BETWEEN ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000200630002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1978
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

By Dr. Curt Gasteyger
The months ahead may be of
decisive importance for the future
course of both strategic armament
and the chances for its limitation or
control. Developments of the past
year or two contain the seeds for
either option. On the one hand, the
United States is about to make some
far-reaching decisions regarding
procurement of new weaponry, while
the Soviet Union has kept making
enormous efforts in the fields of
both strategic and conventional
armament. Either development finds
its prolongation in the armament ef-
forts of the two alliances, NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. In addition the
arms race has engendered a growing
militatization in many areas of the
Third World. On the other hand,
more efforts are being made at vari-
ous levels to arrive at least at some
measure of arms control. Conflict-
ing as they may appear, these trends
are closely interrelated: because all
attempts to-date at calling a halt to
the arms race have failed, its limita-
tion is being sought with growing
urgency.
Of course, not unlike the quar-
rels about environmental protection,
each party expects the other to co
ahead first. To accuse one side alone
of being primarily or solely respon-
sible for the arms race would be
too simplistic if not outright wrong.
Both superpowers are inescapably
interlocked in it and share a great
amount of mutual responsibility for
it. It is therefore both ludicrous and
implausible if Moscow alleges that
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ARMADA
Jan/Feb 1978
any increase in Western armament -
in particular the introduction of the
neutron bomb - be directed against
Dr. Curt Gasteyger is an inter-
national security expert. He stud-
ied at Zurich University, at the
College of Europe in Bruges,
Belgium, and at Berlin's Free
University. Later, he was a Visit-
ing Scholar at Columbia and
Harvard Universities. Back in
Europe, he joined the Inter-
national Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, as Director of
Studies and is now a Council
Member. In' addition to being
Managing Editor with Atlantic
Papers, Paris, he holds a Chair
for international relations at the
Geneva Graduate Institute of
International Studies. Dr. Gast-
eyger is a contributing editorialist
for Armada International.
detente. By massively incrcasin her
own offensive capability the Soviet
Union herself has caused the West to
respond. However, we know that a
sensible East-West dialogue is pos-
sible only if a inutual1v accepted
balance of forces exists. "lip pretend,
as Moscow does, that detente was
made possible only as a result of
growing Soviet military power con-
tributes substantially to mutual
distrust which has always been the
very source of any arms race.
If, in turn, it is stated that \ Vest-
ern defence efforts are primarily a
reaction to what the Soviet Union is
doing, this claim does not stand up to
closer scrutiny either. Nor indeed do
contentions that the Soviet Union is
on her. way to strategic superiority.
US Maintains
Technology Lead
They not only show a lack of con-
fidence in Western defence capa-
bility, but pass over too easily a
number of developments which
clearly favour the West.:l'hus the
United States still maintains a sub-
stantial lead in advanced technology;
it is about to introduce new weapon
systems which the Soviet military is
manifestly envious of, and in the
early eighties it will have an esli-
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 mated total of , ., .,,,,, r ., t cc on disarma-
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targetable nuc-. .rcuu~nua u~ w ?.u.u .wu uuu.cuy asuu.~auw, .[l kun,~,~.vlua.inade only m od-
against the Soviet Union's 7,500. ? makes any international agreement achievements in the more than
Mutual deterrence remains vital
for both sides; neither can have an
interest to undermine it. Even allow-
ing for a pessimistic evaluation of
Soviet arms policy it seems highly
improbable that it is aimed at pre-
cisely doing that. However, neither
side should delude itself that the
introduction of new strategic weap-
ons will not affect the strategic bal-
ance, or simply raise it to a higher
level where, by some miracle, it
remains as stable as it was before.
Rather, certain weapons develop-
ments under way are almost bound
to have a unsettling effect on the
present system of mutual deterrence.
They include on the Soviet side the
ever growing number of heavy and
increasingly accurate ballistic mis-
siles - such as the land-based SS-18
and SS-19 and the mobile SS-X-20
with variable range and directed
primarily against Western Europe,
as well as the alarming development
of "killer satellites".aimed at down-
ing those of the adversary.
