USSR-WEST GERMANY: MOSCOW'S REVANCHISM CHARGES CHILL BILATERAL TIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001100520001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 2, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D 020505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
2 August 1984
USSR-West Germany: Moscow's Revanchism Charges
Chill Bilateral Ties
Summary
An increasingly strident Soviet propaganda campaign
against an allegedly spreading revanchist spirit in West
Germany, begun after initial INF deployments last winter,
appears to be backfiring. Indeed, the campaign has
undermined Soviet influence in West Germany; it has angered
the Kohl government, sparked negative media commentary, and
even offended the opposition Social Democrats. Although
detente remains high on Bonn's agenda, the Kohl government
is under little pressure to appease Soviet concerns at the
moment. In addition to having support at home, Bonn notes
that intra-German relations appear to be still improving
despite additional Soviet scrutiny and complaints that good
bilateral relations are inopportune in a period of East-West
tensions. Other East Europeans, moreover, are still willing
to deal with Bonn, and Moscow significantly has not seen fit
to disturb bilateral economic relations. As maladroit as
the Soviet propaganda campaign is, Moscow probably will
persist with it as one of the few means at its disposal to
impress on West Germans, East Europeans, and the Soviet
public that the current state of East-West relations is
deeply troubled.
This memorandum was prepared byl ~IOffice of European
Analysis, and Office of Soviet Analysis. Information
available as of 2 August 1984 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Western Europe Division,
EURA or the Chief, Policy Analysis Division, SOVA
EUR M 84-10162
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The Anti-Revanchism Campaign
Since US INF deployments began last December, Moscow's propaganda
concerning a possible revival of West German revanchism and militarism has
been growing increasingly alarmist. Soviet media now freely discuss the
alleged rebirth in West Germany of a determination to restore German hegemony
in Europe, West German efforts to undermine East Germany, and the danger of
rising Fascist and neo-Nazi sentiment in Europe at large. Some media in
Eastern Europe -- Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Poland -- have picked up on
the campaign to a lesser extent, voicing suspicion of intra-German relations
and criticism of other East Bloc states for trying to promote improved East-
By evoking dreaded images of Germany's past, Moscow apparently hopes to
convince Bonn that its continued support for INF has damaged bilateral
relations, to reinforce the theme that the international situation has reached
a level of danger unprecedented in the postwar era, and to warn East Germany
-- and perhaps other East Europeans -- against moving too close to Bonn.
Moscow probably views the supposed German threat as an especially useful
bogeyman for diverting public opinion in Poland from the regime's internal
problems. Both Soviet Premier Tikhonov and Polish leader Jaruzelski made the
threat of German revanchism a central theme in speeches to the Polish Sejm on
21 July.
The propaganda charges also reflect knee-jerk reactions of Soviet leaders
accustomed to suspecting the worst of the Germans./
We believe that weaning West
Germany away from close support for NATO policies remains a key long-term
foreign policy goal for Moscow and that Soviet policy still clearly
differentiates between the United States and West Germany. Soviet spokesmen
have not displayed the same degree of pessimism about the Bonn government that
they have about the Reagan Administration, and some Soviet commentators have
publicly suggested that Kohl serves as a moderating influence over Washington
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and a force for detente. Although the bilateral political climate has
worsened, the Soviets have continued to seek diplomatic contacts with the West
Germans. Economic relations also remain on track, and West Germany continues
to be the USSR's largest trading partner in the West and a major source of
Western technology.
The West German Response
The Soviet statements have been publicized widely in West Germany.
Although public reactions are difficult to gauge, the statements have elicited
much negative media commentary. Bonn has responded to Soviet charges by
emphasizing West Germany's commitment to detente and its belief that
reunification and border changes can only come about peacefully. Moreover,
both government and opposition leaders have pointed out that the Soviets
implicitly accepted the West Germans' commitment to peaceful reunification in
a letter of understandin associated with the 1970 Moscow Treaty normalizing
bilateral relations.
Even the Social Democrats have been disappointed with the Soviet
behavior.
Indeed
a top CDU official earlier this week publicly praised the SPD's reaction to
the Soviet revanchism charges, including Bahr's stand on the question of
German unity during his meetings in Moscow.
