most explicit analysis of his view on voting
is to be found in the incomplete pamphlet, State and Revolution,
which he wrote in 1917, just prior to his seizure of power. He
argued, in particular, against those democrats who "instill into
the minds of the people the wrong idea that universal suffrage
in the modern state' is really capable of expressing the will
of the majority of the toilers and of assuring -its realization,"
In the same text he protested that "to decide once every two
years which member of the ruling class is to repress and oppress
the people through parliament -- this is the real essence of
bourgeois parliamentarism, not only in parliamentary constitu-
tionalmonarchies, but also in the most democratic republic."
(SR, 14, 40.)
In the summer of 1920 Lenin was to complain, in a private
letter., that in other countries. "the mass of illiterate and
semi-literate workers and peasants participate in election's
in all earnest for they still believe in bourgeois-democratic
prejudices." ~L.(4), XXXI, 144,) His attitude towards parli-
amentary democracy followed the same pattern. Arguing against
the followers of Eduard Bernstein, he wrote in 1906;;
They consider the parliamentary struggle not as
one of the means of struggle particularly suitable
at a specific historical period, but as the major
and perhaps exclusive form of struggle which renders
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"duress," "seizure.," and "dictatorship" unnecessary.
This is a vile, philistine distortion of Marxism...,
(L (4), X, 223.)
Indeed, as Lenin was to write in the spring of 1917, upon re-
turning to Russia,.
A parliamentary bourgeois republic strangles and
crushes the independent political life of the
masses, their direct participation in the demo-
cratic office building of the state life from
top to bottom, (CW, XX, Book 1, 140.)
It is also more difficult to distinguish here between his
genuine views and those advocated for purposes of propaganda.
Prior to the seizure of power, and especially during the early
years of the century, he, as a leader of the Social-Democratic
Party, accepted democracy almost by definition as a goal, albeit
temporary and in its own turn but a means towards a more ul-
timate goal. On a theoretical level, he repeatedly developed
his view that democracy is but a form of state, and that con-
sequently along with the anticipated "withering of the state"
democracy, too, would wither. In practical terms., he often
'equated democracy with "formal" or "bourgeois" democracy, reject-
ing it as. shallow, phony., or meaningless. In State and Revolu-
tion he referred to Engels' view that
After the seizure of the means of production in
the name of society the political form of the
state is complete democracy. But it never enters
the head of any of the opportunists who shamelessly
distort Marx that when Engels speaks here of the state's
""withering away.," or "becoming dormant," he speaks of
democracy. At first sight this seems a 'very strange
period, but it is unintelligible only to one who has
not reflected on the fact that democracy is also a
state and so that, consequently, democracy will also
disappear when the state disappears. The bourgeois
state can only be put an end to by a revolution.
(SR, 17.)
In 1917 when the question became acute, Lenin ins3Viced that
Revolutionary democracy is good for nothing; it is
nothing but a phrase. It covers up, it does not
disclose, the conflicting character of class in-
terestso A Bolshevik must open the workers' and
the peasants' eyes to the existence of these con-
flicts, not gloss over them. (CW, XX, Book 1, 205,)
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He reiterated that "democracy is a state recognizing the
subordination of the minority to the majority, that is, an
organization for the systematic use of violence by one class
against the other, by one part of the population against
another." What it amounted to was that
...under capitalism, fully consistent democracy is
impossible, while under socialism all democracy
withers away. (SR, 65, 680)
When it came to the use of democratic institutions, however,
Lenin had no aversions in principle. As early as 1899 he main-
tained that under autocracy, the working class could not secure
its economic or political gains; under democratic conditions it
could advance its cause:
Only with political freedom is a decisive struggle
of the entire working class against the bourgeois
class possible, and the ultimate end of this
struggle consists in the seizure of political power
by the proletariat and the organization of socialist
society by it. (L (4), IV, 243-244.)
In 1917 he still maintained that
Democracy is of great importance for the working
class in its struggle for freedom against the
capitalists. But democracy is by no means a
limit one may not overstep; it is only one of
the stages in the course of development from
feudalism to capitalism and from capitalism
to communism. (SR, 82.j
In brief, I'revolutionary utility is higher than formal democracy."
(Speech, January 23, 1921, L (4), XXXII, 34.)
D. Tactics Toward Democratic
The actual tactics applied with regard to democratic insti-
tutions varied. Thus, during the early years of the century,
Lenin repeatedly spoke of "democratic" tasks of his movement,
the need to inculcate "democratic ideas" in the masses,, refer-
ring here to a struggle against the authoritarian regime, and
more specifically against abuse by the police, for the right to
strike, and other specific means that would advance his cause.
(L (4), II, 308,) In arguing against the bourgeoisie, he repeat-
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edly stressed that it "feared complete democratization of poli-
tical and social life," (L.(4), II, 311.) All the while his
view of political freedom was real.ly.a utilitarian one. As early
as 1903, he maintained that political freedom was not needed as
an end in itself., but rather as a stage, as a means "for the
broad, open union of all Russian workers in the struggle for a
new and. better society." (L.(4), VI., 331.)
