KENYA: THE ETHNIC KEY TO MOI`S FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000200010002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Kenya: The Ethnic Key
to Moi's Future
ALA 83-10047
April 1983
Copy 271
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. Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Kenya: The Ethnic Key
to Moi's Future
This paper was prepared by
the Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations
and the National Intelligence Council. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, West and East Africa Division, ALA
Secret
ALA 83-10047
April 1983
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Kenya: The Eth
to Moi's Future"
Key Judgments Over the past seven months, President Moi has intensified efforts to reduce
Information available the dominance of the Kikuyu tribe, a course that challenges Kenya's ethnic
as of 30 March 1983
was used in this report. structure and poses serious problems for the country's stability. Ethnicity
has long been a major ingredient in Kenyan society, and the Kikuyu, the
country's largest, wealthiest, and most powerful tribe, are the keystone of
Kenyan politics. President Moi, a member of the relatively minor Kalenjin
tribe, has maintained his position so far only through his skill in dealing
with other ethnic groups, particularly the Kikuyu.
The catalyst for Moi's recent campaign to limit the influence of the Kikuyu
was the coup attempt in August 1982. Moi viewed that attempt in tribal
terms-even though growing popular discontent with Kenya's economic
slump and the deteriorating political situation were contributing factors-
and was especially disturbed by the key role played by the Kikuyu. As a re-
sult, he has begun to challenge the Kikuyu's privileged position on a variety
of fronts and has edged toward formation of a new ethnic coalition of
minor tribes that is designed to lessen Kikuyu influence. We believe he will
continue this policy in the months ahead.
Moi can probably remain in power at least until the 1984 presidential
election-and has a fairly good chance of winning-because the Kikuyu
are divided and he is adept at playing the tribe's leaders against one
another. The Kikuyu's continuing strong influence in the government and
Kenya's single party make them a threat to Moi's position, however, if he
overplays his hand and causes them to unite in opposition against him in
the coming election. Although we believe it is less likely, Kikuyu unhappi-
ness with Moi could lead, in the extreme case, to widespread civil disorder.
This, in turn, could prompt either a military takeover by senior officers-
who are sympathetic to Moi and would want to restore order-or a
spontaneous uprising by lower ranking Army personnel largely from the
Luo and Kikuyu tribes.
We believe Kenya will continue on its pro-Western political and economic
track as long as power remains in the hands of either Moi, the current Ki-
kuyu political elite, or the conservative military leadership that is dominat-
ed by Moi's fellow Kalenjin and their Kamba allies. We believe the country
would be likely to veer toward a leftist or radically nationalist foreign
policy only in the less likely event that Kikuyu-led discontent continued to
escalate and ignited a successful coup by the lower ranks of the military.
iii Secret
ALA 83-10047
April 1983
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Kenya's ethnic conflicts are longstanding, domestically rooted, and do not
result from external meddling. We have no evidence of specific Soviet Bloc
measures to heighten tension. Over the years the Soviets have been
unsuccessful in efforts to cultivate the generally pro-Western, capitalist-
oriented Kenyan leadership. Libya reportedly has tried to expand its
influence in Kenya, but there is no reliable information that it has mounted
a major effort or met with any significant success. In the unlikely event,
however, that the situation in Kenya becomes seriously destabilized, we
believe both the Libyans and Soviets would move quickly to cultivate
disaffected groups and exploit the situation to their advantage.
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Possible Outcomes and Implications for the US 7
Heritage of Kikuyu Dominance 11
Senior Security Officials 6
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Figure 1
Ethnolinguistic Groups in Kenya
LAKE
VICTORIA
CUSHITIC 2.1
Somali 1.0
GaIla 0.7
Bendille 0.2
Hawiyah 0.1
Boni 0.1
Percent of Total Population
(Preliminary Report, Census of 1979)
I Bantu
~ Cushitic
Nilotic
Complex mixture
MERU Tribal name
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Kenya: The Ethnic Key
to Moi's Future
Introduction
The Kikuyu have long been the dominant tribe in
Kenya, politically, economically, and geographically.
