C.P. PENETRATION AND INFILTRATION OF ARMED AND SECURITY FORCES (MILITARY ORGANIZATION - M.O.)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03362A001600120005-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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76
C.P NF MTION AYD IN.FILTFATION Qom' AWJ) MID SF.CTTTri `TTh :J'ORCFS
(MUITARY ORG~.1dtZA'rIOPd - M, 0>,~._:_:~_ _ __._
I.
INTRODUCT:ON
Page 1
II,
PEMTRATION AND INFILTRATION
Page 1
III.
AUXILIARY SUPPORT CTROUES S
Pace 2
IV.
COMMUNICATIONS
Page 2
V,
SELECTION OF TARGETS
Page 3
Via
SUBVERSION
Page 4
VII.
CONCLUSIONS
Pace `?
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C,P4 PEI T,R(1T'.ON OF A?ME;D AEI SECURITY r'ORGES. ~1~?0
CO RD NTL-.'
The Armed and Security Forces as social organizations being more
compact than other social formations of Democracy, present, from the
point of view of sub'Versive penetration and activities therein special
problems, but Cori_:unists claii.l that it is possible to organize even
inside a jail or a concentration camp in comparison with which
organizations inside the Armed and Security forces is relatively si..ple.
Lefore proceedinG to the specific methods known to have been used
in penetration and sth:version of armed and security forces, keep in
mind the character of the CP as & conspiratorial type of a political
craanization, whose ..embers are ideological warriors. A setting
ideal for most any type of clandestine operation,
Also, kept in mind should be the vast spread of C.P. organized or
controlled mass organizations or "fronts", including youth movement, and
CP.s clandestine penetration-and infiltration of public opinion forming
agencies (newspapers, radio, the movies) all of which cone into play
as an aid in their penetration and infiltration and subversion work
in the armed and security services. And last but not least, the subver-
sion of the armed and security forces of the "class encny" is a part
of tactics of C.P. `s, adopted asva part of the Marx-Engels-Lenin?Stalin
doctrine. according to which no serious attempt at the overthrow of the
government is possible without subverting its armed and security forces.
JuV. Stalin himself has taken out a double insurance on that
score. His regular army is not only thoroughly policed from the
inside, but he has a most well equipped political army.
The basis of penetration in the armed and security forces is the
spread of the influence of the Party and its fronts inccivilian life
and while activities in the armed and security forces are a special
strategical and tactical operation it cannot be disassociated from
Communism operation as a whole.
Potentially the penetration of the armed forces has its ori;;in
in the clandestine and semi-concealed or overt activities, in the
schools, colleges, universities and the youth in general. The;;rounds
for subversives are generated right there, crystallize into various
forms of student or faculty organizations and from there find their
way, either by conscription in war time or by purposeful clandestine
direction of the Party into the armed forces.
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A. General fra_.ework of recriritr.e.at
.Like all operations, this too is a systouaticatlly orgaiiized
proposition, operating from the center down. The Party sets u.- a
6llagn(des:tine (anti militarist) Military Committee. It wsuld take
riu3h ::core tine.' than is advisable to explore all the angles but
briefly this is operated as follows:
1. The Coia:iittee, through subordinate channels (instructions
offices) (not directly) 16 keeping in touch with Party m:_merlbes?s
joining the ar':i.dd and security forces, or-ranizes and directs
them. Similar setups under a"rirection of the Military Co::iAttee
are of eratin through youth organizations sponsored by c
corresponding C.P.'s
2. A similar setup under the pretense of "helpin, the
boys" is operating throe ,li the controlled front or~e.nizations
including fractions controlled labor unions. This part of
the job is o;porated as far as the Military Coimoittee is
corcernec1 secretly the-ough the Party fractions in effective
control of these organizations,
The above indj cater merely the general framework of
recruitment for such operations.
D. Next cones puttin; it into shape on an operational level, by
division, re;-;invent, compmiy, air win;;, ship, etc. This will be
done by appointing one trusted Party member of C0P, controlled
Youth Organizations to coordinate the others in suitable fern in
each fori.iation,. he is responsible whatever his rank and the only
one in touch with the next rung in the setup. The above indicate
the basin organization which is setup so that it can operate and
probably survive no Latter what the operation of the military unit,
like the fleas it follows the regiment.
III. Auxiliary Suonort ;r s,
Auxiliary support grows nay be setup through a store. office,
fam, etc. adj.oini'g the caa_i;, airfield or naval base, or through the
permanent personnel of such bases, fields or camps. This time of
responsible is usually among the top of the setup. Specially trained
as in addition to the subversive activities they nay handle in carp
they report directly or indirectly on the movements of troops or c;:~is s
or material for the Soviet Military Intelligence.
