RECENT TRENDS IN COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO IRAQ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030031-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: March 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum.
Recent Trends in Communist Economic and Military Aid to Iraq
Secret
ER IM 72-31
March 1472
copy N2 '54
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WARNING .
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
ExIud.d Iran auleaatk
down mdlna and wclattlRcelbn
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
RECENT TRENDS IN COMMUNIST ECONOMIC
AND MILITARY AID TO IRAQ
Sum;nary
I. Before the coup that overthrew Iraq's monarchy in July 1958,
both economic and military aid came entirely from Western sources. Since
the coup, a series of leftist regimes have turned to the USSR and other
Communist countries for the great bulk of such aid. Moscow, the first to
respond to Baghdad's request, made its first economic aid commitment less
than one year after the coup. East European countries began their economic
aid program in 1965, and in 1971 the People's Republic of China (PRC)
made its first commitment. While a modest Western aid effort continued
during the 1960s, it was overwhelmed by Communist aid extensions, which
totaled more than $830 million by the end of 1971. Communist aid during
the 1960s went to a variety of economic sectors, but Iraq's petroleum
industry has received the lion's share since 1969, when Baghdad sought
Communist help in developing areas taken over from the Western-owned
Iraq Petroleum Company some years earlier.
2. The Communist countries, chiefly the USSR, are now practically
the sole suppliers of military equipment and training for Iraq's armed forces.
From the coup through 1971, Communist arms commitments exceeded $1
billion. As a result: Iraq is the third largest active recipient of Communist
military aid to less developed countries. Thus far Iraq has not been especially
successful in absorbing sophisticated Soviet military weapons, but training
is continuing.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.
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Discussion
The Amount and Character of Economic Aid
3. Communist countries have been Iraq's chief source of economic
aid since the monarchy was overthrown in July 1958. By the end of 1971,
Communist aid extensions had reached nearly $832 million (see Table 1).
Actual deliveries of non-Communist aid totaled only about $62 million
during 1959-70.
4. For the first few years after the revolution, all Communist aid
was supplied by the USSR. In the mid-1960s, however, East European aid
became important, and in 1971 China extended its first economic credit.
An upsurge in Communist aid came in 1969 when Baghdad accepted
Communist help for Iraq's oil industry; nearly 75% of Communist aid
extensions date from this time. Western aid has continued at a relatively
low level - about $5 million annually during the 1960s - with almost
three-fourths of the total coming from the United States, largely in the
form of PL 480 - Food for Peace.
5. Nearly all Communist economic aid has been in the form of
project assistance - about 33% for the petroleum sector, some 11% for
light industry and electric power, and a like amount for transportation and
agriculture.(') About 25% of the economic aid not yet committed will
probably be channeled largely into industrial and petroleum projects. Before
1969, most project aid was for industry and transportation. The largest
project, the Baghdad-Basra railroad (see Figure 1), was built under a 1960
Soviet credit and completed in 1968 after a total Soviet contribution of
more than $46 million.
The Petroleum Sector
6. Since mid-1969, Communist countries have allocated Iraq's oil
industry a minimum of $245 million in aid. The USSR alone is providing
at least $170 million. In two agreements concluded in 1969, Moscow agreed
to make available $121 million for machinery, equipment, and technical
services for projects primarily in the North Rumaylah oilfield area of
southern Iraq (see Figure 2). Seven wells already have been drilled in this
area, which is thought to contain between 25% and 50% of Iraq's proved
oil reserves of some 10 billion barrels. An 80-mile, 28-inch pipeline with
an initial capacity of 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) has been constructed
from !:umaylah to the port of Fao, where storage facilities are now being
built.
1. For a list of Communist aid projects, see Tables 3 and 4 (Tables 3 through 9 are
in the Appendix).
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Communist Economic Aid Extended '--o Iraq
Million US $
1959-71
1959
1960
1962
1965
1967
1969
1970 1971
Total
831.8
137.5
45.0
1.4
20.0
18.4
245.4
65.3 298.8
USSR
553.7
137.5
45.0
1.4
0
4.4
120.7
22
5 222
2
.
.
Cn
Eastern Europe
238.9
0
0
0
20.0
14.0
124.7
42.8 37.4
0
Bulgaria
26.0
--
--
--
--
14.0
--
12
0 --
Czechoslovakia
27.0
--
27.0
.
-- -
y
East Germany
84.0
--
--
--
--
--
84.0
--
Hungary
42.0
--
--
--
--
--
11.2
30
8 --
Poland
24.9
--
--
--
20.0
--
2.5
a/
.