Their position and power have caused resentment
among other tribes-including the Kalenjin, the tribe
of President Daniel arap Moi-and tribal rivalries
have been a significant factor in Kenyan politics since
the independence movement.' The coup attempt last
August, which in part was inspired by the decline in
Kenya's once-promising economy, was interpreted by
Moi as tribally motivated. It greatly exacerbated
existing tensions and led Moi to initiate a series of
moves to promote the ascendancy of the Kalenjin and
allied groups at the expense of the Kikuyu. Because of
the Kikuyu's power, such actions are dangerous for
Moi and for political stability in Kenya. The Kikuyu
are angered by Moi's actions, but because of intratri-
bal divisions they have so far been unable to mount an
effective resistance. This paper will analyze the path
on which Moi has recently embarked, consider the
impact of his policies on Kenya's political stability,
and discuss the implications of a range of possible
results for US interests in Kenya.'
Moi's Ethnic Politics
When Kenya's founding father and first President,
Jomo Kenyatta, died in 1978, Moi, as Vice President,
constitutionally became President for a 90-day period
preceding new elections. According to the US Embas-
sy, Moi occupied the vice-presidency mainly because
A skillful grass-roots politician, Moi compensates for his lack of
substantive expertise and higher formal education with a shrewd
political instinct. Because he has learned to operate masterfully in
the cut-throat atmosphere of Kenyan tribal politics, he has
remained in the highest ranks of the party and government for over
20 years. In August 1982 he weathered Kenya's first coup attempt
since independence; in its wake he has moved to quell dissent and
avert further challenges to his leadership. A member of the
minority Kalenjin ethnic group, he draws his support from the
country's non-Kikuyu, the Army, and the business community. He
Moi, 58, is widely traveled and has visited this country several
times. He is a former school teacher who has substantial business
Kenyatta and his principal advisers-all Kikuyu-
were unable to find a Kikuyu leader who was accept-
able to all of them and who possessed even a shadow
of Kenyatta's popularity and prestige. The succession
issue was further complicated by Kenyatta's unwill-
ingness to groom a successor. Indeed, we believe that
Kenyatta may have made Moi his Vice President in
large part to dilute the power of the several major
Kikuyu politicians who were contending for the post,
and thus for a chance to succeed Kenyatta.
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Minister for
Constitutional Affairs
Njonjo has long been a power behind the scenes in Kenyan
politics. He has been in the Cabinet since independence in 1963,
serving as Attorney General for 17 years until he received his
current post. A ruthless politician, he has ambitions of becoming
vice president of Kenya's sole political party, KANU, and thus a de
facto vice president of Kenya. He is not on good terms with Mwai
Kibaki, Vice President of Kenya, who is his main rival to succeed
to the presidency. Although he is a member of the influential
Kiambu (southern) branch of the Kikuyu ethnic group, Njonjo has
not developed a strong tribal base he
lacks popular support and also is unpopular with the Army.
According to US Embassy officials in Nairobi, Njonjo has a
reputation as a bureaucratic infighter and as a close adviser to and
Educated at the London School of Economics, Njonjo is deeply
pro-British and is often called "the black Englishman. " He is
about 63, is married to a Kenyan-born white woman of British
During the 90-day interregnum Moi took advantage
of these circumstances to campaign successfully for a
full term as President. We believe that he was
acceptable as a compromise candidate to the Kikuyu
leaders because he belonged to the Kalenjin-a rela-
tively fragmented group that they did not consider a
serious threat. They probably saw him as no more
than a figurehead who would temporarily hold office
while they continued to control events and resolve the
question of who should pick up Kenyatta's mantle
Moi, however, moved quickly to consolidate his posi-
tion by pitting one Kikuyu leader against another. He
named Finance Minister Kibaki, a Nyeri Kikuyu, as
Vice President and continued Charles Njonjo, a
Kiambu Kikuyu, in the important post of Attorney
General. By putting two rivals in positions of relative-
ly equal power, he precluded either from gaining
ascendancy and weakened their ability to challenge
Vice President; Minister
of Home Affairs
Once widely regarded as one of the most intelligent, competent,
and popular government officials in Kenya, Kibaki lost
considerable personal prestige and political influence in a 1982
Cabinet shuffle. At that time, he lost the finance portfolio he had
held since 1969 and assumed the less prestigious home affairs post.
His diminished standing has been attributed to
a lack of ambition, and a strained relationship with President
Daniel arap Moi. His reputation may have suffered further since
the coup attempt against Moi in August 1982 in that he is the de
facto head of the northern (Nyeri) branch of the dominant Kikuyu
group, some of whose members were implicated in the abortive
coup. As Minister of Finance, Kibaki impressed international
observers with his in-depth understanding of economic issues.
