SOVIET MILITARY POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00831R000100210052-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 112
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMIREX FILE COPY
?
SOVIET
mnirritit
powElt
1983
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-"WOW
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SOVIET MILITARY POWER
First Edition
September 1981
SOVIET MILITARY POWER
Second Edition
March 1983
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
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CONTENTS
I SOVIET MILITARY POWER 5
II STRATEGIC FORCES 13
HI THEATER FORCES 33
Western Theater 35
Southern Theater 48
Far Eastern Theater 51
General Naval Forces 55
NATO/Warsaw Pact 62
IV SOVIET SPACE SYSTEMS 65
V RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY 71
VI SOVIET POWER PROJECTION 83
VII THE CHALLENGE 101
The illustrations of new Soviet weapons systems introducing each
chapter are derived from various US sources; while not precise in
every detail, they are as authentic as possible.
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PREFACE
"There is nothing hypothetical about the Soviet military machine. Its expansion, mod-
ernization, and contribution to projection of power beyond Soviet boundaries are obvious. A
clear understanding of Soviet Armed Forces, their doctrine, their capabilities, their strengths,
and their weaknesses is essential to the shaping and maintenance of effective US and Allied
armed forces."
Those words from Soviet Military Power, published in September 1981, provide a fitting
point of departure for this updated second edition. Soviet Military Power 1983 reports on the
size, capabilities, and deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces?and documents the improve-
ments and the R&D which are shaping the increased capabilities of the Soviet Strategic
Rocket Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and the
Navy?forces numbering more than 4.9 million men.
Since late 1981:
? The USSR has begun test flights of two new land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Mis-
siles, while continuing modernization of the deployed SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBM force.
? The USSR has begun test flights of a new generation of strategic, manned bombers?the
BLACKJACK bomber, larger than the US B-1.
? The USSR has begun test flights of a new generation of ground-, sea- and air-launched
cruise missiles, missiles with nuclear capability with ranges in excess of 1,600 kilometers, sig-
nificantly expanding the flexibility of Soviet strategic options.
? The first of the USSR's 25,000-ton TYPHOON-Class strategic ballistic missile subma-
rines has test fired its MIRVed, nuclear-warhead, 8,300-kilometer-range, submarine-launch-
ed ballistic missiles. A second TYPHOON has been launched.
? Modernization and forward deployment of increasing numbers of Soviet intermediate
nuclear forces ?land, sea, and air?have proceeded at an unparalleled pace.
? More than 330 mobile launchers for the SS-20 ? a Longer-Range Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Force (LRINF) missile with three nuclear warheads and reloads for each launcher?
are now arrayed against Western Europe, the Middle East, parts of Africa, and most of Asia,
including China and Japan.
? Su-24/FENCER ground-attack aircraft have been forward-deployed to nations of East-
ern Europe and to border bases in Asia, extending the combat radius of these new nuclear-
capable aircraft to include Japan and most of NATO Europe.
? The USSR has introduced additional nuclear-capable weapons systems to its forward-de-
ployed divisions in Eastern Europe. The new SS-21 mobile, short-range ballistic missile system
is operational in Eastern Europe as is the 152-mm self-propelled gun, adding to Soviet con-
ventional, chemical, and nuclear war-fighting options.
? The USSR's T-80 main battle tank, in development in 1981, is in the field with Soviet
Tank Divisions in both the USSR and Eastern Europe, adding to the extended combat capa-
bilities of the more than 190 Soviet ground force divisions.
? In 1981, two Soviet KIEV-Class aircraft carriers were operational. Now, three units are on
the high seas; a fourth unit has been launched; and development continues on a newer, larger
class of aircraft carriers.
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? In shipyards on the Baltic and Black Seas, series production continues on four new classes
of surface warships? a new generation of nuclear- and conventionally powered Soviet cruisers
and guided missile destroyers enhancing the Soviet Navy's air defense, antisubmarine war-
fare, and cruise-missile, surface-strike capabilities.
? Five Soviet shipyards have continued to produce new attack submarines for the world's
largest submarine force. In 1980, the first of the new, extremely large OSCAR-Class guided
missile submarines was launched, a submarine capable of firing up to 24 long-range antiship
cruise missiles while submerged. That lead unit is now on sea trials, and a second unit has
been launched.
? The USSR's military-related space program has grown in manned missions, more recon-
naissance/surveillance/targeting satellites and antisatellite space systems.
? The USSR's combat operations have continued to expand in Afghanistan, and now in-
volve more than 105,000 Soviet troops with some of the newest Soviet weapons.
? From Indochina to the Caribbean, the USSR has continued to expand its global military
presence. To cite just one example, a Soviet Navy task force operated in the Caribbean and
Gulf of Mexico from November 1982 to February 1983.
? Expansion of the USSR's technology and industrial production base has matched the
growth and deployment of its armed forces, reflecting a top priority investment in defense
production aided by continuing acquisition of Western technology.