-- 2
4
Romani. a
People's Republic
of China
39.2
0
0
0
0
0
.
0 39
2
.
a. Mvn.'mum estimated va ue.
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Figure 1. Iraq: Communist Economic Aid Projects
2. Soviet proposed hydroelectric stations
3. Soviet radio station
4. Soviet proposed dam
5. Soviet pharmaceuticrl plant
6. Soviet irrigation project
7. Soviet railway work shops
8. Soviet glassware factory
9. Soviet electrical equipment factory
10. Soviet garment factory
i I. Soviet telephone exchange
12. Soviet grain elevators
13. Soviet cotton textile mill
14. Soviet agricultural machinery plant
15. Soviet canning factory
16. Soviet railroad construction rnd rehabilitation,
Caghdad to Basra
17. East German shipyard
613246 3.72 CIA
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Figure 2. Iraq: Communist Aid to Iraq's National Oil Industry
Refinery
Oilfield
Iraq National Oil Company
(INOC) pipeline
A Proposed drilling sites
..,,Al Halfayah
Rumavlah, 4a
Luhais :;ft4rh TFao
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7. In April 1971, Moscow extended a $222 million credit, of which
at least $50 million will be used to construct oil pipelines and a refinery
at Mosul with a capacity of 30,000 bpd. Soviet personnel are now surveying
a 375-mile pipeline route from Baghdad to Basra; an extension from
Baghdad to northern Iraq also is in the planning stage. The state-owned
Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) has opened a Moscow office to expedite
work on Soviet-aided oil projects.
8. East European cou :tries are also an important source of aid for
Iraq's oil industry. These countries have extended about $75 million in
credits since 1969. Czechoslovakia provided $27 million for a 70,000 bpd
refinery at Basra. Under an $11 million credit, Hungary has drilled four
wells in North Rumaylah and is drilling three additional wells near Jambur
in northern Iraq. Bulgaria will conduct an oil survey under a $12 million
development credit, and a $35 million Romanian credit will be used for
petroleum equipment and technical assistance. The agreement with
Bucharest also provides for joint construction of oil refineries in Iraq,
Romania, and possibly third countries. Although Communist-aided oil
projects are still largely in their initial stages, work is moving ahead rapidly.
The largest share of the estimated 815 Communist economic technicians
in Iraq last year were working on oil-related projects.
Drawings
9. By the end of 1971, more than $200 million of Communist
economic aid had been drawn. Drawings rose slowly after Communist aid
began in 1959 but jumped sharply to a peak of $30 million in 1962 as
construction accelerated (see Table 5). Drawings averaged about $22 million
annually during the next four years but fell to only $6 million in 1967
as most major aid projects were completed. There were almost no drawings
in 1969. In 1970, however, drawings increased sharply as work began under
more recent credits.
Economic Aid Repayments
10. By the end of 1971, Iraq had repaid the USSR an estimated
$80-$85 million in principal and interest. Although Moscow's early credits
carried the usual repayment terms of 12 years and 2.5% interest, the terms
of recent credits have varielt. For example, while the $222 million credit
extended in 1971 presumably carries the usual repayment terms, two smaller
petroleum credits provided in mid-1969 call for repayment over five to
seven years at 3% and 2.5%, respectively. Unlike most Soviet aid recipients,
Iraq chose to repay the earlier credits with hard currency rather than in
local commodities. However, the $222 millior credit and a $67 million
petroleum development credit extended in 1969 are repayable in crude oil.
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11. East European credits call for repayment over seven to 12 years
at 2.5%-3% interest. Practically all East European credits extended since
mid-1969 are to be repaid in crude oil. Repayment terms for the $39 million
credit extended by the People's Republic of China in 1971 are especially
generous. The credit is interest-free and payable in oil over ten years
beginning in 1984.
12. Communist countries are willing to accept repayment in oil largely
because they need additional sources of supply to meet their growing energy
requirements. Iran and Afghanistan, for example, are repaying Soviet credits
by shipping natural gas to the USSR through Soviet-built pipelines. A
number of East European countries also accept payment in oil from Iran.