During his later years in the post, however, he came under
increasing criticism as a result of the steady decline of the nation's
A British-educated economist, Kibaki, 51, has held a series of
Cabinet posts since 1964. Also, he has been Vice President since
1978. He speaks English well. He is Roman Catholic. Married, he
him. Neither has been able significantly to expand his
power base and both have been forced to perform
under the watchful eye of Mo
Although Moi lacked the towering presence of Ken-
yatta, he shrewdly went about adding to his support.
In contrast to the isolation Kenyatta cultivated, he
traveled widely throughout Kenya. At the same time,
he emphasized his long association with Kenyatta and
his plans to continue Kenyatta's moderate policies by
adopting the slogan "Nyayo" (Footsteps) for his re-
gime. According to the US Embassy, Moi distributed
patronage more equitably than Kenyatta had among
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Figure 2
Kenya: Coffee Production and Prices
Kenya's ethnic and political groups-many of which
either lost out under Kenyatta or feared a similar fate
under Moi. Most significantly, he brought back into
the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) and
placed in senior-although largely ceremonial-gov-
ernment positions the Luo tribe's patriarch Oginga
Odinga and other Luo leaders. The Luo had tradition-
ally been the Kikuyu's strongest rivals. Odinga and
the other Luo associated with him had been politically
inactive since Kenyatta banned their party in 1969.
At the same time, the US Embassy reports that
although Moi gave some individual Kikuyu prominent
roles in his administration to avoid alienating the
tribe, he moved to reduce its influence as a group. In
1980, for example, he dismantled the Kikuyu tribal
organization-the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association
(GEMA). Ostensibly a social welfare organization, it
was in reality controlled by Kenyatta's family and
associates and exercised considerable political and
economic power
I
100 1977
Economic Woes Weaken Moi's Grip. We believe Moi
might have been able to sustain his ethnic balancing
act longer if the economy had not slumped badly. The
economic decline more clearly exposed underlying
demographic and institutional liabilities that had be-
gun to affect events during the last years of Kenyat-
ta's rule. Heading the list of problems was Kenya's
staggering 4-percent population growth rate-one of
the highest in the world-which put pressure on land
supply and urban facilities. In addition, in our opin-
ion, the desire of both Kenyatta and Moi to involve
the government in virtually all aspects of the economy
by means of inefficient public corporations has ham-
pered productivity. In agriculture, government-
imposed producer prices and restrictions on distribu-
tion have for several years kept production increases
below the population growth rate. These policies have
resulted in a steadily rising migration of young pro-
ductive farmers into the cities.
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Against this backdrop, a combination of high world
oil prices and a declining demand for coffee-Kenya's
principal export-led to falling foreign exchange re-
serves and a growing foreign debt. The recession in
the West and increased transportation costs also have
hurt the tourist industry, a major source of foreign
exchange. These circumstances produced a current
account deficit that, we estimate, has averaged
around $1 billion during each of the past three years.
Moreover, Kenya has suffered high inflation-now
officially at more than 20 percent and likely to jump
to more than 30 percent later in 1983, according to
the US Embassy. The Embassy also reports that
unemployment has increased substantially, to as
much as 30 percent in urban areas.3
Coping With Opposition. Mounting economic prob-
lems provided opposition leaders with an opportunity
to attack governmental policies. In early 1982, Luo
patriarch Odinga publicly attacked the government's
economic performance. He also criticized Moi's deci-
sion to grant the United States access to Kenyan air
and naval facilities
there were
widespread rumors that Odinga would reconstitute his
own party and turn it into an essentially socialist and
anti-US organization.
Moi responded by banning Odinga from political
activity-a move that heightened tensions between
the Luo and his government.' We believe that Moi
and his Kalenjin kitchen cabinet became convinced
that Odinga's criticism weakened the government's
authority and that a stern reaction, first against the
Luo and then against other critics, was necessary to
reestablish Moi's primacy. Moi's awareness of his
weakness as a member of a minor tribe and the
' We believe Moi's fears about Odinga were exaggerated. Despite
Odinga's permanent hold on the Luo community, he seems to have
only a limited following in the country as a whole. His socialist
economic formulas have little appeal in view of neighboring
Tanzanian President Nyerere's failed economic experiments, nor
does his anti-US bombast receive much of an audience in view of
Kenya's basically pro-Western orientation and the significant eco-
nomic benefits that accrue to the economy of the coastal region
likelihood that Kenya's economy would get worse
before it got better presumably reinforced his sense
that he should take steps to safeguard his position.
