LETTER TO HAROLD P. LUX FROM (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 2, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
Central Intelligence Agency V -~ \ v \/`~
OLL 83-2035
2 September 1983
Mr. Harold P. Lux
Foreign Affairs Legislative Assistant
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Enclosed is the article you requested on Soviet Espionage
in France. If I can be of further assistance, please give a
call.
Sincerely,
Office o Legislative Liaison
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - DMP Chrono
v4 - LEG File: Legislation General Vol. II
1 - OLL Chrono
(0LL;DMP:maw) (6 September 1983)
STAT
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
v i i. 5 May 83 I t.'I:S'1'I:lW EUROPE
ANNEX
FI ANCI:
LE POINT 1'IE1r'S SOVIET ESPII)NACF. IN FKANCI:
P"4041525 Paris LE POINT in Freni:h 25 Apr-1 May 83 pp 110-121 -- FOR OFFICIA1. USE ONLY
Jean-Marie Ponlaut article: "Espionage: The FW8's Tricks"J
ITexti Bang! One morning the French people discovered that the president had
meticulously organized a charter flight to Moscow for Soviet diplomats. They did not
know that it was the (provisional) culmination of a Ion); story.
indeed, brushing aside his predecessors' normal precautions, Francois Mitterrand chose
a more spectacular political game to put an end for :, time to the tide of "technology
snatchers" operating in France for the KCB -- the Eastern bloc's great economic and
military war machine. But in fact the )lead of state had personally been very closely
following affairs of industrial espionage or, as it is railed, "the transfer of
technology," since the start of his 7-year term. Ills decision to launch this great
purge had been taken several months previously. All that remained to be done was to fill
the files with irrefutable proof and to find a political opportunity.
After May. 1981, the Directorate of Terniorial Surveillance IDSTJ, hampered by the
LE CANARD ENCHAINE bugging affair and several other ste;plcions, had a rather had press
on the left. Marcel Chalet, who was its boss at the time, a policeman who had spent
all his career in the "Si" 'as it is called in the dusty offices in the Rue des Saussaics.
undertook to plead its cans,'. Armed with files and asked to explain his case. lie- went
to defend his organization to Anterior Minister) Gaston nefferre and to the president
himself. He was the only head of ?a pol ice department to be rer,?ived by Francois
"Iittcrrand in person. The counterespionage bass explained to the head of state the
vast plundering carried out by the Eastern bloc services, which were trapping French
scientific secrets by every means imaginable. It was an industrial l,.?morrhage which was
much more danaginc to the country than terrorism.
The fact is that espionage is the most active department of scientific research in the
USSR.... The Russians, who are very good in theoretical work but nut so good on
technological application, found it quicker to plunder (stir laboratories than to
develop their own research. It is not ? pc?n~iv, and the returns are high....
Now. particularly from the seventies, the Eastern bloc, which w:as vorac?iou!;1v trying to
make good its lag, was seized with insatiable curiosity in France. It swallowed
everything, showing particular relish, for French industry's 'tr.'ng s.?rtors: aviation.
computers, electronics, laser heams, fiber optics, lhc? Chemcial and nuclear industries,
and, of course, the arms industry. The DST men exhans:ed themselves following phoney
diplomats who showed an interest in all spheres from )-)!ties l0 food and from aviation
to pharmacy.
There were two possible remedies for this Red tide -- 7111) Soviets enjoy diplomatic
status:
-- The homeopathic remedy using repeated doses. This was the disputed method used by
the former government. which from 1974 to 1980 expelled nearly 30 Eastern bloc
diplomats caught stealing secrets in dribs and drabs.
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
k'I:S'i L RN i:t!Itltl'I:
ANNL:X
-- Another solution was surgery without :anesthetic. That W.-, lilt- draft ic? remedy chosen
in 1971 by the British, who sent hom' 105 excessively inquisitive peorle.
The DST, but also the General Directorate of Foreign-Securil.v Iix:Si:) -- formerly _
Alexandre de !wrenches' foreign 101 e I I I geoce and Counter i nt t-l l I gene' Se rv l ee ) SUECL:) --
had called for the scalpel and surgical knife several times. It was in vain.
