PRESS CLIPPINGS JULY 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00620R000501270001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 186
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 8, 1979
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (ILLINOIS)
24 June 1979
rum
Former CIA official saysV
we can verify treaty terms
Dear Editor,
The News-Democrat was quite correct
in its recent editorial entitled, "SALT
may be difficult to sell," when it said
that "verification of the SALT II treaty
is and should be a key issue in the
Senate ratification debate."
The dangers of nuclear weapons are
too great to depend on trusting the
Russians. But, fortunately, we do not
have to, even with the loss of our in-
telligence posts in Iran. .
The Iran bases were important sites
for collecting data on Soviet ICBMs be-
cause they were only 600 miles from
their Tyuratam test launch area. But,
this data was not essential for ensuring
that we could carry out timely detec.
tion of the provisions of the SALT 11
treaty which could affect significantly
our security. We have alternate redun-
dant methods of doing this..
I. The basic SALT ceilings on strate.
gic delivery, vehicles. do not rely on
Iran for-verification. They are mon-
itored by reconnaissance satellites le.
galized and guaranteed against
interference , and concealment by- the
terms of the treaty.
2. The limits- on MIRVed missiles and
number of warheads per missile can be'
verified primarily by our extensive in-
telligence capabilities. at the re-entry
end of the Soviet test range. There we
have radars, cameras, and many other
sensors on land, on ships and on air-
crals which can detect, count and even
weigh the incoming re-entry vehicles
and warheads. The deployment phases
of MIRVs our at such high altitudes
that we can monitor this from far
beyond Iran. Satellites can watch and,
identify the missiles as they are;
brought to the test launcher before fir-':
ing.
3. Limits on new ballistic missiles',
also can be monitored satisfactorily.
without the Iranian posts although
these would have provided us more de-1
tail and redundancy. However, the So-,
viets could not test a significantly news
missile, as defined by the treaty, with-
out running a very high risk of. being;
caught.
We should replace our lost
telligence capabilities as fast as
sible but satisfactory verification doesi
not depend on this.
Such replacement would be more im-j
portant in the absence of the treaty;
since that' agreement provides many i
means of determining the nature andl
the extent of the Soviet stra=1 Herbert r..
former Deputy Director
i
and former Assistant Directors
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
MrLean, Va.j
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in Europe and on- U.S. carriers, give the
1 nited States thousands-of nuclear bombs
that can be used against Soviet targets but
aren't counted in SALT.-
The Joint.Chiefs of Staff and some oth-
er elements inside. the, American. bureau=
racy have argued- repeatedly that, it Back.
fire has the capability to attack the Unite
.States, it should be counted in SALT. I
But more' than -once the JCS has ap-
proved SALT, proposals that left the plane
uncounted, in return for other provisions
they thought would balance Backfire. .
The JCS signed, off oa,the.Carter admin.
istration's March; 1977 "comprehensive"
SALT proposal?later rejected by the So-
viets, and they, lfave- signed of on. the. new
SALT II treaty; both of- which excluded
Backfire.
Some critics. of; SALT" `II argue- that the
Backfire issue leas.'symbolic , importance
beyond its, substance:. They contend that
excluding the. Backfire from. SALT limits
amounts to at On e-sided ' concession to the
Soviet Union in-'a treaty that is supposed:.
to provide equality
Defenders of the Backfire arrangemen+ ,
respond that the. treaty also permits the
United States to,-do things the Soviets
can't match. And beyond that,:, the practical aspects
of Backfire cannot, be ? ignored- Specifi
cally, they argue,: a?Baclifire attack against
the United- Statas wouid`,take.ja' hours.,
from.: takeoff to bombs rscay,-,a. fact tha
makes the bomber; irrelevant td'the initial
phase of a nuciear&war.,~.
a
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ARTICL AP?U THE BALTIMORE SUN
ON PAGE7 July 1979
- he , sale Over Verification
The struggle over ratification of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) with the Soviet
Union turns in part on how well Soviet compliance can be verified. Paul R. Bennett, who thinks
it can, is an arms control specialist with the Union of Concerned Scientists. Charles M. Kupper-
man, who does not, is a defense analyst with the Committee on the Present Danger.
TT WOULD be utterly foolish and
tremendously dangerous to rely
on "the honor system" for enforce-
ment of SALT IL Fortunately, we
don't have to trust the Russians, be-
cause today's sophisticated military
satellites, radars, signal reception
gear- and computers can probe deep
into the interior of the Soviet Union
and detect any significant violation.
Take SALT's overall ceilings, for
example. Since our huge satellite
cameras can capture details as small
as a golf ball. the Soviets have vir-
tually no chance of building illegal
missile silos, submarines or bombers
without detection. Nor could they
slip extra Backfires or forbidden silo
reload equipment past our view. Cer-
tainly the Soviet Union stretches
across vast territory, but American
satellites pass over every inch of it
every day
Camouflage won't help either.
Special multi-color image techniques
and computerized picture enhance-
By Paul R. Bennett
ment would reveal any hidden facili-
ties. Efforts to-conceal would them-
selves constitute violations of the
treaty.
In fact, launcher verification by
satellite is so good that SALT criticsgenerally skip over the subject entire-
ly and go directly to other concerns:
Can we determine the number of
missiles equipped with multiple war-
heads (" MIRVs" in SALT jargon)?
Cad we count the MIRVs atop a par-
ticular missile?
Yes we can, during- the two dozen
test flights every Soviet missile goes
through to attain combat reliability.
Anything shot up in these tests falls
to earth within easy range of what is
probably the world's- most sophisti-
cated radar, at Shemya Air Force
Base in the Aleutian Islands. A Sovi-
et basketball couldn't get pest this
device, which is supplemented by
planes and ships in the vicinity.
Under SALT rules, "blank shots"
(Lila those included in several Soviet
SS-18 missile tests) count as the real
thing. Aiming and shooting maneu-
vers of a warhead carrier, tracked by
our powerful radar in Turkey and sig-
naled by intercepted telemetry, count
even if no warhead is actually re-
leased.
Assume a test missile carried
MIRVs. Prior to liftoff, American
satellite cameras photographed its
launcher (silo or submarine tube). All
-other launchers of the same design
count as MIRV launchers. Non-
MIRV look-alikes of these launchers
are banned- These rules leave the So-
viets no way to secretly add illegal
MIRVed missiles.
All this should give some perspec
tive on the toes of our Iran monitor-
ing stations.. Radar and listening
equipment there followed Soviet mis-
sile tests at low altitudes, providing
important tip-offs to new missile de-
velopments restricted by SALT. Sim-
ilar facilities in Turkey fail to pick up
certain valuable data, because they
are older and farther away.. -
Where does that leave us? Satellite
photographs still reveal the dimen-
sions of test missiles. Our Aleutian
radar tracks descending warheads, al-
lowing us to calculate missile throw- -
weight- The bases in Turkey, radars-
elsewhere and heat-sensing satellites
watch the 'ascent of test flights.- But
the certainty of.several ' measure-
ments is lees without Iran:- i
Turkey, by sending in specially'
equipped U-2 planes to follow missile
tests, and/or by launching sounding
rockets to shadow those tests. Ulti-
mately, we can orbit enough electron
is intelligence satellites to eliminate
dependance on ground stations for
launch monitoring. These steps will
maintain the total monitoring capa-
bility necessary to SALT verification.