His tactics were diametrically different when, in 1917,
he was about to seize power and when thereafter he was intent
on consolidating and centralizing its authority. In April 1917,
he maintained that
The'word democracy is not only not scientific
when applied to the Communist Party, but it
has simply become a blinker placed upon the
eyes of the revolutionary people.... (Handbook,
789.)
Two years later he was to state., in arguing against Xautsky,
that "pure democracy., or simple democracy, ... is a perfect
absurdity." (Handbook 8330) And in 1920, in commenting on
B,ukha.rin's demand for "industrial democracy," Lenin exclaimed.,
"Industry is always necessary., democracy is not always nec-
essary." (Speech, December 30, 1920, SW, IX., 12.)
The changes in tactics are well illustrated in his ap-
proach to the 1905 and 1917 Revolutions. The use of rhetoric
and propaganda was amply apparent even during the earlier of
these crises. Even within his own Party, he claimed to speak
for the majority., labeling his opponents a minority; he
claimed to speak for the proletariat, disparaging his opponents
as intellectuals; he claimed to speak for the consistent re-
volutionaries, labeling his foes as opportunists. (e,g. L
(14), VII, 350.) With regard to the participation within the
revolutionary movement in the summer of 19059 he wrote:
For us revolt is not an absolute but a concrete
slogan. We rejected it in 1897, we raised the
problem. of generally preparing for it in 1902,
and we put it as a direct challenge only in
19050
Lenin recalled that in 1848 Marx had. been in favor of revolution;
in 1850 he had opposed a new revolt; until 18709 Liebknecht had
opposed socialist participation in the Reichstag thereafter
he had been willing to participate in it. (L.(45, IX, 247.)
In similar fashion Lenin was prepared to switch his view on
revolt and revolution.
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When in 1905, the forces agitating against autocracy were
gaining momentum, and Lenin's own group was but a poor and weak
Faction on the fringes of the movement, he defined his tactics:
What must the immediate support of the Constitutionalists
by the Proletariat amount to? Above all, in utilizing
the general excitement for agitation and organization
of the least affected, the most backward strata of the
labor class and the peasantry .... The more acute the
struggle becomes, the closer the moment of the decisive
struggle, the more we must shift the center of gravity
of our work to the organization of the workers and
semi-proletarians themselves for a direct battle for
freedom. (L (4), VIII, llo )
Soon after he reaffirmed that the coming struggle of the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie against autocracy must not and
cannot force the proletariat to forget the hostility and contra-
diction of its interest and those of the propertied classes."
(L (4), VIII, 64.)
He argued against the moderate socialists in opposing par-
ticipation in a struggle for a Russian parliament by maintaining
that "if there is lacking a revolutionary class instinct ... the
participation in the parliamentary strug le can end in parli-
amentary cretinism." (L (4), VIII.2271.) In April 1905, he
insisted that the basic task of the Party was to "organize the
proletariat for the direct struggle with autocracy by means of
an armed revolt." (L (4), VIII, 3+10) What followed from this
shift of tactics was a refusal to participate in the Duma or
any other quasi-parliamentary institutions that the regime
might agree to. Any such parliament was to be boycotted.
Thus: the most energetic support of the idea of
a boycott; an exposing of the right wing of bour-
geois democracy, refusing to boycott it; the
activization of the boycott and the advocacy of
an armed uprising ....(L (4), IX, 160.)
As late as November 1905, he maintained that participation in
the Duma elections was not permissible; by mid-1906 he was
willing to take part in them in order to secure some seats for
his supporters; the following year he again chose to abstain --
only to admit years after the Revolution that he had been wrong
on the boycott of the Duma. (L.(4), X, 79: XXXIII, 182.)'
Significant during the same time period was his banking
on the military defeat of his country in the war with Japan as
a means likely to precipitate revolution,
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A military collapse is inevitable, and along with
it dissatisfaction, unrest, excitement will grow
tenfold ,... At that moment the proletariat must
strive to head the revolt ....
And when Port Arthur fell to the Japanese, he wrote.
The cause of Russian freedom and the proletariat
depend greatly on the military defeat of autocracy.
This cause can only win from a military collapse
.... While fighting against any war as such., we
must none the less ... reco nine the great revol-
utionary role of warp (L (4), VIII, 12, 37; 361.)
E. The Constituent Assembly
In April 1917, a month after the fall of the tsarist re-
gime, Lenin recognized that, under the then "bourgeois" govern-
ment, "Russia is now the freest of all the belligerent countries
of the world ....11 (Handbook, 7850) At first he used, as in
1905, the advocacy of a Constituent Assembly as a propaganda
weapon against the political right, Just as in 1905 he had
raised the demand for "the calling of deputies from all citizens
without exception for the convening of a constituent assembly,"
(L (4), VIII, 317.)9 so again in April 1917, he told his fol-
lowers:
I would be glad to see the Constituent Assembly
convoked tomorrow, but to believe that Guchkov
leader of the early Provisional Government
will convoke the Constituent Assembly is naive.
All this talk about forcing the Provisional
Government to convoke the Constituent Assembly
is pure prattle, wholesale deception .... The
Soviet is the only government that can convoke
the Assembly. (CW, XX, Book 1, 100.)
