SECURITY PROBLEMS - LONG RANGE PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04007A000800150004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY PROBLEMS - LONG RANGE PLANNING
The Office of Security is constantly striving to improve security
in all of its fields. Technical developments, sociological change.,
and possible realignment of international forces will require.changes
in our security techniques and procedures. These unique problems
must be met with a high degree of sophistication in the security field.
Some of the future problems can be identified by manifestations appearing
at this time. Others cannot. Accordingly, this paper will address
itself to-future security problems which are either with us at the present
time and will continue to be problems, or those which can be anticipated
with some degree of certainty.
1. Investigations and Operational Support
1. As a result of recent writings on the "invasion of privacy"
there has developed a noticeable reluctance on the part of persons
interviewed during the course of investigations to furnish information
about, or even identify, the persons known to them who are being
investigated. This reluctance has also manifested itself in the refusal
by some university officials to make available documents and informa-
tion pertinent to personnel s ecurity investigations. It is contemplated
that this will be a continuing problem which will become even more pro-
nounced in future years. These circumstances will require the develop-
ment of new investigative techniques and additional sources of informa-
tion. In this regard, the Office of Security has a senior officer. working
2. The conduct of inter -agency name checks will, in the future,
be made through the medium of automatic data processing equipment.
This anticipated development will require long range planning on the
part of the Office of Security in order that we may reap the benefits
from such automated developments, but at the same time protect the
security of Agency information and sources.
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II. Physical Security
1. The physical protection of CIA installations and personnel
abroad will be a continuing problem. The prominent power position
of the U. S. will continue to subject its overseas personnel to increased
numbers of demonstrations, riots, or acts of violence together with
their attendant security problems. Long range planning must take this
into account in order to provide additional security on a continuing
"in-place" basis.
2. The ever increasing cost of guard protection of Agency
buildings should be reduced through the use of technological advances
in the field of personal identification. It is anticipated that by continuing
effort, the state of the art in this field can be advanced so as to yield
the desired security results. Automatic and instantaneous fingerprint
processing is one of possibilities toward the achievement of this security
goal.
III.: Counterintelligence
Within the framework of a "bi-polar" world power structure,
considerable emphasis in the security field has been given-to the
threats presented by the currently identified -- Communist oriented
opposition. Security techniques, practices. and procedures must be
sensitive to any new penetration efforts on the part of other nations
which may affect the security of the Agency. Necessary security
measures must be developed on a timely basis in order to meet any
new, developing threats. In cooperation with the CI Staff, DDP,
necessary security measures must be developed on a timely basis
in order to meet any new developing threats.
IV. Polygraph
1. There has been much congressional interest in connection
with the use of the polygraph. In this connection, the validity of the
polygraph has been challenged and certain restrictions on its use are
highly probable. Every effort must be made to permit the Agency to
continue the use of this highly effective security asset.
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2. Appropriate research will be necessary in order to improve
the security benefits which can be derived by stress measurements.
It is felt that considerable advancement in the state of the art of the
polygraph technique is possible.
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V. Industrial Security
Until the present time there has been little evidence of concerted
opposition efforts to penetrate industrial facilities performing -classified
Government contracts. With the increased importance of technology in
the intelligence field and with increased dependence by the intelligence
community on industrial assistance, it is anticipated that opposition
efforts in this connection will be materially increased. Future
security policies, procedures and techniques must address themselves
to this problem and produce the necessary security protection.
VI. Technical Security
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VII. Personnel Security
In order for the Agency to stay abreast of new developments
in the intelligence field it will be necessary to process security
clearances in large numbers on a continuing basis. Increased efforts
on the part of the opposition to penetrate CIA will require a continuing
vast expenditure of manpower in order to yield the necessary degree
.of personnel security. Additional emphasis will be required to carry
out a current, reinvestigation program of staff employees, consultants
and contractor personnel.
VIII. Automatic Data Processing
All Office of Security programs must be geared so as to accrue
the greatest benefits from automation. The most serious problem is
the development of systems for the easy and effective in-put of security
data into a format which can be automated and retrieved at a later date,
compatible with the needs of all Agency components involved.
IX. Protection of Intelligence
1. "Leaks of information" will continue to pose a threat to the
protection of intelligence sources and methods. Efforts to combat
such disclosures must continue to be exercised through the USIB,
with continued emphasis upon the realization that the cooperation of
all departments and agencies will be required to produce the necessary
degree of success in this security effort.
2. The degree of protection afforded classified information is
only as strong as the lowest standards maintained within the recipient
agencies. Recent revelations of espionage have shown that all agencies
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are affected by the penetration of any one community agency. CIA is,
therefore, continually striving through the Security Committee of the
United States Intelligence Board to develop uniform security criteria
and standards for use by all member agencies in the intelligence
community. .
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