APPRECIATION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R000500060014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: NOTES

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aura _eOciation of the Current Situation in Indochina
noted The f'ollov,ing, was written in French on 9 February 19L 7c )
The Viet Minh (Piet Nair, Doe Lap LonJ i.ainh lioi) is an association of several
political parties which combined in 1941Q19L2 and whraee aim is to achieve inde-
pendence for Viet Hero and to free the people of Viet ;Jam from the yoke of French
fascist lnperialistso
Durn; tlae Japanese occupation, Viet ,.:inh partisans succeeded in establishing
bases in the Thai~'13guyen and Bso Kaan (mountainous reJion of Tonkin), to launch
,uerrilla attacks to harass the enemy. in other zornes, their elanuestine press
succeeded in rousin,i in the minds of the people, who were sufforin.; from starvation
and the cruelties of the Japanese, a feelin,; of comradeship and common struggle.
Groups of young fighters were organized. The movement gradually spreado
The aairi of the Viet 14irih was in harmony with that of the Allies, and they
received with open arms the aid of Chinese and ithierioarns. They also sought the
friendship of the French ( the French of Tam- Lai who were saved by the Viet Linh
from the Japanese at the tine of the events of 9 ...arch 19115), because the "Free
French" were on the side of the Allies, and Vichy French colonialism, on its
knees before Japanese imperialism, no lon;;er constituted a direct threat,
The day of the General Insurrection coincided with the unconditional Surrender
of the Japanese, an(. the last days of august l9L 45 saw nearly all of Viet Nam under
the control of "Peoples ?. Committees" organized and guided by the Viet Isiinho A
provisional government Al under the presidency of ho Chi l~-'inh,, was formed, and
declared Viet idsm an independent nation on 9 September 1945
The provisional government of the Democratic Republic of. Viet Nam, from the
first days of its pourer, found itself faced with thorny questions, both national
and international,
faational Questions
Political. In order to install a democratic political rule, the government
had first to abolish the decayed old feudal system A dele:;ation sent to flue
(the ancient imperial capital) was officially present at the aabdicution of the
Emperor L'Fao t aai in favor of the new Lovernment. At the same time, in all the
provinces the hierarchy of Mandarins was dissolved (sometimes the strum; ~1e was
bloody) in favor of the system of "FFeoplese Coxmriittees" (of villages, provinces,
and bo.) Each elected committee has its president and vice-president; two oommi-
sears, one political and one military, are attached to ito Sometimes the president
or vice-president and the commissars are members of the Viet i,inh. I.yost often?
only the two commissars ai-e members. Thus the Peoples' Committees function with
the aid of the Viet Minh, lest the system be misunderstood, and in order to avoid
slipping back into the decayed old system of the "Council of 1lotaables0," The people-
formerly animals to be sacrificed, now citizens of a free nation-are beginning
to understaanc. and to take seriously the rights anu duties of citizens.
In step with these administrative measures, the Viet Minh organizes "National
z+elfaare Associations", of workers, technicians, peasants, women, children, merchants.
These associations, which include a large part of the population, aid greatly in
mutual understanding between persons of similar social status. The result is not
only a meeting of men, but also of public entities through the adhesion of the
members Above all, the masses are introduced to the idea of struggle, and the
specialization of the masses in this struggled Thus the Peoples' Committees,, and
the "National t;elfaare Assoe1&tioxs", have been the two fundamentally revolutionary
measures initiated by the Viet i`inh,, The people have accepted therm, not as an
historical accident,, but as the finish of the impotent feudal eystern., and the
awakening of the strength and sense of duty of the masses,,
The application of these two measures has been facilitated by the struggle
against illiteracy (a struggle which was often resisted by the French and the old
iiaandarin rer;ime), uric by the development of the press,. iiesr:spcpers increased ten-
fold, and, in cooperation with the hanoi dio, give full commentaries on the recent
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insurrection, the evils of the old regime,, the prospects of a bright future
which still req Ores sacrifices.