IV. Com ccinun'Lc at, ions
Armed and security forces in t 'U-.1e of war are in continual ::lotion
which complicates greatly the problem of communications for the
subversive underground operating within it. In fact this is one of the
major headaches, 1Uedause without addquate and frequent contact, direction
becomes ineffective and intelligence worthless. I can only indicate the
general 'method. ..Contact in the rain is established by:
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A. Personal Qorrespondence is from the "reti,;ionsible" wherezver-,i
located to a f rienr~ or relative on the Mainland, from whence it nay go
to a, b, c, d before it reaches the Military Sor_r-wittoe or. ;the Soviet
Military Intelligence4 Each responsible corresponds with his own
"friend or re;lati,v4" assined to h.ir:, for that purpose thus r:rakin' for
hundreds of contact channels, but the results are funneled by devious
ways into one place,
The correspondence it by elm le ; person to person code not
disoernibie to untrained censors sxnd difficult even for trained ones --
no false tricks are used, The letter nay talk abo.t cooties and other
insects, which May stand for infantry, Artillary, Tanks, etc. This
S eam of continuous information is then pieced together at the top
and forms the background to more current information received by fas-cer
.
moans
I3. Rac~o the oarmed services radio setup if infiltrated may be
used to transmit in_s orr:.ati ,n to agents at the horse bases or to the
ener: direct.
C. Other means - this refers to personnel in air transport.
The cableservices and ocher channels of coLziunii cation within and
outside the service.
Selection 9f..T argots
The Military ~;or _Zi _ gee prefers to concentrate on certain branches
of the armed ar.,? security services such as:
Security Police
Prison guards
Armed Forces (Arr.:y, Navy, Air Force)
Gendar:rer:.es etc,
Within each of these services, the concentration is on the ground
and training installations, especially on supply and communication.
services. The sense of that is Vhere the greatest result with the :inir.u:.i
of risk nay be obtained both from the point of view of organization,
sabotage and intelligence. The general idea belnJ that the stab ii the
back is the most effective.
Other points of concentration are the armed and security forces
intelli"once services, dicinfornation to the enerr being considered
More important than accurate information upon hir.r..
The orientation a_?.d p::ychological warfare sections are other
preferences - as exper,.enc__i propagandists they can create more havoc
than ' in any other fig ld.
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No matter how the Military Coumi':}ee may want to concentrate-.'. its
forces, it is not within its poser to determine the data.ils either
qualitatively or the total result is what, let us say
50'%, of its plan is carp: ed out, 5tY/o of the penetr=ation force goes in
the branches of service where the Military Committee wanted it an:
501, whore the wheels of the armed and security forces put then. The
re~u'it will be a distrjbution of the subversive under;_;rcu d i o:re or less
eccordir: to plan.
There arc four phases of sizbver?sion, not because they are
separated by tine - they :lay in 'o . be (foing on at the sane time,
depen."'Liin. ; upon the suo jectivo and objective factors involved. These
ary separa ed in the r.a n because they are separate links in the
general o oration - subversion directed by World: Communist Mover ent
through the "nation'.!" C,P.'s, "buided." by the CPSU - (USSR).
The Coi:ni unist Party of France: excelled in this type of
activity, 1 rior to World War II and contributed l&-rE~(1-1-Y to the
collapse of the Array in fact of Hitler s attack. Theeneral
pattern of operatirl this type of activity is to flood the arlae 1 a d
security forces, not with obvious Communist naterJ.al which is
easily dizcerniblo and may be kept out, but with literature which
attacks subtly ti- ma. ale fiber of the troops by alle,Jedly
exposin, corruption, profiteering , brutality, injustice, and r..is-
rsanaper:ent at home
.
1. This type of .:i te.rial nay reach the troops in the
form of pulp Ti-.a azines a- d pamphlets, mixed in with unoffensive
stuff. It i?ay. reach than in the form of car,,oufla ed
Co,.I.Unist journals, or .alleged reli;ious or veterans' jo~_'rnals,
or the radio. The r ethods of doinL this are infinite. It ?.,ay
reach there ii-_ the form of fake issues of a ,ublication such as
the Rea'-r's Phest, where two or three articles of the nary
are designed for that purpose.
2. Subtle Lei oralization work can also be done throuJii
army papers, like Stars and _Stripes, or papers p d li shee'd oil a
r euir1t ntal ana divisional level, etc.
3. The Communist Clan Iestine organization, of course,
thorou hly exploits a l complaints and ,grievances within the
Armed and security forces, with'.the hatred or ridicule con-
centrated on ccrtaii, officers, aimed at the officer staff as a
whole, who are suitable for targets. This should not Live the
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idea that the pen .trttion agat a.'sriun acgt .r Mg officer.rank:,
especially in the services upon which they concentrate but
on the contrary, they and symuathizers bocome the "good"
officers boosted by the undirgrcund for their purposes. The
game of di?.r .ding so one may rule or take advantage therefrom
works its stay -s many subtle forms not easily discernible in
the tension and stress of war.
4. The disintegration work grows bolder with reverses
and defeat. "Soldiers" committees may then spring up to lead
the disintegration to a conclusion. Disintegration work, too,
has its Several phases, but this should Dive a general idea
as to how it works.
5. One of the most notable and unprecedel ;red cases of
quick disintegration was our rush demobilization following
AJ. Day. Taking full advantage of the strong urge of the
..en to get home after the job was done, the Communist Party
underground operati n~ within the Armed Forces, strongly
supported by the penetration agents and their dupes back
hone, organized the "back hone" movement, causing a rush
demobilization before the signing of a peace treaty, leaving
USSYs military power supreme in Asia and Europe. Never
before had a victorious power demobilized before a peace
treaty was signed.
