A-12 BACKGROUND PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66R00546R000100070159-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 159
• Content Type: REPORT

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A-12 BACKGROUND PAPER
When the U-2 program became operational in 1956 it was
generally assumed that the life expectancy of the program would be
approximately two years. Although the viability of the U-2 program
far exceeded our expectations, recognition of the lead time required
to bring into operational existence a follow-on aircraft prompted at
that time studies looking toward the development and production of
.an aircraft of greatly improved performance characteristics.
With the sanction of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, the Central Intelligence Agency undertook a review
of all military aerial reconnaissance projects in being or in study.
This included the ideas and proposals of a diverse group of aircraft
and missile manufacturing concerns.
Early in 1959 interest had narrowed to a supersonic, high
altitude unstaged design by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and a
version of the Convair "Super-Hustler" design proposal parasited
to the B-58 aircraft. In the summer of 1959, with the reduction in
the B-58 program by the Air Force, and particularly in view of the
extreme logistics problems posed by parasiting to that aircraft,
interest in the "Super-Hustler" configuration terminated. Both
Lockheed and Convair immediately thereafter undertook new design
studies. These designs were of unstaged vehicles and differed
only in external configuration. Size, weight and aerodynamic per-
formance were nearly identical.
In August of 1959, after coordination and agreement of the
highest,officials in the Department of Defense and the Air Force,
the CIA proposed to the President that the Lockheed design be
selected and his approval for the initial development was obtained.
Both Lockheed and Convair had previously investigated the use of
the J-93 engine and both had concluded that use of this engine would
not provide the same high cruise altitudes that could be reached by
using the Pratt & Whitney built J-58. The latter was chosen to
power the aircraft which had now been designated the A-12.
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The designer of the A-12 was Mr. C. L. (Kelly) Johnson,
a vice-president of Lockheed who also designed and built the F-104
and the U-2. It was decided that the same streamlined development
and production techniques utilized in building the U-2 would be employed
in this program.
In pursuance of this philosophy it was further determined that
it would be desirable to adopt the sole source procurement technique
for those components, systems or subsystems, whose performance,
configuration, characteristics, materials, major expense, or speci-
fications could be assumed to be indicative of the existence of a
major effort in the field of manned propelled supersonic flight, pro-
vided that reasonable and prudent care be exercised by all concerned,
not only in the initial selection of a source but in all managerial and
substantive areas possible. Limited competitive bidding was permitted
whenever it did not interfere with the execution of the basic mission.
These procedures were identical to those so successfully employed in
the development of the U-2, and from the standpoint of security and
compression of time from the design phase to production proved again
to be unparalleled in the history of standard aircraft procurement.
The time-saving accomplished through these techniques can be
better appreciated if a comparison is made of elapsed time between
major milestones in the A-12 development program as opposed to the
B-58 and B-70 programs.
For example, in the A-12 program 26 months of preliminary
design studies involving various aircraft configurations were expended
prior to contractual "go ahead". Twenty-nine months were required
from "go ahead" to first aircraft completion (rollout), 31 months to
first flight, 37 months to first MACH 2 flight, and 46 months to first
MACH 3 flight.
By comparison, in the B-58 program 32 months were devoted
to design studies, 50 months were required from "go ahead" to roll-
out, 51 months to first flight and 59 months to first MACH 2 flight.
In the case of the B-70, 38 months were consumed by design
studies and 68 months have now elapsed since "go ahead". The B-70
has been beset by various technical problems and first aircraft com-
pletion now is not anticipated until late in 1963 or early 1964.
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Both in the assignmen of military personnel and the re-
cruitment and selection of the pilots, techniques and ground rules
which were found to be effective in the U-2 program have been em-
ployed.
In October of 1960, the Air Force, using CIA as its pro-
curement agent, contracted for three aircraft of a two-place, long-
range interceptor version of the A-12, which was designated the
AF-12. This version includes the Hughes manufactured GAR-9
missile and ASG-18 radar guidance system. The principal air-
craft changes involve the cockpit area and redesign of the fuselage
nose to accommodate the radar.
In January of 1963 the Secretary of Defense approved purchase
of six additional aircraft for Air Force use as a general purpose
reconnaissance vehicle configured to carry a variety of systems
packages. Subsequently, in August of 1963, the Secretary of Defense
approved an additional procurement of 25 aircraft of this configuration
which was designated the R-12. Again, CIA performed as the pro-
curement agent.
It should be noted that in January of 1961 the then President-
Elect reviewed the entire program and upon his assumption of
office endorsed its continuance under the same rigid security pro-
visions employed to that point.
The A-12, which is constructed almost entirely of titanium
operates in the MACH 3 regime. It is 99 feet in length and has a
wing span of 59 feet. Its two Pratt & Whitney engines each develop
a thrust of 32. 500 pounds. Range is 4, 000 nautical miles without
aerial refueling and altitude capability is in excess of 90, 000 feet.
The aircraft are constructed within a special security area
at Lockheed's Burbank, California plant and flight testing is bein
conducted
The first A-12 aircraft was delivered tol on
25 February 1962 and the first flight was accomplished on t e
26th of April 1962. Since that date, there have been a total of
ten A-12 aircraft delivered to of which eight are in flying
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status. A total of 15 A-12's Fe been ordered, he last two of which
will be configured as drone versions of the basic vehicle. The first
flight of the A-12 was flown with two J-75 engines installed and the
first flight with two J-58 engines installed was accomplished on 15
January 1963. The MACH 3 flight regime was reached on 20 July 1963.
On 24 May 1963, the program sustained its first loss of an aircraft
when an A-12 crashed approximately 20 miles south of Wendover,
Utah. In accordance with a contingency plan previously prepared,
injured
The pilot of the A-12 ejected successfully and was un-
To date the A-12 program has cost approximately
dollars. From the inception of the project certain key members of
Congress have been kept informed of the objectives and progress of
the program.
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