USSR: TURBINES FOR NATURAL GAS PIPELINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00313R000200050005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Ton Secret
Intelligence
USSR: Turbines for
Natural Gas Pipelines
NGA Review Complete
Top Secret
SOV 84-10108CX
July 1984
Copy 440
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Intelligence
USSR: Turbines for
Natural Gas Pipelines
Soviet Analysis, with a cont
Comments an
Chief, Soviet Economy Division, SOYA, on
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
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SOV R4-/OIORCX
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Ton Seera
Summary
Information available
as of 1 June 1984
was used in this report.
During the 1970s, the USSR imported nearly 300 Western turbines,
accounting for at least one-third of the aggregate power installed on 1,420-
mm gas pipelines. These turbines were installed at compressor stations on
key gas transmission pipelines. The importance of these Western turbines
to the pipeline system was underscored by repeated Soviet requests during
USSR: Turbines for
Natural Gas Pipelines
During the 1986-90 period, the USSR will probably be much less
dependent on the West for gas turbines than in the past, largely because of
increased production of industrial gas turbines and a slower pace of
construction of large-diameter gas pipelines. We estimate that the Soviets
will lay about 12,000 to 14,000 kilometers of 1,420-mm gas pipelines
during 1986-90 (compared with 20,000 kilometers during 1981-85) and will
be required to install roughly 9,000 megawatts (MW) of turbine power to
fully equip them. At the present estimated level of output, nearly 2,100
MW a year, domestic production may be adequate to meet demand for gas
turbines with power ratings between 10 and 25 MW. However-on the
basis of the history of Soviet gas-turbine development and the opinions of
Western turbine experts-we believe that domestically produced gas
turbines will prove less reliable and less efficient than Western turbines. As
a result, Moscow may continue to import Western turbines on a selective
basis, particularly if supplier credits are available on favorable terms.
and to develop larger and better turbines themselves.
The Soviets' development of large gas turbines with power ratings of 16
and 25 MW made very little progress during the 1970s. This slow
development was the result of the confusion caused by too many design, re-
search, and production groups working on the same problem; the typical
bureaucratic turf wars; and the absence of strong pressure from above.
Because the Soviets were able to rely to a considerable extent on the West
for high-quality turbines, they lacked incentive to cut through the redtape
the recent US embargo for resumption of spare parts deliveries.
have adverse consequences for the service life of the turbines affected.
The US embargo delayed and clearly threatened to lower availability of
high-quality, efficient gas turbines and thus reduce Moscow's ability to
rapidly bring all of the planned new pipelines to full-capacity operation.
The embargo also posed a threat to the operation of Western-equipped
compressor stations on existing pipelines. Although we do not have
evidence that pipeline operation was hampered by a lack of spare parts, it is
likely that some scheduled maintenance was delayed-a factor that could
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SOV 84-10108CX
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When faced with the prospect that the US embargo might delay delivery of
120 Western 25-MW gas turbines ordered for the gas export pipeline, the
Soviets made the development of powerful turbines a national economic
and political priority. We estimate that the aggregate power provided by
annual Soviet production of 10-, 16-, and 25-MW turbines increased from
about 1,000 MW in 1981 to 2,100 MW in 1983.
The crash program to produce 16- and 25-MW gas turbines even drew
upon the resources of a major defense production ministry-the Ministry
of the Aviation Industry. This ministry is devoting plant and personnel
resources to modify retired NK-8
aircraft engines for use as industrial gas turbines, but this activity is
probably not having any major impact on the output of engines for military
aircraft
Although the embargo motivated Moscow to accelerate development of a
production capability for 16- and 25-MW gas turbines, it probably also
caused substantial short-term disruption in several branches of industry.
Our analysis indicates that the USSR expanded turbine production
primarily by diverting existing plant capacity from other uses. We believe
the Soviets had to reschedule production of some turbines intended for the
electric power and chemical industries; and in addition-even though
nuclear power plant construction is behind schedule-major component
suppliers for the nuclear power industry were tasked to manufacture parts
for gas pipeline turbines.
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Contents
Summary
Background
Gas-Turbine Supply for the 1,420-mm Pipeline Program 2
Development Status of Soviet 16- and 25-MW Turbines, 1971-80 3
Key Role of Western Imports, 1971-80 4
Imports of Western Turbines, 1981-85 5
The Impact of the US Embargo 7
Vulnerability Exposed: The Spare Parts Issue 8
Opportunity Created: Acceleration of Domestic Production 8
The Consequences of Accelerated Turbine Production 14
Reliability and Efficiency of Soviet Turbines 15
Outlook for Increased Self-Sufficiency 15
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USSR: Turbines for
Natural Gas Pipelines
Natural gas produced in West Siberia currently ac-
counts for over half of the Soviet Union's gas output.