Economic Aid Financing for Iraq's Development Plan
13. Drawings on Communist aid, which averaged about $15 million
annually during the 1960s. have accounted for only about 5% of total Iraqi
public investment. In Iraq's current development plan, however, Communist
aid will play a much more important role, providing nearly 20% of planned
public investment.(2)
14. Communist aid to the petroleum industry will be particularly
important. Iraq plans to invest some $1.4 billion in the petroleum sector
during the 1970s, of which about 18% will come from existing Communist
commitments. Since these credits will largely be drawn down by 1975,
additional aid extensions seem likely further on in the decade. Several
Communist countries already have expressed i,~terest in participating in
Baghdad's $400 million scheme to build a 750-mile, 48-inch pipeline fiom
the Rumaylah oilfields to the Syrian port of Tartus.. This extremely
ambitious project, however, is not likely to be built for some time.
Technical Assistance
15. The number of Communist economic technicians in Iraq has
fluctuated with the level of aid. Soviet personnel probably reached a record
750 at the height of Soviet aid activities in 1962. Their numbers
subsequently leveled off at around 400 but rose to 630 in 1971 as activity
again increased. The salaries and expenses of these technicians - between
$3 million and $5 million annually - are covered by Soviet credits. The
number of East European technicians generally has ranged between 150
and 200, although it rose to about 550 in 1966. During 1956-71 an
estimated 5,030 Iraqi students and trainees studied in Communist countries.
2. Iraq currently is implementing its Second Five-Year Plan (April 1970 - March 1975).
Most of the planned investment of some $4.4 billion will be public investment, the
funds for which will be drawn primarily from oil revenues. These revenues reached
an estimated $950 million during 1971 and are expected to total about $5 billion during
1971-75.
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Impact of Communist Aid on Iraq's Trade
16. Although trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe has been
increasing in recent years, it was still only about 8% of Iraq's total trade
in 1970. These countries, however, are an important source of Iraq's
imports, accounting for nearly 25% of the total in 1970 (see Table 6).
Drawings on Soviet and East European aid during 1962-66 represented about
33% of Iraqi imports from these countries. Drawings subsequently dropped
sharply, but imports remained relatively high, indicating a developing trade
relationship outside the aid program. In fact, Iraq's total trade with thes:;
countries jumped from $33 million in 1960 to $127 million in 1970. It
should continue to rise as aid deliveries again increase and oil is exported
in repayment.
17. Crude oil will quickly replace agricultural products as the chief
Iraqi export to the Communist world. Oil exports as repayment for aid
should reach about $6 million in 1972, an amount approximating Iraq's
total 1970 non-oil exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe. Iraqi oil
exports to repay credits should reach more than $20 million in 1975 and
nearly $40 million by the end of the decade (see Table 7). Total Iraqi
exports to Communist countries, however, probably will be mu6i higher
since commercial contracts for additional oil are likely to be concluded.
Military Assistance
18. Since 1958, Communist countries have extended Iraq nearly $1.1
billion of arms aid (see Tables 2 and 8), almost all from the USSR. Only
Egypt, India, and Indonesia have received more. About $725 million had
been delivered by the end of 1971, some 45% since the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War. Although Iraq continues to receive some equipment from the West,(3)
it is almost completely dependent on the Soviet Union for arms.
Early Agreements
19. By June 1967 the USSR had extended almost $565 million of
military aid to Iraq under five separate agreements dating back to November
1958. Equipment delivered under these accords included more than 90 MIG
jet fighters, ten TU-16 medium jet bombers, 15 IL-28 light jet bombers,
330 medium and light tanks, 440 armored personnel carriers, and 120
self-propelled guns.(4) Ir iq also installed the Soviet SA-2 missile system
in 1962 but was unable to operate and maintain it. The equipment was
resold to Egypt a few years later.
3. During 1967.70, Iraq received $30 million worth of arms from the West -- primarily
armored cars from France, Cobar antitank missiles from West Germany, and some
ammunition from the United Kingdom.
4. For a list of major equipment delivered to Iraq, see Table 9.
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Communist Military Aid Extended to Iraq
Million US $
Total
r~
1958-71
1958
1960
1961
1964
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Cn
Total
1,081
131
98
113
41
181
100
42
70
55
250
h7
USSR
1,004
131
98
113
41
181
80
10
45
55
250
y
Czechoslovakia
65
--
--
--
--
--
20
30
15
--
--
Poland
10
10
--
--
Bulgaria 2
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20. Baghdad's purchases of Soviet naval equipment during the early
years were confined to three subchasers, 12 motor torpedo boats, and some
auxiliary craft. In 1966, however, Baghdad ordered four T-43 minesweepers,
eight Komar-class guided missile patrol boats, and a Petya-class escort ship.
The Petya contract subsequently was canceled because of Iraq's inability
to operate and maintain this type of ship. Only two T-43 minesweepers
have been received. Since no Komar-class boats have been delivered, the
contract may have been canceled.
