INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM THE PETROLEUM SITUATION IN PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700020082-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: December 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OR
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence. Memorandum
The Pety?leum Situation in Pakistan
Secret
ER IM 71-229
December 1971
Copy No.
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WARNING
'Plus dociunent contains inEormakion ai[ectu~g the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or rCVelatlOIl of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an tuiauthorired person is prohibited by law.
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
'THE PETROLEUM SITUATION IN PAKISTAN
Total Oil Supply and Demand
1. Pakistan depends on imports for about 90% of its oil supply,
about 110,000 barrels per day (b/d), see Table 1. Domestic crude oil,
produced only in northern West Pakistan, provides slightly less than lOl~
of total supply. Imports, mostly in the form of crude oil (78^/~ of total
supply) and refined products (13?l0 of total supply), come almost exclusively
from Iran.
2. Domestic consumption of petroleum products under normal
conditions is on the order of 90,000 b/d' about 70% is consumed in the
West and 30% in the East. Almost 20,000 b/d, or about 18%, of total supply,
are exported -some 7,000 b/d as bunkers for aircraft and ships.
3. We do nut know the military demand for petroleum products
in either East or West Pakistan. Assuming, however, that all of the normal
demand for aircraft fuels and 50"10 of the demand for motor gasoline and
diesel fuel are allocated exclusively to military activities, then consumption
by military forces in the West would approach 20,3;10 b/d ur 30% of the
total normal consumption, and in the East, about 4,000 b/d or 15'/~ of
total normal consumption.
The Situation in East Pakistan
4. Oil is imported into East Pakistan through the port of Chittagong,
the location of the only refinery and of almost 90'% of the storage capacity
in the East, see Tables 2 and 3. Tankers delivering petroleum to Chittagong
since April 1971 have been repeatedly harassed, and the refinery reportedly
operated only intermittently during 1971 because of crude oil shortages
and fear of sabotage. Moreover, imports of petroleum to build up stocks
were restricted because of scarce foreign exchange, and inventories probably
Note: This ,emorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coord~nnted within the Directorate of Intelligence.
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were held at or near minimum essential needs. A reasoned guess suggests
that total oil stock levels in East Pakistan at the opening of full-scale
hostilities did not exceed 30 days of supply at normal rates of
consumption.* The extent of damage to storage facilities and the destruction
of oil stocks from recent air attacks on Chittagong and Dacca is not known.
West Pakistan
5. Oti is imported into West Pakistan through the port of Karachi.
The two principal refineries in the Wes (representing about 85`I~ of refining
capacity in the West) are located in the vicinity of the port, and imported
crude oil is delivered directly from the tani:ers to the refineries. About
75`% of the bulk oil storage capacity in West Pakistan is conce~ltrated in
the four import terminals and in the two refineries located in the Karachi
port area. The only domestir. oil production in Pakistan originates near tl~e
refinery at Rawalpindi and is transported by local pipeline. This refinery,
which accounts for about 15`% of the oil supply in the West, reportedly
suffered minor damage by air strikes on 6 December but continued to
operate normally.
6. Crude oil stored at the refineries in the Karachi area, it' filled
to 75% of capacity, probably would be sufficient t'or 10 day. of operation.
Stocks of refined products, using the same assumpticn, probably would
not exceed 60 days of supply. Thus, maximum total stocks of oil on hand
in West Pakistan would not exceed about "10 days of supply at normal
rates of consumption. Actually, the stocks probably arc substantially 1CS5
than that amount and may be as low as s0 days' supply. Initial reports
of the air attack on oil facilities in the Karachi area on 5-G December suggest
that damage was confined to a small independent oil company facility.
Prospects
7. The virtual interdiction of Chittagong makes it most unlikely that
East Pakistan can be supplied with oil, and Pakistani forces in the East
will have +o depend on the products currently in storage throughout the
region. These stocks probably would not last more than a month.
8. West Pakistan also faces a critical petroleum situation with stocks
that also may not be sufficient for more than a month of normal
consumption. By strict rationing, these stocks probably could be stretcl~sd
to perhaps two months' supply. Pa)istani military forces do have some
petroleum supplies at bases and airports around the country, but the
* This and other similar estimates of stock levels elsewhere in this memorandum do
not include stocks, presumably small, contained in 55-gallon drums in the country.