Soon after, Lenin was to argue against those who accused him
of seeking to use forcible means.
To become a power, the class-conscious workers
must win the majority over to their side. So
long as no violence is committed against the masses,
there is no other road to power. We are not
Blanguists, we are not for the seizure of power
by a minority. (CW, XX, Book 1, 117.)
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Before long, however, Lenin had changed his mind and was
eager to take advantage of a "revol.utinary opportunity." Now
his argument was quite distinct. A Constituent Assembly had
been called, and elections were to be held in the entire coun-
try in November 1917, Now, writing to his Central Committee,
just prior to the seizure of power by his group, he declared:
It would be a disaster or formalism to wait for
the uncertain voting of November 7th, The people
have a right and a duty to decide such questions
not by voting but by force .,., (Handbook, 808-809.)
When, after the successful seizure of power by the Bol-
sheviks, the elections to the Constituent Assembly were still
held (Lenin's Party being in control of but a small part of the
country), Lenin decided to disperse the Assembly, sho'se majority
was clearly hostile to him, In a draft of a decree on the dis-
solution of the Constituent Assembly, he wrote:
To relinquish at this stage any particle of the
power of the soviets, the Soviet Republic won
by the people, for the sake of bourgeois parli-
amentarism oo, would mean the complete collapse
of the October Revolution. (SW, VI, 4610)
Clearly the preservation of his power had priority over obedi-
ence to the mandate of the electorate. The following year
he was to reiterate his stand in a broader framework, arguing
against Western European socialist critics:
And in the face of this condition of things, at
the time of a most desperate war, when history is
placing on the order of the day the question of
the life and death of age-long privileges -- at
this time to talk about a majority and minority,
about a democracy, about the superfluity of the
dictatorship, about equality between exploiter
and exploited -- what bottomless stupidity and
phili.stinism are needed to do it! (Handbook, 836.)
Now he could argue,, recalling the Russian experience with
the Constituent Assembly, that
Participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament
even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet
Republic, and even after that victory, not only
does no harm to the revolutionary proletariat,
but actually makes it easier for it to prove to
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the backward masses why such. parliaments deserve
to be dispersed; it facilitates the success in
dispersing them, and it facilitates the process
whereby bourgeois parliamentarism becomes poli-
tically obsolete, (SW, X, 101.
And finally, in March 1921, with his own regime in the
saddle for years, though recently challenged by demands for
democratization, Lenin reiterated:
The class which took political power into its
hands did so knowing it took power sinle-handed.
This is a part of the concept of dicks torship of
the proletariat o This concept has meaning only
when the single class knows that it alone takes
political power into its hands, and does not de-
ce.lve either itself or others by fine speeches
about "popular, generally elected, popularly-
sanctified" authority, (Speech., March 27, 1921,
SW, IX, 137.)
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IV. The Party is All
A. Party organization and Discipline
The inevitability of the struggle, its anticipated violent
character, the rejection of the principle of voting and control
by the rank-and-file membership from below, the need for sudden
and violent shifts of tactics and zigzags -- all this imposed
a necessity for a rigidly organized, highly disciplined, obe-
dient Party organization. Time and again Lenin used analogies
between his Party and military institutions, with a small
headquarters of commanding generals, and a mass that must be
trained, indoctrinated, armed and prepared for the inevitable
battles ahead. The concept of a disciplined, elitist, hier-
archical party was in his mind as far back as 1897, when he
wrote:
The struggle with the government is impossible
without increasing and developing revolutionary
discipline, organization, and "conspiracy." It
demands above all specialization of individual
circles and persons, mastering various functions
of work, and leaving the uniting role to the
numerically most insignificant central nucleus.
(L (4), It, 325.)
Again in 1899 he urged that "the improvement of the re-
volutionary organization and discipline, the perfection of
conspiratorial techniques, are essential and urgent ... in order
to wage a systematic battle against the government, we must
perfect the revolutionary organization, the discipline, and
the techniques of conspiracy." (L (24), IV, 201-2o4.)
The problem became more serious when severe disagreements
within his Party arose. In 1900, already, Lenin insisted that
some splits were useful if the result was a more homogeneous
organization. "Before uniting, and in order to do so, we must
first decisively and firmly split (L (4), IV, 328-329.)
In 1902, he replied to those colleagues of his who demanded
greater freedom of criticism within the organization -- demands
which he called a cloak for "naive" and "demagogic" elements:
A freedom of criticism is a freedom of opportunism
within Social-Democracy, the freedom to convert it
into a reformist democratic party Freedom is
a great word, but under the banner of freedom all
sorts of robbers? wars have been fought, and under
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the banner of freedom of labor, workers have been
robbed. ("'What to Do?" 1902, L (4), V, 328.)
Increasingly his stress was on central direction and elitist
leadership!
Not one revolutionary movement can be stable and
maintain control without organized leadership ..
Only a centralized combat organization ... is
capable of converting the movement from an unthink-
ing one into one promising success .... "Broad demo-
cracy" in the Party organization, under conditions of
autocracy, under the rule of tsarist policemen?.;is
merely an empty and harmful toy. (L (4), v, 433,
445, 447.)