? Despite economic difficulties, the USSR allocates an estimated 15 percent of GNP to its
military buildup, an increase from the 12-to-14 percent reported in 1981, which in turn repre-
sents a continuance of the trend of the last 21 years.
To place this modernization and growth of the USSR's Armed Forces in perspective, Soviet
Military Power 1983 includes substantial data on US and Allied forces enhancement as well
as some comparative US-USSR and NATO-Warsaw Pact tables. Comprehensive information
on US forces, of course, is regularly made available to the public in such publications as the
Secretary of Defense's Annual Report and the Military Posture Statement of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ours is a free society; the Soviet Union is not. The updated facts
presented in this report leave no doubt as to the USSR's dedication to achieving military su-
periority in all fields.
It is our duty to have a full awareness of Soviet military growth, modernization and capabil-
ities and to shape our defense forces and our deterrent capabilities accordingly. We can do no
less if we are to provide fully and wisely for our security, and that of our Allies. Ours is a for-
midable task, made more difficult by a decade of our neglect coupled with two decades of
massive Soviet increases. But, we and our Allies can accomplish the task if we have the will,
the courage, and the resolution possessed in ample measure by our predecessors who won our
freedom, and who have kept it for us all. This is at once our most precious heritage and our
most solemn responsibility to posterity.
March 1983
Caspar W. Weinber
Secretary of Defense
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I SOVIET MILITARY PO
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The continuing growth and modernization of
the Soviet military have enabled the Soviet
Union to structure and posture its forces for of-
fensive use on short notice. Consequently, the
need for the fullest possible information on the
mission, capabilities and deployment of the
Soviet Union's Armed Forces is today greater
than ever before.
In the nuclear area, the Soviets continue to
build far greater numbers of missiles and war-
heads than are necessary for a credible deter-
rent capability. Soviet conventional forces have
increased offensive capabilities, and the Soviets
have demonstrated detailed plans for the offen-
sive use of these forces. Soviet tactical air and
missile forces continue to acquire advanced
weapons systems and support systems designed
for the conduct of large-scale air offensives. So-
viet ground force modernization, deployment
and training permit rapid and sustained for-
ward movement from peacetime locations to
objectives well beyond Soviet/Warsaw Pact bor-
ders. At the same time, it is clear from Soviet
strategic planning and operations that its naval
ships and aircraft are committed to denying op-
posing navies use of adjacent seas and conduct-
ing strikes against enemy land targets.
In September 1981, Soviet Military Power
was published to make available to people
everywhere a factual report on the magnitude
of the Soviet military buildup and the changing
character of Soviet military objectives. That
first report:
? examined the Soviet and non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact military industrial base, the
The new Pushkin? Antiballistic Missile Radar?
part of the continuing modernization of Soviet
military power?provides 380? strategic defense
coverage from the phased array radars in its four-
sided structure 120 feet high and 500 feet wide.
Silo-launched interceptor missiles contribute to
this improved ABM defense of Moscow.
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world's largest in facilities and physical
size;
? described the organization of Soviet
Armed Forces, the USSR's strategic com-
mand structure, command and control,
logistic support and combat doctrine;
? described the Soviet conventional and
nuclear land, sea and air forces
designated for theater operations;
? reviewed the increasing capabilities
of Soviet strategic forces, including the
SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, and the
continuing modernization of the subma-
rine-launched ballistic missile force;
? described the research and develop-
ment effort behind the USSR's drive for
modern military technology;
? reported on the USSR's projection of
military power around the world; and
? summarized the challenge posed to
the United States and its Allies by the
Soviet Armed Forces.
Two fundamentally important considerations
have now led to this updated report, Soviet
Military Power 1983. First, the USSR during
the past year has pushed ahead with force
modernization, expansion and forward deploy-
ment on a scale even larger than before. Sec-
ond, the American people and free people
everywhere have continued to seek the most re-
cent information on Soviet military develop-
ments, as well as information comparing the
forces of the Warsaw Pact with forces of the
United States and other NATO nations to per-
mit a fuller appreciation of the magnitude of
the Soviet force buildup. Such comparative
data are included in this report.
The chart, "Soviet Military Forces," on pages
8 and 9 summarizes the size and composition of
the USSR's strategic nuclear forces, ground
forces, air forces, air defense forces, and naval
forces. Each chapter in this report develops a
different aspect of the current dimensions of
Soviet military power.
The US-USSR and NATO-Warsaw Pact
charts and tables in the chapters that follow
help to depict the shift in the military balance.
These charts are not all-inclusive. Comprehen-
sive information on US forces is regularly made
available to the people of the United States and
throughout the world in such publications as
the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report and
the Military Posture Statement of the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Soviet
Union does not make such information avail-
able. Thus, the focus of Soviet Military Power
1983 is on the Soviet Union's Armed Forces.
Weapons production, for example, is an indi-
cator of the shifting balance over the past
decade. The Soviets have manufactured ap-
proximately 2,000 ICBMs; 54,000 tanks and
other armored vehicles; 6,000 tactical combat
aircraft; 85 surface warships and 61 attack sub-
marines ?with much of this stockpile of materi-
al comparable in quality to US counterpart
systems. US production over the same period
has been considerably less ?approximately 350
ICBMs, 11,000 tanks and other armored vehi-
cles, 3,000 tactical combat aircraft, 72 surface
warships and 27 attack submarines.