Most West Siberian gas is transported 3,000 to 4,000
kilometers (km) to the European regions of the USSR
through 1,420-mm gas pipelines operating at pres-
sures up to 75 atmospheres (atm)-about 1,100
pounds per square inch. To drive the compressors on
these long-distance gas transmission pipelines, the
Soviets almost exclusively use gas turbines fueled
from the pipeline. This operation thus achieves inde-
.pendence from outside energy sources; it does not
deplete local supplies of energy in the regions transit-
ed. Using electric motors, instead, to power the
compressors would create a need for new powerlines
in West Siberia and would impose a drain on already
heavily taxed power grids in the western USSR. The
amount of power required to operate the compressors
on 1,420-mm gas pipelines is by no means small. For
example, the power required to drive the compressors
on the gas export pipeline at full capacity alone would
be equivalent to the amount of electricity used by a
city with a population of about 2.2 million (the size of
Kiev).'
During the 1971-80 period, Soviet industry made
halting and mostly unsuccessful attempts to develop
and manufacture 16- and 25-megawatt (MW) gas
turbines for installation on large-diameter gas pipe-
lines. Consequently, the USSR relied on substantial
imports of Western turbines and became heavily
dependent on a US supplier for spare parts for most of
these turbines. The Soviets' primary reaction to the
1981-82 US embargo was a greater effort to perfect
and manufacture turbines for large-diameter pipeline
' In 1980 about 80 percent of the aggregate power installed on the
USSR gas pipeline network was provided by gas turbines. We
believe that nearly all of the compressors powered by electric drive
service-an effort that had a negative impact on the
production of gas turbines for use in other industries.2
The USSR has a history of difficulty in developing
and producing gas turbines. During the 1950s, it
produced 4- and 6-MW turbines that were large in
size and weight and inefficient in fuel consumption.
These units were shipped to compressor stations as
major subassemblies and required up to two years to
install. During the 1950s, the Soviet demand for
lightweight, efficient, and more powerful gas turbines
was not great: gas production in 1955 was only 10
billion cubic meters (m'), the USSR gas pipeline
network was only 4,900 km in length, and the largest
pipe in use was 720 mm in diameter
Subsequently, Soviet gas output soared-to 46 billion
m' in 1960 and to 200 billion m' in 1970-as new and
productive gasfields were developed in the remote
areas of Central Asia and West Siberia. To transport
and distribute gas from these areas to the industrial 25X1
and populous European USSR, the Soviets rapidly
increased the length of the gas transmission network,
to 21,000 km in 1960 and to nearly 68,000 km in
1970. Moreover, they began to lay large-diameter gas
pipelines (1,020 mm and greater in diameter) at an
ever increasing pace. During 1961-70 the Soviets
' Gas turbines are manufactured for various purposes. In this paper,
gas turbine, unless otherwise stated, refers to the mechanical-drive
gas turbine used to drive a compressor on a pipeline. Mechanical-
drive turbines are of two basic types: aeroderivative and heavy duty.
The aeroderivative gas turbines (derived in large part from retired
aircraft engines) are more compact and weigh much less than the
heavy-duty turbines. Mechanical-drive gas turbines for gas pipeline
service or industrial processes are sometimes referred to as industri-
al turbines to distinguish them from turbines designed for genera-
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Figure 1
Turbine Inlet Temperature Versus Efficiency'
V I I I
5 260 520 780 1,040
Turbine inlet temperature in degrees Celsius
" The use of more efficient gas turbines can save up to
a billion cubic meters of gas per year per pipeline in
fuel consumption.
installed nearly 21,000 km of 1,020- and 1,220-mm
gas pipelines. Recognizing the need for more power-
ful, less bulky, and more reliable gas turbines for the
expanding gas pipeline system, the Soviets instituted a
program for development of 10-, 16-, and 25-MW
units.
By 1970 the turbine program was still progressing
slowly. The design of the 4- and 6-MW gas turbines
was improved, and a new 10-MW unit, the GTK-10,
was developed. The GTK-10, however, was bulky
(weighing about 115 tons, or nearly as much as a US-
designed heavy-duty 25-MW unit), and the turbine
inlet temperature-an important factor affecting effi-
ciency and gas consumption-was about 170 degrees
Celsius below the inlet temperature of a US turbine
developed at about the same time (see figure 1).
the alloys used for
the blades of the high-pressure turbine of the GTK- 10
were similar to the materials employed in US indus-
trial gas turbines developed during the 1950s (see
figure 2 for explanation of gas-turbine operation).
Thus, the level of technology being applied in indus-
trial gas-turbine development in the USSR during the
1970s was far behind that available in the West.
Gas-Turbine Supply for
the 1,420-mm Pipeline Program
tages.'
