SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A004100730007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 14, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY USSR/East Germany
SUBJECT Soviet Methods of Interro,,ation
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT NO.
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
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r
25X1 1. (0rdinarily, after a person. had been. arrested by the Soviet security
services, all materials indicating his criminal activities would be
sent to the interrogation subsection, or section of the appropriate
organ of the MGB. The chief of the subsection or section would examine
these materials and then pass them on to one of the interrogators for
action.
2. Materials proving the criminal activities of an arrested person were
considered to be either official or unofficial. Official materials in
the MGB were those items which were not classified. secret, i.e., records
of interrogation, records of search, reports from the place of employment,
autobiography, statements of various organizations on the activity of
the accused, and material evidence in the case.
3. The following were classed as unofficial materials: the operational register
on the accused, the case logbook, various agent reports, and the results
of the security check at the place of birth and places of work of the
arrested person. This type of unofficial material was not shown to the
prosecutor.
1+. After receiving the orders from the chief of the section or subsection
to assume responsibility for a case, the interrogator was obligated to
familiarize himself with all materials, to study them, and to prepare a
tentative plan for interrogation and a questionnaire.
5. The interrogator first acquainted himself with the unofficial documents,
carefully studying and comparing the information on the arrestee uncovered
by agents, including statements which compromised the arrestee. After
this the interrogator studied the official materials, recording any con-
tradictions found between the first statements made by the arrestee and
his later statements, and between the testimony of the arrestee and that
of witnesses or agents. Contradictions were weighed, and were entered in
the record as possible lies. The interrogator also etft
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or photographs taken from. the arrestee which might contain evidence.
After the interrogator had completed all this, he would formulate a
tentative plan for interrogation, in which a general goal was set of
"unmasking" the arrestee. In his plan the interrogator would consider
the contradictions which had arisen during the study of the case and
determine the course to be followed in eliminating them. The interrogator
also indicated any necessity for examination of additional. witnesses in
the case to establish specific points, or for confrontation of the
arrestee by a witness, or for additional investigation at the arrestee's
residence or place of employment.
7. The interrogator would then write out the main questions which he in-
tended to ask the arrestee at the interrogation. The questions were formed
with a preconcei4ted idea of what the answers were going to be. The in-
terrogator 'wouId consider the possibility of. "unfavorable" answers, and
would,therefore, compose two or three variants of the questionnaire. The
questionnaire would be devised in such a manner as eventually to drive the
arrestee into a blind alley and force him to make a true confession.
8. Having completed this phase of his work, the interrogator would return to
his chief and report with all the case material, including his own con-
clusions on the investigation and forthcoming interrogation. The chief
would usually agree with the plan. and questionnaire of the interrogator,
making a few additions and deletions.
9. The chief of the subsection. would then order the arrestee to a special
cell where there was an internal agent (vnutrikamern.yy agent). If an
internal agent was not available, then the chief would designate one of
the interrogators to recruit such an agent for the purpose of "enlightening
the ,,hrrestee."
10. On orders from the chief, the interrogator would have the prisoner summoned
to his office. Each interrogator had his own room which was suitably
furnished with a large writing desk, perpendicular to which was another
small desk. A chair for the arrestee stood two or three meters from the
interrogator's desk. There were curtains on the windows, and on the. wall
the ever-present portrait of Stalin.
11. The first and most important interrogations began between 2100 and 2200
hours, and continued until 0300 or 13400 and sometimes even longer. Reveille
for prisoners was at 0600, so that during the interrogation the arrestee
was permitted to sleep two or three hours during a twenty-four-hour period.
12., The above was an account of the preparation of the interrogator for an
interrogation-in the event that agent data, however incomplete, were available
* activity
risoner'
the
p
to some degree
which would aid in characterizing
and conduct. The availability, howevert of such material in tie interrogation
practices of the MGB was rare.
13. It was often the case that in preparing a person fry S.nterx l ct~on there
were several examination records prepared by uUQva ifted, m,,gra=natical
case officers, which rendered the establishment of the presence of con-
tradictions ,br even criminality in the evidence extremely difficult or
even completely impossible. Therefore, very often upon arrival at prison
the prisoners were put into a category of "detained" but not "arrested',
that is, they were not formally and legally arrested because of the absence
of any materials or evidence connecting them with criminal activities. In
many cases, there were not even any agent reports on them. In this situa-
tion the fate of the detainee was not predetermined, but with good luck
he might be freed by the organs of the MGB. This was why the full effort
of the Interrogator in this type of case was exerted to try to dispover
any sort of criminal activity, no matter how trivial, for the ex p9st
facto formalization of the arrest.
