CHINA-USSR: MANEUVERING IN THE TRIANGLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000302340001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 December 1985
China-USSR: Maneuvering In The Triangle
Summary
Over the past year Beijing has unilaterally moved to establish a
broader framework for normalizing relations with Moscow that could open
the way for an expanded political dialogue and resumption of
party-to-party contacts. These steps reflect China's increased confidence
In its ability to maneuver within the Sino-US-USSR strategic triangle--a
confidence stemming in part from steady improvements in Sino-US
relations, its reading of the US-USSR strategic balance, and Soviet signals 25X1
Although Beijing probably does not expect any significant change
soon in Soviet policy on the security issues that divide them, it may be
preparing to make a greater effort to probe the limits of Moscow's
flexibility. The Chinese probably have concluded that they have little to
lose by,offering General Secretary Gorbachev some inducements,
calculating that at a minimum this gives them more leverage with the
United States. They probably are also convinced that they can control the
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis, and
Office of Soviet Analysis Information available as of 20 December
1985 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Foreign Affairs Branch, China Division, OEA
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pace of any improvements in Sino-Soviet relations to avoid endangering
their expanding ties with the West. The Chinese, in our view, do not
appear to have a clearly thought out strategy, however, and could end up
moving further toward accommodating Moscow than they now
envision--especially if Gorbachev responds with some new, more
imaginative Initiatives of his own.
The Soviets, for their part, are undoubtedly pleased by the recent
progress in relations but realize they may still have lost some ground in
the triangular relationship. Apprehensive about Sino-US ties, particularly
In the military sphere, Moscow seems to be trying to develop a "China
card" of its own in the hope of driving a wedge between Beijing and
Washington. The Soviets, while apparently encouraging an improvement in
Sino-Mongolian relations, have yet to offer China any security
concessions. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether Gorbachev will
give relations with China a higher priority
and reassess the old policy of encirclement and military
intimidation. If he does, we could eventually see the Soviets float some
new initiatives on troop deployments along China's northern perimeter or
Beijing's Game
Creeping Normalization
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The Chinese continue to insist that they will not "normalize" political relations
with Moscow until the Soviets accommodate China on at least one of the so-called
"three obstacles:" agreeing to withdraw from Afghanistan, stopping support to the
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, or reducing Soviet forces deployed against China.
Yet they have steadily doled out small, symbolically important helpings of normalization 25X1
over the past year without any Soviet quid pro quo.
Since. last winter, for example, Beijing has begun once more to refer to Soviet
leaders as "comrade" and the Soviet Union as "socialist," terms not used since the
mid-1960s. More recently, the Chinese have restablished parliamentary relations and
agreed to resume trade union ties, and exchange foreign minister visits sometime next 25X1
year. Chinese leaders also made a not so subtle display of their. "independence" on. the
eve of the Geneva summit by receiving the Soviet American specialist Arbatov and a
delegation of the Supreme Soviet at the same time they hosted Vice President Bush.
The Chinese continue to insist they are not prepared to resume formal
party-to-party ties. But we believe that if asked, they might be tempted to send an
observer to the next Soviet party congress, scheduled for next February, although they
probably would carefully weigh the US reaction first. A Chinese Foreign Ministry
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spokesman coyly turned aside a journalist's question recently on this subject by saying
only that China had not been invited.
In pursuing this more conciliatory tack, the Chinese have not abandoned their
view of the Soviet Union as the main threat to their security and geopolitical interests.
Rather, we believe they see increasing opportunities for China to maneuver between the
superpowers--if only on the margin. This confidence may be based on several
assumptions:
? That neither the current US-USSR rivalry nor the balance of strategic forces will
change significantly over the rest of this decade, thus Beijing need not fear
superpower collusion against its interests. The outcome of the Geneva summit
probably, has not altered the Chinese view, although they clearly will be watching
the evolution of US-USSR relations closely over the coming months for some
signs of change.
? Having placed their relations with the United States on a firmer footing over the
past two years, China is, in a stronger position to move forward with Moscow
without appearing to do so out of weakness.