Agreements Since the June 1967 War
21. Since mid-1967, Moscow has extended some $440 million of
military aid. Although Iraq lost only about a dozen aircraft during the June
1967 War, Moscow rapidly airlifted 12 MIG-21s and 16 MIG-15/ 17 jet
fighters to Iraq as part of its overall Arab resupply effort. Moscow also
quickly delivered 35 SU-7 fighter bombers ordered under a previous
agreement. Soviet willingness to provide the additional aircraft rapidly and
Moscow's pressure on Baghdad not to purchase Western aircraft led Iraq
to cancel a contract for 54 Mirage jet fighters negotiated with the French
before the outbreak of hostilities. Between mid-1967 and the end of 1971,
Moscc,w had delivered 78 MIG jet fighters, 66 SU-7 jet fighter-bombers,
about 430 tanks, about 695 armored personnel carriers, and 520 artillery
pieces.
22. Since 1967, Baghdad aiso has concluded several accords with
Czechoslovakia totaling $65 million for 40 L-29 jet training aircraft, some
MIG-15s, and various antiaircraft guns. In addition, Iraq purchased about
$10 million worth of MIG-15s from Poland and $2 million worth of
ammunition from Bulgaria. The MIG-15s obtained in Eastern Europe,
however, were purchased primarily for parts.
23. The Soviet Union extended a $236 million credit in October 1971,
apparently as part of an agreement to modernize Iraq's armed forces. It
is not yet known what equipment the agreement calls for. Baghdad did
press for a new generation of fighters, but apparently accepted updated
models of the MIG-21 jet fighter and the SU-7 fighter-bomber. MI-8
helicopters, T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, antiaircraft guns, and
antitank rocket launchers also are believed to be included in the new accord.
24. Iraq has been negotiating with several East European countries
for additional arms, but there are no reports of any new arms purchases
from them. An agreement with China probably covered only a token
quantity of ground forces equipment as a political gesture.
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Terms of Repayment
25. Moscow sells Iraq arms at low prices and on favorable terms;
repayment varies from five to ten years at 2% interest. Discounts from
list prices average about one-third for most weapons systems. Although the
agreements specify repayment in commodities, Iraq has chosen to repay
in hard currency. Baghdad probably has repaid $250 million on its arms
debt to the USSR (about half of the amount owed), with recent payments
averaging about $30 million annually. East European terms have been more
stringent, discounts are not given, and repayment is over five years in hard
currency.
Military Technical Assistance
26. The Communist military technical assistance program consists
largely of training Iraqi military personnel at military installations in
Communist countries. By the end of 1971, an estimated 1,825 Iraqis
received such training, primarily in the USSR. Some Iraqi officers have
attended various Soviet staff and command schools.
27. The number of Communist (mainly Soviet) military technicians
in Iraq has varied with the flow of arms. It reached a peak of about 500
in 1962, subsequently declined to a low level, but rose slowly after 1966
to an estimated 400 in 1971. These technicians generally deliver, assemble,
and maintain military equipment; train Iraqi personnel in tactics and in
the operation and maintenance of equipment; and serve as advisers to staff
and line military officers. Their costs represent a current account outlay
since Moscow rarely provides credit for such expenditures.
Impact and Outlook
28. Communist economic and military aid has continued to flow into
Iraq despite periodic tensions in Soviet-Iraqi relations. This aid will continue
and probably increase over time since buth countries view the aid
relationship as serving their respective interests. Baghdad is procuring
modern and sophisticated weaponry at prices and terms not available
elsewhere. Iraq also has found the Communist countries to be an important
additional foreign source of investment capital. From the Soviet point of
view, their aid program has contributed substantially to the elimination of
Western influence in Iraq. Through its technical assistance program, the
USSR has exposed many Iraqis to socialist ideas and techniques. Moreover,
the program has enabled the Soviets to establish important relationships
with Iraqis who in the future may hold key positions.
29. Moscow's aid - particularly its military aid - also has given
Moscow some leverage and influence over Iraqi domestic and foreign policy.
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After the pio-Soviet Kassem regime was overthrown in February 1963, for
example:, the new government attacked the international Communist
move:nent, violently repressed domestic Communists, and stepped up
mili,ary operations against the Kurds. Moscow retaliated by first slowing
the pace of its military deliveries to Iraq and then stopping deliveries
altogether. When Baghdad s>bsequently ceased its anti-Communist
propaganda and reduced its repression of local Communists, military aid
shipments were resumed. Soviet attempts to make life easier for local
Communists, however, have had short-lived effects as repression of
Communist activity has occurred several times since the early 1960s. More
recently, Baghdad condemned the ostensible Soviet-Egyptian acceptance of
US peace initiatives following the August 1970 ceasefire. Although Baghdad
did not fall into line on this issue, it subsequently became less vocal in
its opposition.