In early 1982, Moi took the offensive. According to
the press, he threatened to detain dissident members
of parliament and warned all members not to discuss
topics derogatory to the government on the floor. He
also closed three small independent Nairobi colleges
when the students-both Luo and Kikuyu-protested
the country's growing economic problems. According
to the US Embassy, a contributory reason for. Moi's
decision to close the schools was his belief that
Marxists had infiltrated the University of Nairobi and
that the country's intellectuals did not respect him
because of his meager education
According to press reports, Moi then removed
Kenya's internationally renowned author, Ngugi wa
Th'iongo, from his post at the University of Nairobi
and banned his recent works. Moi had been particu-
larly angered by Ngugi's criticism of government
corruption and may also have worried about Ngugi's
growing status as a spokesman for the idea of greater
Kikuyu brotherhood. At about the same time, Moi
also turned to the use of political detention for the
first time in his presidency by imprisoning seven
dissident university lecturers and students for criticiz-
ing the government
ment.
The culmination of Moi's efforts to bolster his position
came in June 1982 when he pushed a constitutional
amendment through parliament that formalized the
existing situation by making KANU the sole legal
party. We believe that he sought with this step to lay
to rest the specter raised by Odinga of a new party
that might mobilize tribal opposition to the govern-
Moi, in our judgment, may have thought that by
taking these steps he was freeing himself from the
need to cater to leaders of different tribes who
threatened his position-particularly Njonjo and Ki-
baki of the Kikuyu and Odinga of the Luo. Indeed,
many critics quickly drew a twofold lesson not much
to Moi's liking: first, the regime's increasing repres-
sion left little room for a loyal opposition. Second, that
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in the absence of channels for nonviolent dissent
people who disagreed with Moi would have to resort
to clandestine plotting and direct action to effect the
changes they sought. Moi reinforced that lesson short-
ly after the establishment of the one-party state when
he cracked down on press freedom by ousting the
editor of a leading newspaper that had criticized the
government
The Coup Attempt and Its Aftermath
We believe that these deteriorating economic and
political conditions contributed to the coup attempt on
1 August 1982 conducted by members of the Kenyan
Air Force. In Nairobi, the plotters-mostly Luo and
Kikuyu enlisted men-seized armories, the radio sta-
tion, and the university, and set up roadblocks
throughout the downtown area until the conservative,
disciplined Army-with its many Kamba officers and
enlisted men-was able to quell the challenge and
restore order. A similar sequence of events occurred at
two airbases outside Nairobi.'
Tribal Purges. Political. According to US Embassy
reporting and the press, Moi saw the challenge in
tribal terms and initially believed that most of the
perpetrators were Luo. As a result, he sacked a Luo
cabinet minister, replaced him with another Luo,
widely disliked in that community, and dismissed the
second-most prominent Luo from his position as
chairman of the Kenya Film Corporation. He also
charged Odinga's son with treason-a crime carrying
a mandatory death sentence-and seized the aging
leader's passport as well as those of several other Luo
notables. Moi placed Odinga under house arrest, but
shied away, we believe, from imprisoning the Luo
leader for fear of creating a martyr. By clamping
down on Luo leaders and placing unpopular members
of the community in positions of authority, Moi
clearly sought to isolate and divide the tribe, even at
the cost of destroying his own ties to it.