That brings us to the cruise mis-
sile, the favorite straw man of SALT
verification critics. Sure, the small
size of these precision-guided drones
makes them difficult to verily. But
the Soviets lag so far behind in cruise
missile development that they
couldn't reach illegal levels before the
treaty expires anyway. The United
States accepted cruise missile limits
because in return the Soviets agreed
to a ceiling on MIRVed land-based
missiles (their . most threatening
weapons) and to a freeze on warheads i
per missile (the payload of their most
threatening weapons). Thew crucial
restrictions can be confidently veri-
fied, as described above. .
So why does everyone think the
United States cannot monitor SALT
I suggest that SALT opponents have;
successfully exploited this technical.
issue by scaring the public with sen-1
sational charges. Somewhat excessive 1
secrecy restrictions have prevented a
credible Administration response. It's'
a clever tactic - for defeating the
treaty, but not one that serves the ..-;
curity interests America in the nu
clear age.
CC 11TITt
We can quickly compensate for"
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DRESMENT Carter has stated re-
peatedly that the SALT II treaty
"will be verifiable" because "we have
very sophisticated proven means-
including our satellites-to deter-
mine for ourselves whether the Soviet
Union is meeting its treaty oblige-
tions." Such words fail to place the
issue : of verification in the proper
perspective: That SALT II, far from
By Charles hL Kupperman
being verifiable, is a bad agreement
on both strategic and political
grounds, and a bad agreement does.
not cease to be a bad agreement by
being wholly verifiable.
Not only does SALT II limit the
wrong things, the United States has
little capability to verify Soviet com-
pliance with the critical terms of
SALT II limits. Soviet violations of
both the letter and the spirit of
SALT I and our reluctance to con-
front the Soviets quickly and reso-
lutely on such matters have set a bad
political and strategic precedent for
Soviet compliance with SALT IL
Another major source of difficulty
is the treaty's language. Definitions;
of key terms, such as "missile launch-
er" and "heavy bomber," are ex-
tremely tremely weak. In addition, loopholes
in the treaty will compound the prob-'
lem of verification. The limit of onel
"new type" of ICBM with no limits:
on new types of submarine-launchedi
ballistic missiles is one glaring loop
hole. The failure to close such loop
holes permits the Soviet Union to,
further expoit its "breakout potenti-
al" for quickly adding to its strategic II
capability. Components of the fifth
generation of Soviet missiles could be
easily retrofitted to Soviet ICBMs
currently deployed. Placing the pro-
pulsion system ofthe SS-17 or an im-
proved version in an SS-19 type mis-
sile would give the Soviets an ICBM -I
nearly as capable as the heavy SS-19
missile.
While the administration appears
to be satisfied with its assertion that
"we do not rely on trust or Soviet
good faith," provisions covering Sovi-
et cruise missile capabilities and de-
ployments, Soviet encryption of te-
lemetry in missile tests, and the film- I
sy assurances relating to the Backfire
bomber, for example, are based on
trusting the Soviets.
Even assuming that the Soviets
will neither deliberately conceal ac-
tivities nor attempt to deceive U.S.
intelligence - (an, analytical leap ? of
faith by the administration. of the
first order), recent intelligence goWs
by the Soviet Union-a ion of
the technical manual for .the KH-11
satellite (reportedly our most ad-
vanced photo reconnaissance satel-
lite) and. vital information on other
U.S: satellite systems-have severely
compromised U.S. verification re-
sources and capabilities. As a conse-
quence, the Soviet Union now knows
what U.S. intelligence satellites can
see on each pass over the Soviet Un-
ion.
Despite the administration's fixa-
tion with compromised verification
technology, the fact that the number!
of Soviet missiles and warheads pro- i
duced and stockpiled is not limited
by SALT should not be forgotten nor
that overhead photo reconnaissance 1
cannot peer inside a building, shed,;
or under canvas, and that it is limited I
by adverse meteorological conditions. E
Regardless of how precise satellite;
photo reconnaissance becomes, it
cannot reveal the range of Soviet
cruise missiles or the type of war-
heads they carry. Verification of So-
viet cruise missile deployment inside
Backfire bombers will be virtually
impossible to detect. Other potential
Soviet developments that would be!
militarily significant and unverifiable
include the clandestine deployment
of MIRVed or un-MIRVed missiles
or deployment of a longer range sea-
launched cruise missile on their al-
ready large number of cruise missile
submarines.
The loss of U.S. intelligence facili-
ties in Iran has virtually eliminated
our ability to verify critical qualita-
tive aspects of Soviet missile per- i
formance, including the power of So-
viet missile boosters, the specific im-
pulse of the propulsion system, and
the throwweight of the missile. The
proposed stopgap measures simply
cannot replace these sites, and when
Turkey, a NATO ally, requires Soviet
permission to allow American U-2
aircraft the use of Turkish airspace,
this indicates how far the strategic
balance has shifted against the West.
Finally, verification of the terms of
SALT II ultimately rests upon the-'
nature and accuracy of intelligence estimates. The SALT record indi-
cates a rather substantial American
error rate in. the intelligence esti-
mates of Soviet quantity, quality, and I
the rate of Soviet. strategic improve
meats. As Walter Lippman said,
"I do not find much ground for
reasonable confidence in a policy
which can be successful only if the,
most optimistic . prediction should
prove to be true. Surely a sound poli-
cy must be addressed to the worst
and hardest that may be judged to be
probable, and not to- the but and"'
easiest that maybe possible." ._
After nearly ten years of SALT,
such skepticism is long overdue.
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R1ICI A~F"A THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
ON PAGE 7 -- 9 July 1979
Russians See
SALT's Value
As Political
By Henry S. Brandon
Specwl to The Washington Star
MOSCOW - Russian officials say j
the outcome of the SALT II ratifica-
tion debate will indicate whether
Soviet-American relations can move
into a phase that will lead to further
arms reductions or an era of fiercer
arms competition.
The possibility that a Senate rejec-
tion of the treaty later this year
might coincide with Chairman Leo-
Kremlin Views
A Star Special Report -
As the SALT 17 debate begins today
in the U.S. Senate, the Kremlin, too,
is watching. The view from there, as
recorded in recent days by Henry
Brandon of the London Sunday
Times, is one of hope for ratification.
But one aside by Kremlin insider
Georgi Arbatov suggests a lot about
the tone of Russian thinking. He
says bluntly: "American senators
cannot expect to make the world
dance to their tune." This is the re-
port by Brandon, on special assign-
men t for The Washington Star.
nid I. Brezhnev's physical and politi-
cal demise is on the minds of Rus-
sian officials and many statesmen in
the world as are the uncertainties
that this could inject into the world
situation.. -
Russian officials, Russian military
experts and Western diplomats indi-
cated in interviews that the Soviet
leadership attaches more of a politi-
cal than a military importance to the
SALT II treaty. But the Soviets do
stress that the treaty includes for
the first time qualitative restrictions
on weapons and that its ratification
could lead to further arms limitation
agreements.
