USSR-NORTH KOREA: COURTSHIP WILTS FOLLOWING THE KIM VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001400960001-3
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 10, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRB ORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
10 October 1984
USSR-NORTH IDREA: COURTSHIP WILTS FOLLOWING THE KIM VISIT
Sa
North Korean leader Kim I1-song's visit to Moscow in late May failed
to give a new impetus to Moscow's two-year long courtship of Pyongyang,
and subsequently Soviet interest in wooing the North appears to have
diminished. The Soviets apparently remain unconvinced that P'yongyang's
warmer atmospherics reflect a willingness by the North to moderate
substantially its pro-Beijing stance on international issues of concern to
the Krenlin. Soviet preoccupation with internal politicking may also have
helped erode its political initiative, or the post-Aodropov leadership may
have deliberately relegated North Korea to a back burner position while it
focuses 7tberon and resources on relations with the US and Western
Europe. 25X1
!meanwhile, the Soviets must find disquieting P'yongyang's moves to
improve relations with the west even as it expresses interest in closer
ties to Moscow. Pyongyang may be testing the limits of Moscow's
willingness to strengthen ties, particularly with a new North Korean
econcinic plan and a political succession in the offing. 25X1
is msmorandun was prepared byl of the Third World 25X1
Activities Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. It has been coordinated with
the office of East Asia Analysis. Questions and comments are welcane and may
be addressed to the Chief, Third World Activities, SOYA 25X1
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The Kim Visit
Both the Soviets and the North Koreans probably anticipated that the May-
June visit of Kim Il-song to the USSR and Eastern Europe would be a high point
in Moscow's two-year courtship of North Korea. Prior to the visit, the
Soviets upgraded the level of delegations to North Korean anniversary
celebrations, endorsed the North Korean position on sensitive international
issues such as the IPU meetings in Seoul and the Rangoon bombings, moved
incrementally towards acknowledgement of a Kim Chong-il succession, and
possibly provided the North with Scud surface-to-surface missiles.*
Moscow probably expected some firm indication during the visit that
Pyongyang had decided to moderate its pro-Beijing tilt. The visit did
provide a forum for wide-ranging bilateral discussions, but apparently no
agreements were signed. Moscow failed to endorse either P'yongyang's proposal
for tripartite talks between Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang or Kim's
succession arrangements, and Kim did not follow Soviet leader Chernenko in
sharply criticizing US, Japanese and Chinese policies in Asia. n
We have no evidence to suggest that Moscow agreed to major new arms
transfers or an increase in military assistance either during or after the
visit.
The Aftermath
Following the visit, Moscow's courtship appears to have stalled, at least
temporarily.
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-- Soviet media coverage and messages for the anniversaries of the USSR-
North Korea defense treaty and Korea's liberation in July and August
were comparable to Soviet treatment of these events before the
courtship began. Moscow's coolness was especially notable in view of
the warmth of North Korean messages to Moscow on both occasions.
-- The amount of attention Moscow devoted to the North's mid-September
National Day celebrations this year was no greater than the pre-
courtship coverage of 1982. The level of Soviet representation at
celebrations held in North Korea's Moscow embassy remained basically
the same as before and was substantially lower than the delegation
dispatched by the Chinese to the North's embassy festivities in
Beijing.
-- Since late last spring, the Soviets took no major step to recognize
the Kim Chong-il succession, which progressed after the elder Kim's
return, until Moscow's ambassador reportedly requested a meeting with
the younger Kim in late September. The Soviets meanwhile continue to
use toasts and greetings by their East European allies, during
anniversary celebrations in both P'yongyang and East European
captials, as a way of indirectly acknowledging Kim Chong-il's
leadership status as they have since 1983.
Neither the USSR nor its allies have made significant new economic
offerings to the North in the aftermath of the Kim visit.
-- The Soviets have not been forthcoming on the North's request for
reactors for its atomic energy program, claiming that no assistance
can even be considered before 1990.
We do not believe that the annual Soviet-North Korean economic and S&T
talks held in Moscow in September produced major new economic projects,
although there probably was some agreement to expand existing projects such as
Siberian forestry joint ventures and to provide more training for North Korean
scientific and technical cadres. A TASS release replayed in Pravda described
the agenda for the routine session chiefly in terms of economic issues that
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predated Kim's visit and labeled the atmosphere "friendly and businessli 'key
formulation Moscow often uses to suggest disagreement over key issues.