Senseless Development
While one may, if pressed, ex-
plain the deployment of missiles as
an attempt by Moscow to compen-
sate for its technological backward-
ness, no reasonable explanation can
be found for the development of
killer satellites. Both superpowers
are using satellites for strategic in-
telligence. Accordingly, they have
explicitly recognized the role of
these satellites in monitoring the
observance of the first SALT agree-
ment. As a result, reconnaissance
satellites have become an essential
prerequisite for mutual confidence
building and arms control. Hence,
should in fact the Soviet Union be
on the way to developing means of
eliminating these satellites, this
would seem both irrational and ir-
responsible.
As regards the United States, it
is less the introduction of the much
disputed neutron bomb than that of
ficult indeed. If, as seems highly
probable, West European countries
are to acquire cruise missiles, this
will fundamentally alter the hitherto
bilateral framework of the SALT
negotiations into which they have so
far been included as being of ex-
clusive concern to the two super-
powers.
The introduction of mobile land-
based missiles represents a challenge
of a different kind: strategic stability
so far rested on the fact that part of
the strategic forces - in particular the
ICBMs - are vulnerable to each
other's attack, the submarine-based
missiles alone being still practically
invulnerable. The moment one side
attempts drastically to reduce the
vulnerability of the land-based forces
by making them mobile, it abrogates
the implicit acceptance of mutual
vulnerability. The other side cannot
but feel more vulnerable and thus
less secure; its temptation to launch
a pre-emptive strike may grow,
whereas additional security could be
an invitation for the adversary to
taking greater risks. Either possi-
bility could equally compromise the
continued effectiveness of the bal-
ance of mutual deterrence. The bal-
ance between armament, deterrence
and security is therefore highly fragile
and the kind of armament referred
to above is likely to jeopardize it.
This explains President Carter's
reluctance to go for major new
weapon systems.
President Carter's
Dilemma
However, he can justify his
restraint only if tangible progress is
achieved in the field of arms control
primarily with Moscow. There is at
present no lack of opportunities to
do so.
it counts the extension of the nuclear
test ban agreement to include under-
ground tests and the prohibition of
chemical weapons among its more
promising topics. No agreement is,
however, at hand in either field.
Likewise, the mutual force reduction
talks in Vienna (MBFR) have hardly
gone beyond the preliminaries. Here
the difficulty lies primarily in the
different understanding the two
blocs have of the political role of
armed forces rather than in a funda-
mental agreement about the desira-
bility of reducing the enormous con-
centration of military might on the
continent.
Dialogue is Vital
What therefore remains as the
hard core and starting point for arms
control is the dialogue between the
two superpowers. And in fact one
is surprised to see that never before
have they been engaged in so many
simultaneous negotiations in this field
as they are today. First priority is still
given to the strategic arms limita-
tions talks (SALT ll)*. After all the
ups and downs of recent negotiations
the two sides now expect to reach
some kind of agreement during the
current year and enter into a third
round thereafter. At the same time,
negotiations are under way or being
initiated in other fields: on a limita-
tion of American and Soviet naval
presence in the Indian Ocean; on
restraining arms sales to the Third
World or, should Moscow take up
President Carter's invitation, on
banning the deployment of killer
satellites.
The disarmament agenda is thus
quite impressive. Past experience
shows that expectations should not
be set too high. But it would be
equally wrong to consider such ne-
gotiations as mere window-dressing
on the part of the two superpowers.
To be sure, there is always an ele-
ment of propaganda in this game.
Yet, neither side will be able to avoid
completely the hard question as to
how much disarmament is possible
and how much armament remains
necessary in order to maintain a
viable defence and a credible deter-
rence. Neither question invites an
easy answer.
cruise missiles and mobile intercon- Firstly, the Special Session of
tinental missiles (such as the MX) the UN General Assembly on dis-
which could compromise strategic armament is scheduled to start in
stability. The cruise missiles' opera- May. Its result, at best, will be ad-
tional possibilities are so varied that ditional pressure upon the two super-
it will be difficult to subsume them powers for more substantial progress
under any of the "classical" headings in cutting or slowing down their
used so far in arms control negotia- armament. On the whole, however,
tions: they are at the same time the UN has been a largely inade-
strategic and tactical, have a dual - quate platform for dealing with as
nuclear and conventional - capacity highly politicized and complex a
Curt Gastevger
40 and can serve c Approved For Release 2009/06/18: CIA-RDP05T00644R000200630002-24/1977