In 1982, the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion published NATO and the Warsaw Pact?
Force Comparisons, a publication carrying the
conviction and authority of all the NATO na-
tions that participate in the integrated military
structure of the Alliance. In his foreword,
NATO Secretary General Joseph M.A.H. Luns
stated:
"The numerical balance of forces has mov-
ed slowly but steadily in favor of the War-
saw Pact over the past two decades. During
this period the members of the North At-
lantic Alliance have lost much of the tech-
nological edge which permitted NATO to
6
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rely on the view that quality could compen-
sate for quantity. It is clear that the trend
is dangerous. Nevertheless, the overall de-
terrent continues to safeguard peace."
NATO-Warsaw Pact comparative data from
this report ?data that address the totality of
Soviet/Pact forces that could be brought to
bear against NATO in the event of war ? are
presented in the concluding section of Chapter
III of this document.
The illustrations opening Chapters I and
11?the new ABM radar in the Moscow area
and the new strategic BLACKJACK bomber ?
dramatize the continuing upgrade of Soviet
strategic force capabilities. Chapter II examines
Soviet strategic force developments in detail.
The third and fourth generations of Soviet
ICBMs currently deployed and under develop-
ment continue to emphasize the missile force
improvements of more than a decade ?greatly
improved nuclear-warhead accuracy; multiple,
independently targetable re-entry vehicles
(MIRVs); reliability and survivability. At least
two new solid-propellant ICBMs are under de-
velopment; flight testing began in 1982 and
1983.
New, long-range, air-launched cruise missiles
currently under development and the strategic
BLACKJACK bomber will significantly enhance
the USSR's strategic offensive capabilities. The
BLACKJACK is a variable-geometry-wing ?
swing-wing ? aircraft similar to, but larger
than, the US B-1 bomber. It will be capable of
long-range subsonic cruise with supersonic
high-altitude dash and subsonic/transonic low-
level penetration. This new bomber will likely
be a multiple-role aircraft that can deliver both
free-fall bombs and air-launched cruise missiles
to intercontinental range. It is particularly
significant given the weakness of North Ameri-
can air defense.
At the same time, the Soviets have steadily
modernized their sea-based strategic force. A
second TYPHOON-Class nuclear-powered bal-
listic missile submarine (SSBN) has been
launched at the Severodvinsk Shipyard, while
the first TYPHOON is now with the Northern
Fleet. Armed with 20 launchers for the MIRV-
ed SS-NX-20 solid-fueled submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM), the first submarine of
its class should be fully operational by the end
of 1983. Moreover, the 8,300 kilometer range of
the SS-NX-20 places all of NATO Europe,
North America and Asia well within TY-
PHOON's reach, even when operating in home
waters.
As detailed in Chapter II, the USSR's strate-
gic defense force is the most massive in the
world. It includes active defenses such as mod-
ern interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) and ballistic missile defense (BMD) sys-
tems; and passive defenses such as surveillance
and warning systems, hardened bunkers, elec-
tronic countermeasures (ECM) and civil defense.
In the first edition of Soviet Military Power,
more than 180 Soviet Ground Force divisions
and some 250 SS-20 LRINF missile launchers in
the field were identified. Today there are over
190 Soviet Ground Force divisions and more
than 330 SS-20 missile launchers positioned for
delivery of nuclear warheads against Western
Europe, the Middle East, parts of Africa, and
most of Asia including China and Japan. Chap-
ter III presents an updated review of the full ar-
ray of Soviet nuclear and conventional theater
forces and their readiness for deployment in the
three theaters of operations ? the Western,
Southern and Far Eastern Theaters. These
forces, opposite NATO and arrayed against the
nations of Southwest Asia and East Asia, have
been further strengthened during 1982 by the
addition of new SS-20 launchers, and by the
forward deployment of additional nuclear-cap-
able weapons systems such as the long-range
7
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ICBMs
55 NON-SOVIET WARSAW
PACT DIVISIONS
30 SOVIET
DIVISIONS
BALTIC FLEET
TOTAL SHIPS 554
NAVAL AVIATION 275
SO VIE
NORTHERN FLE
TOTAL SHIPS
NAVAL AVIATION
ASTERN EUROPE
.1)(141ONS.:
BLACK SEA FLEET/
CASPIAN FLOTILLA
TOTAL SHIPS 542
NAVAL AVIATION 430
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
LRINF SLBMs
SS-11
550
SS-N-6
SS-13
60
SS-N-8
SS-17
150
SS-4
232
SS-N-17
950+
SS-18
308
SS-5
16
SS-N-18
SS-19
330
SS-20
333
_ SS-NX-20
IATION
8
BACKFIRE
BISON
BEAR 100 TACTICAL
BADGER/BLINDER 456 AIRCRAFT 6,200
* 200+, including
Soviet Naval Aviation
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AIR DEFENSE FORCES
14 INTERCEPTORS
OTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS
ANK DIVISIONS
IRBORNE DIVISIONS
ABM AT SAM
LAUNCHERS 32 LAUNCHERS 9,600+
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The Soviet Navy's nuclear-powered, deep-diving,
titanium-hulled ALFA -Class torpedo attack
submarine is the world's fastest, with
submerged speeds of over 40 knots.
