THE SOVIETS GRAB THE UMBRELLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: November 26, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
ClOccko"t
NIC #06641-84
26 November 1984
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Counci
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Coun- 1
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: The Soviets Grab the Umbrella
1. The Soviets have decided to engage in the umbrella arms control
exchange in a remarkable, but not surprising, tactical switch from the
stone-wal?1 policies followed with almost uniform consistency since the end
of last year. Their aim is no less than to encourage a substantial
redirection of the Administration's policies in its second term. Soviet
commentaries -- the most recent and comprehensive current example is
attached -- lay out for internal audiences why this is worth a try:
The stress on "new talks", not resumption of the old ones, makes it
possible to resume negotiations without explicitly repudiating past
positions, such as no talks on INF without reversal of US INF
depl oyments.
The world has learned that the "language of force" and "positions
of strength" will not force Soviet concessions. Read: Moscow's
hanging tough for the past year paid off after all.
President Reagan is being pulled in the opposite directions of
"playing the peacemaker" or "returning to the course of
confrontation". He currently leans toward the former role.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
 Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
Washington is in the throes of political battle which will
determine the future US line, whose outcome cannot be assured, but
which, by implication, ought to be influenced by active Soviet
political tactics.
Meanwhile, US allies, domestic opinion, and economic conditions
have generated pressure that could modify Administration behavior
in the next four years.
Firm Soviet pursuit of "its principled line" has contributed to
this pressure and created a potentially new situation. Resumption
of talks does not represent a Soviet concession, but response to
opportunity -- which will be very cautiously explored.
2. There is a certain amount of rationalization in these arguments.
They are crafted to reassure skeptics within the Soviet elite, among whom
there are surely many, that these talks will not put Moscow on the slippery
slope to unnecessary concessions, but offer the chance of coaxing Washington
onto it. It is unlikely that these rationalizations will be entirely
persuasive. We can expect in coming weeks to see implicit questioning on
the part of such skeptics as to who is going to take advantage of whom ("kto
kovo", or "who gets whom" as Lenin put it) in these talks and the process
that follows.
3. Underlying these arguments is the pragmatic recognition that you
can't make money at political poker by staying out of every hand. With the
President massively reelected and the Soviet bureaucracy convinced,
according.to many good reports, that the previous policy had run its course,
it is now time to rejoin the game.
4. It is worth note that a Soviet Politburo evidently beset by
vigorous internal politicking over succession has been able to make this
tactical adjustment quite handily. It is equally significant that the
process of adjustment coincided with the reassertion of Chernenko's
political status. This coincidence should not be read as proof of
Chernenko's detentist proclivities, at least for the moment. Rather his
reemergence damped prospects for an immediate succession and permitted the
Politburo to get some other business done. All reporting about his current
authority indicates that Gromyko must have had a decisive voice in the
Soviet decision.
5. The Soviet decision to reengage the Reagan Administration does not
represent a fundamental or strategic change of foreign policy line. So far,
it is a sensible tactical shift in dealing with a US administration that
will be around for another four years and clearly wants its second term
marked by better US-Soviet relations or, at least, earnest attempts to get
them. The Soviets have certainly heard Bud McFarlane's assurance that the
President is committed to getting arms control results before he leaves
office. This sets them up for playing hard to get.
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
 Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
6. In the months ahead, we can expect the Soviets to be more active on
many fronts to influence the political setting in which the US decides its
negotiating positions in new arms control talks and, equally important, the
contents of the rest of its national security agenda: military budgets and
programs, and policy toward regional security matters such as Nicaragua and
Afghanistan. With arms control talks once again in prospect or progress,
the Soviets expect they will have better prospects to influence this agenda
than they did over the past year, or possibly the past four years.
7. Playing this game does not require a lot of decisiveness in Moscow
given its advantages of secrecy and its ability to pursue several seemingly
contradictory tactical lines at once. Chernenko has made plain that the
larger objective of the game -- admittedly a long shot, but worth a try --
is to get back to the "experience of the '70s" and to detente as "the
natural state" of US-Soviet relations. Such a condition would tend to spare
the Soviet leadership the necessity of more fundamental choices in foreign,
military, and domestic affairs, or at least to delay the need for
fundamental choice. That would be tailor made for,-thip Soviet ldership.
