A POST-MORTEM OF THE NEAR-SUCCESSION IN YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100360001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 12, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
12 February 1980
A POST-MORTEM OF THE NEAR-SUCCESSION IN YUGOSLAVIA
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Yugoslav President Ti to 's ilZ~ccos since the
?,Eainning of the year has givens Be In eade tine to
prepare for the succession period. It appears
the 1'zcgosiavs have used the time well. Formally,
Steven Doronjski and Lazar KoZiseveki, both relative
political non-entities, have been in charge of the
collective party and state Zeader,;hips. The real
power, however, evidently is in the hands of a small
group of men Tito has long trusted. These leaders
are Vladimir Bakaric, Milos Minis, Defense Minis tar
Ljucbicic, Interior Minis, ter Herl,jevic, and Stane
Do lino. "First among egual,s" in the group is
Bakaric, whom Tito placed "in o7in ge. "
The Formal Succession Mechanism
leadership is likely to conduct itself without Tito.
in effect passed into the hands of Tito's successors. Now,
with Tito's health rapidly deteriorating, a look at what
happened in January may give us clues as to how the system
will function if he dies soon. While there are limitations
on the judgments we can make, the January events do, never-
theluss, provide us with a rare glimpse of how the Yugoslav
1 . Yugoslav President Tito' s illness in early January
brought Yugoslavia to the verge of the succession, and power
2. With Tito seriously ill, the chairman of the
Yugoslav Assembly commission for legal affairs,-Miodrag
Tiar' memora~ntdum was requested b the National Security
Council. It was prepared by
the Office of
Political Analysis. It was, coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for 04331?-Eastern 1:'urope. Research was
completed on 1? February. Questions may be addressed to Chief,
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Zdcevic, held a briefing devoted to the succession question
for foreign journalists on 16 January. This move was
probably unprecedented in Communist annals. Zecevic's briefing
reflects Yugoslav confidence in their preparation for the
succession. Just in case there were any doubts, Zecevic
confirmed that Lazar Kolisevski, current- Vice President of
the state' Presidency, would succeed Tito in the state
hierarchy until Kolisevski's current term of office expires
in May. At that time, he will be succeeded by the Bosnian
representative on the state presidency, Cvijetin Mijatovi_c.
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reserved for the President of the party.
3. Zecevic also verified that. there is no provision
for the replacement of Tito as President of the party.
When Tito dies, Zecevic said, "the office will be subsumed
within the party presidency as a whole." The leading member
of that body, the current Presidium chairman, Stevan Doronjski,
assumes the majority of Tito's roles and functions in the
party leadership. Zecevic confirmed that the chairman would
fill the ex officio seat on the collective state presidency
and function smoothly.
4. On 12 ;January when Tito checked into the hospital
in Ljubljana he met with Doronjski and holisevski--a jestur_e
clearly designed to give an air of legitimacy and continuity
to the two men who legally assume much of Ti.to's power. On
the surface, then the succession machinery began to function,
The Locus of Real Power
5. Clearly, however, it is the I.h,ehind-tile-scenes
political activity that could spell thie difference between
success or failure of the Yugoslav succession mechanism.
With this in mind, Tito, prior to his f .i.rst. operation,
called on his longtime friend and adviser Vladimir Bakaric
to "take charge," and oversee the smooth operation of the
collective leadership system. We believe Tito wanted (and
wants) Bakaric to act as a stabilizi.nq influence and to
provide continuity as Yugoslavia moves iron Tito's personal
rule to the new collegial system. Bakaric, the last of
World War II partisan colleague:-,, also may attempt to
play the Pole of referee, keeping the country's diverse
Iationali5tand factions in line and arbitrating disagreements
that are bound to arise between the country's leaders.
Prior to Tit.o's illness, it was not clear what role Bakaric
would play in the succession. Now, it appears he will be a
central, if, not the central, figure in overseeing the transition
of power.
