JAPAN: THE POLITICAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000400710001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 4, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency /"I-
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 February 1983
Japan: The Political Situation
25X1
Prime Minister Nakasone faces several challenges to his
government during the current Diet session. His positions on
Japan's defense role, on transfer of defense technology to the
United States, and on constitutional reform are only a few of the
policies for which he has come under attack both in the Diet and
in the press. He is not backing away from the challenges,
however, and may in fact be trying to throw the opposition
parties off balance by crowding the political agenda with
contentious issues. So far, his assertive, straightforward style
has helped him carry off this strategy.
.
The Opposition Challenges
The government has a heavy schedule in the Diet, beginning
with passage of the FY 1983 budget; it should go into effect on 1
April, when the Japanese fiscal year begins. There are issues
that may delay budget deliberations, however:
-- Nakasone's?Washington pledge for greater cooperation with
the United States on defense has brought cries of protest
This memorandum, requested by James Murphy, Assistant Special
Trade Representative,'was prepared Japan Branch,
Northeast Asia Division, Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 3 February 1983 was used in its
preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to Japan Branch, Northeast Asia Division,
OEA, on
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from leftwing parties and the press.
-- Questions on Nakasone's defense policy and accusations
that Japan will become entangled in the US global
military strategy have alreadv been a major feature of
opposition Diet tactics.
The opposition parties have also criticized the government's
agreement in principle to exchange defense technology with the
United States. Nakasone's intervention led to a decision on this
issue, and the opposition is attacking him for violating Japan's
ban on arms exports. Even when Diet debate focuses on the
budget, we believe the opposition will continue to address the
defense issue, criticizing increases in defense spending--also
the result of direct intervention by the Prime Minister--
especially in view, of the limits placed on spending for social
programs.
In his policy speech to the Diet on 24 January, Nakasone
said that he will pursue fiscal and administrative reform,
beginning with reform of the public corporations. The opposition
parties will challenge him on this issue. The Japan Socialist
Party in particular is concerned about reform of the Japan
National Railway.. The gradual return of the national railways to
the private sector--the goal of the reform effort--would weaken
the powerful public sector rail union, a mainstav of Sohyo, the
labor federation that supports the Socialists.
Nakasone's call for open discussion and review of the
constitution has been another target for opposition attacks in
the Diet. The opposition parties are concerned about revision of
the "war renouncing" Article 9. Revision of the constitution has
been part of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) platform
for years, but for the first time it was included in the
resolution issued at the end of the party convention, held on 22
January.
Nakasone's association with former Prime Minister Tanaka
could also threaten his government. On 26 January the prosecutor
in Tanaka's trial for involvement in the Lockheed bribery scandal
recommended that he be fined and sentenced to the maximum prison
term of five years. The opposition parties are trying to
formulate a joint resolution calling for Tanaka to leave the
Diet. They also plan a joint campaign to attack the Nakasone
administration, which they allege is controlled by Tanaka: six
of Nakasone's 20 Cabinet ministers are Tanaka faction members,
and several others have ties to him. Bitterness toward the
powerful Tanaka is strong among the nonleadership factions in the
LDP, and we believe party unity might not hold if a resolution to
expel him came to a vote. A split LDP vote on this issue could
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damage the very structure of the party and thus shake the
Nakasone government.
..but Nakasone Stands Firm
Nakasone's personality will help him meet the challenges
ahead. His responses to tough questioning in the Diet have been
confident, informed, and straightforward. His approach to
controversial questions, unlike that of his predecessor, has been
bold and decisive, and the opposition rties have failed to back
him into a corner on any issue.
Another advantage he has is his power to dissolve the lower
house. He has warned that if opposition party boycotts or
stalling tactics delay government activity too long, he will call
for general elections. The opposition parties expect lower house
elections this summer but are not prepared for them now.
Nakasone has other assets. Although his statements on
increasing Japan's defense effort aroused strong protest at home,
the heavy-handed Soviet response diverted some media criticism to
Moscow. Some LDP members could break ranks on the Tanaka 25X1
resolution, but a serious move in that direction might prompt
Nakasone to dissolve the Diet. The LDP factions that oppose
Tanaka could lose seats because they are not as well prepared for
elections now as are the Nakasone, Tanaka, and Suzuki factions.
This, as well as the need for party unity before the already
scheduled local elections in April and upper house elections in
late June or early July could keep NRkasnne~'s critics in the
party in line on the Tanaka issue.
We believe a unified resolution calling for Tanaka's
resignation may not even come. to a vote. The centrist parties
are reluctant to join with the Japan Communist Party in a joint
resolution. The opposition parties' usual inability to work
together may thus stop the resolution before it reaches the
floor. The opposition parties also have a history of making
deals with the LDP. It is possible that in exchange for an
agreement to discuss repeal of the wage freeze for government
employees, for example, theSon-ialis~ts would agree to postpone
introducing the resolution.
Prospects
So far the Prime Minister has given every indication that he
will not back away from his vigorous approach to fiscal and
security problems, as well as to those caused by international
pressure on trade. In fact, he has said he intends to lead the
process of forming a national consensus on such difficult issues
as constitutional reform and an increased defense effort. He
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will probably have support from Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda
and LDP Secretary General Nikaido, both of whom are skillful
conciliators. With their backing, as well as that of former
Prime Ministers Tanaka and Suzuki, and by the force of his
personality, he may well maintain control of the Diet throughout
the current session. The Tanaka case is unprecedented, however,
and could still damage him.
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SUBJECT: Japan: The Political Situation
Distribution:
1 James Murphy, USTR
2 DDI
1 D/OEA
1 OEA/NA
1 OEA/NA/J
1 C/OEA/production
1 PDB Staff
1 C/NIC
1 NIO/EA
1 Executive Director
1 C/PES
2 OCR/ISG
5 CPAS/IMC/CB
1 C/DDO/EA/RR
DDI/OEA/NA/Japan (3 February 1983)
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