After the DST chief's account. Mitterrand demanded a complete report on tilt- SovietN'
activity in France. And the interior Ministry soon could not speak too highly of the
DST, consecrated as "the best police department." Yves hornet. the new boss who
replaced !farce] Chalet, who had reached retirement age. hammered the same message
home. Rather than chasing the Soviets. the DST decided to forestall them. A list was
drawn up of interesting targets and they were awaited there. 11at? thick file grew
thicker. It was placed on Francois Mitterrand's desk ;it tIK beginning of the year. The
president apparently took several days to examine it. lie knew the matter was disturbing?
what he discovered was worse. Lc't us leaf through it, too.
Serving Officers (Officiers Traitant,) and "Trainees"
First there is Gennadiy Travkov. the consul in Marseilles, who was expelled in 1980.
His is a kind of classic case. So much so that the UST made a film of the '1?ravkov affair
which is shown to threatened industrial sectors.
As soon as he arrived at Marseilles' Saint-Charles station in August 1976, Travkov was
watched by the DST. Ile was taking over the' post of anoths?r cia,t-ricnct-d officer, former
consul Igor... a tough, clever, and skillful man who it hall never succeeded in faulting
This time the DST wanted its rt?ven};e and wanted to bring down the now consul, who is
in fact -- as it knew -- a licutenant colonel in the GRU (nilliLary Intelligence as
opposed to the KGB, which covers all kind, of intelli),ence}.
Travkov set to work as soon as he arrived. lie was responsible for the scientific
sector and for spece research and established many contacts and had many meetings. For
3 years the counterespionage service watched his attempts to c?stahli,h "contacts." In
his first attempt, the consul tackled a Marseille-, Iaboratory governed by the National
Center for Scientific Rest-acch ICNRi'. -- one of the most advaiic?ed laboratories in France
working for both the civi 1 ian and ml I it arv sector,.. I',ir in::I arm's it was working on
infrared rays, sonar and lasers for detecting targets. Phis "top st-cret" rest-arch also
relates to submarine detection. Travkov used an lot'rmodiarv to gain access to the
laboratory. Nikolay Sobolev, a Soviet "trainee" and t:xpt?rt on lasers. applied to spend
a period in the Marseilles laboratory. Once installed, lie introduced his friend
Travkov, consul in Marseilles, to his "colleague." but the French, warned by the DST,
rejected this invasive friendship. Sobolev returned to Paris. lie was shamelessly used
by his controls, squeezed dry, finally slipped part oI a laser head into his pocket,
and was igrominiously expelled from France and banished from the scientific community.
This explains the DST's reservations about the growing number of applications for
training periods and scientific exchanges coming from Eastern bloc counties -- around
100 per year. "First," an expert stated. "it is often a swindle. 1'hev offer us
nuclear engineers or physicists. We send them ethnological trainees or human sciences
researchers.... And second, to obtain their visas, the Eastern bloc trainees are often
forced to collaborate with the secret services."
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
VII. 5 May 83 3 WESTi:RN EUROPE
ANNEX
That was true of the young ??nnr1n who, when visiting an aeronatutics factory. used her
woolen gloves to take samples of filings (to dciorinIu the aI .iys). It was also truc-of
Lite engineer who collected small samples of fiber optics under his ad sive soles.
Finally. more recently during a visit a young Soviet sus:ceeded in removing a shaving of
the metal used to manufacture nuclear boilers. In addition to this, they take back
kilograms of documents in their luggage.
Let us return to the more serious activities of Comrade Travkov. Marseilles consul.
who, after the failure on Lite lasers, became passionately interested in other subjects.
lie showed interest in underwater biology and at the same time set out to win over a
research worker specializing in space research. lie invited him and his wife to his
residence; the two wives became friendly. But Travkov went too far. lie casually
proposed to help the research worker buy a boat or even -- why not -- an apartment. The
research worker came back to earth and became alarmed. Travkov failed completely once
again. Time was running short. His stay in France -- usually 4 to 5 years -- was
drawing to a close. Travkov, who preferred the deep creeks of Cassis to the shores of
the Black Sea, stepped up his activity in order to be kept in France.