Attachment: As Stated
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
 Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
FBIS 51
PRAVDA ON RESUMPTION OF USSR-U.S. ARMS TALKS
TAKE i OF 2 -- PRAVDA ON ARMS TALKS
PM241825 MOSCOW PRAVDA IN RUSSIAN 25 NOY 84 FIRST EDITION P 4
(NIKOLRY PROZHDGIN 'INTERNATIONAL REVIEW')
(EXCERPT) TIME FOR CONCRETE DECISIONS
THE OUTGOING WEEK IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE HAS BEEN MARKED BY
THE BROAD AND INTERESTED DISCUSSION OF THE PROVISIONS PUT FORWARD
BY COMRADE K.U. CHERNENKO IN HIS REPLIES TO QUESTIONS FROM A
CORRESPONDENT OF THE AMERICAN TV COMPANY, N, THE FACT THAT
THEY HAVE ATTRACTED SUCH CLOSE ATTENTION IS LOGICAL, FOR IT IS
R MATTER OF THE MOST VITAL QUESTIONS OF THE RGE -- OF HOW TO
AVERT THE TWAT OF NUCLEAR WAR, FIND A WAY OF ENDING THE ARMS
RACE, AND CREATE A SITUATION IN THE WORLD IN WHICH THE PEOPLES
DO NOT FEEL FEAR FOR THE FUTURE.
FOR THIS IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES.
TAKING ACCOUNT OF THEIR SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
PRESERVATION OF PEACE, TO AGREE ON THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION
OF ARMS, PRIMARILY NUCLEAR ARMS, AND ON THE PREVENTION OF THE
SPREAD OF THE ARMS RACE TO AREAS AS YET UNAFFECTED BY IT.
THE SOVIET LEADER STRESSED THE PROPOSAL THAT HE HAD PUT FORWARD
RECENTLY, POINTING OUT PRACTICAL WAYS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE.
THESE ARE THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF
THE MILITARIZATION OF SP , A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
FREEZE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE COMPLETION OF WORK ON AN
AGREEMENT ON THE COMPLETE AND TOTAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPON TESTS. THESE ARE URGENT AND OBJECTIVELY THE MOST EASILY
SOLURBL~STIONS, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE THE LIST OF POSSIBLE
STEPS IN THE DIRECTION OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY AND SECURITY
IN THE WORLD COULD BE LENGTHENED.
THE PEOPLES NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION
F WS ITS PRINCIPLED LINE IRRESPECTIVE OF THE
COMPLEXITY OF TL' .; N INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. THIS IS CONFIRMED
YET AGAIN BY THE ANTHOLOGY OF SELECTED SPEECHES AND ARTICLES
BY COMRADE K.U. CHERNENKO PUBLISHED,IN VIENNA THE OTHER DAY.
. Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
 Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
TO THE EXPEP.IEh :E OF THE '?OSs WHICH SHOWED THAT FRUITFUL
GOOMPERATION BETWEEN STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS IS
NOT ONLY POSSIBLE BUT NECESSARY. OUR COUNTRY IS CONVINCED THAT
DETENTE IS THE NATURAL STATE SINCE CONFRONTATION IS A DANGEROUS
Of~A MALY WHOSE CONS QENCES E DIFFICULT TO PREDICT IN PRESENT
CONDITIONS.
RRE NOT TO BLAME FOR THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLES' HOPES
FOR THE RRTI LATION OF THE SRLT-II TREATY WERE DISAPPOINTED.
THAT OTHER IMPORTANT TALKS HAVE BEEN BROKEN OFFS THAT THE SITUATION
IN THE WORLD HAS BEEN DANGEROUSLY EXACERBATED. THE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ALL THIS IS BORNE BY THOSE CIRCLES IN WASHINGTON WHICH
BELIEVED -- AND MANY PEOPLE THERE STILL BELIEVE THIS TO THIS
DRY -- THAT, HAYING FORGED AHEAD IN THE ARMS RACES THEY WOULD BE
ABLE TO TALK TO THE USSR IN THEIANGUAGE QF %FQRCE' AND IMPOSE
THEIR 'SOLUTIONS.' TODAY IT IS WFI I IIMDE. 51005 IN THE WORLD THAT
THIS CANNOT 1L..._THE SUPPORTERS OF A 'POLICY OF STRENGTH' ARE
FITHEMSELYES INCREASINGLY ISOLATED IN THE FACE OF WORLD
PUBLIC OPINION.
RN IMPORTANT ROLE IS PLAYED BY THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COMMUNITY COUNTRIES AND THE PEOPLES
BROADENING PEACE STRUGGLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, INCLUDING IN THE
UNITED STATES. THESE FACTORS HP NOT BEEN UNINFLUENTIAL RECENTLY
IN OFFICIA S' 'S ON THAT IT WOULD
BENEFICIAL S HEIT SOFTEN THEIR ICON TONE.