FENCER ground attack aircraft, the SS-21
short-range ballistic missile system and the 152-
mm nuclear-capable, self-propelled gun. In lit-
tle more than a year, Soviet forces in combat in
Afghanistan have grown from 85,000 to more
than 105,000. The weapon systems being used
in Afghanistan are among the most modern
available to the Soviet Armed Forces, including
the formidable Su-25/FROGFOOT ground at-
tack aircraft. New attack submarines, surface
ships and naval aircraft further strengthen not
only the USSR's theater military capabilities,
but also its capability to conduct aggressive sea
control and sea denial operations on the world's
oceans.
Chapter IV, Soviet Space Systems, examines
the serious threat posed by the USSR's increas-
ing use of space for military purposes. The
majority of Soviet space programs has been spe-
cifically designed to support terrestial military
operations. However, the long-term develop-
ment of an antisatellite system has extended
Soviet military use of space from support opera-
tions to a direct space warfare capability. The
relative scope of the overall military program is
demonstrated by a launch rate that is four-to-
five times that of the United States, and by an
annual payload weight placed into orbit:
660,000 pounds?ten times that of the United
States.
Chapter V reports on the magnitude of pro-
duction and the cost of supporting the USSR's
continuing military buildup. It reviews the
technology and industrial resources of the
USSR's defense industrial base; the effort being
dedicated to research, design and test programs
and the commitment to training needed scien-
tific and engineering manpower. It summarizes
the results of this effort in terms of the steady
delivery of new and modernized weapon systems
to Soviet forces, and in terms of future weapon
systems that will be available to the forces. It ex-
amines the intensity with which the USSR pur-
sues the acquisition of Western technology, and
the overall impact of its military program on
the Soviet economy. The USSR's current mili-
tary capabilities reflect the achievements of a
Research and Development (R&D) and indus-
trial base that has grown steadily since the late
1950s when top priority was accorded military
R&D and production. Soviet defense continues
to receive regular and large infusions of capital
investment allocations, legally and illegally ac-
10
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quired foreign technology and equipment and
the most highly qualified science and engineer-
ing graduates. In return, the defense industrial
establishment is justifying its preferential treat-
ment by producing a steady succession of new
and improved weapon systems for the Soviet ar-
senal. These continuing efforts reflect the cur-
rent high-priority Soviet intent and commit-
ment to the development and production of
future weapons.
The cumulative dollar costs of Soviet invest-
ment for the decade were 80 percent higher
than US investment outlays. The estimated dol-
lar costs for the Soviets were more than twice
the US outlays in the mid-1970s, but, because of
the slower growth of Soviet programs and
growth in US costs, this margin had decreased
somewhat by 1981. The slower growth of Soviet
programs during the period was due to the cy-
clical nature of Soviet military* production. The
large Soviet research and development effort,
coupled with observed expansion in military
production facilities, suggests that the dollar
costs of Soviet military procurement may soon
resume their historical growth. The estimated
dollar costs for Soviet RDT&E were 70 percent
greater than US RDT&E outlays for the period
as a whole, and were more than twice as great in
1981. The dollar operating costs for Soviet ac-
tivities were about 25 percent higher both for
the period and in 1981.
The illustration at the opening of Chapter
VI, of a KIEV-Class aircraft carrier riding in a
Japanese-built floating drydock now serving
with the Soviet Pacific Fleet, symbolizes the
continuing growth of the Soviet Navy, and the
mounting capability of the USSR to project
military power wherever required in the world.
Chapter VI provides a detailed examination of
the USSR's multi-tiered approach to power pro-
jection ranging from Soviet "active measures,"
to the use of arms sales and military advisors,
the use of proxy forces, and the deployment of
military forces beyond the Soviet border.
Over the past decade, the growing capability
of Soviet armed forces to project power to great
distances has helped the USSR to sustain and
consolidate many new military outposts. This
geographic expansion of Soviet influence has
important military implications. The basing fa-
cilities now available to Soviet maritime forces
in Cuba, Vietnam, South Yemen, Angola,
Ethiopia, and elsewhere greatly extend the
reach and the staying power of Soviet naval and
air forces. While the Soviets' peacetime use of
these bases might not translate automatically to
wartime access, the potential for such access
places added burden on US and Allied forces.