As Lenin affirmed on another occasion, "the organization
principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy strives to go from
the top downward, it defends the enlargement of the rights and
plenary powers of the central body against the parts." (Wolfe,
259.) Here was a stark expression of distrust in democracy,
faith in hierarchy. It was confirmed in the years thereafter
in a number of instances -- except when, in 1903, Lenin momen-
tarily found himself in the minority of his Party. Then, as
a matter of transitory tactics, Lenin argued that a minority
should not be barred, "everything possible must be made ..
to offer the various factions freedom to express themselves."
(L (4), VII, 98-99.)
During the following years he kept stressing that "in the
theoretical and practical direction of the movement and the
revolutionary atruggle of the proletariat, the reatest possible
centralization is necessary." (L (4), VI, 221.) And the demand.
of various national parties for separate organizations and auto-
nomy was refuted as "absurd," as defeating
the
need
guidance and coordination. (e.g., L (4),
VI,
299.)
for central
The same attitude towards authority at the top and complete
direction from a small center sanctioned the practice which be-
came known as the "purge," originally conceived as an attempt
to review Party membership to eliminate "dangerous" elements.
The Communist Parties of all countries in which
the Communists are carrying on the work legally
must periodically purge (reregister) the member-
ship of the party organization so that the Party
may be systematically purged of petty bourgeois
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elements which inevitably attach themselves to it.
('Conditions of Affiliation to the Communist Inter-
national," 1920, SW, X, 204)
Once a split had occurred within the Party, it was perfectly
defensible and necessary to struggle against the erstwhile
colleagues
It is wrong to write about Party comrades in a
language that systematically spreads among the
working masses hatred, aversion, contempt for
those who hold different opinions. But one
may and must write in that strain about a seceded
organization. Why must one? Because when a split
has taken place it is one's duty to wrest the
masses from the leadership to the seceded section.
The limits of the struggle based on a split are
not Party limits, but general political limits,
or rather general civil limits, limits set by
criminal law and nothing else. (Sw, III, 490-249+.)
The sanction of the purge and the attack on erstwhile colleagues
was thus contained in the necessity to apply terror, as explained
above.
B. Dictatorship of the Proletariat
The previously stipulated acceptance of force as a legiti-
mate and necessary means to secure the desired end, as well as
the anticipated opposition of hostile elements, gave rise to
the axiomatic acceptance of the necessity to establish a system
which, upon the seizure of power would be able to use the re-
quisite force to secure compliance with the dictates of the
new ruler. The theoretical defense of such an order, known
as the dictatorship of the proletariat, was to be found in the
writings of Marx and his disciples concerning the "transitional"
period after the assumption of power, until all class enemies
had been eliminated or liquidated in one fashion or another.
Lenin was quick to explain, as early as 1920, that "the dicta-
torship of the proletariat represents a necessary political
condition of social revolution." (L (4), VI, 13; VI, 231.)
As he proclaimed in 19060 "Power unlimited, extra-legal,
relying on compulsion in the most direct sense of the word --
that is dictatorship.' (L (4), X, 218.) And he repeated his
definition almost word by word when, in 1918 he argued against
socialist critics-.
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Dictatorship is power based directly upon force
and unrestricted by any laws. The revolutionary
dicta,' ors4ip Gf t3ae proletariat is power won and
maintained by the violence of the proletariat
against the bourgeoisie,, power unrestricted by
any laws. (SW, VII, 12;3,)
At times the broader concept of proletarian dictatorship was
eliminated when the question of individual or group dictator-
ship arose. Thus, early in 1920, Lenin explained to the
Congress of the Communist Party,
Soviet Socialist Democracy is not contradictory
to individual management and dictatorship in any
way; the will of a class may sometimes be carried
out by a dictator, who at times may do more alone
,and who is frequently more necessary. (SW, VIII,
222.)
The definition of dictatorship, proudly adopted, was still the
same: "The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing
more or less than unrestricted power absolutely unimpeded by
laws or regulation and resting directly on force. This is
the meaning of dictatorship and nothing else." (SW, VII, 254.)
And at the end of the Civil War;, in addressing the Congress of
Soviets in December 1920, Lenin confirmed once again: "The
dictatorship of the proletariat does not fear compulsion -- it
does not fear sharp, decisive, merciless application of duress
by the state." (L (4), XXXI, 466.)
Even in the summer of 1921, when a certain consolidation
of power within the country had taken place and no foreign wars
were being fought, Lenin maintained that the need for dictator-
ship continued to exist -- and would continue to exist until
all enemies had been eliminated. From that point of view, he
subscribed to the view of permanent war.
Dictatorship is the state of acute war. We are
precisely in such a state. There is no military
invasion at present., but ... until the final
issue is decided, the state of awful war will
continue. (Speech, July 5, 1921, SW, IX, 242,)
C. Party Control over Government, Trade Unions, Press
The arrogation of complete authority implied an extension
of this striving for complete, "totalitarian" control after the
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seizure of power to the various arms and organs of governing.