During 1971-80 the problem of an adequate supply of
gas turbines for the gas pipeline network became
more complex. As the development of the Central
Asian and West Siberian gasfields intensified, it was
necessary to keep pipeline capacity commensurate
with rapidly expanding gas production. The Soviets
began to lay long-distance, 1,420-mm pipelines oper-
ating at 75 atm and capable of transporting 30-35
billion m' of natural gas annually (see figure 3). The
laying of 1,420-mm pipelines was undertaken because
of construction economies and operating-cost advan-
To maintain 75 atm of pressure on the 1,420-mm gas
pipelines, gas turbines with power ratings of 10 MW
and greater were needed. According to Soviet techni-
cal journals, smaller turbines are not economical for
use on 1,420-mm gas pipelines operating at 75 atm
because of the much higher construction costs per unit
of power (see table 1). Moreover, the operating ex-
penses per unit of power are approximately 20 percent
greater for the smaller turbines than for larger ones
(10 MW and above).
' The net throughput of a 1,420-mm gas pipeline (about 30 billion
m') is 50 percent greater than the throughput of a 1,220-mm gas
pipeline (20 billion m3) and about 200 percent greater than that of a
1,020-mm pipeline (10-12 billion m3). Thus, for a given increment in
the capacity of the pipeline system, the use of 1,420-mm gas
pipelines meant that fewer pipelines and fewer compressor stations
would have to be built-and that aggregate capital and labor costs
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Figure 2
Operation of an Industrial Gas Turbine
Power Turbine
Exhaust
Drive shaft
to pipeline
compressor
High-pressure
turbine
I. Rotating compressor draws in air, pressurizes, and forces air
into combustor.
2. Fuel is added and ignition occurs.
3. Volume of gas-air mixture expands rapidly and passes across
blades of high-pressure turbine, which rotates a shaft that drives
the turbine compressor, thus sustaining the cycle.
4. Air-gas mixture passes through high-pressure turbine and across
the blades of low-pressure turbine, which is connected by a
shaft to the pipeline compressor.
Low-pressure turbine
Development Status of Soviet
16- and 25-MW Turbines, 1971-80
During 1971-80 the development of Soviet 16- and
25-MW gas turbines for pipeline service made little
progress. Although some prototypes were assembled,
no unit entered serial production. Typically, following
the assembly of prototypes, testing was delayed, took
a long time to complete, and led to a decision to
postpone serial production. Moreover, the urgency of
the program to manufacture more and better turbines
was sapped by the Soviets' reliance on the West for a
large number of high-quality turbines for use on
1,420-mm gas pipelines. The imported turbines pro-
vided a "safety valve" that tended to minimize the
need for the Soviets to manufacture larger and better
We believe that a major obstacle to the successful
development of 16- and 25-MW gas turbines was the
gas ministry's preference for the more reliable and
efficient Western turbines.
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Figure 3
USSR: Installation of Large-Diameter
Gas Pipelines (per five-year period)
1,020 and
1,220 mm
Table 1
Relative Capital Investment
Costs for Gas Turbines With
Different Power Ratings a
Power per Relative Capital Number of
Unit Investment b Turbines
(MW) per Unit of per Compressor
Power Station
16 0.54 5
25 0.41 3
a For 1,420-mm gas pipeline operating at 75 atm and transporting
30 billion m3 annually, see S. S. Ushakov, Ekonomika magistral-
'nogo transporta gaza, 1978.
b The source does not indicate the actual investment cost for each
size of turbine, but rather a percentage of the capital investment
that would be required to produce a given amount of power with 6-
MW turbines.
produce 16- and 25-MW gas turbines. The develop-
ment of 16- and 25-MW gas turbines was slowed by
normal Soviet bureaucratic confusion caused by too
many design, research, and production groups work-
ing on the same problem; the typical bureaucratic turf
wars; and the absence of strong pressure from above.
the gas ministry's preference for West-
ern equipment, together with Gosplan's willingness to
finance imports rather than allocate resources to
develop domestic versions, was a major hindrance to
the develonment of a Soviet 25-MW gas turbine.
In 1980 the Council of Ministers noted that the
Ministry of Power Machine Building (MEHM) had
facilities for serial production that were inadequate
for expanded turbine production and lacked the
equipment to produce high-temperature, corrosion-
resistant alloys.
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We believe that the decision to import Western
turbines and the availability of the domestic 10-MW
unit resulted in the assignment of a relatively low
priority to the Soviet Union's efforts to develop and
Key Role of Western Imports, 1971-80
Soviet press reports indicate that approximately
14,000 km of 1,420-mm gas pipelines were laid during
1971-80. We estimate that the Soviets would have
needed to install about 8,800 MW of turbine power
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Table 2
USSR: Imports of Western Gas Turbines
During 1971-80
Year
Number
Exporting
Power per
Aggregate
Imported
Country
Unit (MW) Power (MTV)
Total
284
3,101
1972
9
Italy
25
225
1974
65
United States
10
650
1976-80
5
Japan
10
50
128
West Germany
10
1,280
35
Italy
10
350
during this period-approximately 75 MW of turbine
power (including standby capacity) every 120 km of
gas pipeline-to operate these pipelines at 75 atm.