Economics The Japanese-inspiried influtioA; the flood of Chinese notes, and the
treacherous decree of the Banque de 1'Indochina in repudiating the) 500-piastre notes
cast a black shadow over the financial situation. Somehow or other, the public
treasury, although incurring large; losses by the abolition of taxes and duties,
gradually recovered, ovding to the 1,utional telfare Associatiors and so-called "collec-
tion weeks."
Production had also been seriously affected. Two pillion people died of
starvation; 6OOa of the tillable lands of Tonkin were covered by floods; Cochinchina,
the granary of the country, was attacked by the French. The counter vs saved by
the appeal of Ho Chih L:inh to the nation to increase production to the greatest
possible extent and to make the most econoiraical use of the available land; and
also by the use of agricultural cooperatives.
The disarmament of the Japanese was accomplished (1) by the British, south of
the 16th parallel, (2) by the Chinese north of that parallel.,
The provisional government sought always to facilitate the task of the Allies,
although the British helped the French attaa,ci: in 1Jam Bo (Cochinchina), and the
Chinese brought with them a new element of internal trouble. the Vietnamese Kuomin-
tango It is noteworthy that the Vietnamese :':uon:intang is only a degenerate out-
growth of the "Party of Iloblsa" founded by 1.g u: cn T i i .41ce:, who was executed at
the time of the Yen Bai Insurrection (1930=?31) ~ iielped sand partially equipped
by the Chinese rsilitarists, this party ceased to play a ,)olitical role after the
withdrawal of the Chinese troop.; inasmuch as its adherents consist of disparate
elements, without a clear and coherent political doctrine or a definite program
of action and, though they have some forces under arms, they are usually without
any solid support in the progressive elements of the rcusses. The `;overnment
maintained a rather passive attitude towards there, with the expectation that their
opposition would disintegraite of itself
Ever since the end of l.orld ';a ar 11, the French have shown a hostiles attitude
towards the Vietnrtta.ese. At the volt' beginning, in the wake of British bayonets,
they opened an attack in loam Be (Cochinchina.,)
hen the Japanese disarmament was completed, the French returned to replace
the British and Chinese. The events in Nam 13o taught them to be r:ore prudent
and to use means which were less direct, but relatively safer and less compromising,
On 61.arch 191E6 they si;;ned a preliminary a ,reeraent with the Vietna.Teise Government
with the air.i of endin,-, hostilities and preparing the way for a treaty between the
two countries? (without havinL the documents available, it would be risky to go
into the details of this preliminary a reerient. The same applies to the I3alrat
Conference, and the Fontatinebleau "modus vivendi,," Besides, it would be idle to
attach too much importance to the polities of intri.ue, which do not shed a clear
light on the true policies of the Viet ;Minh masses.) By means of this preliminary
a reenent, the French succeeded in landing, a strong; array in Indochinese territory
(its numbers are greater than those permitted in the a,;reemmnt, namely ,5j?.3.,000 )
Although IN-ance recognized the freedon of Viet ?Jam within the French Union, the
filrenoh have attempted, by all sorts of indirect means, to revert to their old
colonial policy, The true cause of such a policy may perhaps be explained by the
economic crisis in France Collosain , the disaster of b'orld filar 11 Viet Nazi would
be a factor for the restoration of more or less stability in the French economy,.
That is a question which is important to France as well as to Viet ,Jams, Under-
staandin,; would be difficult%, but is it impossible? Which side should bear the
blame for the present conflict? Is it France,, one of the Big Four, with her
stronger array and her means of justifying herself somehow or other internationally
and before the UN, or is it the young republic of Viet Nam, lacking any regular
kA 90e el
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armed forces, suffering no less from the effects of 6+orld y.ar ] ] and, above all,
1ankin;; means to justify herself before the entire world which has been deceived
by the insidious propaganda of the French?