6. ;Thu "Dr.':u' the Boys Home"movement, led by the
Communists in and out of the Armed Forces, revealed: for the
first time that the so-called ally had organized-against its.
Western A1105 w1i .ale they were fighting on USSR's side.
As small numerically as the Corl.un..st underground inside of
the Armed Forces may have been, it was big enough to lead the
rush sentiment to get out of uniform.
It is the function of this type of organization to fan
sparks into flames and flames into conflagrati.nns. Thus, a
victory demobilization was turned into a defeat, a won war
into a lost peace, leading up to the present war -- a master
stroke of the enemy within and a tragic warning to us.
B. Sabotage
An attack on the morale of the armed and security forces is,
of course, a perliuinary or concomitant of other forms of sabotage.
it is, in fact, itself an indirect form of sabotage.
Direct Sabotage becomes possible on a lame scale only when
the morale is sufficiently shot, in which case it can take the form
of sullen resistance to duties and commands, blowing up of supplies
and equipment, sneak extermination of officers, etc. Misdirection
of supplies, misdirected or "accidentally" delayed orders, etc. --
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where and how this is done depend;, on which echelons and services
have been infiltrated. All of it is made to appear accidental,
or as an holiest i:,is~take. There are idany other forms to cover up
an l dissimulate. skilled organization of fanatics can do a lot
of these things wh; _h otherwise would seem not practical_.le,, and
still survive. Sabotage ar.1 possible measures against it is in
i.taelf a vast subject and requires specialized study for each branch
of the service. Suffice it to say that a sabotage organization
survives longest when it works in a manner so asAF o expose tselL
the least. Communist sabotage works in that :ianner.
C. Mutiny
There are various fonas of open defiance in the Communist book
in tine of war generally associated with the concept of
"fraternization with the enemy." The release of Am.merican.prisoners
by the Red Chines in ,orea falls within that concept . Its aim
is to soften up our units and induce "desertion" by giving way to
the enemy's pressure, or by cUreedy going over to the enemy in
numbers, preferably in strategic spots. This latter is a covert
fort: of aiding the Soviet army.
Moscow has training acaCer-iies for the various types of
subversive warfare, in which the shortest course is three : Months
and some run lip to three years, and the men who go there arc
seasoned conspirators before they are accepted. This should -live
one an idea t' at there is more to learn than meets the eye, or more
than could be told in this brief.
D. Espionage
Soviet military espionage seeks the type of information
customarily sought by otter intelligence services in this field,
but operating through native subversive organizations it has
facilities usually not available to ethers. Also, in wartime,,
it is not a purely intelligence organization, but i.; busy with
demoralization work, sabotage, etc. - a subject for specialists
and part of the total pattern of subversion.
E. Peacetime Penetration
In peacetimm, the C.P. prefers to use its forces in civilian
activity where there is much more leeway for dehloae:. t of
their talents. The idea is that Po-,rerful civilian penetration
in peacetime makes for powerful penetration in war time.
Even in peacetime, however, this activity, although on a vastly
reduced basis, is not eglecteda Large numbers of Communist veto ans,
lying in wait as it were, in the enlisted Reserves, will. be blanketed
in when r.iovilizatior. comes, or else will enlist in the National Guard,
which makes them free as civilians whale keeping in shape for
military purposes.
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The C,P: does maintain a skeleton form of penetration in
the redu.lar peaeetiue forces also, but his is mostly a convenience
for Soviet Military Intelli _ once, and there is no sustained
sawvers ve activity connected with it, except in countries which
have meSS conscript.-on armies, as used to be the case in France.
This bein '; a cold var afdainst the USSR, the C,,P, `s must be expected
to putt fo rard far more than their iusual,reffort at subversion. The
main target still is the morale of the armed and securii y forces. Since
the adversary is the USSR, perfect coordination of Soviet and C.P,
clandestine activities is possible in every way.
i?ext in importance is Soviet military esp_o lagge, carried out
t11x'ou? ll the Cal ~ . independently. Tipping off the advei~ nary as to
soft spots in r:icrale, a~-eame?ni;, command and o her dioco,itica:ls,
sabcta{ e a11U. mutiny may code at a later stage when the military under-
grouncL. has cuff?ie eent or anization and the i:,o:rale may ag under the
stresses of war.
A counter.-gd ve:rsi.ve o.cCan zation in the Armed and security forces,
starting with a few hundred am perhaps expanding tb three to five
thousand sfecializing in t .Js problem may be an adegyuat-ce insurance
because as a security agency it can command the assistance of others,
That is, it works with the wind, while the Communists work against it.
A thorough study of the problem in all its aspects may rec7uire more
than that.
The final objective of military subversives is, of course, to
take over the Arj:icc. and security Forces, or parts thereof, as the
military aril of the new "Peoples Government".
The above should dive at least a general id ea of t11e problem,
and perhaps a few surge stions of what to do about it.
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