6. Bakesic, for exam])le, add.ressccl a national. prime
time television audience to mark the first anniversary of
Edvard Kerdelj's death. In doing this, Bakaric carefully
documented his close association with Kerdelj--the father of
Yugoslavia's self-managing socialist system--and his firm
support for the innovations in the Iy.stern of Yugoslav
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socialism that Kardelj masterminded. Bak-ric's impressive
and vigorous delivery style was intended to provide a
symbol of continuity with the past and a reassurance that
7. Several other Yugoslav leaders evidently also
played leading roles during January. They included Milos
Minic, a close Tito adviser and the Presidium's main foreign
policy expert; Franjo IIerl jevic, Minister of Internal
Affairs; Stain Dolanc, longtime Tito associate and Pre-
sidium membe : and General Nikola L-jubicic, Minister
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8. While Bakaric was assuring audiences at home and
abroad that Yugoslavia would not deviate from its chosen
path to socialism, Minic forcefully reasserted Yugoslavia's
independent foreign policy. Speaking to a party gathering
on 1 February, Minic--for_ the second time in two weeks--called
for the withdrawal of "foreign forces" from Afghanistan as
soon as possible. Earlier, on 11 January, a joint session
of the party and state presidencies met and endorsed the
government's opposition to the Soviet military intervention
in Afghanistan. 0
9. Throughout January, Yugoslav officials, while
expressing concern for Tito's health, projected a business-
es-usual image.
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notified within a matter of hours.
10. The January events showed the Yugoslavs approaching
the succession with a great deal of resolve and determination.
The atmosphere in the major Yugoslav cities appeared to be
one of calm, and there were only a few isolated reports of
public concern. The populace expressed its uneasiness in a
few cases by withdrawing hard currency from bank accounts,
but these withdrawals were not extensive. The media reported
on Tito' s condition frequently and candidly as Yugoslav
radio and television regularly featured medical bulletins.
There was no attempt to conceal anything from the citizenry;
when the first operation failed, the general. public was
group, or nation challenging that right..
11. As if to assure the man-in-the-street of the
leadership's determination to pursue Yugoslavia's nonaligned
course--with or without Tito--the media repeatedly denounced
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and called for the
total withdrawal of Soviet forces. The domestic press also
reminded its readers of Yugoslavia's accomplishments and the
correctness of Tito's road to socialism. The party journal
Komunist lauded Yugoslav policies and Belgrade's achieve--
ments_in building socialism. In an appeal to the entire
populous, the journal cited Yugoslav stability as not only a
result of the party and its members but of all those who are
participating in the building of modern Yugoslavia. Komunist
also reiterated Yugoslavia's determination to strengthen the
all-peoples' defense system and to fight any individual,
without. Tit, at least in the near term.
12. While Yugoslavs have worrind for years how they
will survive the passing of Tito's 35 year one-man rule,
the lesson of January appears to be that the leadership is
determined to carry out a smooth transition of power. Now,
a successful--albeit short--precedent exists which should
give the post-Tito leadership added confidence when the
succession does actually occur. The nature and open manner
in which the regime went about preparing for the succession
is indicative of a large degree of confidence and efficiency
in the government and party over their ability to govern
13. Looking to the post-Tito era, it is also apparent
that important decisions in Yugoslavia will initially be made
collectively, by Ti_to's Aner circle of close associates and
trusted advisers. In addition to the key individuals already
mentioned, several others could play a significant role in
the future course of events: Berislav Badurina, Tito's chef
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de cabinet; Premier Djuranovic; par',--y Presidium secretary
Dragosavac; and Presidium member and economic expert
14. How well this group will be able to work Lo ge Lher
over a longer period of time must, it this point, remain
an OpCf gtie. s t:ion. In the immediate wake of Tito' s passing
an overriding sense of common purpose is likely to prevail ,
but this col-iesion may dissipate with time.
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