? Finally, a younger more reform oriented Soviet leadership may in time be willing
to reassess its policy toward China, thus it is in China's interest to offer
Whether Deng Xiaoping shares these assumptions is unclear. Earlier this year he
was under pressure from some of his Politburo critics--Chen Yun and Peng Zhen--to
expand economic and political contacts with Moscow at a faster pace, according to US
Embassy reporting and our media analysis. Since Deng was unable to shunt them aside
at the recent party congress, we suspect that they and perhaps some within Deng's own
reform wing of the party, are continuing to press for the adoption of a more flexible
strategy in dealing with Moscow and Washington.
Prospective Gains and Potential Danger
Beijing, for its part, is likely to continue gradually to expand economic and
political contacts with Moscow, leaving the way open for Gorbachev to respond more
positively to China's security concerns. It may even be preparing to make a more
intense effort to probe the limits of Soviet flexibility. The Chinese probably believe that
at minimum improving relations serves their modernization program by keeping tensions
manageable. They also regard the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc states as potential
markets for goods, such as textiles, that they are having a harder time selling in the
West and as sources for some technology they need, such as in the field of
hydroelectric power.
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By being patient and flexible toward Moscow, Chinese leaders probably also
believe they stand to gain at least some leverage with the United States on issues like
Taiwan and technology transfer--certainly more than they would if they allowed
Sino-Soviet relations to remain static or to deteriorate. They probably recognized,
however, that if they pursue this tack too far they run the risk of not only encouraging
Moscow to stand pat on security issues, but of weakening the strategic underpinnings of
Beijing probably believes that it can continue to control the pace and scope of
improvements in ties with Moscow to avoid alarming the West, whose reaction the
Chinese carefully monitor. Indeed, Chinese almost certainly will continue to invoke the
three obstacles partly to reassure Washington and to frustrate attempts by Moscow to
exploit improved relations to its own advantage within the triangle. We also expect
Beijing to continue its support for the Afghan and Cambodia insurgents.
Although the three obstacles no longer appear to be the impediment they once
were to "normalizing" Sino-Soviet relations, we believe Sino-Soviet strategic differences
will continue to set limits on how far Beijing is prepared to go in improving ties with
Moscow--especially as long as China also wants access to Western technology for its
modernization drive. But Beijing's new approach to triangular politics runs large,
potential risks. If Gorbachev decides to respond in some new, more imaginative way,
than has been past Soviet practice, this could reopen last spring's debate among
Chinese leaders over relations with Moscow and push Deng to move further toward
The Soviets. have reason to be pleased with the recent progress in Sino-Soviet
relations, especially because it has cost Moscow little. But they also recognize that they
have not been able to deter China from developing closer ties with the United States,
especially in the military sphere, and that they could actually lose some ground in the
strategic triangle. Moreover, we believe Moscow must worry that Washington will try to
solidify its relations with Beijing rather than be more forthcoming with Moscow in
response to any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.
Apprehensive about Sino-US ties, the Soviets have sought recently to develop
some kind of "China card" of their own. To that end they have expanded the dialogue
with the Chinese by adding more topics to the agenda of their periodic consultations.
The Soviet have, for example:
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? Sent a delegation of foreign ministry officials to Beijing for a week of
consultations on disarmament issues in August.
? Persuaded the Chinese to discuss disarmament issues, space weapons and
security in the Asia/Pacific region, as well as Afghanistan, Cambodia and various
"bilateral" issues, at their seventh round of consultations at the deputy foreign
minister level, held in Beijing this October.
The Soviets also have pushed for more exhanges like Georgy Arbatov's recent
visit, which reportedly prompted a Chinese proposal for a Sino-Soviet seminar on
International issues in 1986, as well as an agreement to exhange more scholars
Interested In International relations and the foreign policies of the two countries:
? Mikhail Titarenko, the new Director of the USSR's Institute of the Far East, visited
China in late October-early November for talks with Chinese academics on party
matters and domestic reforms.
? Chinese First Deputy Premier Song Ping stopped off in Moscow in late November,
enroute home from visits to Bulgaria and Poland, for talks and dinner with Soviet
First Deputy Premier Talyzin, Chairman of the USSR's State Planning Committee.
The Soviets are striving not to reawaken Chinese fears of superpower collusion.