Soviet technical journals indicate, however, that only
500 GTK-10 units with aggregate capacity of 5,000
MW were installed during 1971-81. We estimate that
output of the GTK-10 provided a total of 55 to 65
percent of the power requirements for the 1,420-mm
gas pipelines. To service requirements in excess of
domestic production, the Soviets turned to the West.
Moscow imported at least 284 gas turbines with a
combined power of about 3,100 MW during 1971-80
(see table 2). These imports account for about 15
percent of the aggregate power installed on gas
transmission pipelines of all sizes during 1971-80.
Because nearly all of the imported turbines were
installed on major pipelines, we believe that these
units may account for a much higher percentage-
about 30 to 35 percent-of the 8,800-MW aggregate
power requirement for 1,420-mm gas pipelines. Thus,
imports of Western turbines during 1971-80 filled a
substantial part of the gap that existed between Soviet
domestic supply and demand for gas turbines suitable
for use on 1,420-mm gas pipelines.
The Western turbines were installed at compressor
stations along key Soviet gas transmission pipelines.
For example, nearly all of the turbines used to power
the Soyuz gas pipeline-a major link to Eastern and
Western Europe-were imported. Most of the tur-
bines installed on a major pipeline transporting West
Siberian gas to the Urals region and another pipeline
to Moscow (along the "Northern Lights" corridor)
one-third of the turbines at two of the USSR's most
important compressor station sites-Aleksandrov Gay
and Yelets-were imported (see figure 4).4
Imports of Western Turbines, 1981-85
During 1979-82 the USSR negotiated with various
West European entities a series of contracts relating
to the Siberian-West European gas export pipeline.
Several West European gas utilities agreed to new
purchases of Soviet gas. The USSR, in turn, agreed to
buy pipe and compressor equipment from West Euro-
pean firms for installation on the gas export pipeline.
West European banks, with the approval of their
respective national governments, arranged financing
packages for the Soviet pipe and equipment pur-
chases. Taken collectively, the agreements were popu-
larly viewed as a single deal involving the exchange of
gas for pipe and compressors.
The USSR originally contracted with Western firms
to buy 120 US-designed Frame V (25 MW) and five
US-designed Frame III (10 MW) heavy-duty industri-
al gas turbines for installation on the 1,420-mm
gas export pipeline to be constructed between the
Urengoy gasfield and the Soviet export terminal at
Uzhgorod.s After the United States imposed the
embargo in December 1981, however, the USSR
committed itself to equipping some of the compressor
stations on the gas export pipeline with Soviet tur-
bines-both as a riposte to the US embargo and as a
demonstration of Soviet technological progress. On
the basis of earlier analysis, we believe that seven
' The Frame V turbines were to be built by three West European
firms (Nuovo Pignone of Italy, AEG-Kanis of West Germany, and
John Brown Engineering of the United Kingdom). The rotor sets for
these units were to have been supplied by General Electric (United
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Figure 4
Major Soviet Gas Pipelines Equipped With Western Turbines
The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
Q?
Baltic Sea
Bening d
'Ilzhgorod oc?Q Torzhok
Black
Sea
Major gas pipeline corridor
Pipeline equipped with
Western gas turbines
O Gasfield
Yelets
Kharkov
Aleksandrov Gay Chelyabinsk
v.Orenburg
Orenburg
~) Gazli
Central Asia
Shatlyk
Lake
Balkhash
Prengoy
West
Siberia
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stations will be equipped with Soviet turbines and that
99 of the 120 originally contracted Frame V turbines
will be installed at 33 line stations on the gas export
pipeline.' (The five Frame III turbines are bein
installed at the head station at Urengoy.)F
Table 3
USSR: Major Gas Pipelines Scheduled
for Completion During 1981-85
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Gas Pipeline Number of Status (Estimated)
Compressor
25 Complete
24 Complete
30 Nearly complete
40 Pipe laid; compressor
stations (gas export pipe-
line) under construction
We believe that the remaining 21 of the Frame V
turbines, which were ordered for the gas export
pipeline, will be used on at least one of the two major
domestic gas pipelines now under construction-the
Urengoy-Center I and Urengoy-Center II. The Sovi-
ets have also contracted to purchase another 21
Frame V turbines from the Italian firm, Nuovo
Pignone. These 42 turbines could fully power 14
compressor stations, considerably enhancing the reli-
ability of those domestic gas pipelines utilizing West-
ern equipment. Altogether, the importation of the 141
US-designed 25-MW turbines will provide the Soviets
with about 3,500 MW of turbine power and satisfy
about 30 percent of the estimated compressor station
power requirement for the pipelines planned for com-
pletion in 1981-85.