The reason for the political impor-
tance attached to the treaty is that
the Carter-Brezhnev meeting in
Vienna and the signing of SALT II is
seen as proof that the basic Nixon-
Kissinger detente policy, derailed by
the first Carter proposals for SALT II
of March 1977, is again the guiding
impulse to American policy. Its basic
function is to contain the risks of
conflict within certain boundaries
by negotiated agreements or im-
plicit understandings.
In contrast to the Kremlin, the
U.S. Senate puts more emphasis on
the military aspects of SALT II. The
Russians for this reason have been
unusually cooperative in giving a
Senate delegation and Sens. Sam
Nunn and Robert Byrd access to top
military and civilian leaders in
order to help President Carter to
convince the Senate of the impor-
tance and the equal advantages of
the SALT II treaty.
There is a barely suppressed re-
sentment by the Russians that after
all the long drawn-out negotiation
with the Carter administration, the
Soviet government in effect is now
engaged in another set of negotia-
tions with American senators.
Soviet experts in American af-
fairs, however, seem to have had
enough influence to overcome the
resentment and to win a better
understanding in the Politburo for
the American constitutional pro-
cesses.
'A Clearcut Solution'
The Soviets also stress that it is
important for the West to under-
stand their foreign policies.
Georgi Arbatov, the director of
the Institute for American and Cana-
dian Studies, for instance, put the
Soviet position as follows:
"The U.S.S.R. is a great power with
its own responsibilities. A situation
could develop, say in Southern
Africa where we would have no
alternative but to aid national liber-
ation movements. We have a clear-
cut solution, though, to prevent such
a situation from developing, which
is for the United States to help re-
move the remnants of colonial rule,
in Africa: -_ a
"It is a great opportunity for the
West to strengthen its position in
Southern Africa. But American sena-
tors cannot expect to make the
world dance to their tune. We had
some very difficult decisions to take
in 1972 when President Nixon de-
cided to bomb Haiphong on the eve
of his meeting with Mr. Brezhnev in
Moscow.
"Our leadership then had to weigh
what was more important in the
long run and it decided to hold the
summit meeting in spite of this
provocation. Whatever might hap-
pen on the sidelines of Soviet-Ameri-
can relations, it will be up to the Sen- I
ate to weigh the importance of SALT
II against this and against the fact
that it has raised many people's
hopes for further positive develop-
ment."
'To Be Or Not To Be
Valentin Falin, the spokesman for
the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party and former Soviet
ambassador to West Germany, put it
somewhat differently.
"The SALT?II problem-is not an
emotional one, it is one of common
sense. It's a matter of to be or not to
be. It cannot be considered in con-
nection with events in other parts of
the world."
He and Vitaly Kobysh, the head of
the Department for American Af-
fairs in the Central Committee who
sat in on the interview, nevertheless
wondered whether some senators,
opposed to SALT, might not take
advantage of the revolutionary
situation that has developed in
Nicaragua and blame the SnviPt
Union for it though, he-stressed,,
Russia had nothing to do with it
One of the highly respected sovieti
specialists in military affairs praised;
the SALT agreement for being the!
first effort to place quantitative and;
qualitative limits on the missile
race. But he warned that unless it is
ratified and serves as a bridge to
SALT III, the world "will be moving
into an increasingly more danger-
ous phase."
"The arms race is not any more a
race to improve weapons, but one
that gains its momentum from new
technological inventions. This dan-
ger is growing because the military,
and the scientists now look for weap-
ons which are more useable than big
missiles to make limited-wars more i
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One Missile Breeds Another-
iETsaid that according to the SALT
U treaty the United States had the
right to opt for the NIX missile with a
mobile basing system. but it would
be a dangerous development be-
the idea behind it is that
cause
United States now needs a counter-
force capability.
"As we all know," this man, a for-
mer high military official, argued,
"the military are like children.
When one child has a new toy the
other wants it too. Therefore if the
United States proceeds with the MX,
our military are bound to tell us that
they too find a mobile basing system
very attractive. Then. it will be our i
turn to improve the accuracy of our ,
missiles and their invulnerability.
This is the natural way. If one side
escalates the other follows sooner
rather than later. The last 15 years
prove it"
Three Russian officials, ques-
tioned about the prospects of a shift
of priorities from military to civilian
production, confirmed independ-
ently that no shift would even be
contemplated until SALT II is rati-
fied.
Obstacles to Ratification
He was emphatic that the Soviet
Union is not aiming at military su-
periority.
He added: "It is impossible for two
great powers such as the Soviet
Union and the United States to
create a situation where one or the
other side can achieve superiority. It
is not possible even if one tried to
gain superiority in one or the other
military sector.'
It was pointed out that one obsta-
cle to ratification could be the prob-
lem of the verification of Soviet mis
sile testing and Soviet unwillingness
to give the Turkish government at
least tacit approval for overflights
by American U-2 planes.
The Soviet officials said it wouldI
be psychologically difficult for the
Soviet Union to approve the opera-
tion of a plane that has such notori-1,
ety with-the Russian public: They
also said that the United States did
not really need the U-2 flights for
missile test verification but wanted
them for other intelligence reasons.
The leading Western ambassadors
here, while not necessarily consider-
ing Brezhnev a man of peace, be-
lieve that he is sincere in his abhor-
rence of war and that the Soviet
government has shown a good deal
of restraint in recent months in
Africa, the Middle East. Iran and
Vietnam.
These Western ambassadors also
believe that SALT II is important t
the Soviet government because it i
symbolic of military equivalence b
tween the Soviet Union and the
United States. It flatters the Soviet
power ego and it also is a useful re-
minder to China that the Soviet
Union has its own special relation.
c4.in 1.14#11 ?1?p TT-;-a.A Q?...p.. - ..
. 'v
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1Nll1t~:VAYULIS JJ tC
29 June 1979
Ex-Director Of CIA Says Senate
Must Ratify The SALT-11 "reaty
William E. Colby, a former director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, Thurs-
day urged ratification of the Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), say-
ing. "We are a lot better off with the
treaty than we are without it."
Colby said that adoption of the treaty
by the U.S. Senate will halt the nuclear
arms race and allow the nation to con-
centrate on conventional Soviet threats.
He said treaty ratification will save
the American taxpayers $504100 billion
because it would stop the need to develop
new nuclear weapons systems to counter
Soviet threats. ,, -, .-- ...,,, .>._::,.
IN SHARP contrast to~ congressional
critics of the treaty, Colby said verifica-
tion is not a problem with the treaty.
"Our intelligence can absolutely tell
us about Soviet weapons development
ally (lik . -
and production," he said...
Colby, now an attorney, made his to help him is a contradiction in terms,"
remarks to the Economic Club of Indian- he said.
apolis in the Indiana Convention- By assisting moderates in foreign gov-
Exposition Center. ernments, the U.S. can make sure the
He said that America's spy service people of those nations won't be faced.
had made some "stupid and some with the choice between a right-wing
wrong" moves during its existence since Dictatorship and a left-wing. terrorist
World War,II. group, he said.
