BERLIN CONFERENCE DEVELOPMENTS - IX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300340009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 17, 1999
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300340009-0
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OCI NO. 1532
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
12 February 1954
BERLIN CONFERENCE DEVELOPMENTS - IX
Soviet plan for European security, Foreign Minister
Molotov 's plan for European security climaxes a Soviet diplo--
mat:ic campaign of several months designed to prove that Euro-
pean security is a matter for the Europeans to achieve without
American interference. The Soviet Union has often suggested
that the existing Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet treaties
formed a good basis for such a security plan. But in pre-
senting this new multilateral plan, Molotov belittled these
treaties on the grounds that Britain and France were both
engaged in remilitarizing Germany and consolidating NATO.
He said that references to the present force or possible
extension of these bilateral treaties are "incomprehensible
to the people in the USSR".
The new plan appears to be basically little more than
a multilateral pact for collective security. It falls short
of the rumored Soviet plan for a "Council of Europe" which,
among other things, would have had the task of supervising
the unification of Germany. Molotov did not clarify the
role that would be played by the conferences and,comniit.tees
to be set up under the pact. If these were developed into
a functioning organization in which all European countries
were joined, the Kremlin would run a greater risk of satel-
lite disloyalty. It is possible that the Kremlin would con-
sider the chance of gaining a stronger voice in Europe worth
this satellite risk. It is more likely that the Soviet
leaders assume that their plan will not even be accepted,
because of their demand that as prerequisites NATO and EDC
be dissolved and the United States be excluded from Europe.
The other new Molotov proposal at the 10 February
meeting calls for withdrawal of occupation troops from
Germany within six months. For the first time Molotov has
set a definite time for this withdrawal and proposed it
apparently independent of his. unacceptable plan for a pro-
visional. government and elections. Soviet security now
would be assured not only by.the maintenance of "limited
contingents" but by reserving the right to return the
troops to Germany if that security is threatened.
State Dept. review completed
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East Germans polled on conference issues: The American
Hicog evaluation staff an rmany conducts a poll on 4-8
February among about 400 East Germans and East Berliners
who were visiting West Berlin, The results should be in-
terpreted with caution, particularly because of the unre-
presentative sample of East Germans likely to be found in
West Berlin.
In this poll, 86 per cent favored the Eden plan and
only 2 per cent favored the Molotov plan for Germany. Al-
though 48 per cent would accept the Molotov prohibition of
German alliances, only 10 per cent would accept the Oder-
Neisse line. Furthermore, 95 per cent preferred four-power
or neutral supervision of elections to all-German control.
Only 11 per cent of the East Germans believed that the Molotov
plebiscite plan was meant seriously and only 8 per cent said
they would vote for the Molotov treaty in such a plebiscite.
Opinions expressed on these issues are very similar to
those of West Germans.
ET
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