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Statistical Tables
13 -
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USSR: Economic Aid Extended to Iraq
1959-71
Date of Agreement
Million US $
Allocation of Credits
Total
553.7
Mar 1959
137.5
Line of credit -- complete plants,
Payment in 12 years at 2.5% interest in
May 1960
45.0
machinery, and equipment
Baghdad-Basra railroad
local goods or convertible currency.
Payment in 12 years at 2.5% interest.
Jul 1962
1.4
Extension of Baghdad-Basra railroad
Payment in 12 years at 2.5% interest.
Feb 19057
4.4
Agricultural equipment
Payment in 6 years at 2% interest.
Jun 1969
54.0
Petroleum development, Al Halfayah
Payment in 5 years at 3% interest under
the
Jul 1969
66.7
Petroleum development
terms of the 1958 trade agreement with
periodic settlement in convertible
currencies.
Payment in 7 years at 2.5% interest in
Jul 1970
2.5
North Rumaylah
Ar Ratawi
Nahr 'Umar
Pipeline from Rumaylah to Fao
Agricultural equipment
crude oil.
Payment in 5 years.
Nov 1970
20.0
Agricultural equipment
N.A.
Apr 1971
222.2
Line of credit
Payment at 2.5% interest in crude oil.
Oil refinery, Mosul
Pipeline, northern Iraq
Pipeline from Baghdad to Basra
2 hydroelectric stations, Dukan and
Darband-I Khan
Phosphate mine, Ukashat
Superphosphate fertilizer factory
2 dairy plants
Fisheries development
Irrigation equipment, Ath-Tharthar
Canal
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Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China:
Economic Aid Extended to Iraq
:965-71
Date of
Agreement
Million US $
Allocation of Credits
Bulgaria
Aug 1967
14.0
Telephone network, machinery, and
Sep 1970
12.0
equipment
Oil and minerals surveys
Czecho-
Nov 1969
27.0
Industrial projects
Oil refinery, Basra
slovakia
East
Germany
Jul 1969
84.0
Line of credit -- complete plants,
Payment in 12 years at 2.5% interest
Hungary
Oct 1969
11.2
machinery, and equipment
Oil drilling
primarily in crude oil (70%)
Payment in 7 years at 3% interest probably
Apr 1970
30.8
North Rumaylah and Jambur
Machinery
in crude oil.
Payment primarily in crude oil (70%).
Poland
Jan-Jun
20.0
Railroad cars
1965
1969
2.5 a/
Sugar refinery, Mosul
N.A.
Jan 1971
2.4
200 railroad tank cars
Payment in 6 years at 5% interest
Romania
Oct 1971
35.0
Petroleum development
Payment in 7 years at 2.5% interest in
crude oil.
People's
Republic of
China
Interest-free; payment over 10 years
beginning in 1984 in crude oil.
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Total Official Gross Bilateral Economic Aid Delivered to Iraq
Western a/
Austria
France
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
West Germany
Communist b/
Million US $
1959-61
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970 1959
-70
20.3
31.1
28.1
35.3
31.6
27.9
9.8
8.2
9.0
23.3
224.6
3.3
1.1
5.1
13.3
9.6
4.9
3
9
1
8
8
5
10
0
.
.
.
.
61.5
--
--
--
--
1.8
0.2
0.1
--
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
6.8
9.3
16
1
--
--
--
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
.
0
6
Cr
--
--
0.8
--
--
0.1
0.1
--
--
.
1.0
3
2
--
--
--
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
.
0
1
1.0
5.0
12.0
7.1
4.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
37.3
.
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.4
4.1
17.0
30.0
23.0
22.0
22.0
23.0
5
9
6
4
0
5
13
3
.
.
.
.
163.1
a. Western countries include-
nclu e those countries that are members of the Development Assist-
ance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. Deliveries include grants, net loans repayable in
recipients' currencies, net transfers of resources through sales for recipients' curren-
cies, and loans with maturities over one year. While determination cannot be made of the
amount delivered on those loans with maturities of one to five years, it is known that
such loans amount to less than 5% of the total.
b. Deliveries of Communist aid include grants and loans with maturities of five years or
more. An estimated $40 million was drawn in 1971.