Effects of Moscow's Behavior
The effect of Moscow's actions has been to weaken for the moment its
leverage with West Germany. As a result of perceived Soviet interference in
West Germany's affairs, the Kohl government now faces less domestic pressure
to advocate Western arms control concessions or changes in the INF deployment
schedule. At the same time, Moscow's readiness to continue economic ties and
to maintain the appearance of a dialogue has reduced Bonn's sense of urgency
in bringing the Soviets back toward detente. Bonn appears willing to wait for
the Soviets to return at their own pace to a constructive stance regarding
Part of Bonn's feistiness may stem from the readiness.of some East
Europeans -- notably East Germany and Hungary -- to continue a high level
dialogue with Bonn despite Soviet scare tactics. Kohl has even received an
invitation to visit Czechoslovakia. Under these circumstances, Soviet-West
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German bilateral political relations are less significant than a few years ago
when they appeared to be a prerequisite for a warming in intra-German
relations. In contrast to earlier threats that INF deployments would bring on
an "ice age" in intra-German relations, the pace of the relationship has
appeared to pick up. Nevertheless, Bonn fully recognizes Moscow's ultimate
control over East Berlin's Germany policy.
There are recurring reports that Moscow is indeed concerned by the extent
of recent intra-German developments. Moscow signaled its disquiet most
clearly when Pravda published a lengthy diatribe against alleged West German
revanchist ambitions toward the East on 27 July, just two days after Bonn
announced its approval of a $330 million loan guarantee to East Germany that
was linked implicitly to East German humanitarian concessions. The article
pointedly warned that Bonn is trying to undermine East German sovereignty by
using "economic levers and political contacts" to solicit concessions on
"matters of principle." The article's appearance prompted Kohl to refute
publicly the revanchism charges and dismiss the entire Soviet campaign as
Moscow may have backed itself into a corner on intra-German relations.
If Moscow had forced a cutback in relations last November, the West German
public and the political opposition would have blamed INF deployments and
Kohl, and the government would have been under much pressure to take steps to
limit or repair the damage. If the Soviets were to cool the relationship now,
however, they would be blamed and the public probably would rally around the
Kohl government. Nevertheless, the intra-German relationship remains the most
vulnerable target of Soviet pressure.
The Soviets thus far show no sign of reversing field. Indeed, their most
recent rhetoric has grown even more vituperative. Moscow apparently
calculates that emphasizing the German threat will pay dividends at home and
in East Europe that outweigh the potential costs to Soviet-West German
bilateral relations. The Soviets probably also feel that pressure tactics
will eventually work to their advantage with Bonn. In this respect, Moscow
shows little capacity for innovation in handling traditional adversaries and
is resorting to methods it has used repeatedly in the postwar period when it
has been displeased with Bonn's policies. For want of a more effective
strategy, Moscow will probably continue to lash out rhetorically at perceived
threats from West Germany while seeking to protect its substantial economic
and political equities with Bonn from major damage.
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Implications of the West Germans' New Assertiveness*
The Kohl government has become more assertive in pursuing "German
interests" since INF deployments began, most notably in efforts to improve
relations with East Germany. Indeed, both the government and the Social
Democratic opposition agree on the basis for Bonn's Germany policy. The West
Germans regard this as no one else's business and are sensitive to
interference from East or West. By criticizing Bonn's approach to this
fundamental issue, the Soviets have sparked a nationalistic response in the
Federal Republic. Although such Soviet behavior in the past would have driven
West Germany even closer to its Western Allies, today it may further fuel the
West Germans' determination to control their own destiny more fully and to
pursue German interests more aggressively and independently.
The Kohl government almost certainly will not modify its position on
German unity in the face of Soviet threats. This stems from a constitutional
obligation, and the government derives substantial domestic political benefits
from its present course. On the contrary, Bonn appears genuinely irritated
with the Soviets and for the time being appears more willing than in the past
to confront Moscow. The West Germans last month detained for three days a
large truck for which Moscow claimed diplomatic status and refused to back
down in the face of Soviet Protests.
Still, despite their present irritation with Moscow's heavy-handedness,
the West Germans remain fundamentally committed to good relations with the
East and to arms control. If Moscow indicates a readiness for a thaw in
relations, the West Germans will want to exploit it. Although Bonn realizes
that arms control prospects for the moment are bleak, it will expect the West
to be prepared to respond to any future Soviet initiatives so as to maintain
the West's propaganda advantage. In short, Bonn's attitude will depend on how
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