At any rate, a young and weak country, baflyr in need of peace in order to
consolidate its organization, could not possibly have wanted to run the risk of
incitin- the Haiphong Incident (19 November 1946) and the Hanoi _incident (19 Decem-
ber 1940- A free country cannot allow its customs officers to be fired upon.
A free people cannot allow the police in their capital city to be under control of
persons who ruake further and further demands upon them. Peace was answered with
war, France attacks; Viet Kam defends herself,,
The war has lasted more than two rionths. How much lon;_;er will it last? ,`,hat
will be the outoore ? It would be difficult and dangerous to attcnpt a positive
answer to these questions. But it is not entirely impossible to clarify in some
measure the problem by exwaining the opposing forces.
At the outbreak of hostilities, the strength of the French Array (in Indochina)
was more than 80,0000 At present, the number is more than 130,000. If reinforce-
ments continue to arrives,it Will shortl,r reach 150,000. The French have armored
cruisers (of which the Richelieu is one), cruisers, Spitfires, Junkers, Dakotas,
tanks and trucks. They are therefore well equipped They have a great generals,
General Leclerc, the hero of the liberation of Paaris0 They have captured Saigon
an c: Haiphong At Hanoi, although they are in possession of the airport of G.ia Lam
and are layin? siege to the still-resisting S_no-Annamite quarter, they have not
yet cleared the outlying districts, and the junction between Hanoi and riiphong is
not yet r:ade. tam J'inh (80 kilometers south of Hanoi), even with the arrival of
parachutists, remains still in a state of siege. The sane is true of Hue. During
the very first hours of hostilities, the French garrisons at Vinh, Than'h4ioa, and
Phu?han. Thuong;, laid down their arms. Thus the French successes to date have not
been very brilliant, unless one counts the exploits of the Spitfires, which machine-
gun the civilian population and sometir:es bomb even the concentration camps of
French soldiers, one of whom was Sgt. Leclerc, son of the famous general0 Some of
of the Germans in the French Foreign Legion are deserting an(' joining the Viet
ne mese forces. This war is only a war of attrition for the French; and unless they
succeed in bringing in an army of 500,000 men (an estimate made by a captain in the
Foreign Legion), success will remain uncertain. In compensation, to date there
have been no material profits o
On the Vietnamese side, it is e=stimated that they have more than 100,000 (armed
men) in the north, and more t, an 50,000 in the south. But their are not regular
troops, trained for pitched battle The principal centers are defended in part by
"Tu Ve" (Defense Volunteers), assisted by Government troops. I n general, they use
guerrilla methods; v:ith the valuable experience gained in the anti-Japanese strugglep
in a land of mountain and jungle, and the strategy of "scorched earth" in the plains,
They have a cons ic.erable number. of light automatic weapons and the. guerrillas replenr,
ish their supplies of arms by capturing weapons from their enemies.
Basically, the chief weapon of the Vietnamese Government is the political
stability of the people, The war is no longer one solely between two armies, for
the rule of the new democracy has inculcated into the minds of the people the hopes
of freedom, the consciousness of collective responsibility, and the object which is
being defended.. It is this that explains the fanaticism of the Tu Ve of Hanoi, and
the impossibIlity of treachery or disorder in the Rome Front. The. corner-stone is
the discipline of the Peoples' Gommittecs 0 Under the old regime, when a i:andarin
gave himself up to the enemy, his province was totally lost. Times have chaangedr
A puppet govr:rnment set up by the French in order to divide the Vietnamese would have
little success,, Among the most ardent patriots, collective responsibility and love
of the object which is being, defended; amon lukewarm Arrnamites, distrust of French
treatment and four of reprisals for having worked in the Peoples a Committees or for
having taken part in anti-French demonstrations: these considerations will push the
people to an all-out struggle;, The spirit of struggle and sacrifice is decidedly
great and lofty..