"The agency was created by.a presi- He. said that the, greatest threat
dential commission that directed it to be -world stability ?is . the: chance that
more ruthless than the opposition and, by nuclear weapons will be developed by
a Congress that said it didn't want to Third World nations, adding that South
know what was happening.' Africa. Brazil, Taiwan and Argentina
"WITH A directive like that, the Fish could develop those weapons. ,?, .
and Wildlife Service would have gotten He told the audience"of about
into trouble,,, he said. _ " persons how the CIA observed the co
He urged the U.S. -to- resume en- struc ion and outfitting of a Soviet air
gagememt in. "covert'" . operations in craft carrier and when it sailed into the
foreign counties. "To say. we support an Black Sea, it was no suprise to us. : , `?;
"The question is this Are. we petty
loggers looking for absolute evidence ?for
some little variatiotr;. - & .quarter--
inch an
inch on the side of an absolute state: or
are we interested- in the protection of our
country and the:-abiiity, tai make an
agreement to move ahead to these kinds
of new restraints that will, help us as well,
as the Soviets."
Colby- said the agreement. must* be.
ratified before the "next generation of
Soviet leaders take over the govern--,
ment."
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Ar.icle Arpe-::red
Cn ?a:-e 1
3ALT Trea
THE WASHINGTON ST, 't..71 Line)
12 Jul l', 1979
GetSr Backing 0%f Join-1. %-`Zh~ le-A ss
By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
Washington Star Staff Writer
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are "not
really enthusiasts" for the SALT II
treaty, acknowledged one of their
number, Adm. T.B. Hayward, the
Chief of Naval Operations.
But the chiefs appeared before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
yesterday to give a guarded, condi-
tional endorsement to the new
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
with the Soviet Union. Their aim
was clear. Hayward put it this way:
"Pressure decision-makers."
According to the chiefs, "SALTII
is a modest but useful step in a long-
range process which must include
the resolve to provide adequate capa-
bilities to maintain strategic equiva
lence."
But Gen. David C. Jones, chairman
of the chiefs, who did most of the
testifying, declined to link any par-
ticular defense programs to support
for the treaty and bristled at any
"implication of being bought off."
Jones insisted that "regardless of
the outcome of the SALT U ratifica-
tion process, there is an urgent need
to proceed resolutely and deliber-
ately with a well-thought-out pro-
gram of force modernization, both to
avoid the undesirable international provisions of the agreement var
consequences of strategic inferiority substantially," ones sat . Thus,
and to create the necessary incea- there are risks in t his area of the
tives for Soviet agreement to treaty, a sat a ing_t at tae significant reductions as the arms ' chiefs on balances-ound the risks
control process continues." ``acce ttable provided- we pursue
ss to uestion-
CriticizelCivilians
Jones was critical of past civilian
masters of the military. He claimed
that previous administrations were
given military advice that, if fol-
lowed;-would have left the nation
better off in the 1980s and made the
Russians more agreeable to signifi-
cant arms reductions in the round of
SALT negotiations just completed.
The four chiefs and their chair-
man sat side-by-side at.the witness
table in the big Senate Caucus Room,
from time to time outnumbering the
senators who questioned them as the
long afternoon of SALT testimony
wore on.
Despite differing degrees of con-
cern- among the joint chiefs of staff
on specific aspects of SALT R." Jones
tesified, "all of us judge that the
agreement which the. president
signed in Vienna is in the U.S. na-
tional interest...."
vt_gorous y c a enge q
able Soviet practices, improvements
in the capability of our monitoring
assets, and mo erinization of our
strategic forces." Another of the chiefs' concerns
was the treaty provision that per-
mits the Soviet Union to retain 308 of
its mammoth SS-18 intercontinental
missiles.
The chiefs would have preferred
"a major reduction" to cut. down on
the payload the Russians can hurl at
the United States. At the same time,
Jones said limiting the Soviet Union
to 10 warheads did go some of the
way toward denying them the fall,
of this throwweight advantage.
Chief among those concerns was
one that the mere existence of a
treaty would lull the public into be-
lieving that a larger expenditure for_
a strengthened strategic arsenal was
not necessary.
The chiefs did. have specific con-
cerns and they voiced some of them
yesterday. For ?-,P1, thing they were
concerned abohe abity of the
United States to as uat monitor
coviiet behavior In or Per to verity
compliance with the new treaty.
"Our review of these matters indi-
cated that the U.S. ability to monitor
Soviet compliance with t e many
.
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Article appeared
on page A-1, 6
SALT Wins
Cool Support
From Military
By Robert G. Kaiser
Waa:iax!o s Post Staff writer
The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed
the new strategic arms limitation
t: eaty yesterday as "a modest but use-
ful step" provided it is accompanied
by substantial new military spending.
The five chiefs "are not raging en-
thusiasts for many features of the
treaty," as Adm. Thomas B. Hayward
put it, but under intense senatorial
questioning the chiefs reiterated their
overall support for SALT II and their
belief that the treaty is "adequately
verifiable."
As the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee continued hearings on the
treaty, John Glenn (L-Ohio) said he
thought the chiefs were "damning it
by faint praise," but Gen. David. C.
Jones of the Air Force, chairman of
the JCS, said he would not use that
phrase.
Moreover, Jones explicitly rejected
the idea of reopening substantive ne-
gotiations on SALT II with the Sovi- !
ets, and he disputed the suggestion;
that the country- would he better off
by abandoning the SALT process or
rejecting this treaty.
Repeating the phrase the chiefs
worked out to describe their position?
Jones said the treaty was "a modest
but useful contribution, but it doesn't
solve the whole problem. That's our
advice and we hope you will take it."
In a detailed prepared statement
and in answers to senators' questions,
the five chiefs echoed the messageI
given earlier by both Defense Secre-I
tary Harold Brown and Secretary of
State Cyrus R. Vance: Even with
SALT II, the United States will have,
to increase its spending on strategic
forces- by S10 billion or more in the-
next six years.
But in the special echo chamber
that the nation's military leaders cre-
ate. that message came through yes-
terday louder and more forcefully
than it had in earlier hearings on
SALT II in this committee.
Senior officials of the Carter admin-
istration expressed satisfaction that
the chiefs had given broad support for
the treaty while declining to adopt
any of the opponents' substantive or
tactical positions. r ,
However, skeptics and' opponents
thought they- found some support ia)
the many qualifying clauses that dot-
ted the chiefs' comments.
'Led
Sen. Jesse Helms (R. .C.), for,exam-I
:ale, pressed Gen. Lew Allen Jr. of the;
THE WASHINGTON POST
12 July 1979
Air Force on qualifications in the:
cniets prepared stn ement About the!
verifiability o SALT - that is,'I
America's ability to monitor Soviet
compliance W1 7H treaty.