This expanding access to basing facilities re-
mote from the Soviet periphery provides new
possibilities for long-range projection of Soviet
power. The Soviets have traditionally maintain-
ed their naval infantry and airborne forces at
high levels of readiness. Since 1972, naval infan-
try and airborne unit training, equipment, and
deployments have also been matched by com-
parable enhancements to Soviet airlift, sealift,
and mobility infrastructure. The trend of Soviet
geographic expansion is especially apparent if
one recognizes that most of the Soviet Union's
new military outposts are in countries that once
supported the Western alliance system by pro-
viding transit rights or other facilities. Central
America and the Caribbean are now clearly the
target of a concerted Soviet-inspired penetra-
tion effort. Further spread of Soviet military
outposts throughout the world increasingly
threatens the lifelines of the Western alliances
and makes it even more difficult and costly to
defend essential national interests.
In Chapter VII, Soviet Military Power 1983
assesses the challenge posed by the continued
growth and modernization of the USSR's Arm-
ed Forces, and summarizes the nature of the re-
sponse which the United States and its Allies
must sustain to deter Soviet aggression.
11
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II STRATEGIC FORCES
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The buildup of Soviet strategic forces con-
tinues. The following introductory paragraphs
outline the long-standing policies and objectives
behind Soviet strategic nuclear force develop-
ment and provide the backdrop for Soviet activ-
ities since the First Edition of Soviet Military
Power was published.
Soviet leaders since Khrushchev's time have
followed a consistent policy for nuclear develop-
ment. Their main objective is to capitalize, in
peacetime, on the coercive leverage inherent in
powerful nuclear forces, to induce paralysis and
create disarray in the free societies. In wartime,
they regard employment of those forces as the
key to their survival and winning.
The Soviet policy calls for forces which are
designed to destroy Western nuclear forces on
the ground and in flight to their targets, and for
the capacity to survive should nuclear weapons
reach the Soviet homeland. The overall mis-
sions encompass the likelihood that interconti-
nental nuclear war would evolve from a general
East-West conflict across the face of Eurasia.
These missions are: protect the homeland, sup-
port the land war in Eurasia and eliminate the
United States' capability to conduct or support
warfare beyond its own shores.
Protection of the homeland is the most diffi-
cult mission. The strengths and weaknesses of
Western forces determine the tasks of the
offensive and defensive forces assigned to it.
Hence, it is closely linked to Western weapons
development programs. Because of this, the
Soviets attach great importance to working
hard to keep Western modernization programs
to a minimum during peacetime.
With the flight-testing of the new BLACKJACK A
swing-wing bomber during the past year, the
USSR is nearing production of a new-generation,
strategic manned bomber to add to Soviet offen-
sive power provided by new generations of land-
based and sea-based strategic ballistic missile
nuclear forces.
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Strategic Nuclear Forces
oattroma, -
SS-13
Yoshkar 01
ICBMs
SS-11
550
SS-13
60
SS-17
150
SS-18
308
SS-19
330
Not dep
20
950 +
Protection of the homeland in a nuclear war
would involve:
? disruption and destruction of the
enemy's nuclear-associated command,
control and communications,
? destruction or neutralization of as
many of the West's nuclear weapons as
possible on the ground or at sea before
they can be launched,
? interception and destruction of sur-
viving weapons?aircraft and missiles ?
before they can reach targets,
? protection of the party, state, and in-
dustrial infrastructure and the essential
working population against those weap-
ons that reach their targets.
The forces and programs in place or under
14
BACKFIRE
BISON
BEAR
BADGER/BLINDER
ERS
200 +
45
100
455
active development designed to accomplish
these tasks include:
? hard-target-capable ICBMs and
LRINF missiles,
? bombers capable of penetrating US
defensive systems and SLBMs which can
be postured for short flight times,
? antisubmarine forces capable of at-
tacking US SSBNs,
? air and missile defenses, including
early warning satellites and radars, inter-
ceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles,
ABM radars and interceptors, and some
anti-aircraft artillery,
? passive defense forces, including civil
defense forces, and troops and equipment
devoted to confusing incoming aircraft,
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? hardened facilities numbering in the
thousands, command vehicles, and evac-
uation plans designed to protect party,
military, governmental, and industrial
staffs, essential workers and, to the extent
possible, the general population.
Supporting a land war in Eurasia and elimi-
nating the United States' capability to fight
beyond its own shores require a capability to
employ intercontinental forces useful over a
variety of ranges and the destruction of:
? other military-associated command
and control,
? war-supporting industries, arsenals
and major military facilities,
? ports and airfields in the United
States and those along sea and air routes
to European and Asian theaters of war,
and
? satellite and ground-based surveil-
lance sensors and facilities and
communications.
Offensive forces (ICBMs, LRINF, SLBMs,
and bombers) and antisatellite weapons are
generally assigned these tasks although some
special operations troops could be used, es-
The BACKFIRE Bomber, Capable of Nuclear Strike, Conventional Attack, Anti-shipping, and
Reconnaissance Missions.
15
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pecially in Eurasia. These tasks are generally
less demanding than those for the first mission.