He was hard pressed and was to make the fatal mistake. During a degree ceremony at
Aix-en-Provence university, he met a senior officer. a former pilot working at the
Istres Air Base who was trying to go over to private industry. The consul, himself
a former pilot. started a conversation with him; they hit It off. Travkov gave him
his card and invited the officer to visit him. But he went too quickly once again. He
was too quick in offering to find the officer work. A warning light flashed under
the officer's cap and he went straight to the DST. "There are two solutions." the
experts told him. "Either you break With him now and everything stops. or you play a
double game and hand Travkov to us completely wrapped up. Rut take care, it will be a
long job and may be dangerous." %
"It's a deal!" the former pilot answered. The adventure lasted 7 months. It was not
easy following Travkov. The meetings usual]; took place in Carry-le-Rouet near
Marseilles. Travkov left home very early to get there. lie spent 4 hours taking a
secure route. The "planted pilot" played his role perfectly. He even received some
money. very little -- the KGB is known for being mean -- and handed the consul
documents carefully chosen -- by the DST.
Finally, the DST arranged for him to be "caught red-I~:indLd:" The officer was warned and
asked to entice the Soviet consul to a meeting by laying a fine trap: the Doppler
system for the Mirage 2000 and the complete plans of the Istres base. Armed with these
documents, Travkov could spend a few more happy years on Lite coast. The consul fell into
the trap, or more precisely, into the Carry-le-Rouet rubbish pile where he met with his
agent. As he was pocketing the documents, men emerged from behind the mounds of rubbish.
He merely had time to throw down the papers and express surprise at those confidential
documents fluttering amid the rubbish. Exit Travkov. For him it was goodbye to the
sweet-smelling creeks.
That one was caught, but when spies succeed brilliantly, you scarcely hear anything
about their exploits. You do not even know that they were active. The KGB and CRU
members are hand-picked. The best university students are chosen for the intelligence
schools -- the most famous is Center 101 situated in the suburbs of Moscow. The bosses
of the services are high-ranking people.
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
VII. 5 May 83 4 WESTERN EUROPE
ANNEX
The dazzling appointment of former KGB chief Yuriy Andrupov bears witness to that.
Some 120 of the 700 Soviets who enjoy diplomatic status in France actually hold diplo-
matic posts. Around 160 of their cohorts are "officers" trained in the KCB and CRU
schools. In addition to this, there are the agents from the other seven Eastern bloc
countries.
"For a long time," an expert explained. "at least one-third of the Soviet 'Diplomats'
posted here have been intelligence 'pros.' And we always underestimate their number.
Each time a defector or intelligence passed on by friendly countries has enabled us to
review our calculations and identify the spies who had come to our country. there were
always more of them than expected."
"The DST is not as 'paranoid' as people would like to this expert adde... "We
do not see spies everywhere. We do not see enouch of them.... And of course there are
also the 'illegal cntrants'...and the 'sleepers,' who have not been involved in intelli-
gence for years but are awaiting the opportunity or the order to act."
Indeed, Eastern bloc espionage involves two types of secret fighter in the field. There
are the "legal" ones who are "serving officers" used tinder diplomatic cover. If
arrested. they only run the risk of being declared persona non grata and courteously
escorted to the border. The "illegal" ones, however, spies introduced into France under
a false identity and a false nationality, live more dangerously. They are like the
"infiltrators" who often arrive from a "country of transit" after whitewashing them-
selves by posing as Eastern bloc refugees.
Their-mission is to integrate the host country and climb as high as possible up the
social ladder. The "sleeping" agents. not called upon much at the beginning of their
careers, are "woken up" when they reach an .interesting position.
All these people work actively to establish contacts. Some of the people "approached" -.
out of imprudence, ideology. blackmail. naivety or even self-interest -- get their
fingers caught.
one of the Soviet intellipv-ice services' favorite tar;-,cts is still immigrants from
Eastern bloc countries installed in France but who still have relatives on the other
side of the Iron Curtain. They are easier to iri;;I10-11 and manipulate....