REPR SENTATIYES HAVE EVEN BEGUN TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT DURING
THE 'SECOND PRESIDENTIAL TERM' THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WILL
HAVE NO TASK MORE IMPORTANT THAN TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE
USSR. WELL-i WE W111 WAIT BUD CFF_
UN
ARK ON NEW
REACHING MUTUALLY ACCEPT
c i GE OF
HOLE
DI NUCLEAR FIND SPACE WEAPONS. TO FORMULATE
A JOINT UNDERSTANDING OF THE SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES OF SUCH TALKS
USSR FOREIGN MINISTER A.A. GROMYKO AND U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE
G. SHULTZ WILL MEET Itti ~F t: ~'F UN 7-g .TRMUPL Y t 4
HIS LIGHT THE SOVIET UNION'S APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES
TO JOIN US IN SEEKING PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS
ASSUMES INCREASINGLY TOPICAL SIGNIFICIRNCE.
DISCUSSIONS, DISCUSSIONS...
WHEN DISCUSSING THE THEME OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE USSR, THE CONCEPT OF 'UMBRELLA' TALKS HAS BEEN PUT INTO
CIRCULATION IN WASHINGTONi MEANING THAT A BROAD RANGE OF QUESTIONS
CAN BE DISCUSSED UNDER SUCH AN 'UMBRELLA.'
ONE HIGH-RANKING WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL HAS DESCRIBED 'UMBRELLA'
TALKS AS 'RN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES DESIGNED
A REPORT WAS RECENTLY PEIBLISHED THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
 Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
TO PROVIDE BOTTH SIDES WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASCERTAIN TO WHAT
EXTENT OUR VIEWS DIFFER ON STABILITY AND HOW EACH OF US SEES THE
POSSIBILITY OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY WITH THE RID OF ARMS
CONTROL.' FOR HIS PART; U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY DIRECTOR K. ADELMAN ADDED THAT THESE WOULD NOT BE
'NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SENSE THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ELABORATE
TREATY FORMULATIONS OR REACH AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES;;
THEY WOULD BE A PRELUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS.'
LET US NOTE; FIRST; THAT BOTH THESE EXPLANATIONS DEAL NOT WITH
ARMS REDUCTIONS BUT MERELY 'ARMS CONTROL.' THE TERMINOLOGY
ADOPTED IN WASHINGTON IS NO ACCIDENT; OF COURSE. MOREOVER; THE
CITED STATEMENTS ARE NOT DISTINGUISHED BY CLRIRTY IN DEFINING THE
U.S. STANCE. THIS LATTER flC E IDENTLY REFLECTS THE STRUGGLE
W 7UDGING BY U.S. PR SS REPORTS, IS TAKING PLACE DEEP WITHIN
THE wR GTON ADMINISTRATION ON THE QUESTION OF TALKS WITH
'WE ARE BY NO MEANS UNANIMOUS IN OUR
P ON;' AN OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMAN ADMITTED A FEW
DRYS AGO.
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WRITES THAT 'A STRUGGLE TO INFLUENCE
THE PRESj,p,W HAS BEGUN ADMONG HIGH-RANKING HIP .. ;~.
HIE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE PENTAGON ARE GIVING HIM DIAMETRICALLY
OPPOSED ADVICE ON ALL THE MAIN QUESTIONS RANGING FROM ARMS CO!41 OL
TO CENTRAL AMERICA. THE MAIN SUBJECT OF THE DISPUTES IS THE
OF
QUESTION OF WHETHER REAGAN SHOULD ATTEMPT TO PLAY THE R 01F
PEACEMAKER DURING HIS SECOND TERM; TRANSLATING HIS PREELECTION
RH RORIC INT1 RLITY; OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE BETTER 2r1 T
TO THE COURSE OF CONFRONTATION WHICH CHARACTRIZED HIS FIRST
INCLI
WING
TER . - ' ' ; --FF,'.-FRR AS CAN BE ; REAGAN IS
rn'RR-D THE COURSE ' '- NF ONTATIGN
TH RTE FNj AT THE SAME TIME THE SUPPORTER[: Or A HARD
LIB RE LONTINUING BACKSTAGE MOVES TO PREVENT A SOFTENING
OF THE U.S. POSI11ON,'
(MORE)
24 NOV 2135Z CLB/TM
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
 Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
FBIS 5S:
TAKE 2 OF 2 -- (PRAVDA ON ARMS TALKS)
///THE U. S. POSITION.'