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Iraq:
Trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe
1960
1965
1966 .
1967
1960
1969
1970
3xports
854.1
882.3
934.1
828.2
1,043.3
1,045.2
1,098.?
Excluding petroleum
30.8
59.4
74.'2
66.9
77.3
72.5
69.4
Of which:
To the USSR
0.7
3.7
3.2
5.1
4.1
4.7
4.6
To Eastern Europe
1.3
1.4
2.4
1.5
1.7
8.0
3.4
Imports
Of which:
From the USSR
From Eastern Euru.)pe
Share of the USSR
Share of Eastern Europe
388.9
450.5
4&3.1
423.4
404.8
t40.4
508.8
7.4
29.6
35.9
36.7
50.8
67.7
66.0
23.5
60.5
42.2
26.1
31.6
34.6
53.0
13
15
13
8
8
10
Handbook; East European figures are from official country data reported by the US
Uepartmet of Commerce. Iraq's total trade figures are from official country data
reported by the International Monetary Fund in the Direction of Trade and Interna-
tional Financial Statistics.
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Estimated Repayments in Oil
for Communist Credits Extended to Iraq
a. Estimates assume that drawings on Communist
c3redits repayable in oil will be made through 1988
with an annual average drawdown of $37 miZZion
during the period 1970-80.
Million US $
Total
Repayments 1
Principal
Interest
226
192
34
1970
--
--
--
1971
--
--
--
1972
6
4
2
1973
11
9
2
1974
17
14
3
1975
21
18
3
1976
27
23
4
1977
33
28
5
1978
36
31
5
1979
38
33
5
1980
37
32
5
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Table 8
Commun.st Military Aid Agreements with Iraq
1958-71
Month
and Year
Communist
Signatory
Million
us $
Selected Types of Equipment Ordered
Nov 1958
USSR
131
32 MIG-17 jet fightere. 12 IL-28 light jet bombers,
Feb 1960
USSR
98
12 MI-4 helicopters, 150 T-34/54 tanks, armored
personnel carriers, artillery.
16 MIG-19 jet fighters, 3 AN-12 heavy transport air-
Oct 1961
USSR
113
craft, P-6-class torpedo boats, medium tanks,
armored personnel carriers, artillery.
16 MIG-21 jet fighters, 10 TU-16 medium jet bombers,
Jun 1964
USSR
41
3 IL-28 light jet bombers, medium tanks (SA-2
missile system later resold to Egypt).
18 MIG-21 jet fighters.
181
32 SU-7 fighter bombers, 16 MIG-21 jet fighters, 8
Jul 1967
USSR
80
Komar-class guided missile patrol boats, 4 T-43-
c.ass minesweepers, a Petya-class escort ship.
26 MIG-21 jet fighters, 16 MIG-15/17 jet fighters.
Oct 1967
Czechoslovakia
20
20 L-29 jet trainers.
Mar 1968
JSSR
10
10 AN-24 transport aircraft.
Mar 1968
Bulgaria
2
Artillery ammunition.
May 1968
Czechoslovakia
30
20 L-29 jet trainers, antiaircraft guns.
May 1969
USSR
45
32 SU-7 fighter bombers, 14 MI-8 helicopters.
Aug 1969
Czechoslovakia
15
MIG-15 jet fighters, trainers.
Sep 1969
Poland
10
MIG-15 jet fighters, trainers.
1st half
1970
USSR
30
16 MIG-21 jet fighters, 3 SU-7 fighter bombers.
Oct 1970
USSR
25
Spare parts, communications equipment.
Jul 1971
USSR
14
MI-8 helicopters.
Oct 1971
of China
USSR
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Major Communist Military Equipment
Delivered to Iraq
1959-71
nazcatee number of fighter aircraft equipped
with AAM (two to four per aircraft).
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a. IncZ u ding recoilless r f es rocket 7aune ers,
and mortars over 100-mm in size.
b. Indicates number of vehicles used as Zaunehe>s
(three missiles per vehicle).
Equipment
Units
Land armaments
Tanks
758
Armored personnel carriers
1,133
Artillery a~
1,575
Self-propelled guns
156
Naval ships
Minesweepers
2
Submarine chasers
3
Motor torpedo boats
12
Other
7
Aircraft
Medium jet bombers
10
Light jet bombers
15
Jet fighters
235
Heavy transports
11
Helicopters
58
Other
129
Guided missile systems
Surface-to-surface, antitank b
28
Air-to-air
97