Igor Zolotayevskiy. a Soviet immigrant naturalized French, was recently caught in that
way. This modest architect was working in AGARD (expansion unl.nown), a NATO agency
which gathers technological data in the aeronautics sphere 'r C"rnp.. For Vladimir
Rybachenkov, a Soviet secret agent in UNESCO, it was a good catch. The little clerk had
access to the agency's classified documents. For years. Zolotayevskiy systematically
photocopied everything which bore the seal "confidential," "secret," or "top secret."
This lowly spy did not even know what he was stealing. After his arrest. it was
impossible to gauge the scale of the damage. which was probably considerable. While
the little Frenchman was reflecting on his action in prison. "Rybachenkov." his "serving
officer," was discreetly asked to go and use his special talents elsewhere.
(Annex runtimes on:back pages of report]
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
 l'. 1. 5 rt,y 83
Tice ideologists
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
WI:S'1'rRN EUkOPC
AN\'LX
Although the serving officers are mainly interested in Industrial espionage. and its
military applications, they do not nrs;lect a more subtle form of intelligence:
political Information and its counterpart. misinformation. For instance, for around
20 vuars they secretly financed the confidential letter of .)ra,c_Charles Patlce, a minor,
active and discreet man. The son of the famous cinema industrialist had two loves:
journalism and the.USSR, which he admired unreservediv. In the sixties he
devoted an Impassioned work to it. "iissav on the Soviet i'Itenomt?,tn
lie received Moscow's congratulations. His passion was such that lie"wasrmar1ried,
briefly -- for 3 months -- to Ariana Cedeonvoa, a former Miss t!SSR, who
meanwhile became a French citizen....
Thus. when Pathe launched a'confidential letter called SYN'f11ESIS, he merely had to beg
to receive a meager handful of rubles (Fr)00,000) -- another example of the KCR'ts
.tinniness." Nonetheless, Pathe was politically useful.
the Soviets with a platform for misinformation, he enabled themcto1understandg
the squabbles between Rocard and Mitterrand. for Instance. I'?r 1'atlsc' provided
the organization with long biographies of prominent people for whirl, Lite Kremlin
is greedy. Back in the sixties, t:e?rgc.s P:,q?es, a senior NATO official who was
working for the Soviets. had indulged in these La Bruycre-style exercises which
flatter their authors. They make these armchair spies think they are pullinx a
few strings in the shadows and helping direct the curse of Icist.,rv. To sw,?Il their
pride. the KCB has no hesitation in sending them secret 1ettvrr: of rongratit ]atloll
signed Khrushchev or Brezhnev and bombards them with appointments as Red Army
. oIoneels or with the Order of Lenin. .)van-Charles lathe was ui?
his secret vanities. In 1980, he received :, 5_ war r e ) to pay for
t.,ct that he was 70 years old. And his sentence wasfor ~c very modvc;tetreason.
hill, Jean-Charles Pathe, we enter Lite disturbing world of agents anti infiltraturs.
'ivrre Cardot is a typical infiltrator. This 20-year old Czechoslovak arrived In
r.,:,ce one fine day and asked for naturalization. His story was moving: His
grand-
-r, a French soldier who left to fight In Bohemia in 1914, was imprisoned there.
'-ier his.releas,, he married a Czechoslov.1k, Pierre's grandmother. Pierre Cardot
u.sturalized and agreed to do his military service like any good Frenchman. He
:an an excellent soldier and impressed his colonel so much that the nice guy
?u;,pested that he join the SDECE (now the GOSE, the French espionage service).
itis knowledge of Czech would be marvelous there. In the "swimming pool" -- te
,D!.CE's nickname -- he worked in the monitoring service responsil,lc? for Intercept ing
-...,.ages from Czechoslovak networks. Cardot became friendly with his boss, a captain,
ho could not speak too highly of him.