Soviet intercontinental forces are designed to
fulfill their missions under the best and worst of
circumstances. In the Soviet view, the most fav-
orable circumstance is a first or preemptive
strike; the least favorable is a follow-on strike
after nuclear weapons have hit the USSR. In be-
tween is the launch-under-attack circumstance:
that is, executing offensive forces after weapons
aimed at the USSR have been launched but be-
fore they hit their targets. The Soviets have
wide-ranging programs designed to provide
nuclear forces able to operate under each of
these circumstances. Moreover, the Soviets ap-
pear to believe that nuclear war might last for
weeks, even months, and have factored this into
their force development.
? In a First or preemptive strike, the es-
sentials are effective coordination of the
strike and sound intelligence of the
West's intentions. Soviet nuclear forces
practice almost constantly, emphasizing
command and control under various con-
ditions. During wartime, the main mis-
sion of Soviet intelligence is to determine
the West's nuclear attack intentions.
? The Soviets practice launching weap-
25,000-ton TYPHOON-Class SSBN firing SS-NX-20
missile.
ons under the stringent time constraints
that would prevail under hypothetical
launch-under-attack circumstances. They
have established a satellite-based ICBM
launch detection system, have built an
over-the-horizon radar missile launch
detection system to back up the satellites,
and have large phased-array radars ring-
ing the USSR.
? Follow-on strikes stress the survivabil-
ity of the command, control and commu-
nications systems and that of the weapons
themselves. The Soviets have invested
heavily in providing this survivability.
The SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs are
housed in the world's hardest silos. Silo
deployment has been adopted for ABMs
DELTA Ill-Class SSBN
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YANKEE-Class SSBN
as well. The SS-20 LRINF missile is
mobile, and a mobile strategic SAM is
being developed. The launch control fa-
cilities for offensive missiles are housed in
very hard silos or on off-road vehicles.
Communications are redundant and
hardened. Higher commands have multi-
ple hardened facilities and mobile com-
mand vehicles and aircraft available for
their use. Bombers have alert procedures
and dispersal airfields. Ballistic missile
submarines can be placed in tunnels near
their home ports, submerged in deep
fjords just off their piers, dispersed and
protected by Soviet surface and subma-
rine forces.
? The Soviet belief that war might be
protracted requires the survivability need-
ed for follow-on strikes, along with war
reserves, protection for people and equip-
ment, and the capacity to reload launch-
ers. For their ICBM, LRINF and air de-
fense forces, the Soviets have stocked ex-
tra missiles, propellants, and warheads
throughout the USSR. ICBM silo launch-
ers can be reloaded in a matter of days,
and provision has been made for the de-
contamination of those launchers. Plans
for the survival of necessary equipment
17
and personnel have been developed and
practiced. Resupply ships are available to
reload Soviet SSBNs in protected waters.
Despite these comprehensive warfighting ob-
jectives and ambitious development and deploy-
ment programs over the years, the Soviets are
continuing to modernize all aspects of their
strategic forces.
Much of what the Soviets have done since
September 1981 involves the consummation of
programs begun in the 1970s and offers the first
signs of new programs designed to help remedy
weaknesses still remaining and to allow them to
attain their own objectives in the face of pro-
spective Western programs.
Older programs:
? replacement of older missiles with SS-
19 Mod 3 and SS-18 Mod 4 MIRVed
ICBMs, the world's most lethal ICBMs,
? construction of DELTA III SSBNs,
fitted with 16 SS-N-18 MIRVed SLBMs,
with YANKEE and HOTEL SSBNs dis-
mantled in compensation,
? continuation of the SS-NX-20 MIRV-
ed SLBM testing program (The
TYPHOON/SS-NX-20 weapon system
will become operational in 1983.),
? continued production of BACKFIRE
bombers,
? further deployment of the SA-10 low-
altitude SAM around Moscow and
throughout the USSR,
? initial production of the 11-76/
MAINSTAY airborne warning and con-
trol systems (AWACS),
? continued development of a high-
speed ABM interceptor and a modified
version of the older GALOSH ABM
interceptor,
? additional construction of large
phased-array radars around the periphery
of the USSR,
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SS-11 ICBM
? continued construction of hardened
shelters and command posts for passive
defense.
New programs since 1981:
? first tests of a new solid-propellant
ICBM similar in size and payload to the
US MX,
? the first test of a new small solid-
propellant ICBM, which could be deploy-
ed on mobile transporters,
? preparations to begin testing other
new ICBMs, probably in 1983,
? development of a series of long-range
cruise missiles intended for ground, air
and sea launch platforms,
? preparations to begin testing another
new SLBM, probably in 1983,
? the first flight tests of the new
BLACKJACK strategic bomber,
? new ABM deployment around Mos-
cow to include a new, very large phased-
array radar and deployment of new ABM
interceptors,
? testing of high-energy laser systems
for land-based and sea-based air defense,
? Testing of a mobile version of the
SA-10 SAM,
? the initial deployment of the FOX-
HOUND interceptor which can identify
and track targets flying far beneath it
and fire air-to-air missiles against those
targets,
? testing of two additional new air de-
fense interceptor aircraft.