T 17e statement said that verification
"will pose a stern challenge to our l'
va_ _
systems," and that L.'ability to ver-
ity different specific elements of the
treaty will vary "substantially."
n er questioning rom Helms,
Gen. en said there were some
points that might not be ossible to
verif3t- wt h confidence, but the
chiefs assessed the potential signifi.
cnce o c eating in ese areas and
our conclusion. was that it -is all
righV1 - pLROVi e e went on, that
the nited States aggressively im-
proves is a ce
Helms replied that he sympathized
with citizens watching the hearings onI
television who had to decide what the)
general had just said -"IL think you
said.'yes and no,," Helms commented I
with a grin, and Allen did not dispute]
him. .
The chiefs' testimony illuminated!
the complex web of interests involved)
in the SALT process. When the five
pillars of braid and brass who lead
the country's armed services sat down
in a row- at the witness table, there
wasn't a civilian officialin sight-only
military aides. This was the military's
day, as Jones aff'rmed under ques.
tioning from Frank Church, (D-Idaho),
the committee chairman -
Will you "give us your honest ad-
vice" even if it differs from the posi-
tion of the president and secretary of
defense, Church asked..,
"Yes, sir, we pledge to- do so," the
general replied. -- -
In their carefully drafted statement,
read by Jones, the chiefs declared:
"With or -without SALT, the United
States needs tm do. far. more than we
have--t-done in- recent years- to
strengthen and modernize our strate-
gic forces lest the trend. toward Soviet
superiority become irreversible-"
'Thechiefs said continued cutbacks
starting: in the- Nixon. administration
"lowered the incentives for the So-
viets to negotiate significant reduc-
tions in strategic arms." -
"The most serious. concern of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff," their statement
said.."is the risk that SALT II could
be allowed to become a tranquilizer to
the American people," one that would
disguise- the "urgent need to proceed.
!
resolutely and deliberately with a
well-thought-out program of force-
modernization ..."
The chiefs' statement acknowledged
that they, had always wanted the Sovi-
et's Backfire bomber to be counted
under SALT limits, and that the pro-
vision permitting the Soviets to retain
308 "heavy" supermissiles also trou- ;
bled them. They also said they would -I
have preferred a treaty that called fork
much, deeper cuts in- both superpow-
ers' arsenals.-. - _ ,._ - ... -
But they added that restraints on
the Backfire's rate of production and
on the number of warheads the
"heavy" missiles can carry'(ten) were
both signficant. And the chiefs enu-j
merated half a dozen provisions of
SALT If which they said "operate pri-
marily to our advantaee."
These included provisions forcing
the Soviets to dismantle 230 strategic
systems, limiting the numbers of war
heads rockets can carry, limiting the
introduction of new rockets, banning
the Soviets' SS16 mobile missile, and
requiring that the Soviets not inter,
sere with U.S. "national means" of ob-
"On`the other hand,' the chiefs
said, the specific limits on the United I
States are quite nominal" and permit,
all the strategic programs now on
Pentagon drawing boards to go ahead.
"The danger to the United States I
tionsor inactions in the past--wand,-if
we are not careful-in the future."
If the United States undertakes new
military programs-and senior Carte
administration officials have - been)
promising them repeatedly -all wee
in these hearings-and if future nego-
tiations lead to substantial reductions
"history will record SALT It as a step
forward," the chiefs said.
Without a commitment to bothl
those points, they added, "we will find,
SALT II made little difference and!
may have been a net-
loss.-The chiefs noted that in 1972 their
predecessors recommended approval
of the SALT agreements provided cer-
tain new3American programs were an.
dertaken, but that'some of those pro-
grams (the BI bomber, for example)
were later canceled.. Had that advice.
been heeded the new chiefs. said,,"wer
would face less perilous strategic-
prospects...,'
Yesterday morning, DefenseSekre-
tary Brown and his undersecretary-
for research and engineering, William..
J. Perry, testified. Jospeh R. Biden Jr.
(D-Dew.)-pursued the issue of the 3081
Soviet heavy missiles that- has con-
cerned numerous treaty critics;--Hojv=i
and H. Baker Jr: (R-Tenn.), the Senate)
minority leader, has said these "I'
missiles represent "a fatal flew*' is
the treaty.
Biden elicited affirmative answers
from Brown to a series of questions,[
meant to establish that these3308 mis.j
sites do not give the Soviets any great
advantage that they couldn't achieve I
with other rocket systems. At the end
of his questioning, Biden said: "I hope
this puts an end to what I think it 1
posturing on this issue." .
Bakej could not reply; he was ab.-:
snet from yesterday's hearing..
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Article appeared
on page A-23
THE WASHLNGTON POST
9 July 19 79
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
Bum le on the U2
ANKARA-President Carter's insist- i
ence on flying the U2 spy plane
through Turkish airspace in hopes of
gaining Senate votes for SALT II has
backfired- on Carter and damaged
Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit
in a classic case of risking a major U.S.
strategic interest for a minor tactical
gain.
The strategic interest is keeping Tur-
key cemented in the Western alliance;
while other Soviet-bordered states-
Afghanistan. Pakistan and Iran-have I
turned anti-American or neutral. That
strategic interest was just beginning to,
pay dividends once again following the
lifting of the Turkish arms embargo im-
posed by Congress in a splurge of self-
defeating, pro-Greek emotions in 1974. ,
The minor tactical gain is Carter's
search for votes in the Senate ratifica-
tion battle over the new strategic arms
limitation agreement (SALT ID. With
verification of Soviet compliance a key
element in the debate, Carter has pres.
sured Ecevit-when he should have
pressured Moscow--to - permit the U2
verification flights. His, probably vain
hope is that even though the U2 would .
not possibly be ready for its new task
until long after the Senate vote, it
would attract the support of skeptical
senators.
The result has been a double loss for
Carter: a much-ballyhooed admission
that the United States cannot verify
SALT II without new electronic monitors
somewhere, and a serious but wholly
predictable setback in US. Turkish rela-
tions. This is partly the result of growing
concern inside the Turkish government,
and including powerful military officers,
that Carter is now linking approval for
the United States to launch its U2 over-
flights to the new US. ,Turkish defense
cooperation agreement and the long-
term military aid now being negotiated.
In other words-approve the overflights,
or elsel -
In fact, such direct linkage almost
certainly does not exist at this point as
a matter of administration strategy.
But Turkey has so often been abused,
particularly by the one-dimensional
pro-Greek lobby in Congress led by!
Rep. John Brademas (D-Ind.), the Demo-
cratic whip, that a touch of paranoia
clouds its vision. Moreover, circumstan-
tial evidence abounds in the U2 affair,
that Turkey is being deliberately
squeezed from Washington. .
For example, Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown muscled Gen. Kenan
Evren, chief of staff of the Turkish
armed forces, in his Pentagon office
June 8 in a surprisingly uncharacter-
istic lecture for A he disciplined, self:
controlled Brown. Teaching the.Turk?
ish general a civics lesson,. Brown in
structed him as follows: You Turks
should make up your own mints what to
do about your territory; Turkey is a
sovereign country, isn't it, and are you
not its senior general? You don't have
to clear U2 flights with Moscow. But
Brown knew that Ecevit had already
given Carter his immutable condition
for the overflights. Ecevit wrote Carter
in reply to a long April 13 letter from
Carter asking U2 permission. Since the
U.S. request was not based on any
stated or perceived need of the West'
ern alliance, but on the SALT treaty
alone, Ecevit wrote, Moscow would also
have to agree.
