SOVIET VIEWPOINT ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS OF COMMUNISM IN EUROPE AND GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R000800160008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 10, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 6, 1947
• Content Type: IR

Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP82-00457R000800160008-2
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
WELLIGENCE REPORT
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S BJ ECT soviet viewpoint on FutUrEY Do velopmraat
Communism in Surope and Gerataataa
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6 August 1947
AGES 3
SLIPPLEMEIII
. Strong differences of opinion exist between ton Soviet military and
political personnel on Ruseian relations with the western powers,
particularly on questions concerning Germany. The military group
believes that for ?oonomf_c reasons Ruasia '011 not be able to meet
any aggreseion, or to wage an offensive war, until the end of 1948
at least. Moreover, since the majority of the generals believe that
Russia's political objectives, the extension of her inflaence over
-haropean countries as yet outside her contaol, can be realized through
the local Communist parties within such countries, these generals con-
elude that there is no reason for Russia to wage an offensive war.
Powever, this group shares with the party politicians the fear that the ---
United States will attack Russia prior to her complete economic re-
construction and holds, therefore, that all other considerations are
secondary to a concentrated effort towards this reconstructions par-
ticularly in the armament industry.
2. The political point of v.!.aw on the other hand is that it would be better
to anticipate the ultimate attack by Amertae and to make urope Com-
munist by a bold act of force. It was argaed that even Soviet military
circles, as well as political circles, were convinced that America had
lost "the battle for &Amin" itself in 1945 when its forces were
voluntarily withdrawn westwards to the present zonal boundaries, and
that consequently the United States would not seriously attempt to
defend western.rope against Russian advances.
3. The reasons for concluding that the United Mates will ultimately become
the aggresaor are, briefly, that a normal transition to peacetime economy
would result la the collapae of America's unnatural wartime economic boom'
this would result in a depressior with fatal social consequences to th
United States. The government.is, therefore, persuading the American
people to continue their war-tdme expenditures by means of incessant
propaganda regarding the threat of CommUnism and Russian aggressien.
This gov6rilinent-ripOnsored boom will inevitably lead to a crisis which
can only b 'led by war. The tempo of events leading to this cri
ifeat
;.L1 ermine the timing of the future overt aggression.
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Cenurrent with these developments will be the emergence of an
imperiellst polelcy In order to be prepared for war. Tie's will be
unavoidable since Anerica must gain markets for her industriee.
These considerations aake tJ(' Truman Polley in Greece and Turkey
)uiderstandeele, and account for the suppositJon eyisting in some
Huseian circles that a sir.iler poiici will be aplied to Finland.
illimmilms The expression "imperialist policy" is employed
as more accurately reflecting in English the intent of the
original German "faschistische Politik".
4. It is a foregone conclusion that the november Foreign Yjni tersv
Conference in London will be a failure. One consequence will be
the Ruesien argument that the Allied Control Council, having been
proven umorkable, should be dissolved. The Russiuns will also
ask the miLitary, missions of the western allies to leave Berlin;
if neceseeey, they will force such a departure step by step.
Within two years after the Conference, the western allies will
have vacaLed Berlin completely.
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: These statements were made with grea% emphasis
and w ;le general agreement of the Russian officers present.
.5. After the London Conference the independence of the eastern
states w!.11. be considered.
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Under eo circumstances will Russia reduce her 10,000,0000000
reparetione demands w10.ch, if necessary, will be taken in toto
from tete eastern zone regardless of consequencee.
7. The fellowing devel(vments are foreseen by the Russians after the
anti(ipated failure )f the London Conference:
a, 11-le "Iron Curtain" will become tighter.
b. Western German:. will not be able to feed iteelf alone; even
England and Americi. will be unable to provide the necessary
fooCstuffs in the _ferag run, particularly if America herself is
preparing :for ware Food and economic Colditions will, therefore,
lead to such increased difficulties in the adminietration of the
western zones that ultimately all Germans will redLize that the
failure to unify (!ermany had been irresponsible. With that
realization, it w:71l be nerely a matter of clever propaganda .to
convince the Gereeen people that the western powers had been the
ones who at the Iniscow Conference had prevented Gereanyls
unification.
c. This all-out propagenda campaign will be started, however,
only when, in antl.cipation of an armed conflict., It will become
necessary to win the neetral Germans to the Russien cause.
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d. In order to. prepare the western zones for these developm
there exists a "clear-cut program" exoludin the weste_
KPD as inconsequential, has two main objectives:
(1) Increasing the strength of the workerat councils, 76,,!,
of whose leaders are solid ;:orumunists 'or .sED men
according to Russian statistics, an of the trade
unions in order to create .an effective resistance by
the labor masses against the western occupation
forces; and
(2) Persuading German a0alinistmtive personnel in the
western zones to avoid collaboration in any form so
that ultimately the western powers alone will bear
responsibility for conditiol.,s in their respective zoros.
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