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14. The method and conduct of the interrogation were determined by the
individuality of the interrogator. The following was almost a law the
less intelligent and qualified the interrogator, the harsher and rougher
was the interrogation. The increased nervousness of the MGB interrogator
was explained to a significant degree by the absence of the evidence on
the criminal activity of a prisoner. Shouts, abuse, and primitive threats
helped the MGB interrogator conceal his inability to expose the "criminal"
sitting before him. The interrogator would conduct the.case in such a
manner as to humiliate the prisoner as much as possible, and to convince
thq prisoner that his fate was entirely and completely in the interrogator's
hands. In short, the interrogator would attempt to break the will of the
pr soner to resistance, to self-defense, and to transform him into an
ob dient puppet, who would willingly sign any version of the interrogation.
15. The record (protokol) of the interrogation would be compiled by the in-
tetrogator in question and answer form. In the organs of the MGB great
importance in the process of interrogation was attached to formal pro-
cedure. For example, if the prisoner should by a slip of the tongue have
accidentally supplied false data to which he had signed his name it would
be extremely difficult to convince the interrogator that he had simply made
a mistake in his testimony. The interrogator would not believe him and
would forward the record without corrections to the tribunal,where the
prisoner would be tried on the basis of the mistaken evidence.
16. The interrogator was obligated to give the prisoner an opportunity to read
each page of the record, which he had to sign. Nevertheless, not all in-
terrogators carried out this obligation, since a reading by the prisoner
would deprive the interrogator of the opportunity to alter the record to
his own liking. With this practice in effect, prisoners frequently were
ignorant of the details incorporated in the record of interrogation which
they signed. ,
17. The use of physical force in the organs of the MGB was officially prohibited,
and the beating of prisoners was not perm~tted. Numerous orders and directives
on this subject were sent out by the central organs of the MGB. Not all
interrogators, however, adhered to these restrictions, especially case officers
of MGB organs located at the "periphery" (in the provinces), where prisoners
sometimes were beaten in order to obtain testimony)- This type of activity
was considered in the MGB in 19+8 and 1949 to be illegal,and operational
personnel guilty of the use of force were punished through administrative
channels.
18. In very important cases where it was absolutely known that a prisoner was
giving false information, especially in espionage cases, the chief of the
section (otdel), with the verbal sanction of the chief of the directorate
(upravleniye),assumed responsibility and force was used on the prisoner, i.e.,
he was unmercifully beaten. This application of force was repeated no more
than once with each prisoner, since the MGB was afraid to leave traces of
the beatings on the prisoner. Actually such beatings were rare,since every-
one in the MGB knew that these "measures" might result in unpleasantness.
For example, if the prisoner brought out in court that he had been beaten
and forced to give false evidence wittingly, the chairman of the military
tribunal would return the case to the MGB for further investigation. The
decision of the military tribunal would include the statements of the prisoner
on the beatings. The return of a case for further investigation was con-
sidered to be a serious reflection on the work of the MGB, and the Third
Chief Directorate of the MGB might punish those guilty of administering
beatings to prisoners.
19. Under'such circumstances, the conclusion may be reached that within the
central organs of the MGB (Directorate of Counterintelligence, oblast directorates
of the MGB) only in exceptional cases did high officials assume responsibility
and give sanction for the use of physical coercion.1 Analogous measures in
very rare instances were adopted in lower organs of the MGB (Army counterin-
telligence sections, city sections of the MGB), but the chiefs of these organs
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gave no legal sanction to administer beatings to prisoners. Such action
was "illegal" and was usually investigated by the higher organs of the MGB..
20. The MGB widely employed a method of physical force no less effective than
beating the prisoner: confinement in small detention cells, In every MGB
prison there was a cell of very small dimensions, 1 x 1.5 meters, without
windows. If, in the opinion of the interrogator, a prisoner was giving
false testimony or withholding certain information from the interrogator,
the interrogator would write a report to the chief of the directorate say-
in : "I request the confinement of such-and-such prisoner to the small
de ention cell. The prisoner has conducted himself in a provocative manner
dining his interrogation and has given false testimony." The chief would
endorse the report as follows: "I sanction a term of 5 days." "According
to law", the chief could not confine the prisoner to this cell for more
t n five days. The chief of the prison, on the basis of the endorsed
re ort, would transfer the prisoner to the detention cell, where he would
only have room to stand, and would receive only bread and water.