Brown's civics lesson to Gen. Evrea
looked suspiciously like an effort to
undermine Ecevit, using the general as
a lever. Evren has told intimates here;
If that was on the clumsy side, the
rush trip here by Deputy Secretary of I
State Warren Christopher In-early May,
following the exchange of letters, was
cut from the same cloth. Christopher
warned Ecevit that Congress, the key'
to resumption of absolutely essential
military aid, would be inclined to vote
"no" if the U2 scheme was rejected by
Turkey. Christopher thought he. was
stating an objective fact; to Ecevit;
those words sounded like blackmail: - -,
When the House then rejected a sym-
bolically important $50 million in grant
military aid for Turkey by a 200-vote
margin ins fight led by Braden=s; just
10 days after Brown's civics lessors;
Ecevit, Gen. Evren and most other Turk.
ish leaders drew the conclusion that the
U2 affair had jammed the gears.
Ecevit, clinging to power by a torn
fingernail in an evenly divided pariia--
went, has been badly hurt by the U2 of.,
fair. Opposition leaders have distorted
his "clear-it-with-Moscow" order, call-
ing it ignominious for Turkey. `The U2
affair has hurt Ecevit, yes sir," the prin-
cipal opposition leader, S yman {{
Demirel, told us. "It has ope:,aw up. 3l
_ ..
big hole through him."
More important, the United States-
and particularly Carter himself-have
been damaged. The huge vote that de-
feated that $50 million in grant military i
aid followed White House assurances to
Gen. Evren that Carter would exert all
his influence to get it passed (the Sen.
ate had easily passed it weeks before).
Brademas made the president look ri-
diculous here, alarming Turks of all po.
Iitical persuasions. To them it meant
either presidental weakness or calcu,
lated U2 linkage, both of which raise,
ominous questions about the U.S-Turku
ish future.
Until the U2 affair, Carter had,
moved courageously and with success
to liquidate the errortqf the past, a sue='
cess now dimmed by has haste to press
sure Turkey-instead of Moscow-fat
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THE WASHINGTON POST
Article appeared 12 July 1979
on page A-7
Soviet Union TT
?
~
i
By Don Oberdorfer
Waabtx gtott Peat Matt venter
Another article in the Oslo newspa.
per, however, quoted unnamed "Nor-
wegian authorities" as saying the So-
viet Union.. is not expected to oppose
Norway's becoming more involved in
the monitoring of SALT II through fa-
cilities on Norwegian soil A Norwe-I
gian defense official was quoted as!
confirming that an. existing listening
station in Norway, manned by Norwe-j
gian personnel, is capable of monitor-
ing Soviet strategic weapons systems.
The reported U.S. plan is to use the I
combination of an improved American
space satellite and improvements inl
the Norwegian ground ii-tercept stn-I
tions to prov'de additional data on So-'
viet missile testing performance:- The!
information would substitute for some,
of the data previously obtained by]
U.S. monitoring stations - in Iran?
which were near the Soviet missile
testing sites.
Verification of the highly technical
provisions of the SALT Ir agreement :
is a sensitive issue in the Senate de-
bate on ratification. The United States
has several methods for monitoring
Soviet weapons developments, but
there is disagreement on. whether
they are precise and accurate enough
to do the job with assurance.
Despite. the Soviet message declin-
ing to - approve U2 reconnaissance
flights over Turkish territory just
across the Soviet border, U.S. officials
have not given up on that plan-to im4
prove verification. Further talks on,
the matter both with Moscow and An-
kara are expected.
In addition to the U2 flights, at least)
five other means of improving verifi-
cation are under development by the
United States, according to a recent'
statement by Rep. Las Aspin (D-Wis.).;
chairman of the House intelligence
oversight subcommittee.
The Soviet Union has refused to ac-
quiesce to United States reconnais.
sance flights over Turkey to aid verifi-,
cation of the strategic arms limitation
treaty (SALT II), informed official!
The Russian attitude, conveyed to
Washington through diplomatic chan-
nels since an. inconclusive discussion
at the Vienna summit meeting three
weeks ago,. has generated additional
U.S. interest in an alternative verifica-
tion plan involving improved radio in
terception facilities in Norway.
Norwegian Prime Minister Odvar
Nordli was quoted by the Oslo news.
Paper Aftenposten as saying that "if.
the United States and the Soviet LTn-,
ion want Norway to play a part in the
implementation of the SALT II agree- I
meet, Norway would be willing to do
Sordli's attitude was news to Amer-
lean diplomats concerned with Norwe-
gian affairs, evidently because discus.
sion of the highly sensitive questions
involving surveillance of the Soviet
Union has been carried on outside of
regular diplomatic channels.
Nordli's statement could be inter-
preted to mean that, as in the case of
Turkey, Norway will insist that the
Soviets give their assent to new U.S.
intelligence operations designed to
support verification of the strategic
arms, limitation treaty.
Soviet approval of improved Norwe-
gian facilities seems doubtful in view
of Moscow's refusal to cooperate on l
the Turkish flights. Additional cause{
for doubt is Soviet media criticism of
the Norway bases plan following itsi
publication June 29 by The New York
Times.
A Radio Moscow broadcast earlier
this week, referring to public discus-
sion of Norwegian intelligence bases,
called the facilities "yet another part
of the military presence in Scandina-
via ... another lever for influencing
the border country's policy." The
oroadeast maintained that Norwegian-+
b.,ses are not needed for verification
of SALT II and charged that they
u ould have "no connection" with the
interests of detente in Europe.
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Ai I ~: y ~pP.r.AY; D I Nru YOR- K TIMES
~ y Fa E 13 JULY 1979
Turner Reportedly Asks Inquiry
Into Disclosure of Data to Times;
Intelligence officials described the in-
formation about use of an electronic lis-
tening post in Norway as "terribly sensi-
tive." One official said, "it was one of the
few secrets left in this country."
d
i
te
The Times reported that the Un
States hoped to employ the Norwegian fa-
cility to monitor Soviet missile testing if
Turkey refused to allow this country's
reconnaissance planes to fly over its
territory.
The Soviet Union has objected to such
flights, according to sources here, and
those objections reduce the likelihood
that the Turkish Government will ap-
prove them. As a result, Administration
interest in the use of the Norwegian fa-
cility has increased.
Norwegian officials, however, have in-
dicated that they may also seek Soviet
approval before allowing the United
States to use its detection facilities. Such
approval seems doubtful. In recent
weeks, the Soviet radio and Soviet news-
Papers have criticized the possible use of
Norwegian bases by Americans.
m
A spo es
.that the intelligence agency had informed
the Justice Department about the disclo-
sure but called the notification routine'.