According to information from a Soviet pipeline
construction journal, the 1981-85 plan provides for
the building of about 180 compressor stations to
transport gas through six 1,420-mm gas pipelines at
75 atm (see table 3). To attain maximum throughput
on all six of these lines at a pressure of 75 atm, we
estimate that the Soviets would have to install approx-
imately 13,000 MW of turbine power-about 75 MW
of turbine power per compressor station-during
1981-85.'
' To provide continuity of gas transmission during periods when a
turbine is off line for maintenance or overhaul, spare capacity is
installed in compressor stations. Thus, in a station using 25-MW
turbines, the normal equipment array is two units on line and one in
Urengoy-Gryazovets a
Urengoy-Petrovsk
Urengoy-Novopskov
Urengoy-Uzhgorod
Urengoy-Center I 30 Pipe laid; compressor
stations under
construction
a Estimate based on one compressor station every 120 km of
pipeline, the average distance determined from reported data on the
spacing of compressor stations for the five other gas pipelines.
In addition, the Soviets have recently contracted to
purchase an additional 13 US-designed Frame III (10
MW) units from Ntiovo Pignone.
these turbines will be used to
increase the throughput of the Soyuz pipeline. The
Soviets are also seriously studying the possibility of
installing additional UK-built 22-MVV gas turbines in
compressor stations along the pipeline corridor from
Urengoy to Chelyabinsk.
The Impact of the US Embargo
The US embargo delayed and clearly threatened to
lower availability of high-quality, efficient gas tur-
bines and thus reduce Moscow's ability to rapidly
bring all of the planned new pipelines to full-capacity
operation. The embargo also posed a threat to the
operation of compressor stations on existing pipelines.
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Vulnerability Exposed: The
Spare Parts Issue
Because of normal wear, certain parts of a gas turbine
must be replaced regularly in a preventive mainte-
nance program. Although the USSR has developed a
capability to produce some parts for Western tur-
bines, the critical hot-gas-path parts and certain other
components must be obtained from Western suppliers.
When purchasing equipment from the West, the
Soviets normally buy sufficient parts to cover several
years' use and set up contracts for subsequent supply.
Dependence on imported parts creates a vulnerability
to interruption of supply, but, because of the policy of
acquiring a large parts inventory, operations may not
be affected for a year or more following a supply
interruption.
In 1980 a US turbine manufacturer signed a five-year
contract to supply spare parts for the 242 US-
designed gas turbines (233 Frame III 10-MW units
and nine Frame V 25-MW units) operating in the
USSR. (A major West German turbine manufacturer
dropped out of the business of supplying spare parts
for these turbines during the late 1970s.)F
demonstrated a heightened sense of vulnerability at-
tributable to the US embargo.
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During and immediately after the US embargo, the
USSR repeatedly requested that deliveries of spare
parts be resumed as soon as possible
Although we do
not have evidence that pipeline operation was ham-
pered by a lack of spare parts, it is likely that some
scheduled maintenance was delayed-a factor that
could have adverse consequences for the service life of
the turbines affected! The Soviets, in any event, have
Opportunity Created: Acceleration
of Domestic Production
Faced with the prospect that the US embargo might
delay delivery of the 120 Western Frame V gas
turbines for the gas export pipeline and the fact
that-even with these turbines-the existing level of
Soviet gas-turbine production would not be adequate
to fully equip the five domestic gas pipelines planned
during 1981-85, Moscow initiated a crash program to
produce 16- and 25-MW turbines.
Without the impetus of the US embargo,
the Soviet effort to produce 16- and 25-MW turbines
might have continued to flounder. Instead, we esti-
mate, Soviet industry increased its production of gas
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turbines from about 1,000 MW in 1981 to 2,100 MW
Table 5
USSR: Facilities for Production
of Heavy-Duty and Aeroderivative
Mechanical-Drive Gas Turbines a
1. Kazan' Aircraft Engine
Plant 16
in 1983
Produces 10-MW industrial gas
turbine.
Assembles gas generator for
25- and 10-MW industrial gas
turbines.
The new effort to produce large turbines for pipeline
service entailed some shift in emphasis toward use of
aeroderivative turbines. While production of the
GTK-10, long the workhorse of the Soviet gas trans-
mission pipeline system, was throttled back to permit
an expanded effort on the GTN-16 and GTN-25
heavy-duty industrial units at Sverdlovsk and Lenin-
grad, respectively, facilities were made available at
Kazan' Aircraft Engine Plant 16 to convert retired
NK-8 aircraft engines into gas gen
GPA-Ts-16 turbine-compressor set
Converts aircraft engine to gas gen-
erator for 16-MW aeroderivative.
2. Khabarovsk Machine
Construction Plant
3. Leningrad Nevskiy Plant
4. Leningrad Turbine-Blade
Plant (LZTL)
5. Leningrad Metals Plant
(LMZ)
6. Leningrad Gas Turbine
Plant
7. Sumy Machine Construc-
tion Plant
8. Sverdlovsk Turbomotor
Plant
We do not believe that the produc-
tion facilities at Sverdlovsk or at Khabarovsk were
expanded substantially during 1975-82. Expanded
production of pipeline turbines at these plants conse-
quently has displaced some production of turbines for 25X1
other industries (see section, "The Consequences of 25X1
Accelerated Turbine Production"). 25X1
Produces turbine blades for all
types of industrial turbines.