Lenin rejected categorically and repeatedly the request for
autonomy of groups both within the Party and within the State.
"One must struggle against the chaos in ideas, against those
unhealthy opposition. elements L'w--ithin the Communist Party who
renounce ... the Party's guiding role with regard to the non-
Party mass," (L (4), XXXII, 32.) In addressing a.Congress of
Cooperatives, Lenin explicitly demanded that each group in the
Soviet state "abandon the idea of independence" from the Party
unless it wanted to be treated as an enemy of the Party:
You say you want independence. It seems to me
that anybody who makes such a demand risks
arousing distrust. If you complain of friction
and want to eliminate it, you must first of all
abandon the idea of independence, for anybody
who holds that view ... is by that fact an op-
ponent of the Soviet system .... There can be no
talks, there must be no talks, of independence
for individual groups, ,,.. what this means is
that everything should be subordinated to the
Soviet government, and that all cooperative
societies should be abandoned as quickly as
possible .... (Cw, XXIII, 2440-441.)
The preparation for the dictatorship of the
proletariat demands ... the replacement of the
old leaders by communists in absolutely all
forms of proletarian organization, not only
In political groups but also in trade unions,
cooperatives, educational, etc. organizations.
(L (4), XXXI, 167. )
And in its own turn the government's machine was to be
subordinated to the communist movement. As Lenin stated in
November 1920:
The Party ... rules and must rule over the huge
government machine. (L (4), XXXI, 344.)
The need to control and influence the military arm was re-
cognized even prior to the Soviet assumption of power. One of
the conditions for admission to the Communist International as
defined in July 1920 was "the insistent and systematic propaganda
and agitation in military units and the organization of communist
cells in each military unit. This communist work will have to
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be conducted largely illegally." (L (4), XXXI, 183.)
The same conditions specified the demand that the Party
control the press:
Periodical and non-periodical press and all pub-
lishing must be completely subordinated to the
Central Committee of the Party (L (4), XXXI, 185.)
Lenin argued that under the Soviet system "freedom of the press
ceases to be a hypocrisy, because the printin presses and
paper are taken away from the bourgeoisie." Hnbook,f829.)
Likewise he insisted that Party control contributed
of the press since it freed it from "bourgeois-anarchical indivi-
dualism." (L (4), X, 29.)
The same control was to be exercised over the trade unions
in Russia. As far back as 1902, Lenin maintained that it was
sufficient to have a relatively small number of Party followers
in the unions, who must then "directly, consciously seek to
influence their comrades" within their organization. (L (4),
V,423.) This remained his view, and he was to restate it on
several occasions in 1920-21, notably at the time of the form-
ulation of admissions into the Communist International and the
dispute over the role of trade unions in. the Soviet Union in
1920-21. "Each Communist Party must conduct systematic propa-
ganda and infiltration in labor unions and cooperatives," his
theses for the Communist International declared in July 1920.
(L (4), XXXI, 184.) And he confirmed that the "Party must more
and more than ever, and in a new way, not merely in the old way,
educate and direct the trade unions." ("Left-Wing Communism,
an Infantile Disorder," Handbook, 858.)
D. Non-Communist Parties in the Soviet State
It followed from Lenin's entire approach that he would take
advantage of "friendly" feelings among non-Communists during
the initial period of weakness in order to bolster whatever
support his regime could obtain.. It followed with equal. clarity
that he would dispense with such non-Communist support and, on
the contrary, turn against these non-Communists as soon as he
could afford it, and as soon as the divergency of his views,
goals, and tactics from theirs became a sufficiently serious
concern. In practice the problem pertains to the Social-Revolu-
tionaries, and in particular to their left-wing, which had
cooperated with the Communists during the winter of 1917-18,
and the Mensheviks, some of whom had remained as opposition
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members of the various soviets until 1921.
During the civil war., even at a time when his regime was
not yet completely consolidated, Lenin on occasion was willing
to sanction determined action to weed out such individuals, As
he wrote to a Party organization,
We cannot of course give you written authorization
to arrest Social-Revolutionaries, but if you drive
them out of Soviet organs, if you arrest them and
expose them before the workers and peasants and
destroy their influence among the peasantry (if they
have any) you will be doing good revolutionary work,
and we in the center ... will only praise you for it.
(L (3), XXIII, 560--561. )
In 1920, when foreign socialists had been amply perturbed
by the terror applied by the Communists against others in the
country, Lenin sent a letter to the British labor movement
along with a delegation that visited Russia in May of 1920.
Several members of your delegation asked me with
amazement about the Red Terror, about the lack of
freedom of the press, of the freedom of assembly,
about our persecutions of Mensheviks and Menshevik
workers, etc. 1 replied that the real culprits of
the terror are the imperialists of Britain and her
allies .. esides7 the freedom of the press and
assembly in bourgeois democracy is the freedom of
the rich men?s conspiracy against the poor, the
freedom of bribing the press. (L (4), XXXI, 120.)