As the extent of Kikuyu involvement in the plot began
to emerge, Moi was faced with a far more challenging
problem. We believe that although Moi had never
trusted the Kikuyu, he had presumed that his balanc-
ing between Njonjo and Kibaki was sufficient to
'The Army, created and trained in the British model, thus assumed
its historical apolitical role in putting down the threat to the
divide his principal Kikuyu challengers and to mini-
mize their threat. According to the US Embassy,
however, as he became convinced that the real perpe-
trators of the plot were Kikuyu, with less politically
astute Luo following along, he decided to reduce
Kikuyu influence throughout the power structure.7
there is a grow-
ing belief among the Kikuyu that the President has
decided to remove them from all positions of political
power in the country. He has already sacked a
number of civil servants and has threatened repeated-
ly to shuffle his cabinet. According to the US Embas-
sy, in the November byelection in Nakuru North-a
Kikuyu district-Kikuyu voters were routinely turned
away from the polls by the police. Intimidation and
voter fraud combined to elect a Kalenjin. Although
Moi has taken no direct action against Njonjo or
Kibaki, he has reduced their political influence by 25X1
cutting back on their access to him. They are, in our
view, cowed and uncertain about their future
Moi has thus far moved gradually and appears fully
aware of the risks he is taking in challenging the
Kikuyu, who have a historically dominant position in
Kenyan society. Nonetheless, the US Embassy and
press reports indicate that he has now begun to purge
the security apparatus, where he has sacked numerous
senior Kikuyu, including the police commissioner and
the commander of the General Service Unit (GSU).F-
Military. Moi has also pursued the purge within the
pointment of a Kamba to head the Second Brigade
puts all four brigades in the Kenyan armed forces
under either Kamba or Kalenjin leadership
The US Embassy reports that a Kikuyu backbench
member of parliament has claimed that there is deep
and growing tension between the essentially Kamba
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Chief of General Staff
Jackson Mulinge (Kamba)
Jackson Mulinge (Kamba)
Deputy Chief of General
Staff and Army Commander
John Sawe (Kalenjin)
John Sawe (Kalenjin)
Chief of Staff of the
General Staff
Oliver Cromwell Mkungusi
(Teita)
Deputy Commander of
the Army
Haji Mohamed (Somali)
James Lengees (Maasai)
Commander of the Air
Force
Peter Kariuki (Nyeri
Kikuyu)
Eliud Mbilu (Kamba)
Ben Gethi (Nyeri
Kikuyu)
Bernard Njiinu a
(Kiambu Kikuyu)
Commandant of the
General Service Unit
Peter Mbuthia (Nyeri
Kikuyu)
Erastus M'mbijjiwe
(Meru)
and Kalenjin Army leadership on the one hand and
the large number of Kikuyu in the junior ranks on the
other. this tension has
recently been exacerbated by the arrest of several
junior Kikuyu officers, whose relatively high educa-
tion levels, leadership qualifications, and Kikuyu eth-
suspect. At present, Mulinge is making many of the
important decisions concerning the armed forces that
previously had been referred to Moi. Although the
President is listening to the Army on some issues, he is
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nicity made them politically suspect.
We believe Moi is attempting to ensure future loyalty
of the armed forces by building a loyal minority Socioeconomic.
coalition made up of his own Kalenjin tribe, the
Kamba, and other small groups. In our judgment,
Moi is comfortable with the Kamba. It was mainly
Kamba Army leaders, for example, who steadfastly
supported the government during the coup attempt.
Moi has rewarded a number of them with promotions.
A relatively young Kamba general was named Chief
of Staff to the Commander of the Armed Forces,
General Mulinge, who also is a Kamba.
According to the US Embassy, the military's Kamba
leaders have increased their political influence since
the uprising attempt. The Kamba generals, for exam-
ple, encouraged Moi's decision to arrest and replace
senior Kikuyu security officials whose loyalty was
_Jbeyon limiting t e Ktkuyu's security mi-
tary role, Moi has also threatened their economic
interests. He has, for example, replaced Kikuyu with
Kalenjin on various parastatals, including the boards
that control purchases and distribution of produce and
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Chief, General Staff,
Armed Forces
The most influential and powerful figure in the armed forces,
Mulinge enjoys the full confidence of President Moi. He also has
the respect and support of the Army rank and file. He played a key
role in ensuring stability in Kenya after the death of President
Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 and helped suppress an abortive coup by
disgruntled military officers in August 1982. After the coup
attempt, his influence with Moi increased, and Moi gave him
responsibility for reorganizing the armed forces. Although he has
been expected to retire since at least July 1980, he will probably
stay on for the near term to oversee the widespread changes in the
military. He has always been cordial to US officials, who consider
Mulinge received his military training in the United Kingdom.
He is wealthy and has extensive interests in ranching and cattle
exporting. Mulinge. who is about 58. is a Kamba. Married, he has
Kikuyu also worry, according to the US Embassy,
that they may be expelled from their land in the Rift
Valley. This land was traditionally Kalenjin territory
until Kikuyu landholding companies moved in after
independence.