,.verythint; started to go wrong when Lite I)ST intercepted secret messages sent h
..ic?choslovaks to one of their agents in Paris, y the
;:.srdot's apartment. "Such a nice boy etct r explat[ d, .led to Lice brilliant inviion , t 1 his lei:;ore time listening to music. thMdartake eexplained, "who spends
leaner, which was disturbing the music." he Jr. so nice, he even fixed my vacuum
!ic? Czechoslovak's radio messages .... In fact, the vacuum c_lc?:ncer was distorting
In DST headquarters. Cardot was sick with fear.
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
VII. 5 May 83 6 WESTEitj El!RUI'E
ANNEX
He fiercely denied the charges. but when he was told that lie was going to be taken to
a hospital, he thought. of the Soviet es lab]Ishmeuts. lit' was prepared to confess
everything to avoid buing there.... lie then confessed that he had been hired by the
Czechoslovak services when lie was 16 and specially trained for his mission. Following
his arrest, the DST and the military security sorvice examined all the naturalization
files from Czechoslovakia and detected two other sleepers in France, one of whom was a
chief inspector at police headquarters.
A more recent case is dividing scientists. the DST i:; in no doubt: Rolf Dobbertin, a
CNRS research worker arrested in 1979 for "collaboration with the enemy," is an
infiltrator. This 45-year old physicist, originally from Last Germany, defected to
the FRC at the age of 22. He then came to France. where be submitted a phys:es thesis
and specialized in plasma physics at the LNRS. In 1979. Werner Stieler, a defector
from the CI)P, denounced Dnbbertin and supplied the file of all the documents handed over
by the physicist. When arrested, the research worker admitted working for the Eastern
bloc: "I was a soldier on a mission." lie said. lie admitted using secret methods for
sending his messages: blank carbon and invisible Ink. On the other hand, he denied
handing over scientific secrets. "All I supplied is available in good specialized
bookshops." And that is true. The question is, is It treason to supply available
information? 1'es, the DST replied, lie was paid by the Eastern bloc services. No, the
research workers who defended him replied. Dohhertin, who has been under preventive
detention for 4 years and was due to stand trial last year, is a victim of the left's
arrival in office since the suppression of the state :;t?curIty court delayed his trial.
He seems to have been forgotten in his prison cell.
his -case is that of "open research:" It is the :;implt':;t but also the most
profitable. Examining journal:;, reports, specialized work:;, and cienuiric Publications
makes it possible to gather more than 80 percent of ilitelligence. Glue and scissors
produce surprising results when wielded by an expert. The fact is that in the
Western world the scientific world readily exchanges Information and work according to
a very respectable code, and very often for the good of mankind. But this is also
because to succeed in the West and to obtain finance and aid or sImply to secure
reci,gnit.ion, the resear.:iier must make his work known and compare himself with his
neighbor. However, any research can have a military application, even If its aim is
peaceful, civilian and apparently devoid of strategic interest. Some of these
documents may be found in scientific publications. A lead or an indication can save
months of research and make it possible to identify and locate new industries.
The L'SSR Embassy is one of the main subscribers to periodicals. Some scraps of secrets
have thus slipped under the Iron Curtain. This manna gleaned throughout the world by
officers, agents, or research assistants is sw?allo' reprocessed, and digested by
a vast scientific administration. The best knol- .,f these departments is the State
Committee for Science and Technology.
There is no doubt about Sergey Fabiyev. He was certainly a major spy. He was sentenced
to 20 years' imprisonment in 1979, and lie was the head of the single major Soviet network
in France completely dismantled in Europe since the war. And what a network!