The rather weak and irrelevant explanation thus offered was
entirely abandoned by Lenin during the following year, but he
had no compunctions to declare- "the place for the Mensheviks
and the S-R's, both the open ones and those disguised as non-
Party men, is in prison ...e" (L (4), XXXII, 343.) And he
reiterated on the same occasion-
The so-called "non-Party" people. who are in fact
nothing but Mensheviks and S-R$s in modern,
Kronstadt garb, must be carefully kept in jail --
or else shipped to Berlin .... (L (4), XXXII, 343.)
Early in 1922, appearing before the Eleventh Congress of the
Communist Party, Lenin went even further, at a time when for all
intents and purposes the Mensheviks and S-R?s had been suppressed
as organized movements. Now he declared-
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Mensheviks and S-Rs: to be shot if they show their noses.
For the public advocacy of Menshevism our revolutionary
courts must pass sentence of death, otherwise they
are not our courts, but God knows what. (Schapiro,
208; sw, II, 648-649.)
What it amounted to then, was the implementation of Lenin's
appeal to the Tenth Party Congress: "The time has come to put
an end to opposition, to put the lid on it. We have had
enough opposition." (L (3), XXVI, 227-228.)
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V. Nationalism and Self-Determination
A particularly vexing problem pertained to the nationality
question, both within Russia and abroad. On the one hand, in
line with the general drive for centralism and coordinated,
highly disciplined direction, Lenin preferred, once he had ob-
tained power, to minimize the autonomy of any constituent part,
including national areas of the former tsarist empire. On the
other hand, the appeal to formerly oppressed nationalities was
a powerful propaganda weapon, and moreover, it lent itself to
exploitation along classical lines of Marxist propaganda. The
problem centered around the Leninist assumption that the nation
itself was but a manifestation of the pre-socialist period of
civilization, and that -- along with Marx's statement that the
proletariat has no fatherland -- the concepts of nation and
nationalism would wither away once the proletariat (as repre-
sented by the Communist Party) came to power. In principle,
Lenin maintained, national self-determination was undesirable.
Engels does not make t-he mistake made, for instance,
by some Marxists in dealing with the right of a
nation to self-determination: that it is impossible
under capitalism and will be unnecessary under
socialism. (SR, 65.)
In 1903, Lenin opposed federalism as an anti-centralist
device:
The proletariat must not advocate federalism and
nationalautonomy; the proletariat must not raise
such demands which inevitably amount to the demand
for the creation of autonomous class states....
the demand for national autonomy is not a permanent,
programmatic necessity for the proletariat. Its
support of this demand can become necessary for it
only i.n. specific, exceptional circumstances
(L (4), VI, 293-294 )
The tactical flexibility exhibited in this early statement
was maintained by Lenin during the following years. Upon the
outbreak of the First World War, he wrote in an article on the
tasks of the Socialist International-
The socialist movement cannot be victorious within
the old framework of the fatherland. It creates
new, higher forms of human life under which the
best demands and progressive tendencies of the
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laboring masses of all nationalities will be fully
satisfied in an international unity, while the
present national partitions are destroyed. (CW,
xviii, 87.)
One month later he was frank to reaffirm his general position:
We on our part are not unconditional advocates of
small nations. Other conditions being equal, we
are decidedly for centralization and against the
philistine ideal of federation. (CW, XVIII, 102.)
Nothing could be more revealing of his willingness to go to
considerable lengths for purposes of tactical victories. In
subsequent years, after the seizure of power, federation was
precisely the form which he advocated, adopted, and imposed
over the opposition of several of his close associates. Actually,
he had sanctioned this exception, at least so far as the Russian
Empire was concerned, as early as 1913:
The right of self-determination is an exception
from our general premise of centralism. This
exception is absolutely necessary in view of
Great Russian arch-reactionary nationalism.
(Wolfe, 584.)
And in 1920, when the problem of organizing the various Soviet
Republics into an integrated state was acute, Lenin wrote-.
Federation is a transitional form toward complete
unity of the toilers of different nations. It
has already shown itself in practice to be appro-
priate. (L (Li ), XXXI, 124.)
Even here the "transitional" aspect of the basic arrange-
ment of the Soviet state was maintained, as if to recall the
divergent long-range goal of eliminating national consciousness
and boundaries. In the interim, no time limit on the exploit-
ation of national sentiment was set.
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VI. Inevitability of Conflict Between the Communist and
Non-Communist Worlds
A. The Dialectic. No Third Force
Implicit in the application of the operation of the Marxist
dialectic is the exclusion of the middle. Phenomena tend to-
ward the two extreme poles, the good and the bad, the rich and
the poor, the exploiter and the exploited, the just and the un-
just. No permanent compromises, no lasting halfway positions,
no "third force are possible. As Lenin explained in his
speech to the Party officials of Moscow in November :1920,
As long as Capitalism and Socialism exist, we can-
not live in. peace. in the end, -one or the other
will triumph-- a funeral dirge will be sung either
over the Soviet Republic or over world Capitalism.
. it is the same all over. the impossibility of
any middle ground -- either a White dictatorship
or else the dictatorship of the proletariat.
(SW, VIII, 297, L (4), XXXI, 341.)