Instead, Arbatov reportedly was rather candid with the Chinese about the unlikelihood of
a breakthrough in US-Soviet ties anytime soon. The Soviets could adopt a different tack
in the aftermath of the Geneva summit, but we believe they probably will continue to
put more emphasis on the importance of "socialist unity," and especially China's
obligation to stop blaming the superpowers equally for world tensions and to join forces
with the USSR and its allies against the "imperialist" camp.
To further their efforts to develop a China card, the Soviets also have
soft-pedalled their reservations about Chinese economic reforms and acknowledged
China as "socialist." In doing so, they probably hope to encourage the United States
and its allies to question the wisdom of helping China to modernize its economy and
armed forces. We also believe they do not want to appear to be interferring in China's
internal politics, lest they undermine those in the Chinese leadership who are both
critical of the reforms and in favor of closer Sino-Soviet relations.
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The Soviets continue to refuse to make concessions on the three obtacles and
privately insist that these are artificial barriers Beijing uses to slow the improvement in
relations with Moscow and thus to protect its ties with Washington. They predict the
Chinese will eventually abandon such devices and hence imply that Moscow need not
give any ground. Meanwhile, the Soviets continue to criticize
China's support for the resistance movements in Afghanistan and Cambodia
and Its opposition to the USSR on other Asian issues.
At the same time, the, Soviets are encouraging the new Mongolian leadership
under Jambyn Batmonh to improve relations with China. Batmonh noted during his visit
to Moscow in August that the Mongolians were "paying close attention to the process
of normalizing Sino-Soviet relations." Since then, Sino-Mongolian contacts have
developed along lines similiar to Sino-Soviet relations over the past few years. In
encouraging Mongolia to follow its lead, we suspect Moscow may hope somehow to
persuade Beijing over time to agree to some sort of an acccomodation on the
Mongolian question--possibly involving a compromise regarding Soviet forces now
stationed in Mongolia.
For the Soviets' part, it remains to be seen whether Gorbachev will give China a
higher priority and devise a more flexible strategy for dealing with the security issues
that divide them. A number of Soviet officials have interpreted the replacement of
Gromyko, whose focus was the United States and Europe, with Shevardnadze as a sign
that Gorbachev intends to play a more active role in Asia.
We believe, however, that several factors will continue to inhibit Soviet flexibility.
The Soviets expect China to remain an adversary for many years even if they manage
somehow to deal with one or more of the -obstacles." The two countries have
competing ambitions in Asia and other parts of the world--a situation the Soviets
believe is unlikely to change for the better any time soon. Some Soviets, moreover,
believe that recent Chinese gestures f-rtnfirm the correctness of Moscow's current policy
of toughness. Then too, Gorbachev probably must proceed cautiously because of the
suspicions of China among the Soviet olorN and possible opposition among key interest
groups, such as the party bureaucracy. rnitslary establishment and security services, to
offering security concessions to Beijing
The Soviets also I expect that China,
although hardly a threat at the moment, Will grow stronger and pose a more substantial
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security threat in another decade or two. The Soviet's practice has been to keep the
Chinese hemmed in until Beijing demonstrates a genuine interest in improving
relations--not just a desire to buy time to modernize its armed forces. Soviet policy
toward North Korea, India, and Vietnam suggest this remains the basic thrust of their 25X1
policy.
There Is no direct evidence that the Soviets are considering major concessions
Indeed, most Soviet officials seem to believe in "hanging tough" with the Chinese and
not offering them any concessions. But they could recognize Beijing's claims to almost
.all of the 700 disputed Islands in the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, most of which have little
importance in either economic or military terms, while offering China compensation for
the strategically important Heixlazi Island, opposite Khabarovsk. The Soviets also could
make some token force reductions opposite China, by ,withdrawing one or more of their
ready ground force divisions from the area or thinning out various Soviet units there.
Then, too, the Soviets could withdraw one or more of the five divisions they now have
in Mongolia without seriously eroding their overall security situation or calling into
None of these options appears very likely at the moment, but Gorbachev and his
colleagues may at some point decide that a decision to accommodate Beijing on some
of its security concerns is worth the risk, because:
? Sino-Soviet relations still lag far behind China's ties with the West, and Moscow
could lose additional ground by standing still while Washington and Beijing are
moving closer.