Moi's attention has even extended to the Ministry of
Education. he is
removing Kikuyu education officials in charge of
selecting applicants to government-subsidized second-
ary schools and replacing them with Kalenjin. Tradi-
tionally, the Kikuyu had used their hold on these
administrative positions to nominate members of their
own tribe.
New Alignments. Moi, in his search for a new base of
support for his government, has brought Kenya to the
verge of a fundamental realignment of the ethnic
groups that hold paramount political power. If he
continues on this path, the long-dominant Kikuyu
could find themselves the outsiders. Governing in
their stead, under Moi's aegis, would be minor ethnic
groups, led politically by the Kalenjin and militarily
by a combination of the Kamba and the Kalenjin.
Additionally, Moi could co-opt other ethnic groups by
giving them a larger share of political spoils and
privilege than they ever received under the Kikuyu.
Possible Outcomes and Implications for the US 25X1
We believe that Kenya's economic slump is likely to
continue and that the resulting social and political
tensions-along with the legacy of last year's coup
attempt-will lead Moi to continue his repressive
policies. Although Moi still has considerable room to
maneuver, including the ability to reverse himself, on
the basis of his behavior over-the last several months
we believe it unlikely he will do so. In our view, Moi is
all but certain to continue his efforts to pit the
country's largest ethnic groups against one another
and to forge a controlling coalition of minority tribes.
The Kikuyu's continuing strong influence in the gov-
ernment and in Kenya's single party would make
them a threat to Moi's position, however, if he
overplayed his hand; moving against top-level Kikuyu
leaders or further accelerating the replacement of
lower and middle level Kikuyu bureaucrats could
unite the Kikuyu against him.
According to the US Embassy, Moi may seek a new 25X1
mandate by calling an early election, gambling that 25X1
none of his potential antagonists has yet forged a
broad base of popular support. We do not believe Moi
is likely to take such a step, however, because of his
concern over the political risks involved. If the elec-
tion is held as scheduled in 1984, it is likely to be
preceded by intense jockeying for position within the 25X1
Kenyan leadership. Nonetheless, we believe Moi's
political skills and his opponents' divisions will give
him a fairly good chance to win another term as long
as the economy does not suffer dramatic deteriora-
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As long as Moi continues in office we believe that
Kenya will retain its basically pro-US policy and will
look to the United States for still greater economic
and military aid. The public image of the Kenyan-US
military relationship, however, is closely related to
Moi's political position. To date, public criticism of
the United States has been limited to the statements
of Luo leader Odinga. We believe, however, that a
more visible US military presence in Kenya under the
aegis of a weakened and repressive regime would
increase the possibility of anti-US protests. In our
view, under such circumstances Moi's leftist oppo-
nents would be quick to identify the United States
with the repressive regime, and such criticism could
strike a responsive chord among the increasing num-
ber of disadvantaged Kenyans.
Even if Moi wins reelection, hi
shaky. The Kikuyu still control
administration, the economy, a
that unless Moi repairs his rely
that tribe will be increasingly i
internal differences and unite to oppose Moi and the
minority tribes supporting him. Given the Kikuyu
elite's commitment to free enterprise and ties to the
West, its ouster of Moi by either constitutional or
extraconstitutional means probably would not pro-
duce any significant alteration in the government's
domestic or foreign policies, except that the spoils of
office and economic development would again be
redistributed to the benefit of the Kikuyu.
In the event that Moi was not toppled but appeared
incapable of maintaining order in the face of Kikuyu-
inspired unrest or other disorder, the largely
Kamba- and Kalenjin-led military might intervene.
Although the traditionally apolitical military has in-
creased its political influence under Moi, we believe it
would probably not want to maintain for long the
burdens of governing. More likely, it would look for
someone who would maintain order and respect the
position of the military and its Kamba and Kalenjin
officers. Because of the military leadership's pro-
Western bent, Kenya would be likely to remain on a
pro-free market course supportive of the United
States even during an interim period of military rule.
The ethnic composition of the middle level and junior
ranks of the Army poses a conceivable, although less
likely, challenge to the government. Although the
Kamba and Kalenjin who dominate the top levels of
the Army support Moi, there is some restiveness
among middle level and junior officers and enlisted
men where there are larger numbers of Luo and
military leaders would be inclined to expel the old
leadership completely-breaking with the tribal polit-
ical system of the past-and to call for an end to
corruption and for more populist and possibly leftist
economic policies.