The same was true in another context:
Only the two following kinds of power are possible.
either the full power of the working class or the
full power of the bourgeoisie. There is nothing in
the middle, there is no third path, (Speech of April
3, 1.919, L (2), XXIV, 213.)
And in discussing the tasks of political education., in October
1921, Lenin once again reiterated that
we must say that either those who want to cause our
destruction must perish, those who we think must
perish -- and in that case our Soviet Republic will
live -- or the Capitalists will live and in that
case the Republic will perish in an impoverished
country, either those who cannot stand the pace must
perish, or the whole Workers' and Peasants' Republic
must perish. There is not, there cannot be any
third path, nor can there be an. sentimentality.
(SW, IX, 266. L (4), XXXI I I, 448. )
B. World Revolution
Lenin reiterated the necessity, for his own followers,
to see through their own tactics as well as those of the "class
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enemy." The basic belief in the inevitability of conflict led
him to remark with regard to all "philistine" peace proposals.
Every "peace program" is a deception of the people
and a piece of hypocrisy unless its principal object
is to explain to the masses the need for a revol-
ution, and to support, aid and develop the revolu-
tionary struggle of the masses that is starting
everywhere (ferment among the masses, protests,
fraternization in the trenches, strikes, demon-
strations e...) (SW, V, 237.)
Soon after the assumption of power he declared, urging that
his supporters hold out until communist revolutions elsewhere
come to their relief.
Of course, the final victory of socialism in a
single country is impossible, Our unity of workers
and peasants which is supporting the Soviet govern-
ment is only one of the units of the great world
army But it is striving for unity, and the
proletariat greets every piece of information with
loud cheers because it knows that in Russia the
common cause is being pursued. (SW, VII, 280-281.)
In.similar fashion he declared, later in 1918:
Either the Soviet government triumphs in every
advanced country in the world, or the most re-
actionary imperialism triumphs, the most savage
imperialism, which is throttling the small and
feeble nationalities and reinstating reaction
all over the world -- Anglo-American imperialism
which has perfectly mastered the art of using
the form of a democratic republic. One or the
other, there is no middle course. (SAT, VIII,
148-149.)
Here was the same basic black-white perception, his dialectic
approach applied to international relations.
International imperialism, with all the power of
its capital, with its highly organized. military
technology, which is the real force, the real
strength of international capital, could in no
case and under no conditions get on with the
Soviet Republic ... could not by virtue of trade
links, and international financial relations.
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Here conflict is inevitable, Here lies the great-
est difficulty of the Russian Revolution, its
greatest historical problem: the need to solve
international tasks, the need to provoke inter-
national revolution. (L (3), XXII, 317.)
Thus, the basic outlook remained the expectation of further
revolutions abroad. As Lenin wrote on the fourth anniversary
of the October Revolution:
The first Bolshevik Revolution tore the first one
hundred million people out of the imperialist war,
out of the imperialist world. The following re-
volutions will tear all of humanity out of such wars
and such a world. (L (4), XXXIII, 35.)
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbreviations
Burns, Emile, edo A Handbook of Marxism, New York, Handbook
International Publishers, 1935,
Hook, Sidney. Marx and the Marxists. Princeton, Van Hook
Nostrand C-77.7-177,
Leites, Nathan. A Study of Bolshevism. Glencoe, Leites
Ill., The Free Press, 1953.
Lenin, V. I. Agitation and Propaganda, ein Sammelband. AP
Vienna, Verlag fur Literatur and Politik, 1229,
Collected Works. New York, International CW
Publishers, 19277-`1997"2. 23 volumes,
Selected Works. New York, International SW
Publishers, 19E3 , 112 volumes. Moscow, Foreign
Language Publishing House 1951.
Sochineniya, 2nd ed. Institut,Marksa-Engelsa- L (2)
Lenina pri TsK VKP (b), Moscow, Gox0Iz.
Politicheskoi Literatury, 1926-1932,
Sochineni aa, 3rd edo Institut Marksa-Engelsa- L (3)
Lenina pri TsK VKP (b), Moscow, Gox.Iz.
Politicheskoi Literatury, 1928-1937.
o Sochineniya, 4th ede Institut Marksa-Engelsa- L (4)
Lenin. pri TsK VKP (b), Moscow, Gos.Iz.
Politicheskoi Literatury, 1941-1952.
State and Revolution. New York, International SR
-Publisihers -7732.
The Letters of Lenin. New York, Harcourt LL
Brace & Co., 1937.
Sabine, George H. A History of Political Theorem. Sabine
New York, Henry Holt, revised edition, 1950,
Schapiro, Leonard, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy. Schapiro
London, G. Bell & Sons, 1955.
Soviet World Outlook. A Handbook of Communist Statements. Outlook
Washington, D, C., no date
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Abbreviations:
Wolfe, Bertram D. Three Who Made a Revolution. New Wolfe
York, The Dial press, 1948.
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-50-
LENIN VERSUS KHRUSHCHEV'
The Leninist heritage is far more ambiguous with regard to
the question of the extent to which other Communist revolutions
would have to,or would be expected to, emulate the Bolshevik
experience. on the one hand, Lenin affirmed that "Bolshevism
is suitable as a model of tacticyfor all." (SW, XXIII, 386.)