PM241907
(EXCERPT) THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT WE HAVE SEEN ACROSS
THE OCEAN ' :RTT ~ ~ HI C:H MAKE I T POSug us SIBLE TO SHOW SOME ' E'EA":ETM it, .1 N
FIGURE' IN AN EFFECTIVE PROPAGANDA LIGHT. THE AMERICAN PRESS IS
LAYING IT ON THICK IN DESCRIBING WHAT NBC'S WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT
CALLED OR CLASSIC POWER STRIIGGLE,' WHOSE MRIN PROTAGONISTS ARE THE
HEADS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE ONE HAND AND THE PENTAGON
O!R
THE OTHER.
THE NOT UNKNOWN AMERICAN EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION THE RITA.E
FOUNDATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARIST CIRCLES. A MEV-MRROYFOS" AGO
IT PRESENTED THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WITH A REPORT WHOSE CONTENT
WAS LEAKED TO THE PRESS. THE REPORT CALLS ON THE ADMINISTRATIO":
TO RENOUNCE THE REM TREATIES SIGNED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE
USSR IN 1972 AND NOT TO CCiNDUCT TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON
ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS AND LIKEWISE NOT TO AGREE TO THE CONC SIO
OF A TREATY ON THE COMPLETE AND TOTAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPON TESTS AND NOT TO RATIFY THE T 'EATY ON THE L T I TAT 1 C'+`: it
UNDERGROUND TESTS OF SUCH WEAPONS. MOREOVER, Ac:CORiI k f TCi TH T S
SUPERHAWK ORGANIZATION, THE UNITED STATES MUST NOT 1.?LU LI?L~L A
TREATY ON THE BANNING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS OR REDUCE ARMED FORCES
AND ARMS IN CENTRAL EUROPE... IN A WORD, THE REPORT CALLS FOR ALL
CHANNELS OF THE ARMS RACE TO BE LEFT OPEN AND FOR I T TO BE CO NT NIE
IN EVERY WAY IN THE HOPE OF OBTAINING FOR THE UNITED STfITES MIL IT='. 11
nmi
SUPREMACY OVER THE SOVIET UNION.
SOs DISCUSSIONS, RECOMME D TT ?r T T T E W C; =T
` B_s
WHERE IS THERE ANYTHING CONSTRUCTIVE OR CONCRETE I N R s4` OF Ts- S?
NOTHING OF THI C, KI N D I S S. _y w- C, N L!oC? FT !f;Tf#: 1;
.d t ~ ~T YI S ,LEI -iitu X14 Ni 1 I. TALr\
ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS OR NOT A BAD THI G IFs
OF COURSE s THEY GIVE RISE TO THE TRUTH AND AN UNDERSTAElD I WG
THAT CONCRETE ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE SITUATIO': A!.D
END THE ARMS RACE. IT HAS LONG BEEN TIME TO ABANDON THE
ILLUSIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES, IN THE NEW YORK TIMES' WORDS?
'WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO ELI ILD LIP ARMS WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY
PERSUADING OR COMPELLING MOSCOW TO REDUCE THEM.' THE AUTHOR OF
THE ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN THIS NEWSPAPER COUNTERS SUCH I L L U S 110-1
WITH THE VIEW OF 'PRACTICALLY ALL AUTHORITATIVE SPECIALISTS OI
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
 u l i t t n r i Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
v ti' p'- n A 4 L V" V L i 1- 1?. 1! Iii
? .NECESSARY TO PRESERVE MILITARY PARITY.` YES3 THIS; IS THE CASs.
'AND HERE EVEN THE INSANE 'STAR WARS' CONCEPT, THE SHIFTING OF THE
ARMS RACE TO SPACE, WILL NOT HELP.
BUSINESS WEEK MAGAZINE GlYES ASSURANCES THAT 'E GRN S Y
INTENTION 'OF CROWNING HIS PRESIDENCY WITH AN ARMS CONTROL
'r %evil. v uv v I i{.L.7 P
Lrm U
E CHIEF OF STAFF M. DERYER STATED. AT THE SAME TIME5---TN THE
VIEW OF MOST AMERICAN OBSERVERS, THE MAIN OBSTACLE T REACHING
AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE ..,.TFS ON
3 c%
DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS IS THE
AR ~ARc' P PROCLAIMED IN
WASHINGTON. MOREOVER, THERE IS RS YET NO INTENTION TO ABANDON
THIS SINCE BOTH THE WHITE HOUSE RND THE PENTAGON SEE THIS PLAN?