Produces power turbine for
25-MW industrial gas turbine and
associated pipeline compressor.
Administratively connected to
LMZ but primarily manufactures
large turbines for power
generation.
Produces pipeline compressor asso-
ciated with 16- and 6-MW aero-
derivative turbines.
Produces 16-MW industrial gas
turbine.
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production floorspace at the Leningrad 2bAI
Gas-Turbine Production Facilities. We have identi-
fied eight facilities that are involved in the production
of heavy-duty and aeroderivative mechanical-drive
turbines for large-diameter gas pipeline service (see
table 5). During 1975-82, production floorspace at the
gas generator assembly plants for the industrial gas
Turbine Blade Plant (LZTL) increased substantially
during 1975-82. Soviet press reporting, indicates that
this plant is the sole producer of turbine blades for all
types of industrial, marine, and electric power tur-
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GTK-10. The Soviets began production of the
GTK-10, a 10-MW heavy-duty industrial gas turbine
during the early 1970s. We estimate that this turbine
was produced at a maximum rate of about 100 units a
Plant could produce about 75 to 80 GTK-10s annual-
ly. A 1981 Soviet press report
indicated that another plant, the Khabarovsk Ma-
chine Construction Plant, had the capacity to produce
about 20 GTK-10s annually.
we estimate that
the current annual output of the GTK-10 is about 70
units
We believe that the output of the GTK-10 was
lowered to make room for production of the newly
developed GTN-25, a 25-MW heavy-duty industrial
turbine. The production facilities at the Nevskiy Plant
(which were increased only slightly during 1975-82)
are not adequate to sustain simultaneously the earlier
production level of the GTK-10 and the scheduled
output of the GTN-25. According to Soviet media
reports, output at the Nevskiy Plant of the GTK-10
will continue to be scaled down as production of the
Soviet 25-MW turbine is increased.
GTN-16. The GTN-16 is a 16-MW heavy-duty in-
dustrial gas turbine produced at the Sverdlovsk Tur-
bomotor Plant. Assembly of the first prototype was
completed in 1979-the year in which serial produc-
tion had been scheduled to begin-and testing of the
GPA-Ts-16. The GPA-Ts-16 is a 16-MW aeroderiva-
tive industrial gas turbine. The gas generator is
derived from NK-8-2U and NK-8-4 aircraft engines
retired from service on the TU-154 and 11-62 passen-
ger airplanes (see figure 5). A power turbine is added
to drive the pipeline compressor. Although the Soviet
press reported in September 1982 that the GPA-Ts-
16 was "devised and assembled" in six weeks,
this process could not have been
completed in such a short time. Twelve to 18 months
are normally required for the redesign of the aircraft
engine, and another 12 to 18 months are required to
establish the production facilities and work the bugs
out of the prototype. The announcement that the
turbine was modified in six weeks clearly was propa-
ganda designed to demonstrate Soviet success in
thwarting the US embargo: earlier media reports
indicate that the redesign began about 1979 and that
assembly of the prototype was completed in February
1981.
Soviet media report that the NK-8 aircraft engine is
converted to the GPA-Ts-16 gas turbine by the
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Figure 5
Modification of Jet Engine for Use as Industrial Gas Turbine
Intake
Air
Intake
Air
Fuel High-pressure
turbine
I
Kazan' Turbomotor Production Association (see
boxed text). This association is assigned to the Kazan'
Aircraft Engine Plant 16, which is subordinate to the
Ministry of the Aviation Industry. Plant 16, the only
aircraft engine plant in Kazan', is where the NK-8
was originally manufactured.
W1,
Drive shaft to
/pipeline compressor
Power (low-pressure) turbine
The Soviet press has reported that the assembly of 55
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We believe that the configuration of the NK-8 aircraft
engine is amenable to conversion to an industrial gas
turbine. The NK-8 is a two-shaft turbofan engine with
a two-stage front fan, a six-stage high-pressure air
compressor, a single-stage high-pressure turbine, and
a two-stage low-pressure turbine. As an aircraft
engine, the two-stage low-pressure turbine rotates the
front fan. With conversion to a mechanical-drive
turbine, the front fan is removed, and the low-
pressure turbine becomes the power turbine to drive
the pipeline compressor. (A US turbine manufacturer
made a similar adjustment when modifying one of its
aircraft engines.)