If extremists in the lower ranks did take over, they
could be expected to tilt Kenya away from the United
States, adopt a nonaligned policy, and seek assistance
from both East and West. In return for aid from
Communist countries, they would tend to be more
receptive to Soviet requests for port calls by naval
vessels. Although a leftist government would probably
seek closer ties with left-leaning neighboring regimes
with similar ideologies, including that in Addis
Ababa, its freedom of action would be limited by
ingrained Kenyan suspicion of the Communists. Pub-
lic opinion would probably restrict ties to the East to
nonmilitary areas and would work generally against
Kenya's becoming a Soviet client state along the lines
of Ethiopia.
much of the state
Ltions with the Kikuyu,
nclined to put aside its
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event that the situation in Kenya became seriously
destabilized, we believe both the Libyans and Soviets
would move quickly to cultivate disaffected groups
and exploit the situation to their advantage.
Kenya has probably become a more fertile ground for
outside meddling since the coup attempt, but we
doubt that Tripoli will have much success. In our view
the dissident groups targeted by the Libyans are
fragmented and without effective leadership. We be-
lieve influential government officials and party mem-
bers are basically too pro-Western to be vulnerable to
Libyan blandishments. Moreover, the Muslim com-
munity-comprising only 7 percent of the popula-
tion-is not a major influence in Kenyan political life.
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Appendix
Heritage of Kikuyu Dominance
The Kikuyu are the most powerful ethnic group in
Kenya because of their large numbers and because of
the advantages they gained during the period of
British colonial rule. The tribe constitutes 21 percent
of Kenya's population of 17.8 million and is the
largest of its 42 ethnic groups. Historians note that
the colonial government was established in Kikuyu
territory, Kikuyu lands were set aside for white
ownership, and regular contact between the colonial
government and the Kikuyu immersed this ethnic
group in the British system to a far greater degree
than other Kenyan tribes. Thus, although the Kikuyu
in some ways were the most victimized by the colonial
system, they also benefited the most.
With some justification, this ambitious and politically
astute tribe considers itself the architect of Kenya's
independence. The Kikuyu were the first tribe to seek
redress of grievances from the colonial authorities and
later were the driving force in the nationalist move-
ment. They bore the brunt of British military actions
to subdue the struggle for independence and they
provided Kenya with its founding father-Jomo Ken-
yatta-a commanding figure who governed the coun-
try for 15 years after the departure of the British in
1963.
The 16,000-man armed forces are the only instrument
of power in Kenya that the Kikuyu have not con-
trolled. The Kamba tribe-11 percent of the popula-
tion-has long made up a large portion of the Army.
British colonial policy in Kenya had been to recruit
the Kenyan African Rifles primarily from the
Kamba, largely on the assumption that their martial
values, lack of cohesiveness, and relative backward-
ness made them a more pliant and reliable force.
According to the US Embassy, at the time of
independence most high-ranking Army officers and
senior noncommissioned officers were Kamba, as were
30 percent of the enlisted men.
Tribal loyalties were submerged briefly during the
nationalist struggle and the first years of independ-
ence. Kenyatta carefully balanced tribal and regional
interests in his first government in an attempt to
breathe life into his slogan Harambee (Let's pull
together). He retained the essential features of the
flexible, multiethnic administrative structure of the
British colonial administration. This system included
an elaborate network of patron-client relationships
through which economic development funds were
distributed and the loyalty of the security forces was
maintained. Kenyatta's policies gave rise both to an
African middle class and to a sense of opportunity
among the country's underprivileged. Key segments of
society were co-opted, and, in general, tribal animos-
ities were muted by a general sense of shared enter-
prise
As a corollary to his nationalistic paternalism, Ken-
yatta in 1969 made Kenya a de facto one-party state
with a strong central government by dissolving the
only opposition party and making it clear he would
not tolerate dissent. Indeed, he extolled the one-party
concept as an expression of Africanism. Comparing
his political party, the Kenya Africa National Union
(KANU), to an extended family, he promised that his
government would be representative of all the coun-
try's ethnic groups.
