THE AFTERMATH OF THE INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000600010006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 25, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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P79T004W6000600010006-9 $r
OCI No. 2325/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
25 September 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Aftermath of the India Pakistan War
1. The war in the Punjab drew to an indecisive
close at 6:00 PM EDT on 22 September, leaving a tangle of
loose ends that will probably require months--perhaps
years--to unravel. The cease-fire reluctantly agreed to
by both parties may have saved India and Pakistan from
the economic and political chaos that would have beset
them if fighting had continued another three to six
months, but it leaves basic and pressing questions
unsettled. The long-range stability of the subcon-
tinent may well turn on the diplomatic and political
manipulations of the next few months.
Major Diplomatic Problems
2. The most immediate problem will be to effect
a disengagement of opposing forces. Pakistan has not
accepted totally the UN cease-fire proposals, with their
r to
i
ld
o
pr
provision for a withdrawal to positions he
5 August, but has merely agreed to stop shooting.
Ayub has ordered his troops to. remain in place for
the present. The UN is dispatching a 100,.-man observer
team to the Punjab', and is considering bolstering its
observer group in Kashmir. Nevertheless, it took two
months after firing stopped in the Rann of Kutch to
arrange the withdrawal of forces, and the current
situation could prove more difficult.
3. Working against an easy disengagement will be
the same spiral of tactical considerations that es-
calated the crisis rapidly from the infiltration of
Pakistani sponsored guerrillas on 5 August to large -
scale warfare in the Punjab on 6 September. Thus,
the Indians will not wish to withdraw in the Lahore
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and Sialkot areas until they are assured that the
Pakistanis will pull out of the Chhamb-Akhnur sector
of Kashmir. Rawalpindi will be reluctant to vacate
the Chhamb area unless it can be assured that the
Indians will fall back to the 1949 cease-fire line
in the Uri-Poonch, Tithwal, and Kargil sectors of
Kashmir. This, in turn, the Indians will not do as
long as the infiltrators remain a problem. Finally,
Pakistan may feel compelled to keep up~the guerrilla
raids--although continuing to deny its complicity--in
order to maintain pressure for a Kashmir settlement.
4. With these conflicting considerations in play,
and with both sides retaining significant military
capacity, the net result may be simply an extension of
the old and unstable Kashmir cease-fire arrangements
but extended southward into the Punjab as far as
Ferozepore.
5. A second major diplomatic problem is raised by
the resurfacing of the Kashmir question. While the
Pakistanis contained the numerically superior Indian
forces, they were unable to muster the qualitative-supeti-
ority necessary to bring thelndians to their knees.
The conflict cost Pakistan heavily in terms of military
hardware, and Ayub will only be able to justify the cost
if it results in some progress on Kashmir. Failure
to make progress would intensify Rawalpindi's frustra-
tion and could lead to highly irrational and probably
anti-Western moves on the international scene. Foreign
Minister Bhutto's indication before the.Security Council
that Pakistan will pull out of the UN if a Kashmir
settlement is not reached reflects Rawalpindi's now-or-
never mood.
6. Failure of Ayub's Kashmir bid could also gravely
endanger Pakistan's internal security. The. War has left
the Pakistani populace in a highly emotional state,
and there is"reportedly strong sentiment among senior
military officers favoring a?continuation of the fight
regardless of the costs and despite, the lack of favorable
prospects. The situation has not been helped by the
government inspired,'news coverage of the war which left the
populace-with-the elea.r feeling that Pakisthft,was winning.
While :Ayub.ima.y have lost some stature. as .a result .of the
cease-fire his position does not now appear to be threatened.
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Nevertheless, if it becomes clear that his major bid
on Kashmir has fallen flat, coup plots could form,
and at the least he might feel compelled toward
irrational behavior.
7. Arguing against Ayub's replacement are his
unique competence and the lack of any clear alter-
native to his leadership. His ouster would be under-
taken only in a fit of extreme emotionalism and there
is little chance that a stable and effective regime
would follow. In the ensuing, political confusion,
pressures could arise in East Pakistan for secession
from a West Pakistani-dominated union, although here
again leadership is lacking.
8. New Delhi, on the other hand, appears to be
well satisfied with the results of the undeclared war,
and will be hard to budge from its refusal to talk
seriously about Kashmir. While the toll in Indian per-
sonnel and equipment losses has been heavy, the Indians
prevented Pakistan from scoring any major military suc-
cesses. Moreover, relative to its total, military assets,
India's losses were probably far lighter than those suf-
fered by Pakistan. The threat of Chinese involvement did
not noticeably unnerve the Indians, and New Delhi pro-
bably feels that some of the stigma of military in-
eptitude that has hung over the Indians since the.1962
Chinese invasion has been erased.
9. The Shastri government has come through the
crisis strengthened. Shastri's opponents, both within
the Congress party and without, will find little to criti-
cize in the cabinet,'s'handling of the gonflict. The fact
that hostilities ended beforeserious economic- disloca-
tions were felt, and the remarkable absence of communal
disorders, work'to Shastri's advantage, It is doubtful,
however, that Shastri and his close supporters will
consider their positions sufficiently solid to permit
them to enter into meaningful discussions on Kashmir
even though they may privately see the importance of
doing so.
10. The substance of each country's position on
Kashmir remains unchanged, Pakistan insists upon a
solution based on the will of the Kashmiri'Muslims.
This position is predicated upon the assumption--
probably valid--that Kashmiris would choose Pakistan
if the choice is limited to accession to one of the two
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countries. Rawalpindi would be less than enthusiastic
about offering a third choice, independence, which
appears to be the real desire of the Kashmiri populace.
