YOUR LUNCHEON WITH AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00342R001102560002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 12, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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State Dept. review completed
ACIS - 1385/85
12 August 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence --EYES ONLY--
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
3. Current Support to the NST Negotiations:
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff
SUBJECT: Your Luncheon with Ambassador Kampelman (U)
1. This "fast-track" memorandum is for your information; it provides
some background data on arms control issues which you may care to discuss with
Ambassador Kampelman when you have lunch.with him on Tuesday, 13 August.
(OUO)
2. I have no topics which I specifically would like you to raise with
Ambassador Kampelman.. My perception is that this luncheon is an opportunity
for the two of you to talk about where the world, arms control and other, is
at the moment and where the two of you think it might go. As the paragraphs
below make clear, however, there are a number of topics which you might care
to touch upon in your discussion. Some of this material may be new to you; if
so, this is simply because your luncheon came up before we were able to get
this material to you. (OUO)
You might find interesting reading Ambassador Kampelman's personal
overview of NST Round II (Tab Q). (OUO)
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5. NSDD-183:
This document (Tab R) sets out how the Executive Branch will be
preparing the President for his November meeting. You might find it useful to
point out that the arms control material will be strongly controlled by
National Security Advisor McFarlane through the SACG. This arrangement ought
to minimize "meddling".
6. The "Nightmare":
. In Friday's meeting of the Senior Arms Control Group (SACG), Bud
McFarlane talked about the need to think about a situation in which Soviet
leader Gorbachev in November says "we will agree to the US position if you
will agree to ours". Although there was no exposition during the SACG meeting
of what this concept might mean, I think we have enough knowledge to
hypothesize the outlines an example of the idea:
-- The USSR will reduce its number of strategic nuclear device vehicles by 30
(or even 40) percent; establish internal percentages of ICBMs versus
bombers, etc,; and place an explicit limit on the nuclear devices
themselves (i.e., warheads, bombs) and reduce that number as well.
-- BUT the US has to limit SDI and reaffirm the ABM Treaty.
Bud went on to say the President has to be ready with his position, should
this scenario occur; he cannot go to Geneva and simply react on that date in
an ad hoc manner. Ambassador Kampelman referred to this issue as
"Carrington's nightmare" NOTE: Acceptance of Gorbachev's gambit likely will
imply acceptance in some form of the SALT II Treaty.
7. Implications of Soviet Statements on Strategic Arms Reductions:
CIA recently completed a paper (Tab T), at Bud McFarlane's request,
which addresses this issue. Bud's question was "what do Soviet statements
mean to Soviet forces? The answer in this paper is that it.depends on the
numbers you are trying to get to, the internal percentages (ICBMs versus
bombers), and the counting rules you use for fractionated ballistic
missiles.
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 NSDD-183 - Meeting with Soviet Leader in Geneva
State Message entitled "NST: Overview of Round II"
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8. Expected Soviet Arms Control Moves:
A paper is underway in SOVA in response to a request from the NST
delegation. This paper should be completed by late-August.. It will of
course, be made available to you and Ambassador Kampelman.
(OUO)
The NI0/USSR paper on the Soviet game plan is included (Tab U).
9. Without being indiscreet, if there is anything you consider
appropriate to tell me about after your luncheon, I would appreciate hearing
from you. (U)
10. If there is anything more I can do to assist you here, please call
and let me know. (U)
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TOR: 180147Z JUL 85
00 RUEAIIB
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
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DE RUFHGV #6819/01 1981832
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0 171829Z JUL 85
FM USDEL NST GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1763
INFO RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1657
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1644
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NST GENEVA 06819
EXDIS
FROM NST/KAMPELMAN
FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ADELMAN; SHAPE FOR GEN. ROGERS AND POLAD
MILITARY ADDRESS HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, INF, NST
SUBJECT: NST: OVERVIEW OF ROUND II
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. (THIS IS NST 11-020).
2. BELOW IS MY PERSONAL EVALUATION OF THE SECOND ROUND OF
OUR NEGOTIATIONS.
3. ROUND II WAS DISAPPOINTING BUT NOT SURPRISING. THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THE CONTINUA-
TION OF A "HOSTAGE" SITUATION AMONG THE THREE AREAS OF
NEGOTIATION. START WAS A DOUBLE HOSTAGE -- TO RESOLUTION
OF INF AND TO ARAN ON SPACE RESEARCH. INF WAS A HOSTAGE
TO SPACE. AND PROGRESS IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE GROUP WAS
A HOSTAGE TO THE UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET DEMAND THAT SDI
RESEARCH BE BANNED.
4. THERE WAS SOME CONTRAPUNTAL MOVEMENT IN SOVIET TACTICS
IN START AND INF. IN INF THE MOVEMENT WAS BACKWARD: FROM
THE ROUND I STATEMENT THAT AN INF AGREEMENT COULD BE
NEGOTIATED AND IMPLEMENTED ON ITS OWN TO THE ROUND II
INSISTENCE THAT INF MUST AWAIT THE RESOLUTION OF THE SDI
ISSUE. IN START THE MOVEMENT SEEMED TO BE IN THE DIRECTION
OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET FRAMEWORK IDEA
IS CLOUDED WITH AMBIGUITIES -- AS AMBASSADOR TOWER HAS
CALLED IT, AN UNKNOWN PERCENTAGE OF AN UNKNOWN NUMBER.