He stressed the "international significance of Soviet rule and
of the tenets of Bolshevik theory and tactics." His various
successors and disciples repeatedly referred to these statements.
On the other hand, as early as 1916, he unequivocally declared
that
Any attempt to pply the tactics of October-
Novemberp 1917 J in a single country -- this
triumphant' period of the revolution -- to apply
them with the aid of our fantasy to the progress
of events in the 1rorld revolution, is doomed to
failure. (SW, VII, 299.)
And in 1920 he developed the same idea in greater detail:
As long as national and state differences exist
among peoples and countries -- and these differences
will continue to exist for a very long time, even
after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been
established on a world scale -- the unity of inter-
national tactics of the communist working class
movement of all countries demands not the elimination
of variety, not the abolition of national differences
(this is a foolish dream at the present moment), but
such an application of the fundamental principles of
communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the
proletariat will correctly modify these prin-
ciples in certain particulars, will properly adapt
them to the na onal and n nal'-state differences.
To investigate, study, seek out, dzevine, grasp that
which is specifically national in the concrete man-
ner in which each country approaches the fulfillment
of the single international task, the victory over
opportunism and "left" doctrinairism in the working
class movement, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie,
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the establishment of a Soviet Republic and a
proletarian dictatorship -- this is the main
task of the historical period through, which all
the advanced(and not only the advanced countries
are now passing. (SW, X, 135.)
Lenin was thus expressing himself in different ways at different
times. Thus, Mikoyan could even cite an authoritative text
from his writings, in speaking in February 1956, to the effect
that "the working class would of course prefer to take power
peacefully."
(L (4), IV, 254.)
But it may be well to bear in mind Lenin's own caveat:
In view of the extreme complexity of social phe-
nomena it is always easy to select any number of
examples or separate data to prove any point one
desires. (sw, v, 8.)
In some particulars, the actions of the present Soviet
leadership are in obvious and glaring contrast with Lenin's vision
of the future. The conflict; here do not pertain to principles,
goals, or tactics, but rather to the realization of some of the
promises which Lenin had made -- and presumably believed in --
in earlier years. This was particularly true for the promises
of egalitarianism which he held out:
The narrow horizon of bourgeois rights which com-
pels one to calculate, with the hard-heartedness
of a shylock, whether he has not worked half an
hour more than another, whether he is not getting
less pay than another -- this narrow horizon will
be left behind. There will then be no need for any
exact calculation by society on the quantity of
products to be distributed to each of its members;
each will take freely "according to his needs."
(CW, XXI, Part 2, 226.)
Equally distant from realization would seem to be his vision
that the whole of society will have become one office and one
factory, with equal work and equal pay." (SR, 84.)
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Nor would the continued existence of a police or secret
police machinery seem to bear out his forecast that:
Once the majority of the people itself suppresses
its oppressors, a "special force" for suppression
is no longer necessary. In this sense the state
begins to wither away. (SR, 37.)
Half a century ago Lenin demanded that "without trial the
police must not have the right to jail anyone .... The people
must itself elect civil servants." (L (4), VI, 361.) On another
occasion he stressed the demand for "freedom to go from place
to place."
This means that the peasants must be free to go
where he pleases, to move whereever he wants to,
to choose for himself the village or the town he
prefers, without having to ask for permission.
It means that passports must be abolished in Russia....
(SW, II, 280.)
There is no indication that the implementation of this demand
is considered either possible or desirable at present. The same
applies to the aim of the Party program as he formulated it in
1902, repeatedly reiterated with some variation in the following
years. It amounted in substance to a demand for popular sov-
reignty, universal suffrage, inviolability of the person, sanc-
tity of the home, freedom of movement and profession, the abolition
of all indirect taxes, and "unlimited freedom of conscience, speech,
press, assembly, strikes and unions." (L (4), VI, 14-16.) In
1905 he even deemed it possible to keep non-atheists within the
Party, granting that they would be-in.consistent:
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Those workers who believe in God and those in-
tellectuals who are mystics are of course incon-
sistent, but we shall not throw them out of the
Soviet nor even from the Party.... (L (4), X, 7;
X, 30.)
It seems indeed a long way from his promise, when writing
on the Party program, that
Soviet power is a new type of state, in which
there is no bureaucracy, no police, no standing
army. (SW, VIII, 318,)
Whether or not he himself foresaw the possible direction in
which his regime would develop cannot be ascertained. He did,
in the last years of his life, warn against various defects, de-
viations, and dangers. But perhaps the most telling indictment
was provided by him on an occasion when he argued with an anti-
communist opponent. Replying to one who insisted that "the re-
volutionary government will be a Social-Democratic one ... with
a Social Democratic majority," Lenin answered sharply:
This cannot be! It cannot be because a revolutionary
dictatorship can endure for a time, only if it rests
on the enormous majority of the people .... Anyone
who attempts to achie-!e socialism by a route other
than that of political democracy, will inevitably
arrive at the most absurd and reactionary conclusions
both economic and political. (L (4), IX, 14; Wolfe,
292.)
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