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Internationally, the world is beeonin-; more and more interested in the
Vietnamese conflict. If it continues, the repercussions will be great in Siam,
Burma. India and Indonesia,. ilea ides, despite French propaCanda, the world is
be- innin? to believe that the Viet ::inh, although organized by certain former
cormunists, are not following a Red policy,, A "Peoples O Couunittee" is not an
e7act copy of a"soviet"; and universal suffrage (in Vietnam) contains no anti-
democratic features. The Viet 1inh are not nationalizing all the great estates
-.nd groat factories,, They never speak of the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat";
~:nd have even orrania:ed ";iational i-elfarea i-sesooiations" of bankers, in collabor-
ation yr th the government. They do not ?ut into effect the equal distribution of
land, nor do they adopt reasures of acrariaan reform similar to those of the Chinese
Coruuunists, In order to understand the situation clearly, it is necessary to
follow the bitter struggle of the Viet :.:inh against the Ccx unists of the 4th
International (Trotskyists)G, The hitter always demand the application of these
two fundaciental measures of Communism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat
marching in step 'with the peasantryr The execution of their leader, Tu Thu Thau,
and the imprisonment of the remainder, and some ropercussions which ere quickly
suppressed. The Indochinese Communist Party itself - one of the constituent parties
of the Viet .:inh - was dissolved ("dissolved itself") in October 1945, since the
Viet t.:inh, far from wantin, to make a sudden leap to Socialism, foresaw first a
revolution which will be bourgeois, democratic, and anti-feudal. They are trying
to create a derzocratio bourgeoisie, leavin private property intact. President
Ho Chi i:inh.? himself, in his several speeches, has often referred to the texts of the
declaration of rights of men, in the time of the French and American Revolutions
Are the Viet L'inh therefore Corununists, as Admiral d'Ar~enlieu recently declared?
Are they Corununists simply because they are ,mlike the Vietnamese Kuonintaan;, v6hich
blindly hates the French more than anyone else? ,care they Coznriunists simply because
them fought the Trotskyist Communists who demand (v.orld)'Proletariun Revolution now
that the bourgeois revolution has started? Are they Cornnamists simply because they
have had the sympathy of such .,on as U Ba Law, I.ehru, and Chz;mdra Bose? Or are they
Communists simply because, while Ducloa, Thorez, and Cachin adopt an attitude of
reserve in expectation of a coup d'etat (in France) which is not entirely impossible,
France itself is less corruministio than Viet Nam?
In striking the balance-sheet of the opposing, forces, it is clear that if the
French are thesirorsf-ex materially, the Vietnamese a re the stronger morally. In
case the ,,'Jar is prolon;;ed, and supposing that the French capture all the great
centers, will order be restored? ith the strategy of "ceaseless struZole", the
Viet R:inh will continue to stir up riots and guerilla operations and it is doubtful
if the extrenis?.ts will not then :;uin the upper hand in tho Resistance movement"
V hsat rni ;ht not then be the likelihood of a violent revolutionary rsovenent, more or
less Trotskyist,' not only in Viet LIwu, but also in Siam, Burma, India and Indonesia?
Such a movement might cause a chrangea in the strat- y of the Chinese and Russian
Reds, uho are no longer at present advocating world revolution.
Although the war is still ra-in-,, it tiould not btu surprising If hostilities
were to cease in a few months; France has had her hair of attrition without any
material profits so far. As the" world becomes more and more interested in the
Vietnamese question, France will have to justify herself before her people who have
seen their young sons deeir:ated in the last disaster and now still more before the
forthcoming (:::e.rch 1947) Conference of Foreign L?.inisters axt `-oscow, for not having
been able to use more peaceful metanso
If France under any circumstances should ask to negotiate, Vietnam would wel-
come it with open arras, on the sole condition of independence, according to President
Ho Chi Linh's declarations. Vietnam needs peace in order to Pet organized more
solidly. She is sacrificing herself only for her independence. "`:hen the, principal
objective is attained, she is ready to make some snail concessions for peace. :rill
it come?
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