21. Thh strategem in this case centered around the fact that the prisoner did;
not know for how long a period he was to be confined to this small cell.2
Prior to incarceration the interrogator would threaten him, saying that he
would remain there until he confessed his guilt. "You will rot there,"
th' interrogator would say, "and if you think it over and decide to tell
th truth then let me know through the jailer." The prisoner would remain in
th cell without hope, not knowing that his confinement there was strictly
1 ited to five days since his death in the detention cell would render the
chief of the prison responsible. The prisoner, of course, would be unable
to endure such conditions and therefore would beg to be reinterrogated. If the
prisoner were'torepeat his original testimony, or give false testimony, he would
be returned immediately to the cell to serve the full five-day confinement.
22. The MGB interrogator had to adhere to the use of standard threats, for
example, the threat to batter the prisoner into unconsciousness, the threat
to ship him off to Siberia with no further trial or investigation, and the
thredt to persecute or arrest the prisoner's relatives. These threats were
delivered Inca menacing tone, and were followed with the slogan: "We of
the MGB can do anything!" It goes without saying that most of these threats
remained threats and in actuality were never fulfilled, with the exception,
it is true, of infrequent cases in which the prisoner was beaten.
23. MGB interrogators very often made use of promises to the prisoner, For
instance, the prisoner might be promised lighter treatment if he were
quickly and frankly to admit his guilt. In espionage cases, prisoners
often were offered a chance "to atone for their guilt in the eyes of the
Soviet power" by performing tasks for the MGB. Added emphasis was Furnished
by the assurance that "the MGB can do anything -- either shoot or free a
criminQ.." The promises, of course, were almost never fulfilled, but their
effect 61 the prisoner was great. A not unimportant promise of the interro-
gator to the prisoner was food and cigarettes. This promise was fulfilled
if the prisoner admitted his guilt or commenced to give truthful testimony.
24+. All of the above-mentioned measures were designed to obtain a confession
of guilt from the prisoner and to elicit a list of his accomplices. Ex-
ceptional insistence was placed. on the delivery of the accomplices to the
organs of the MGB. The appraisal of the work of the interrogator was de-
termined by his unmasking of the prisoner and obtaining a confession of
the criminal activities and by his obtaining from the prisoner a complete
list of accomplices. This is w iy the interrogators of the MGB were so
zealous in their demands on prisoners to name all persons who were also.
involved in criminal. activity.
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25. According to the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR 0golovno-protsessualnyy
kodeks - UPK RSFSR) the interrogator was required, not later than two weeks
after the arrest of a "criminal", to present to him the so-called Accusation
Regulation (Postan.ovleniye o predyavienii obvineniya). This law was strictly
adhered to in the MGB. The process of presenting the prisoner with this regu-
lation played a major role in the subsequent fate o the prisoner. The regu-
lation was written on standard blanks in duplicate, one of whidawas,'sent to
the prosecutor for control of the progress of the interrogation. In the
regulation the interrogator would briefly state the essential points of the
offense which incriminatedthe arrestee. There wa;s,a special column on the
form in which the interrogator had to write, according to the statements of
the prisoner: "I admit complete guilt", "I admit partial guilt", or "I do not
admit guilt". The accused then signed the regulation. Immediately after the
presentation of the regulation and the prisoner's signature of it, the interro-
gator would compile the interrogation questionnaire, the first question of
which would be. "Do you understand the accusation and do you admit your guilt?"
26. This whole procedure played a, major role and to a large degree depended on
the adroitness of the interrogator since frequently the corpus delicti were
almost completely lacking and the prisoner did not wish to admit guilt. In
this case the task of the interrogator was, by the use of threats and arguments,
to obtain an admission of partial. guilt, no matter how trivial. The entire
procedure was centered around the fact that the prisoner was unaware of the
major role his admission would play, because in the absence of incriminating
evidence, and if he refused to confess, he stood a one in ten chance of being
freed. Ordinarily,, the significance of such a confession was minimized by
the interrogator, who would promise the prisoner a chance to prove his innocence
during the trial if he would admit partial guilt.
27. It should be noted that the prisoner, during the period of his interrogation,
was entirely isolated from the outside world. As such, he was forbidden to
receive anything, and also forbidden to read newspapers and books.
28. In 1949 the Directorate of Counterintelligence (UKR) in Germany attempted to
adopt the use of a lie detector in the interrogation section. A Orman cardio-
graph was obtained, suitable primarily for medical purposes. The apparatus
was never actually used in the interrogations of the section. Several members
of the UKR said that in the USSR such apparati had been used with success by
the MGB. 3
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always accurate.
terminology as "periphery",'bentral", etc., is not
40
25X1 2. I Iprisoners
often are aware of the time limitation.
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3. Althou h the USSR is known to possess polygraphs,(lie detectors), other
25X1 who are knowledgeable indicate that their employment by the MGB
at least during the period of this report,, is highly doubtful.
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