We believe that modification of the NK-8 aircraft
engine could produce an industrial turbine with a
shaft power rating consistent with Soviet media re-
ports-16 MW. A UK jet engine manufacturer was
able to convert a high bypass (4:1 to 5:1) turbofan
engine, the RB-211, with a thrust rating of 42,000
pounds to an aeroderivative gas turbine with a 22-
MW shaft power rating. In aircraft service, with a
high bypass turbofan, a large part of the thrust is
generated by air passing through the front fan and
over (not through) the engine. This power is immedi-
ately lost when the front fan is removed and the
aircraft engine is converted for mechanical drive. We
believe that the Soviets could produce an aeroderiva-
tive turbine with a shaft power rating of 16 MW when
On the basis of this
information, we believe that output of 50 to 55
turbines a year may well be attainable. We also
believe that the availability of retired NK-8 engines is
adequate to sustain production of 50 to 55 units
annually at least through 1990. Earlier analysis of the
production rate of this engine indicates that nearly
400 NK-8 aircraft engines would be available for
conversion to mechanical-drive turbines, given that
modifying the low bypass (1:1) NK-8 turbofan engine,
which has a thrust rating of 22,000 pounds. Because
of the NK 8's low bypass ratio, the shaft power
available from the converted engine is relatively high
in relation to the thrust rating of the original aircraft
engine.
The conversion of retired aircraft engines is an eco-
nomical alternative to the design and development of
an industrial turbine, which would require long lead-
times in design, development, and production. Be-
cause the inlet temperature in jet engines is only
slightly below the temperature at which the turbine
blade and nozzle materials would fail, most jet
engines have a short service life.
lowering the
metal temperature by just TOO to 150 degrees Centi-
grade can increase the service life of the turbine
materials by 50,000 hours. Soviet technical journals
indicate that the turbine inlet temperature of the
GPA-Ts-16 is about 90 degrees Centigrade lower
than that of the corresponding aircraft engine. Addi-
tionally, aeroderivative turbines are light, powerful,
and suitable for modular delivery and assembly.
Soviet pipeline construction journals report that the
time required to build a compressor station using
GPA-Ts-16 aeroderivative turbines is about half that
required when using TN-16 heavy-duty industrial
turbine
the maximum estimated service life for Soviet civil
transport aircraft engines is about 10 years.'
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During the US embargo, the Soviets were forced to
consider the possibility that delivery of the Western
25-MW turbines intended for use on the gas export
pipeline would be considerably delayed, if not prevent-
ed entirely. At the same time, the plan to lay five
domestic 1,420-mm gas pipelines during 1981-85
required expanded output of Soviet gas turbines.
Soviet production of the two models of industrial gas
turbines for large-diameter gas pipeline service, the
GTN-25 and GTN-16, was proceeding slowly; conse-
quently, increased output of the aeroderivative tur-
bines may have been judged the only realistic option
for bringing about an immediate large-scale increase
in gas turbines. We estimate that output of the GPA-
Ts-16 will provide about 30 percent of the aggregate
power provided by Soviet gas turbines produced for
pipeline service during 1981-85.
parts from the aircraft
engine generally can provide 70 to 80 percent of the
parts required for the aeroderivative turbine." Thus,
conversion of the NK-8 aircraft engine to the GPA-
Ts-16 mechanical-drive turbine enables the Soviets to
avoid many of the consequences of the inertia and
conservatism intrinsic to their industrial product-
development process when tasked to manufacture a
new product. Moreover, using existing aircraft engine
parts helps to avoid some of the problems with
priorities, supply bottlenecks, and technological con-
straints that usually impede the attempts of civilian
industry to acquire high-temperature, corrosion-resis-
tant materials]
GTN-25. The GTN-25 is a 25-MW heavy-duty in-
dustrial gas turbine that the Soviet press is highlight-
ing as a more efficient substitute for the Western 25-
MW turbines ordered for the gas export pipeline. The
first model of the GTN-25 was assembled during
1977-79 and was tested during 1979-81. We believe
that its performance probably was not satisfactory
and that significant changes were required.
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he
Soviets have substantially igne the GTN-25's
compressor stage and the high-pressure turbine
blades. West European
power equipment firms probably provided substantial
assistance to the Soviets in redesigning rotor compo-
nents.
this design is
sophisticated and in some ways superior to that of the
high-pressure turbine blade of the Western Frame V
unit.
The Soviet media claim that 15 GTN-25s were
assembled during 1983 but note that the production
rate may slow because of a shortage of parts-
especially turbine blades.
the Soviets will install
at least 21 GTN-25 gas turbines during 1984. (Most
were probably manufactured during 1983). The pace
of production through the first nine months of 1983
was reportedly sustained by drawing down the parts
inventory.
According to media reports, the Soviets are planning
by 1985 to halve the size of the labor force devoted to
production of the GTN-25. To make this reduction
possible, Moscow is probably counting to some extent
on the scheduled relw of rotor com onents made
n
itself is not optimistic about meeting the delivery
dates. For these reasons, we do not believe that the
production rate of the GTN-25 will be increased
substantially during 1984-85.