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
VI1. 5 flay s) 7
WtST?.?TR.' EL ROPt
ANNEX
,'i., leaky l:v P"-- -I t,?J ?'ndangered NATO's defense sys:tc This son of a White Russian
,::;c.?r v:10 1:.?J t.N Yugoslavia and then to rrance is a romantic. Bien the Soviets
tra;,:J Ti.. in l:?,?,i, ?.I!)IVCV. wh.? speaks Rus Ian, explained that he felt he tr cos.ing
int.? comae: ,:a, the l:reat l:u::sia about which ItIs father spoke. He ran is sm111
in fire protectIon equipment vilich enabled him to travel. ae went
t.' ~:,?.in: tat~? :'?e1: via Swit;:crland and IIaly to learn his "profession" in tit, CRU's
?'' -`~ ~~?? ~~ yew 1e Caled his seert?&s. he eiiai,letl the French in ttlrl, t., decode
r..?5s.I., That was music to Lhe cars (11 the UST and 1)(;til Which had !,cell picking
cables :or years. One "ILsicttier" had said sadly
...?:1t ,?tart, ?.:.%1.11,.? nev.rr brought about the arrest cf any spy." terit hi:: vev
..iicir. 1:.: w,:; lie was able to dread(' a historic message: th the 'wi,iv
!,us:ians sc::: ;.c Sixties to congratulate the network which had stolentue Coucurtht!
de
^ians. ii,. ]u;:,?i~- is so similar to it that It was nicknamed Cuncordski.
:.cr.et:,eless, ,:,fey and secret agents are only one clecient in the Soviet
c~pionage n,lltill.ltir11.,1. It is also necessary to talk of coaatiercial relation:. liow
::.lay i?renci: ind', Irialists. lured by a deal With the USSR. have agreed t:1 su-p
s.i:'ip ies. teclhn:.:1I ::,.u:uals and plans of their products...! And then car.)e tl..? . i.:,;,?
i.):. hrnlect fora factory fit the Urals laded into the. in identical copy of their product appeared Its the Li t.:ru
Llac ;.,u:ltr:un.
tact is ta.,t wh.vl you SuAgeSt. that the Eastern bloc: It. interested in everything
r !'ate for ',,,hl i.,...1 (tor 1:lilitary rations) to antisubmarine combat -- many people
s-:: le. vn :Lc ,?.thcr hand, nohudy smiles When you say that the Japanese are interested
is ro,:cls for r. ad:-.:sane clothes or pressure cookers. Thirty years of cCastOs.i,:
in Lhe 11.1S: -nsured that country's industrial power," a technician s:,id.
1 sterna, 1u:1.11 , .?.?;,. rat Ion can also 'sometimes lead the Europeans to be it:lprudrut with
'::i.:. .?..a he used for military purposes. For instance. the Americans did not
~; ;arc; fat, tae :.wt tiljt Cosmonaut Jean-Lour C1lretien's flight was accompanied by the
i 'a) o# v,:;v ~;':?'ial U.S.-made cametas which make it possible to detect the light of
c.,::.ilc it a dist.:ace of more than 300 kn. It is easy to imagine their possible
uees.
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
VII . 5 May 83 8 wI:STIat.N EURUI'i:
AN.'i1.X
This was the disturbing report submitted to the pre.iJt?nl of the r.:p"hlic. In :addition,
the DST reported several current opcr:ations: :- research .n;slstant in the French Coal
Board was being controlled in Meaux by a Russian officer (Patrick Gucrrier, the
imprudent research assistant was' arrested); and above all the arrest of an important
member of the trade mission who had been caught rt?d-Lnnalcd. After con!;idering the mat-
ter for several days. the president gave the go ahead. It was one way of sending a
message which was easier to decode than those sent by the Eastern blue spies. It was an
operation which had a?:ivious external and internal :adv.uitages. But this operation posed
one question: How many of them should he expelled? Should It be 150. 100, or 50? This
critical number was the real political test. A shirt list was chosen: 47 diplomats.
which was enough to undermine some oviet networks. The figure was not chosen at
random: the French Embassy in Moscow has 46 diplomats.... But our Russian friends were
told that another batch was ready if there was too strong a reaction.
"We are sure of winning at this game and of expellim; more than them," a senior official
said. "Our reserves in Paris are bigger than theirs. 1{ach man counts for them. It
will take them 1 or 2 years to replace these professIonals if they are allowed to do so.
iut it is good to have 2 years' respite."
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
 & Biro
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
_d-
STAT
STAT
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
Pouting Slip
2. DD OLL
3. Ad ht Officer
ACTION INF
SUSPENSE
Action Office
STAT
STAT
00
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP95B00895R000200040010-9