Nevertheless, the Pakistanis yould probably go along
with such a solution as a means of removing the state
from Indian control,
11. The Indians remain firm in their stand that
Kashmir is an integral part of the Indian Union and
cannot be bartered away. New Delhi considers the 1948
cease-fire provisions invalid because the required with-
drawal of forces never occurred, The Indians also argue
that three "free" state elections since 1949 have obviated
the need for a plebiscite. The only settlement New
Delhi would be prepared to consider at this time would
be a permanent division of the state along the cease-fire
line, possibly with minor adjustments to the line,
12. Efforts to come to grips with the enormous prob-
lems facing the subcontinent must take into account the
effects of even so short a war upon the political and eco-
nomic, positions of the two countries, Both India and Pakis-
tan are engaged in major development programs, and the mar-
gin between success and failure in each case is very thin.
India has, in fact, barely managed to keep its rate of
productivity growth above the annual 2.5 percent popula-
tion expansion. Pakistan has done better, partly by
virtue of a development program more attuned to the
realities of the situation than India's but largely be-
cause the per capita input of foreign'aid is nearly
double that of India.
13. Pakistan's military machine has been weakened by
the struggle. With the threat from India as real as
ever, Ayub will be under great pressure to rebuild his
armed forces. Pakistan will almost certainly explore
alternatives to the'US MAP support upon which the army
and air force are now almost exclusively dependent.
Ayu'b is unlikely to receive military aid from the Soviet
orbit, which gives first priority to India. Communist
China has little to offer. In the absence of Western
aid, Pakistan will therefore be forced to choose between
military impotence and hard currency purchases. For-
eign exchange expenditures for arms will reduce funds
needed for Third Plan economic development programs,
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and would probably meet with disapproval among
Pakistan's aid donors. Any serious economic reverses
in Pakistan would heighten the instability en-
gendered by national frustration over Kashmir--
an effect that could be most serious in densely
populated East Pakistan.
14. Economic problems will also be severe in
India, particularly in the area of food production and
distribution, which has already been adversely affected
by the recent fighting. Only the import of 6 - 7
million metric' tons of grain'annually--a shipload
each day--saves some parts of India from severe
famine. This. condition is likely to persist and
perhaps worsen unless agriculture and fertilizer
targets go ahead on schedule. Even then the end to
a dependence on imports is a long way off.
15. To meet this problem resources may have to
be diverted from other projects, and the resulting slow-
down in growth could contribute to political instability.
New Delhi does not face major problems in rebuilding
its armed might, since it can fall back on Soviet aid
if Western support is not forthcoming. Nevertheless,
the Indians may feel compelled to pour more resources
into defense production, and may also decide to go
forward with a nuclear weapons program.
International Considerations
16. The conflict has altered the framework of great
power relationships with the subcontinent. In the
case of Pakistan the forces tending to pull Rawalpindi
simultaneously in two, directions--toward the West
and toward the neutralist East--have intensified.
Popular sentiment: in Pakistan is running heavily against
the cease-fire, largely because as previously pointed
out, government-inspired news coverage of the war
left the strong impression that Pakistan was winning.
Pakistanis who were already highly incensed at the
US suspension of MAP aid are likely to blame., what
they consider to be an untimely cease-fire upon US
pressure. The second postponement of the Western
aid consortium pledging session may be seen as a
bold power playa Even among those in the leadership
elite who were aware that a Pakistani victory had
become' impossible and that the risks of defeat were
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increasing daily will share the conviction that Pakistan
must win broader international support. This means
continued Pakistani courtship of Communist China and
Indonesia, whose support may not have amounted to much
in material terms, but did serve to harass and worry
the Indians. It also means a renewed effort to build
up Pakistani stature among the non-aligned countries
of Asia and Africa in hopes of displacing Indian in-
fluence. Pakistan feels that sentiment among these
countries is strongly against India, and that India's
attack across an international border toward Lahore
reinforces Pakistan's position. Pakistan.'s alliance
with the West continues to be an embarrassment in its
efforts to cement relations with the non-aligned/Com-
munist countries, however, and the tendency toward dis-
engagement from the West will probably continue.
17. On the other hand, Pakistan's economic and de-
fense problems have been intensified by the war, and only
the West can effectively bail the country out. This is
particularly true in the case of military aid. Ayub may
also realize that the only powers capable of applying
significant and concrete pressure upon the Indians
over Kashmir are his Western allies. He will therefore
probably undertake sufficient fence-mending in the West
to ensure a reasonable level of economic and diplomatic
support.
18. In India the net result of the short war is
likely to be some deterioration in India's relations with
the West. As in the"Bann of Kutch crisis the Pakistani
use of MAP supplied equipment has sparked criticism
of the US. In contrast, the role of the USSR is con-
sidered to have, been more favorable to India, despite
Moscow's basically even-handed efforts to bring the
war to an end. Indian satisfaction with the war
effort will lessen New Delhi's'susceptibility to West-
ern pressures on Kashmir and Indian leaders may feel
they are in abetter position than ever to profit from
Soviet rivalry with the West in aid-giving.
19. Indian emotional resolve to hold Kashmir has
probably been strengthened by the open hostilities, and
pressures from the West to reopen the Kashmir question
will almost certainly meet with hostility in New Delhi.
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20. New Delhi would probably react initially to any
attempt to use economic and military aid as levers in
pushing toward a Kashmir settlement by asking for in-
creased Soviet help or by resolving to absorb the sanc-
tions without giving ground. The Indians probably see a
suspension of PL-480 food imports as the only insur-
mountable penalty the West can impose, but doubt that
this sensitive program with its humanitarian overtones
will be touched.
21. Economic sanctions sufficiently severe to
bring New Delhi around on Kashmir could therefore do
irreparable damage to the Indian economy before they
succeed, while leaving an enduring legacy of political
instability and antipathy toward the West. In such a
climate the USSR, and ultimately China, would find new
opportunities.
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