ACCORDING TO AMERICAN PRESS REPORTS, AS A MEANS FOR SECURING
AMERICA'S 'INVULNERABILITY' AND SIMULTANEOUSLY AS 'AN INSTRUMENT
FOR PRESSURING THE tUSSR.'
IN THIS CONNECTION, WASHINGTON POST OBSERVER S. ROSENFELT
NOTES THAT THE RDMINISTRRTION'S ADHERENCE TO THE 'TAR WPB'
PROGRAM IN NO WRY TALLIES WITH THE PROCLAIMED ASPIRATION TO
RC
el-7 I IS ATIVE THAT THE U.S. ALLIES ARE DISPLAYING INCREASING
CONCERN IN ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE WASHINGTON TO EMBARK O1`: TALKS
FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENDING THE ARMS RACE. THIS QUESTION OCCUPIED
RN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE COURSE OF THE JUST-ENDED VISIT TO THE
UNITED STATES BY FRENCH EXTERNAL RELATION} MINISTER C. CHEYSSON.
FRG FEDERAL CHANCELLOR H. KOHL INTENDS TO RAISE THE QUESTION
OF 'REAL RESULTS' IN EAST-WEST DIALOGUE IN WASHINGTON. JAPANESE
PREMIER Y. NAKASONE HAS ALSO VOICED HIS INTENTION 'TO MAKE
EFFORTS AIMED AT ACHIEVING PEACE' DURING HIS UPCOMING TALKS WITH
THE U.S. PRESIDENT.
NO MATTER HOW POLITE THE FORMULATIONS USED BY THESE AND OTHER
WESTERN COUNTRIES IN THEIR APPEALS TO WASHINGTON, THEY DISPLAY
APPRECIABLE CtINC:ERN, PRIMARILY WITH THE U.S. ASPIRATION TO SHIFT
THE ARMS RACE INTO S:1'ACF? WHICH THREAT; TO JEOPARDIZE E4EI! THE
MILITARY CONCEPTS ADOPTED NOW B4' THEIR ALL`, NOT TO MENTION
THE THREAT POSED BY SUCH PLANS FOR THE CAUSE OF UNIVERSAL PEACE.
IN ADDITION TO THE GROWING THREAT OF WAR, MANY PEOPLE IN THE
WEST ARE ALSO CONCERNED BY THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMS
RACE. THE LATEST DOWN-TURN IN THE U. 9 _S NG
-MCRERSINGLY SERIOUS CONCERN AMONG AMERICAN BUSINESS CIRCLES.
IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THAT IT IS AT PRECISELY THIS TIME THAT THE
ORGAN OF THESE CIRCLES, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, PUBLISHED AN
ARTICLE UNDER THE EXPRESSIVE HEADLINE 'THE ARMS BUILDUP PLANNED
BYREAGAN COULD BE BEYOND THE UNITED STATES.' THUS, THE
INEVITABLE HANGOVER.
III.- 10 GC 11r 1J rLiLL() J .` b I ri 19
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
 Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMS RACE HAVE ALSO AFFECTED
THE POSITION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS!
WHO ARE CONVINCED, AS THE JOURNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS STRTESs THAT
'PEACE IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ECONOMIC SECURITY AND THE IMPROVEMENT
OF WORKERS' LIVING CONDITIONS.' 'WE ARE WITNESSING A.TRANSITION
TO THE PEACE STRUGGLE THROUGHOUT OUR SOCIETYs AND THE LABOR UNION
MOVEMENT CANNOT BE AN EXCEPTIONS' THIS JOURNAL TESTIFIES. 'ON
MANY FRONTS -- IN THE STRUGGLE GRINST THE MX MISSILES) THE
CAMPAIGN FOR A NUCLEAR FREEZE, THE GROWING OPPOSITION TO ARMS
EXPENDITURE: AND THE INDIGNATION AT MILITARY INTERFERENCE IN
CENTRAL AMERICAN AFFAIRS -- THE LABOR UNIONS ARE PLAYING AN
IMPORTANT ROLE.'
THE NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON WHICH THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES
HAVE AGREED TO EMBARK WILL BEGIN IN THE NEW YEAR. THE PEOPLES
EXPECT THEM TO BE JUST THAT -- NEW TALKS IN WHICH THE AMERICA:
SIDE WILL FINALLY BE PREPARED TO HEED THE, S OF THE
MODERN WORLD AND THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND IDENTICAL SECURITY
IN ORDER TO REACH ACCORDS IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE.
(ENDALL)
24 NOV 2324Z'CLB/TM
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350017-7