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INCOMING
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TOR: 180147Z JUL 85
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ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
UTS0886
00 RUEHC
DE RUFHGV #6819/02 1981833
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
0 171829Z JUL 85
FM USDEL NST GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1764
INFO RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1658
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1645
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 NST GENEVA 06819
EXDIS
FROM NST/KAMPELMAN
FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ADELMAN; SHAPE FOR GEN. ROGERS AND POLAD
'MILITARY ADDRESS HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, INF, NST
SUBJECT: NST: OVERVIEW OF ROUND II
FROM OUR ALLIES, OUR CONGRESS. AND OUR PUBLICS. AND THEY
HAVE NOT STAMPEDED US AWAY FROM THE CALM AND FLEXIBLE
APPROACH WITH WHICH WE ENTERED THE NEGOTIATIONS IN MARCH.
OUR WATCHWORDS THUS REMAIN PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE.
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THE WH TE HOUSE
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY WAS INGTON
August 8, 1985
SYSTEM II
90787
Executive Registry
85-
3131
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY
SUBJECT: NSDD on Meeting With Soviet Leader in Geneva (S)
The President has approved the attached National Security
Decision Directive on his planned meeting with the Soviet leader
in Geneva. (S)
Attachment
NSDD-183
coeYZoFCcIDw
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SECRET SYSTEM II
90787
August 8, 1985
Na.tionae Secuni.ty Dec zion
pinec-tive Number 183
MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADER IN GENEVA (U)
As we prepare for my meeting with Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev in Geneva November 19-20, it will be important for
personnel of all agencies active in the sphere of U.S.-Soviet
relations to understand clearly the context of the meeting and
United States objectives. (U)
I invited the Soviet leader to a meeting as soon as he assumed
his position, because I consider it important for the leaders of
the two most powerful nations to know each other and to establish
a dialogue which can assist us in managing a relationship which
is inevitably adversarial but which must be conducted in a manner
which improves stability in the world. (U)
Accordingly, the primary purpose of the meeting will be to
establish personal contact and, if possible, to develop an agenda
for negotiations to be undertaken in the future. The meeting
will not be a substitute for negotiations in normal channels, nor
is its aim the signing of formal agreements. It should rather be
viewed as part of an ongoing process of dialogue with the Soviet
leadership, which can give direction and momentum to our
negotiating efforts. (U)
Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in
various areas should continue to be conducted on their merits,
and should neither be hastened nor delayed because of my upcoming
meeting. While I do not preclude the possibility of signing or
announcing possible agreements which may be reached during the
intervening period in the normal course of negotiation, this is
not the purpose of the meeting, and the planned meeting should
under no circumstances be allowed to influence the United States
negotiating position. (S)
Since historically public expectations for meetings between
American and Soviet leaders have been inflated and have led to a
damaging cycle of euphoria and then disillusionment, it will be
important to convey to the public a realistic picture of the
context in which my meeting will take place. In particular,
nothing should be said to encourage the expectation that the
meeting will result in a fundamental change in the nature of the
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U.S.-Soviet relationship, or in major agreements. This must be
done, however, without denigrating the importance of the meeting
or of kindling suspicions that the United States is not serious
in its efforts to resolve problems in the U.S.-Soviet
relationship. (S)
Given the importance of maintaining a clear and consistent
treatment of U.S.-Soviet relations in our public statements and
public diplomacy, it is imperative for all U.S. Government
officials to adhere totally to the press guidance established by
my own statements and those approved by the State Department and
the White House. No official is authorized to originate public
statements regarding the Geneva meeting, or to provide comments
in background briefings that go beyond statements made publicly
by the White House or Department of State. All written remarks
concerning U.S.-Soviet relations must be approved in advance by
the White House or the Department of State. Should public
statements or background briefings by other U.S. Government
officials on particular aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations seem
desirable, they may be undertaken only following the specific
approval of the White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva
Meeting. (C)
In this connection, I am compelled to note that our negotiating
position continues to"be undermined by unauthorized, and often
inaccurate or distorted information provided to the public media
by anonymous government officials. It will be particularly
important in the months ahead to put a stop to this damaging
practice, and I would remind every agency head that it is part of
his executive responsibility to control access to sensitive
information in a manner which insures its integrity from
unauthorized disclosure. (S)
Issues under negotiation with the Soviet Union will continue to
be staffed in the normal interagency process, culminating in the
National Security Council or National Security Planning
Group. Overall arrangements for the Geneva meeting, including
its public diplomacy aspects, will be coordinated by my Chief of
Staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs. (U)
To insure that the various strands of U.S.-Soviet relations are
properly coordinated for presentation to these cabinet-level
bodies, I hereby establish a White House Coordinating Group for
the Geneva Meeting, with the following mandate:
1. To monitor and ensure consistency of substantive preparations
for the meeting in Geneva, except for those which come under the
aegis of the Senior Arms Control Group. (S)
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2. To coordinate policy guidance for public handling of issues
related to the meeting in Geneva. (S)
3. To provide guidance to the White House Advance Office and
other units responsible for arrangements and logistics in respect
to substantive implications of arrangements for the meeting. (S)
The White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting will
operate under the Chairmanship of Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs Jack F. Matlock, and will
include representatives designated by the Secretaries of State
and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, along with
such other officials as my Chief of Staff and the Assistant to
the President for National Security shall deem necessary. (S)
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