Pyongyang meanwhile continues to send signals to the Soviets that it
remains interested in closer ties. North Korea showcased its interest in its
media treatment of both the defense treaty and liberation day anniversaries.
North Korean motivations and timing appear to us to be very much tied to its
econanic planning cycle.
Moreover, the Soviets must find disquieting current North Korean moves to
improve relations with the West, notably Japan and the US. In the first
instance, the North's recent efforts--its conciliatory steps towards the
South, its expressions of interest in US and South Korean proposals for
reducing tensions--seem designed to reinvigorate the tripartite talks
proposal. P'yongyang's preoccupation with its economic problems as it moves
towards a new development plan explain the recent promulgation of a new law on
joint ventures and gestures towards Tokyo. In both instances, however, the
North probably also perceives steps to improve relations with the West as a
way of putting sane pressure on Moscow to be more forthcoming with offers of
assistance and recognition of the succession.
Soviet Motives
Soviet stalling tactics in dealing with Pyongyang since May suggest a
decision to await tangible movement in the North's policies before making
further commitments. Soviet offers of substantial material assistance are
probably contingent on some demonstrable sign that P'yongyang is prepared, for
example, to actively back Moscow on Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, to
fully endorse the Soviet line on Afghanistan, or to invite Moscow to play a
role in arranging talks on the future of the peninsula. 0
Neither Kim's endorsement of some Soviet international positions in his
late March TASS interview, nor his extremely guarded responses to General
Secretary Chernenko's welcoming speech at the state banquet in May, nor the
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noticeably warmer messages from Pyongyang during various summer-fall
anniversary celebrations apparently satisfy Soviet demands. The North Koreans
believe that Moscow remains piqued by P'yongyang's proposal for tripartite
talks--which does not recognize a Soviet voice in deciding the peninsula's
future--and the Soviets almost certainly were displeased when Kim again
endorsed the Democratic Kam uchean forces during the Yugoslav leg of his
Soviet-East European tour. 25X1
A more general disarray within the Soviet leadership, arising as a
consequence of Chernenko's ill health, his inability to consolidate his power,
and the current maneuvering for the next succession, may also play an
important but secondary role in the wilting of the courtship. The courtship
blossomed most visibly during Andropov's brief tenure in office. The absence
of significant Soviet moves since his death may mean that the current leaders
have moved North Korea to a back burner position while they focus their
attention and resources on policy toward the US and Western Europe. 25X1
Implications
If the lull in the courtship represents a deliberate tactic on Moscow's
part, the Soviets probably will continue to stall on substantial new offerings
of economic or military assistance while awaiting signs of a North Korean
political shift. We believe such a dramatic shift is unlikely so long as
Pyongyang is willing only to restore some balance to its relationship with
its two Communist neighbors rather than to tilt definitively towards Moscow.
Should the Soviets continue to withhold major new econanic or military
assistance into 1985--as Pyongyang attempts to pin down major project
assistance for its next development plan--the North might conceivably be
encour to press its efforts, which China applauds, to open up to the
West. 7~ 25X1
A sustained North Korean effort to improve its relations with South
Korea, Japan, and the US, however, might encourage the Soviets to resume their
wooing with material offerings. The Soviets remain sensitive to signs that
they might become "odd man out" in settlements affecting the future of Asia.
Under such circumstances they might, for example, use the promised delivery of
F-16s to the South in 1986 as a pretext for at least token deliveries of
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advanced wea ns systems to the North as a way of building some political
influence. 25X1
Alternatively, to the extent that the courtship has wilted because of
Soviet leadership uncertainties, North Korean moves by themselves are not
likely to get the ball rolling. A resumption of Moscow's courtship is not
likely until the Soviet succession stabilizes and a new leadership focuses on
North Korea as an important element in Soviet Asian policy or Sino-Soviet
relations. 25X1
Meanwhile, Moscow's delay in publicly backing the Kim Chong-il
succession, at a time when the transfer of power is progressing, may already
have generated a lingering resentment within the North Korean leadership that
will limit Soviet political influence in Pyongyang for the foreseeable
future. F-~
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SUBJECT: USSR-North Korea: Courtship Wilts Following the
Kim Visit
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SUBJECT: USSR-North Korea: Courtship Wilts Following the
Kim Visit
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SUBJECT: USSR-North Korea: Courtship Wilts Following the
Kim Visit
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SUBJECT: USSR-North Korea: Courtship Wilts Following the
Kim Visit
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SUBJECT: USSR-North Korea: Courtship Wilts Following the
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SUBJECT: USSR-North Korea: Courtship Wilts Following the
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