? An improvement in Sino-Soviet ties would weaken the US position, demonstrate
that the drift in Soviet policy is over, and show that Gorbachev is in charge.
? Moscow also might see a unique opportunity to influence Chinese domestic
politics, by bolstering any elements favoring a more rapid improvement in
Siniet relations, or a more restrained dialogue with the United State
We cannot rule out the possibility that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa
discussed such moves with the Chinese during his week long visit to Beijing in early
December, at which time the two sides agreed on an exhange of foreign minister visits
in 1986, beginning with a visit to Moscow by Chinese Foreign Minister Wu late next
s ring.
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Annex
Sino-Soviet Relations
A Chronology
21 December 1984
First Deputy Premier Arkhipov arrives on a highly publicized trip to Beijing. Three
agreements signed, calling for bilateral economic and technical cooperation;
bilateral scientific and technical cooperation; and the establishment of a
commission on economic, trade, and scientific and technical cooperation.
28 December 1984
Bilateral agreement to increase the volume of trade from approximately US $1.3
billion to $1.7 billion in 1985.
15 January 1985
Chinese Ambassador to Burma, after only one month in the country, hosts a
private dinner for the highranking -officers of the Soviet Embassy; the Ambassador
claims the dinner was possible because of improving relations between the two
countries.
3-14 March 1985
Chinese National People's Congress delegation visits Moscow, the first
parliamentary exchange in two decades.
10 March 1985
Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko dies, Mikhail Gorbachev is named his
successor.
11 March 1985
Gorbachev states in his acceptance speech that the Soviet desire a serious
improvement in relations with China, given reciprocity in the talks.
12 March 1985
While signing condolences book at Soviet Embassy, NPC Standing Committee
Chairman Peng Zhen congratulates Gorbachev, calling him "comrade."
14 March 1985
Vice Premier Li Peng, head of the delegation to Chernenko's funeral, meets
Gorbachev, the highest ranking meeting between the two countries in 20 years. Li
conveys General Secretary Hu Yaobang's congratulatory message and calls the
Soviet Union a "socialist" country. Li states China's hopes for an improvement in
"political relations."
21 March 1985
High-level economic delegation led by State Economic Commission Vice Minister
Zhao Weichang meets with Arkhipov to discuss bilateral transportation issues.
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26 March 1985
Chinese invite officials from Moscow's Institute of the Far East, once renowned as
a hotbed of anti-Chinese propaganda, to a reception in Moscow.
30 March 1985
Soviets brief the Chinese on Schultz-Gromyko Meetings in Geneva; Soviets state
hopes for reciprocity in these talks.
4 April 1985
Soviet friendship delegation arrives in China and on 5 April signs plan for 1985
program.
5 April 1985
Bilateral protocol signed in Beijing calling for the exchange of 200 students and
trainees during the 1985/86 academic year.
9-April 1985
Sixth Round of Sino-Soviet Talks convenes in Moscow.
22 April 1985
Sixth Round of Sino-Soviet Talks concludes in Moscow. TASS carries a joint
statement identifying among other areas "political relations" as an issue for
improvement.
23 April 1985
Wang Jiachong, Vice President of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions,
announces that China may restore relations with trade unions in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. These relations have been suspended since 1967.
23 April 1985
In a speech celebrating Lenin's 115th birthday, Geydar Aliyev, First Deputy
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, states that the Soviet Union is striving
seriously for an improvement of relations with China based on reciprocity.
4 June 1985
Protocol signed for a short-term exchange of TASS and Xinhua staff members.
13 June 1985
Talks on consular affairs end in Beijing with two sides reportedly agreeing to
simplify visa procedures and to reopen consulates, in Shanghai and Leningrad.
26 June 1985
.Gorbachev speech in Dnepropetrovsk notes that the USSR intends to make active
effort to overcome the "negative patch" in Sino-Soviet relations.
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1 _July 1985
Gromyko replaced as Foreign Minister by Shevardnadze--a development that
several Soviet officials have portrayed as a sign Gorbachev wants a new Asian
policy.