The Consequences of Accelerated
Turbine Production
The US embargo motivated the Soviets to accelerate
development of their production capability for 16- and
25-MW gas turbines. The plan for the production of
the GTN-25 was increased from 14 units during the
entire 1981-85 period to 14 units in 1983. The
schedule for output of the GPA-Ts-16 was increased
from five units in 1982 to 55 units in 1983, and output
of the GTN-16 was planned to nearly double in 1983.
In stimulating the production of turbines for gas
pipeline service, however, the US embargo probably
also caused substantial short-term disruption in pro-
duction of gas turbines and certain components for
other industries.
Production of additional GTN-25s at the Nevskiy
Plant in Leningrad may also have affected output of
other investment goods.
lccording to
Soviet media reports, the Leningrad Metals Plant,
which previously specialized in manufacturing tur-
bines for the electric power industry, was tasked
following the US embargo to produce parts for the
GTN-25. Other media reports indicate that the Sovi-
ets were required in the summer of 1982 to recon-
struct sections of the Leningrad Turbine Blade Plant
to accommodate increased output of the GTN-25.
As described in an earlier section, increased output of
the 16-MW aeroderivative turbine, the GPA-Ts-16,
has been accomplished by drawing on the resources of
the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. Before the US
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embargo, the development and production of the
GPA-Ts-16 was stalled. A 1979 press article indicat-
ed that the GPA-Ts-16 was a far better alternative to
the GTN-16 and called upon all the ministries in-
volved-including the aviation ministry-to work for
its "timely development and incorporation" into pro-
duction plans. According to media reports, however,
only five units were produced in 1982.
Reliability and Efficiency of Soviet Turbines
Gas turbines produced by the USSR's civilian indus-
try have never equaled Western turbines in quality
and efficient see figure 7).F
the effi- 25X1
ciency of Soviet turbines before 1980 was generally
about 24 percent, while that of US turbines was 27 to
29 percent. To operate at the level of efficiency 25X1
attained by US turbines, the Soviets have had to use a 25X1
regenerative cycle-increasing substantially the size
as well as the cost of the turbine.'S 25X1
Recently published USSR technical journals claim
that the newly developed Soviet 16- and 25-MW
turbines already equal Western turbines. Given their
poor track record in civilian turbine design and
production, we doubt that the Soviets could have
achieved high reliability and efficiency in such a short
period-to attain these standards, the West has re-
quired several years.
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for opti
tion, de
and tha
typically during the first years of produc- 25X1
igns are continually modified and improved
this iterative process is absolutely essential
mizing performance. L_ 25X1
working the bugs out of a prototype turbine is 25X1
as much a trial-and-error procedure (requiring time
and observation) as it is an engineering design prob-
We believe that the new Soviet 16- and 25-MW gas
turbines, despite their probable lower efficiencies and
(at least initially) poor reliability, are suitable-if
imperfect-substitutes for Western turbines. During
the first years of operation, they are likely to have a
high incidence of failure. As the problems causing
these shutdowns are corrected, the reliability of the
Soviet turbines (measured as the average time to
failure) may improve
for Increased Self-Sufficiency
In view of the increased production of gas turbines in
the USSR and a likely slowdown in the pace of
construction of 1,420-mm gas pipelines, we conclude
" A regenerative cycle uses turbine exhaust to add heat to
pressurized air entering the combustors. Hotter air entering the
combustors requires less fuel to reach the desired temperature, and
thus a higher efficiency is achieved.F__-]
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Figure 7
Comparison of Performance Characteristics of Western Frame III and
Soviet Industrial Gas Turbinesa
Power Output Weight
Megawatts (MW) Metric tons
Thermal Efficiency
Percent
0 Western
Frame III
we have used data for the GTK-l0. The Western Frame III turbine,
equivalent in power output to the GTK-10, was developed about 20 years
before the GTK-10.
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LOA-I
that the USSR during 1986-90 will probably become
less dependent on the West for gas turbines. On the
basis of previous analysis, we estimate that the Soviets
will lay about 12,000 to 14,000 km of 1,420-mm gas
pipelines during 1986-90, compared with 20,000 km
during the 1981-85 plan period.16 They will probably
lay three or four more pipelines-each about 3,000 to
4,000 km in length-from the Yamburg and Urengoy
gasfields to the industrial regions of the country
during 1986-90. We estimate that the Soviets will be
required to install about 9,000 MW of turbine power
to fully equip the pipelines built during this period-
about 75 MW per 120 km of gas pipeline.
At the present estimated level of output (about 2,100
MW per year), Soviet industry would be able to
satisfy nearly all of the 1986-90 demand for gas
turbines with power ratings between 10 MW and 25
MW. However-on the basis of the history of Soviet
gas-turbine development
gas turbines will prove to be less reliable and less
efficient than comparable Western units. The USSR
may continue to import Western turbines on a selec-
tive basis, particular) if su lier credits are available
on favorable terms.
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