Comments and Proposals Pertaining to JSG Recommendation No. 18

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04007A000700160007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 19, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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JUST 2.2- RIM ASV -2.A1.4.44,- A0110 114
8-0400474A00070016
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr.
Chairman, Ad
SUBJECT
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Comments and Proposals Pertaining
to :SG Recommendation No. 18
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1. In reference to prior meetings of the Ad Hoc Working
Group and the list of suggested items on physical security and per-
scrawl security, the following approach of the Working Group is
suggested. Comments on counterintelligence will follow as a col-
lateral program in support of the first two topics.
Z. The security of overseas personnel and installations is
the responsibility of the head of the department controlling the over
seas installation.. Security policy under which these operate are
responsive to the various Executive Orders which pertain to these
two fields, principally Executive Orders 10501 and 10450. in
addition, there are certain laws in the field of internal security
vihich includes certain categories of information. The differences
in the security programs of the departments and agencies stem from
the internal policies, the interpretation of various Executive Orders,
the nature of the installation, the type of overseas program and the
funds available within the individual departments and agencies.
Heretofore there has been no single interdepartmental organization
which has attempted to coordinate the overseas security programs
and policies and as a result there is a lack of uniformity in such
programs.
3. As proposed in the suggested items of physical security
and personnel security, there are a number of practices, procedures,
techniques azul programs which could be recommended for innovation,
increased emphasis and greater support. These would tend to produce
atigher degree of practical security in official overseas activities
and would tend to correct or overcome inadequacies or weaknesses
that may exist in present programs. Of particular importance would
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ch high ezr degree of uniformity in security programs thereby
of information and problems under uniform
s. This is extremely important in the la-
the wide lateral dissemination of bite/li-
the departments and agencies involved
of that information to overseas In.
in both program and practice by
Y presents a security hazard to the community
of departments and agencies having overseas programs and installs
tions. There should he mutual confidence and uniformity in the
security programs of the departments and agencies concerned;
both from the standpoint of the dissemination of sensitive information
and the conduct of personnel under the security program. In this
regard, the report of the Security Committee produced in September
1960 COACOraing Personnel Security Procedures of the Intelligence
Community in force as of 1 3uly 1960 might serve as an excellent
basis from which to compare programs in these fields.
4. In the field of counterintelligence, NSCID No. 5 and
D. 5/1, 5/2 and 5/3 establish the counterintelligence/counter-
policy and program of the Intelligence Community. The
ent of relationships between the counterintelligence pro.
the security program for security of personnel and in-
s of the utmost importance and this represents anoppor.
a definite forward step in this area. It is suggested that
e following approach be considered by the Working Group.
a. The present knowledge which derives from the
existing system of counterintelligence is not
properly understood, utilised or developed by
the security officials responsible for the over-
seas security programs and the security officers
in charge of the overseas installations.
b. The dissemination of pertinent information in the
counterintelligence field from the producers to
the responsible security components for the over-
seas security programs could be considerably
improved. At the same time, the security per-
sonnel should supplement their organisational,
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research communication ?yeterue to take the
fullest advantage of caunterintellig nce inIorrna..
tion and take appropriate action on the basis of
the information.
C. Th ity officers of the indtviduaI d
ments and agencies Te.pQflib1e Lor the ove eas
security program and the *ecurtty officers in
charge et overseas installations obtain, develop
and exploit to a certain degree, a consider,able
*mount of counterintelligence information in the
ourse of their daily duties. Such information,
however, is frequently maintained within the
confidence of the agency itself and is not dis-
seminated to a sufficient degree to other depart
accents and agencies having overseas' installations
end faced with the same or related counterintelli-
gence problems. The reluctance to disseminate
such information frequently results from the
involvement a an officer or employee of the
department or in. incident affecting the procedures
or controls of that department. tA is felt that more
ch counterintelligence information could be pro-
ly sanitised and reported for the benefit of
cies and departments. It would appeor
a full reporting is desirable of the
operations, provocations, blackmail
enetration attempts, subversion attempts
actions by hostile elements seeking to
U. S. Government installations, per-
curity procedures pertinent thereto.
d. There ie erious need by security pereannet of
the departmsatts and agencies for country studies
setting forth the capability of the local government
and other forces to mount operations against U. S.
installations and personnel. Such studies would
permit security officials to relate their security
pregraras in a more effective manner and certainly
direct their efforts against the capability of the
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? Studies of this nature can be proo
e CIA and by the security components
departments and agencies based
ence in these fields. Frequently1
e or incident serves WO an excellent
ch local hostile capabilities and
be reported and disseminated.
e. It is envisioned that in the above suggestions there
would be a much greater flow of counterintelligence
information between the users and the producers
and U properly exploited should result in a COM*
'adorable improvement in the security program.
5. The oposal to expand the Security Committee into the
Counterintelligence and Security Committee is 'clearly contrary to the
present policies of the USW awl does not serve to *newer in a
practical way the need for improving the relationship of counterin-
telligence to the security program. The counterintelligence program
is in erdstance 'Ind it is more a case of dissemination and proper
utilisation of the inforrrtation by security officials. The Security
Committee cannot "take over" counterintelligence functions but it
certainly can ierve to increase the flow of CIA information, promote
to the utmost use and propose more professionalism in meeting the
security threat in overseas installations.
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Security
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