Some White House. aides said that they
DIU ccau
Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of
Central Intelligence, has taken the first
steps to determine whether an investiga.
tion should be made into the disclosure of
alleged national security information to
The New York Times, accordng to senior
Administration officials.
The information concerns United
States plans to use Norwegian electronic
surveillance equipment to help verify
Soviet compliance with the new treaty to
limit strategic arms.
According to a senior intelligence offi-
cer, Admiral Turner was incensed by the
report of the plans, published on June 29,
and sent what was described as an
"angry" letter to Attorney investigation Grif-
fin B. Bell, demanding
into the source of the disclosure.
Notification Called Routine
an for the C.I.A. confirmed
k
By PHILIP TAUBMAN
special to The New York rimes
WASHINGTON, July 12-The Federal I had been told that they might be asked to
s take a lie detector test.
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OVA -
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iRTICLE AP1?E PS YL
ON' n1GLT i~' 4
~V/ `v'.~a l'~.?' - ~._1~s1 .L `L/~~ Ems.L .&rl Y `~ i
e-' It
TD -: - O
1 , s,-tea ~~~ ? CL
By T0"% F IEDLE Gone is what one source called
C T,,ra(d1YasYngton Ev-1au
VIASi INGTON - Encouraged
by the upheavai in N`caragua. Cuba
recen:'v has "inte-_... :ts ^ffcr:s
TH MIAMI HERALD
4 July 1979
the "frontal assault" strategy of
Cuban revolutionary Ernesto (Che)
Guevara in the 1960s. Guevara led a
small, Cuban-directed - guerrilla
to aid left-wing rebels 'n t eir at- movement in. Bolivia in the mis-
tempts to overthrow three Central taken belief that the populace
Ame-icar, governments. according would join the uprising,
to unconfirmed ' J.S. intelligence re- The new strategy takes a more
ports. pragmatic view of conditions than
Tl?ose effor s, the C^cr:-al Inteili- did 'Guevara, who was killed by
hence Agency -erorted in a secret --Bolivian counterinsurgency forces
.May 2 memorandum, "reflect a far in 1967.
more sophisticated and selective The CIA report notes that now
revolutionary doctrine than that . Cuba is most willing to provide in-
which guided Cuba's action in the ' direct assistance to rebels.
198 cs. Most of this assistance comes in
"Cuba clearly .. :hits to avoid the form of training, although the
provoking a U .S. counter-re- CIA said that Cuba, with Panamani-
spons^," the mcino addc,. an help, also has provided guns and
other weapons to the Sandinistas.
'rUA?r Acg-cc,. N r of CU` a?s
IS
9
To help solidify that coalition,
Castro promised stepped-up aid to
the rebel's as long as they cooperat-
ed with each other, according to the
memorandum.
The CIA also says Castro urged
the Sandinistas to "play down the
Marxist nature of their programs at
this point and to offer to join non
Marxists in forging a broad coali-
tion."
The Sandinista Marxists "have
taken steps to comply with the re-
quest," the memorandum says.
Two weeks ago - in move that
demonstrated this further - the
Sandinistas announced formation of
a relatively broad-based "Govern-
rnent of National Reconstruction"
that includes both leftist and mod-
erate anti-Somoza groups.
renewed interest in zr,^mcting icft IN. ALL THREE countries, the nIPLICIT- IN' THIS "low-key"
ist revolutions in Cc-tr America CIA memorandum says, Cuba has app roach is Cuba's apparent belief
- especialhy Nicarag'.:a. but also attempted to downplay its involve- that events are working aganst the
in Guatemala and El Salvador - is ment - and thereby run less risk of go ernments in Nicaragua, El Sal-
contained in the class;fied memo- provoking the United States -, by valor and Guatemala, according to
randurn entitled " Cu:,an Support 'funneling its did through intermedi- the memorandum.
for Central American Guerrilla ? aries and refusing to provide any.di- In the three countries, it says,
Groups." rect military assistance.. Cuba has urged the rebel groups to
The CIA s co es the '0- Cuba also is, conditioning its help. prepare for a prolonged civil war-.
page document o Sta*e partmert . to El Salvadorean and Guatemalan w` ile avoiding direct clashes with
-r i~
and ot:.er government _~:?_.^._? At rebels ontheir.promises to corm co- "ovenment troops.
the time, Cu a's ro e in '`. ding the alitions with other opposition As in Nicaragua, Cuba theorizes
Nicaraguan Sandinista`.;sin; groups. Cuba now believes that that public sentiment ultimately
Panama as an inter *.^d`ary, jai these coalitions have a better ~^ ill shift in favor of.the insurgents,
been noted in centre. s:c^ai deba'e ?chance of succeeding than do even . the CIA report says.
over the Panama Canal _.-ea'ies. , highly. disciplined guerrilla -groups. The memorandum, citing "sever-
State Depa rt-r-nt spokesman _ I al sources," says Cuba, "on at least
the report says. two and possibily three occasions,"
Tom Reston. c^r?rr-red the reports The memorandum says Cuba ap-
CIA origin. uau e er. '-c and others ? supplied arms to the Nicaraguan
plied Iris strategy with great suc- rebels.
far^i:tar with i* stress *: a: its tied cess in Nicara gua:. Until recently
ings are base' upon "-a'.v iltel'i- Those arms were ferried aboard
despite widespread opposition to Panamanian air force planes'-to air-
gence" that ? not be dg the government of President Anas- fields in Costa Rica for shipment to
Nevertheless. '?~'?, -~eable Casio Somoza, the anti-government
the guerrillas, the report said.
Hera!d that- the memorandum s
findings are consistent with other HO"VEVER, the CIA says. Cuban
information received in recent President Fidel Castro summoned
months. the Sandinista guerrilla leaders 'to
THE CIA REPORT outlines what Havana in `;arch and, during a 48-
hour meeting, got them to put aside
it sees as a new Cuban strategy in differences and forma coalition to
exporting' its, revolution to other include any group inert upon oust-
Latin American countries.
r--
,continuer
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IN GUATEIMALA, Cuba has co:1-
centrated on getting the anti-goy -
er.nr,.ent factions to svor ; together
to overthrow the n;ilitarv uata.
Citing a "reliable" source, the
CIA says a Cuban official met with
representatives of three rebel
groups - the Guerrilla Army of the
Poor, the Rebel Armed Forces and
the dissident wing of the Guatemala
Communist party - "to urge
unity."
If they agreed to work together,
the report continues. Cuba would
promise stepped-up aid as it did in
Nicaragua.
The memorandum says Cuba has
given less attention to El Salvador
than it has to Guatemala and Nica-
ragua on the assumption that the El
Salvador rebels are not as far along
in mounting a revolution..
So far, the State Department has
shown little alarm at the report.
Spokesman Reston, citing the un-
verified nature of the intelligence,
said the United States won't ques-
tion Cuba on its aie;cu activities
unless it has more proof.
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 Approved For Release 2009/04/28: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501270001-6
Article appeared
on page 4
Carter Cltl
ewo
~Zn a i7lll
le in J\icafl7
By Walter Riley
WASHINGTON-President Carter and his aides were fully, aware of
Panama's role in helping Cuba export communist revolutions to Latin
America long before the signing of the canal giveaway treaties, -a secret
10-page CIA report discloses.