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We agree with the academic view that Kenyatta-
despite his general maintenance of a multiethnic
administrative structure-tended over the years of his
presidency gradually to give more of the fruits of
independence to the Kikuyu, and that the early sense
of national harmony began to develop some discor-
dant notes. In particular, Kenyatta fostered Kikuyu
dominance of the bureaucracy and placed the Kikuyu
in effective control of the ruling party. The US
Embassy reports that Kenyatta also made serious
efforts to dilute the strength of the Kamba within the
armed forces and security services by appointing more
Kikuyu officers. In his later years, in fact, Kenyatta
made Kikuyu ethnicity a virtual prerequisite for
membership in the General Service Unit (GSU) -
Kenya's elite force responsible for internal order and
presidential security.
Scholars report that the Kikuyu during the late 1960s
reaped considerable economic benefits from repossess-
ing tribal lands in central Kenya that had been
appropriated by British settlers. While in European
hands, this area had been favored in various ways,
including greater access to the modern technologies of
economic development than most other regions of the
country. As a result, the Kikuyu took over quality
farm lands with well-developed facilities, enabling
them to acquire a leading economic role commensu-
rate with their political status. Kenyatta continued
the trend by favoring Kikuyu areas with a dispropor-
tionate share of government funds and development
projects
The Luo-the second-most influential tribe-have
been particularly resentful of Kikuyu dominance,
according to scholars. The Luo have always been in
the shadow of their traditional rivals, and the Kikuyu
have dealt harshly with the Luo's periodic challenges.
A focal point for modern Luo discontent has been the
treatment of the tribe's patriarch-Oginga Odinga-
who in the mid-1960s was Vice President and Minis-
ter of Home Affairs as well as a power in KANU. His
frequent leftist criticism of the government led Ken-
yatta to strip Odinga of much of his power.
As a result, Odinga in 1966 resigned from both the
government and the ruling party to form the Kenya
Peoples Union (KPU). The new party called for quasi-
Marxist, populist measures to solve Kenya's problems.
Western observers believe that the vast majority of
Luo joined Odinga's organization. His activities con-
tributed to intertribal tensions and produced a Kikuyu
backlash. In 1969 Tom Mboya-an outstanding Luo
leader who was considered the most likely successor to
Kenyatta-was assassinated. The overwhelming view
of Western observers and Kenyans at that time was
that the Kikuyu clique surrounding Kenyatta planned
the assassination.
In our judgment, other tribes besides the Luo were
jealous of the Kikuyu's increasing power and privi-
lege. No tribe, however, was strong enough to stand
up to the Kikuyu on its own, and their fragmentation
and general isolation from each other militated
against coordinated resistance. The Kikuyu kept a
tight grip on power and in 1971 quashed an ill-
conceived plot by a small number of Luo and Kamba
military officers to overthrow Kenyatta. The ease
with which the Kikuyu did this only reinforced the
widespread sense of powerlessness among non-Kikuyu
tribes.
The ascendancy of the Kikuyu over other tribes
encouraged factionalism within the tribe itself as
quarrels developed over the spoils of ethnic hegemony.
According to anthropologists, the most advantaged of
the three major Kikuyu groups-the Kiambu Kiku-
yu-has also been the smallest in number. Centered
in Nairobi, the Kiambu Kikuyu worked more closely
with the colonial government, were better educated,
and had a stronger economic base than the other
Kikuyu. Kenyatta was a Kiambu, and the group's
current spokesman is Charles Njonjo, Minister for
Constitutional Affairs.
The Murang'a Kikuyu are the mother clan for the
tribe as a whole, according to scholars, and they
believe their role has been somewhat usurped by the
Kiambu Kikuyu. The Murang'a, located to the north
of Nairobi, spearheaded much of the opposition to
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British rule and felt the Kiambu shortchanged them
on land, jobs, and political influence after independ-
ence. Charles Rubia, Minister for Works and Hous-
ing, is leader of this clan.
The third major clan, the Nyeri Kikuyu, also com-
plained of getting short shrift. Many of them believe
that the Kiambu Kikuyu were responsible for the
murder in 1975 of J. M. Kariuki, a popular Nyeri
politician and spokesman for Kenya's have-nots whose
proposed reforms threatened Kiambu economic and
political interests; Vice President Mwai Kibaki is now
the leader of the Nyeri. Like the Murang'a, this clan
resides in an area to the north of Nairobi
Despite these intratribal divisions, however, we be-
lieve the Kikuyu have more cohesion than most other
Kenyan tribes. Although at cross-purposes over their
relative share of power, they remain united in defense
of their privileges relative to other ethnic groups. In
our view, their common sense of purpose, coupled with
their political and economic power, makes it difficult
to govern without their support
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