While these efforts have continued, the Soviet
leadership has also been directing an active
measures campaign to support and amplify on-
going anti-nuclear movements in the West, in
order to influence, delay, or frustrate Western
nuclear program developments. Using this two-
pronged approach, Moscow seeks a new gain in
relative capability despite the drive of Western
governments to redress the imbalance which has
developed over the past decade.
INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK
Since the late 1950s, the Soviets have devel-
oped and deployed nuclear attack forces having
two fundamental capabilities: strikes against
enemy nuclear arsenals and command and con-
trol systems and support of land warfare in
Eurasia. While the character, composition, and
technical sophistication of the forces have
changed over the years, the missions have not.
The development of capabilities to satisfy the
missions has been done with patience and pur-
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pose derived from a realization that not all goals
can be achieved at once. ICBMs have the mis-
sion to attack the ICBM force of the United
States and other hardened targets. ICBMs and
SLBMs are earmarked for strikes against com-
munications, command and control systems
and against the defense infrastructure of the
United States. Some ICBMs and SLBMs may
have been designated as strategic reserves. All
of the forces must operate in a variety of en-
vironments. Bombers have become a supple-
mentary force for ICBMs and SLBMs. Finally,
the majority of the systems have been designed
to be capable for use not only at intercon-
tinental ranges against the United States but
also at shorter ranges against targets through-
out Europe and Asia.
US and Soder ICBM Launcher and Reentry
Vehicle (RV) Deployment 1968-1983
6,003 -
5,000 -
4,000 -
3,000 -
2,000-
Soviet RVs
US RVs
Soviet ICBMs
US ICBMs
-6,000
-5,000
-4,030
-3,000
-2,000
-1,000
0 0
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 19130 1982 1984
ICBMS: The Soviet ICBM force has been
developed and deployed in four successive
generations, each representing significant ad-
vances. The Soviet ICBM force currently con-
sists of 550 SS-11s, 60 SS-13s, 150 SS-17s, 308
SS-18s, and 330 SS-19s. These missiles carry
some 6,000 nuclear warheads. Presently, the
great majority of the 17s, 18s and 19s are equip-
ped with MIRVs. By the mid-1980s the Soviets
are expected to complete their current ICBM
modernization programs for fourth-generation
systems. At that time, they will have 520 SS-11s,
60 SS-13s, 150 SS-17s, 308 SS-18s, and 360
SS-19s. When this deployment is finished, the
force will have some 6,400 warheads.
ICBM improvements may be measured in
terms of quantity, quality and survivability.
Quantitative Improvements: Deployment of
the Soviets' first (SS-6) and second (SS-7 and SS-
8) generation ICBMs began in the late 1950s
and early 1960s. By 1966, deployment of third
generation missiles (SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13) was
underway. With this generation, the Soviets
rapidly increased the number of ICBMs deploy-
ed. ICBM deployment reached its peak in the
mid-1970s at approximately 1,600 launchers.
After this, the number of launchers gradually
decreased to the current level of approximately
1,400 as the Soviets removed their less-capable
second generation missiles from the force. (The
first generation was phased out in the 1960s.)
From 1975 to the present, however, there has
been a dramatic increase in the number of
deliverable nuclear warheads as the MIRVed
versions of the fourth generation ICBMs (SS-17,
SS-18, and SS-19) have been deployed. Since
these missiles can carry up to 10 reentry vehicles
(RVs), the number of deployed ICBM nuclear
warheads has increased by a factor of four, not
withstanding the reduction in the number of
SALT-accountable launchers.
Qualitative Improvements: The dramatic
growth in nuclear warheads observed after 1975
could not have been possible without major
qualitative improvements. The first two genera-
tions of Soviet ICBMs were inaccurate, carried
relatively small payloads and required lengthy
19
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METERS
30
20
10
NUMBER DEPLOYED
WARHEADS
MAX RANGE (KM)
LAUNCH MODE
METERS
30
zo
10
EOM Fourth Generation ICBMs
SS-18
SS-17
MOD
2
MOD
3
150 308
4 1 4 1 8/10 1
10,000 11,000 10,000 12,000 11,000 - 16,000
Cold Cold Cold Cold SCold Cold
TITAN II
US ICBMs
10
11,000
Cold
6
9,600
Hot
330
1
10,000
,Hot
6-
10,000
Hot -
NUMBER DEPLOYED
as
450
550
WARHEADS
1
1
3
MAX RANGE (KM)
12,000
12,500
14,000
LAUNCH MODE
Hot
Hot
Hot
launch procedures. To make up for these defi-
ciencies, reentry vehicles were fitted with
high-yield nuclear weapons. With the third
generation, both accuracy and payload capabil-
ity were improved to some degree. However, it
was not until the fourth generation that the
technology became available to the Soviets al-
lowing greater throw weight and greatly im-
proved accuracy so that high-yield MIRVs
could be carried by operational missiles. The
most accurate versions of the SS-18 and SS-19
20
In Development
: Up to 10
14,000
Cold
are capable of destroying hard targets. To-
gether, these systems have the capability to de-
stroy most of the 1,000 US MINUTEMAN
ICBMs, using only a portion of the warheads
available. The Soviets follow an incremental
improvement policy in the development of their
forces. They improve those components of a
weapon system that need improving and retain
those portions that are satisfactory. In this man-
ner, they have greatly improved the reliability
and capability of their current ICBM force.