The May 2, 1979 document reveals Fidel Castro's inside operations with
the regional communist parties of Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and El
Salvador for his proposed takeover of Central America.
The report exposes the Panamanian government as Castro's willing part-
ner in a long-planned communist conspiracy to overthrow the Somoza
government of Nicaragua and install a pro-Cuba Marxist regime.
The CIA papers establish beyond a doubt that President Carter and his ad-
ministration staff have been fully aware of the Panama-Cuba connection
since taking office.
Carter and State Department officials have
not told Congress and the American public
the truth about Panama. Rep. George
Hansen (R-Idaho) has called President Carter
RIPE FOR REVOLT
The opening paragraph of the intelligence
memo states: "The Castro regime apparently
concluded by at least last Fall that prospects
for revolutionary upheaval in Central
America over the next% decade or so had
markedly improved-largely because of the
weakened position of Nicaragua's Somoza,
and the ripple effect his removal would have
on other countries in Central America. ~.r r
? "As a result, Cuba has intensified its at
REP. GEORGE HANSEN
tempts to unify insurgent groups, not only in manufactured weapons to the terrorist bases i'
Nicaragua-where Cuba has concentrated its in Costa Rica, according to the report.
efforts-but in Guatemala and El Salvador DISSENT IN STATE DEPT.
as well t
Ranking military officers familiar with all
The report continued: "1Yhiie tailoring the intelligence reports coming out of Central
extent of its support to the realities of the erica are dismayed by the Carter ad-
up in each country, Cuba has stepped ministration's under-the-table deals with
up its on-island (Cuba) training of guerrillas Cuba and other communist minority groups
from each of these countries . _ ." in Latin America. Many of these military ex-
Panamanian air force planes are used to perts can only shake their heads in despair,
transport the terrorists from revolutionary because the only way they could speak out
staging areas in Costa Rica through Panama would be to resign their offices.
and on to Cuba and return, according to the A veteran State Department- official
report. The same aircraft are used s to 'familiar with the leaked report said: "I am
transport -Soviet- and Red -Chinese-
THE SPOTLIGHT
16 July 1979
FIDEL CASTR.O
afraid that President Carter and members of i
his administration have not been candid with
Congress or the American public. I am of the
opinion that in the near future, many more
documents are going to be leaked to the press
by dissidents in our organization.
"Please don't quote me," he begged.
Many State Department veterans have ex-
pressed. their concern over the narrow
policies of the Carter administration with
respect to the human rights issues. Some sug-
gest that the departure of the assistant
secretary of state for human rights and
humanitarian affairs, Pat Derian, would im-
prove the American image among foreign
circles. - . - - I
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 STAT
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 uban=-lpresence
era
"They come into Liberia airport, then t,teariy? """ "' "-- ` -
CUBAN PERSONNEL are directly in- ' move on into Nicaragua to join the-San- get rid of Somoza and put the Sandinistas i
volved in leftist Sandinista guerrilla open- .,, dinistas.This is the- use of Costae Rican in power as the government of Nica?
ation
ations to oust President Anastasio Somo? a territory as the most valuable part of the = ,ague." j
za in Nicaragua, ,according to a New rebel movement. - the invasion-of Nida- Murphy- charged- that Mexican Presi-
York congressman. ::. ? _ :. - dent Jose ' Lopez Portillo is under pre-
M- Murphy,: a_Statea. ' " htical B~ he, Eanam anians:supply menu sure bythe Castraeommunist po
U.S. Rep. Joiur ra
Island D, made, and. large during an weapons;:and?money_The Cubans furnish structure" in his country to disavow the=:
su ,ter, made g ? charge during an ; Somoza regime: --~ : `~ "?'
interview in which he also accused Cuban, weapons, money, training areas, and now But in fact; Murphy said, Mexico is the
Premier Fidel Castro of supplying the iaanpower_ ultimate plum of:- Soviet intentions in the
r tie any
rebelsb ..doubt. Americas, short of toppling the United
ns ir e. bee all their on San re.: can na' IongR ?
"Cubans have bees overheard on San- abbout out. the. Cuban connection: in Nica States.
dinista radios directing rebel, combat op ragua..*-Castro has repeatedly,4eclared,~ Cates xico has .been the target all along;'.
Soviet=
erations in Nicaragua,'.' Murphy said. hWe =will -get Tacb r(.President Meshy mod: "It's so- obvious
"Intelli ence re rts clean indicate Somoza sLnicitname" T ~'_: , yt influence has. been heavy in Mexico since,
the a an rsonne eve een clan MURPHY., CHAIRMAN ; of the Rouse
enem `the 1930s. The Soviets want Mexico tuting Panamanian creue bey
cre the r M and ,?__ _` _
?^as~ to Merchant Marine and F~stieries Coiamtt cause of its oil and gas . .and mineral
entia s m a, su stk
ntaa,s 7 eu tee, his been interested in. Latin-Amen ' resources , ~~ _
subco fo 'is a na'turaT target
st ass igne
nauona itv..?; at
ee 'for I It's-b' comimunist' domination. But the
practically all of-- the = ca affairs .sin-ce he:wasfir
F? urt~ iee; p
lweapons that have. been recovered Cy the, the nearly 18 Houseyears Panama.ago?Canal - . United States is the-ultimate target: Mex-,
"
Somoza national guard have been Cuban ico is only an intermediate target
He charged that Castro agents started, . ,~,.,~ ..
fact has be gian manufacture:: That ,infiltrating Nicaragua, in 1962, participat-
weapons. been Bel documented
_ . _ _ . ., _.:... >~ . T,.} info in the. murders of, a hundred Somoza
b
a.. ??? ~_ _ _
him asrthe Cuban president in'1959,-was Cu
5,000 FN-14 automatic rifles from the- - , Murphy sees the communist role in the
Fabrique National is Belgium.:;",` ,Nicaraguan insurrection as partof a'
`broad plan-to achieve Red domination2of
.i
ll
a
y
C
ib
ar
" "
marked run for. Cuba. And. Castroo~?got ~`
views :Castro as nothing; roreY than .a-
'
K`#
them when be took. power "
,
are 'the :same weapons- that footpad;,for: Moscow. :1w
ds ,,,, "Already,'Russia has do o thebiggest
.
d
hun
re
Nicaraguan battlefields. So there isreel with "130 personnel who really- serve as-
h said
ectioa
"
: `
? M
.
_
? . ,
u
Cuban coan
-~ s Soviet agents, tP y
. .. e?.- "Virtually every country- in South
t communist or
nifica
i
n
g
MURPHY ..4 PERSONAL friend: and - America has a s
And those organizations are`
ization
hen `
-
gan
high school classmate oE_ Somoza .w
the strongman was-being educated in the growing. Throughout` Central-America;
h of the leadership is leftist-oriented.
l
y a muc
United States, leveled his charges on
few days after having made a. secret trip
to the embattled Central American coon- .'COSTA- RICA GOES_ along by-letting..--
st