PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF HSC DRAFT PAPERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00261R000100050035-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: December 3, 1975
• Content Type: PAPER

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3 December 1975
SUBJECT: Principles and Standards for Review of HSC
Draft Papers
HSC Staff members have indicated their concern
review by the Agency of those
that the technical security
ortions of their report intended for publication in un-
P ublic as
classified form will be viewed by the media and p
some form of censorship. They are concerned that the Agency
will presume on the opportunity not only to attempt to in-
fluence the report, but will employ "security" to suppress
' ns of the report that are only critical or embarrassing.
portlo subject to the
We have reminded them that the Agency is s's commitment that security will not be used to
President roblems.
suppress criticisms that do not constitute security p ale
The problem will be a practical exercise in protecting
sources and methods. While unclassified pub-
telligence so event,
lication of the report entails som& exposures in any
nc 's review must be professional, sound and de-
the Age y
ible. The purpose of this memorandum is to discuss the
fens
approach that is to be taken. It has been coordinated with
the Deputy Directors.
DRAFT
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2. As a general practice, we will continue to propose
;/sanitization or paraphrasing (1) to protect sensitive
sources and methods, (2) protect foreign liaison relations,
and (3) and protect the names of cooperating individuals
and commercial and other organizations. Sample situations
in which security questions may arise are below:
a. General summary statements of operational
activity (e. g. , "there is a pattern of CIA activity
will not be ob-
jected to on security grounds alone. Specific re-
.ferences, however, singling out countries and so
describing persons that they can be identified, would
be questioned.
b. Descriptions of operational techniques
(where employed) should be considered carefully
to ensure that they do not reveal operational
methods to a degree that they would be harmful.
c. Specific identification of Agency employees
below the top command level, or descriptions that
make their identity readily ascertainable (e.g., "COS
Zamboango in 1950") will be questioned.
d. Specific mention of proprietary-type
entities is objectionable, as would be descriptions
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that would locate and identify them. A .general
discussion of the existence of proprietaries
cannot be objected to, but a detailed review of
holding company arrangements, proprietary funding
and management techniques, as well as specific
overseas operations in connection with them, is
to be questioned. Generalized descriptions can
well serve the purpose of informing the reader
and should be sought in lieu of the more detailed
descriptions. In limited instances where publicity
or other consideration make it reasonable, specific
identification will be accepted (e.g., "the Air
America complex").
e. Description of cover arrangements should
be kept very general, avoiding any detail that would
reveal local strengths or serve to pinpoint individuals,
or that permit compromise of cooperating cover organ-
izations.
f. Reference to classified intelligence reports
and studies, in the report, should be studied care-
fully to ensure that they do not reveal intelligence
sources and methods. In some instances, a given piece
of information may be known to only a very few indi-
viduals, and publication of it in unclassified form
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would permit identification of the source.
other instances, certain information could be
known only through technical systems for col-
lection. It is doubtful that any one bit of
intelligence would. contribute much to most dis-
cussions, generalized summaries sufficing to
make whatever points the HSC has in mind, but
there may be instances in which this problem is
presented.
, Reference to specific intelligence gaps
g
that will reveal U.S. capabilities in areas im-
portant to the national interest.
h. Appraisals of the performance characteristics
of Communist or other foreign military equipment should
dered before agreement for release in
be carefully consi
unclassified form. If the information has been re-
leased officially there is no reason to object to its
ort, unless
publication in the unclassified HSC rep
if
textual treatment raises other issues of security; led
it is in the public domain, but has not been confirmed
by official publication, its inclusion in the report
should be considered carefully. Publication of es-
timated performance characteristics may reveal tech-
nical collection capabilities. it may be that
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publication of performance characteristics would
come in discussion of a current policy issue (e.g.,
the BACKFIRE bomber), which would raise additional
questions of classification.
i. Reporting on recent or current foreign
capabilities and intentions, and estimates of these,
should be reviewed closely for discussion with the
HSC Staff. National policy-level materials, which
may compromise national interests, must be handled
specially.
j. Specific organizational descriptions, coupled
with manpower and budgetary figures, must be studied
carefully. In this context, any detailed summary of
overseas organization and activities must be reviewed
for unintended disclosures, or obvious revelations.
k. Inclusion of non-CIA paper, coming from
the Executive level of government, should be iden-
tified for appropriate clearance.
1. The interests of other government agencies
and departments will be kept in mind, to ensure that
their interests are considered for coordination..
The above list of questions is intended as a sample of the
sort of issues that may arise. The nature of the subject
matter is such that a comprehensive list cannot be pre-
pared in advance, and the issues will have to be dealt
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3. As there is some concern on the part of the HSC
Staff members that the security review agreed between
Chairman Pike and the President may constitute some form
of censorship, care should be exercised to raise only real
issues of security, where it is proposed that the draft is
intended for unclassified publication. The manner in which
the Agency handles its security review also will have an
effect on the attitude of the HSC Staff members, so state-
ments of security reservations must be sober and professional,
with clear alternatives being offered for how the. question
can be resolved. The Agency's purpose is to facilitate
publication of a properly sanitized, declassified report,
where unclassified publication is intended.
4. A relatively consistent response by the Agency
will facilitate exchanges with HSC Staff members. The
above discussion is intended to contribute to this. Addi-
tionally, it will also help if the Agency's format for
conveying its comments is consistent. To this end, comments
should be made on a separate paper, each comment keyed to
the page and line of the draft, first stating the problem
raised by the statement in question, why its unclassified
publication in that form is subject to reservation, and
proposing either a way to resolve the problem editorially
by rephrasing the passage, or simply be deleting certain
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specific statements where they do not impair the thrust
of the paper or the flow or writing.. This would serve
as the basis for discussions with HSC Staff members,
giving them a complete statement on each issue in order
to prepare for further exchanges.
5. It is anticipated that working sessions will be
arranged following the initial review, to address the
questions raised by the comments.
6. The HSC Staff people have indicated an interest
in Agency comments on the factual accuracy of the drafts,
although it is not yet clear that the Agency will be re-
quested to conduct such a review. This question is sure
to arise in the review of reports planned for unclassified
publication, but the preparation of classified reports by
the HSC do not require review by the Agency. There is
nothing at present to prevent the Agency from offering
comments on factual accuracy or, for that matter,'on con-
clusions when the opportunity presents itself; however,
the HSC is not obliged to accept these comments. Any
factual corrections that are offered should be handled as
are the security comments, separately, soberly and pro-
fessionally.
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7. The Review Staff will undertake to coordinate
the distribution of papers for review' to monitor progress,
and assist in working reviews of comments with HSC Staff
members that follow the review.
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