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Survivability Improvements: One of the most
important improvements made in the ICBM
force has been in the area of survivability. Most
of the first- and second-generation ICBMs were
deployed on above-ground launchers with no
real protection for the launcher or the missile.
During the deployment of the second-genera-
tion missiles the Soviets began to deploy missiles
at sites containing three underground silo
launchers. Third-generation missiles were de-
ployed in hardened, underground, single-silo
sites. By using hardened and widely-dispersed
launchers the Soviets increased the ICBM force
survivability. The fourth-generation ICBMs
were placed in launchers that, for the most
part, had been converted from third-generation
silos. In the process of conversion, the hardnesss
of the launchers was considerably increased to
improve missile and launcher survivability, up-
graded communications facilities were added,
and silo-based launch control facilities were
built. The Soviets have also undertaken several
programs to modernize and upgrade launchers
for their third-generation ICBMs. The result is
that the current Soviet ICBM force is vastly
more survivable than was the case a decade ago.
ICBM Reload Capability: The Soviets have
contingency plans for reloading and refiring
ICBMs from launchers that already have been
used to fire an initial round. The cold-launch
technique employed by the SS-17 and SS-18
lends itself to such a reload capability. Addi-
tionally, all currently deployed liquid-propel-
lant ICBMs?SS-11, SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 ?
are contained in a launch canister within the
silo. This and the silo design minimize damage
to the launcher during the initial firing and give
the Soviets the capability to reload each of these
launchers. The Soviets probably cannot refurb-
ish and reload silo launchers in a period less
than a few days; nevertheless, they believe that
this capability is of significant value because
21
they anticipate that a nuclear war might be pro-
tracted. The Soviets have made provisions for
the delivery of reserve missiles, warheads and
propellants to ICBM complexes for reload pur-
poses. None of these extra missiles or warheads
are counted under SALT agreements. Only the
launchers are counted.
New ICBMs Under Development: Soviet
ICBMs will continue to emphasize the force im-
provements that have been observed since the
early 1960s: accuracy, MIRVing, reliability,
and survivability. Two new solid-propellant
ICBMs are currently being developed. One of
these is about the size of the US MX intended
for silo deployment; the other is a smaller
missile, which will probably be designed for
deployment on mobile launchers similar to
those used with the SS-20. Because of their
capability for dispersal, mobile missiles are
highly survivable. Furthermore, they have an
inherent reload capability, which is also a
significant force improvement. Testing pro-
grams for one or two additional ICBMs, prob-
ably based on the SS-18 and SS-19, are expected
to begin in 1983.
SSBNs/SLBMs: Over the last two years the
Soviets have continued to modernize their
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
force. A second TYPHOON-Class nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) has
been launched at the Severodvinsk Shipyard;
the first TYPHOON completed its sea trials and
has moved to port facilities on the north coast of
the Kola Peninsula. Armed with 20 launchers
for the MIRVed SS-NX-20 solid-fueled SLBM,
the first submarine of this class will be fully op-
erational by the end of 1983. The range of the
SS-NX-20, 8,300 kilometers, places all of
NATO Europe, North America and Asia within
TYPHOON's reach.
While the TYPHOON SSBN production pro-
gram is still relatively new, the Soviets' earlier
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HOTEL CLASS
- FY\
U580 Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Missiles
METERS
15
SS-N-5
HOTEL II 115m 3 Tubes SS-N-5
HOTEL III 130m 6 Tubes SS-N-8 ? I
YANKEE CLASS
YANKEE I 130m 16 Tubes SS-N-6
< YANKEE II 130m 12 Tubes SS-N-17
_ DELTA CLASS
I- iiiiuir
DELTA I 140m 12 Tubes SS-N-8
DELTA II 155m 16 Tubes SS-N-8
DELTA III 155m 16 Tubes SS-N-18
TYPHOON CLASS
TYPHOON 170m 20 Tubes SS-NX-20
10
5
RV's 1
RANGE (KM) 1,400
1
1
2,400
SS-N-6
MOD
2 3
1 2 MRVs
3,000 3,000
SS-N-8
MOD
1 2
1 1
7,800 9,100
SS-N-18
SS-NX-20
SS-N-17
MOD
1 2 3
3 MIRVs 1 7 MIRVs
6,500 8,000 6,500
6-9 I
73,300
kflO Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Missiles
TRIDENT (Ohio Class) SSBN
TRIDENT 170.7m 24 Tubes
POSEIDON SSBN
r11
POSEIDON 129.5m 16 Tubes
METERS
15
10
5
0
RV's
RANGE (KM)
Modern SSBN Deployments
a
\ A
10 YANKEE \
----- I ,
PAC' j
ocEIAN j
_
,
)