16 July 1985
Chinese Vice Premier Yao Yilin concludes week-long visit to USSR, during which
two sides concluded agreements on bilateral trade during 1986-90 and economic
cooperation. Yao Yilin was received by Premier Tikhonov on 11 July, but
Gorbachev was unavailable, having gone to Minsk for a conference with Soviet
military leaders.
8 August 1985
Soviet trade union delegation arrives in China for week-long visit, first in 20 years.
Returns home on 16 August.
9 August 1985
Soviet Foreign Ministry officials arrive in Beijing for a week of consultations on
disarmament Issues. Returns to USSR on 16 August.
29 August 1985
Mongolian leader Batmonh, at dinner hosted by Gorbachev, notes that Mongolians
have been paying close attention to process of normalizing Sino-Soviet
relations--hinting at Mongolian intent to respond more positively to recent
Chinese gestures aimed at improving Sino-Mongolian ties.
3 September 1985
Politburo member Aliyev attends reception at the Chinese Embassy in Moscow
marking 40th anniversary of victory over Japan, first Politburo member to attend
such an event in many years.
26 September 1985
Foreign Ministers Shevardnadze and Wu meet at UNGA, brief each other on party
developments and agree to exchange visits in 1986.
2-20 October 1985
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister ll'ichev in Beijing for seventh round of bilateral
consultations. Talks took place during October 4-18.
10-18 October 1985
Soviet Parliamentary delegation headed by Lev Tolkunov, chairman of Soviet of the
Union, visits China, first Soviet delegation in 20 years. Tolkunov group received by
CCP Politburo members Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen, whereas Plitburo candidate
member Kuznetsov had been the top Soviet official to receive Chinese group in
March.
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10-25 October 1985
Georgiy Arbatov, Director of USA Institute, visits Beijing for talks with Chinese
academics on world issues, Chinese economic reforms, and Soviet domestic
developments, as well as Soviet views of Soviet-US relations and prospects for
the Geneva meeting.
Late October-early November 1985
Mikhail Titatenko, Director of USSR's Institute of the Far East, visits China for talks
with Chinese academics on party matters and domestic reforms.
11-25 November 1985
Second round of talks on consular matters held in Moscow. Two sides initial new
accord and examine steps they might take to expand contacts in that area.
15 November 1985
Politburo members Peng Zhen and Li Peng visit Soviet exhibit at Asia-Pacific trade
fair in Beijing.
25 November 1985
Chinese First Deputy Premier Song Ping stops off in Moscow, enroute home from
visits to Bulgaria and Poland, for talks and dinner with Soviet First Deputy Premier
Nikolay Talyzin, Chairman of USSR's State Planning Committee.
27 November 1985
Gorbachev, in address to USSR Supreme Soviet, welcomes the PRC's position in
oppposing the militarization of space and its statement of intent to refrain from
first use of nuclear weapons--underscoring parallel interests on key arms control
issues.
5 December 1985
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa arrived in Beijing for discussions on Foreign
Minister visits, the international situation, and--if the Chinese desire--the "military
relationship" between the sides.
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National Security Council
1 - Ambassador Jack Matlock
Senior Staff Member, USSR-Eastern Europe
Room 368, Old EOB
1 - Gaston Sigur
Senior Staff Member, Asia
Room 302, Old EOB
Department of State
1 - James Lilley
X Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 4318
1 - Richard Williams
Office of Chinese Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 4318
1 - Robert Drexler
Director
Office of Regional Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 4310
1 - John J. Taylor
Director
Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Room 8840
1 - Robert H. Baraz
Director
Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, INR
Room 4758
1 _ William Sherman
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 4310
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- Harriet Isom
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 4310
1 - Mark Pratt
Director
EA/RA/Taiwan Coordination
Room 4312
Department of Commerce
1 - Byron Jackson
Office of Intelligence Liaison
Room 6854
1 - Robert Perito
Chief, China Office
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 2317
Department of Defense
1 - James Kelley
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs
Room 4E817
1 - John Sloan
DIO for East Asia
Room.2C238
1 - Wynfred Joshua
DIA
DIO, European and Soviet Political Affairs
Room 2C238
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