.SECRET
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amounts are not known and in any event are not likely to be large. Although
ample oil supplies would be available to West Pakistan from Iran, it would
be difficult to import them through Karachi because of the likelihood of
blockade by the Indian Navy. Pakistan, with no tankers of its ow~t, might
charter foreign tankers, place them under the Pakistani flag, and attempt
to run this blockade. If the import terminals in Karachi were bombed out,
tankers would have to unload into barges or tank cars, a slow and
cumbersome, process. Some fuel could be imported by road from Iran, but
not enough to meet even minimum requirements.
SECRET
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Pakistan;
Estimated Oil Supply and Demand
1971
Thousand Barrels Per Da
d
.Total
West
East
Supp Zz~
109. S
81.5
28. 0
Domes tic crude oil
production
10 0
10.0
0
Imports
99.5
'1
1.5
28.0
Crude oiJ-
85.5
_
66.1
19.4
Products
14.0
5.4
8.6
Demand
109.5
81.5
28.0
Domestic
90_0
62.8
27.2
Aviation gasoline
0.6
0.6
0
Jet fuel
6.0
4.7
1.3
Motor gasoline
7.5
6.0
1.5
Kerosene
17.8
8.7
9.1
Diesel fuel oil
25.3
21.9
3.4
Fuel oil
24.4
16.1
g~3
Lubricants
1.6
1.3
0.3
Other, losses,
and stock changes
6.8
3.5
3.3
Exports
19_5
18.7
0.8
Bunkers
7.3
6.;
0.8
Other
12.2
12.2
0
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Pakistan: Estimated Oil Stozaqe Capacity at Principal Facilities
Location
Crude Oil
Products
Total
Crude Oil
Produ
ts
T
t
l
c
o
a
Crude Oil
Products
Total
Total
950
5,550
6,500
480
1,610
2,080
1,430
:,IEO
8,590
Import terminals
0
3,200 a/
3,200 a/
0
1,020 b/
1,020 b/
0
4,220
4,220
Burmah-Shell
C
900
9J0
0
620
620
0
1
520
1
520
Ca'tex
0
500
500
0
--
0
,
500
,
500
Esso
'
0
1,300
1,300
0
400
400
0
1
700
1
700
Pakistan Nat
l Oil Co.
0
500
500-
0
--
--
0
,
500
,
500
~
~
1
Refineries
950
1,460
2,410
480
330
810
1
430
1
790
3
2
~
,
,
,
20
^
l J
~
1
Rawalpindi
Attock Oil Co.
250
550
800
--
--
--
250
550
800
~
~
H
Karachi
National Refinery
290
600
890
--
--
--
290
6
['1y
Pakistan Refinery
00
890
a. Located ~n Karaclez,
b. Located in C:eittagor.~,
(Karangi) 410 310 '20
--
--
--
410
310
720
Chitta;ong
Eastern Refinery -- -- --
460
330
B10
480
330
B10
Airfields 0 140 140
0
10
10
0
150
150
Other 0 750 750
0
250
250
0
1
000
1
000
,
,
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Pakistan: Oil Refineries, Locations, and Capacities
December 1971
Name
Location
Capacity
Total
115,140
West
85,'140
Attock Oil Co. a/
Rawalpindi
11,6x0
National Refinery
Karachi
13,500
Pakistan Refine y
Karangi
(Karachi)
60,000
East
30,000
Eastern Refinery
Chittagong
30,000
Capacities in Barrels Per Day
Ownership; Burmah Oil Co., 27$; re-
mainder privately owned. Operates
exclusively on do:n~~stic ;.rude oil.
Owned by government and private
Pakistani interests. Operates on
imported crude cil.
Ownership: Burmah Oil Co., 15~;
Shell Oil Co., 15$; Es~o, 18$; Cal-
tex, 12$; government and private
Pakistani interests, 40~. Operates
on imported crude oil.
Ownership: Burmah Oil Co., 30$; re-
mainder government and private
Pakistani interests. The only re-
finery in East Pakistan; operates
on imported crude eil.
a. Reportedlr~ damaged in air strike on 6 December 1971.
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