MEETING WITH A LENIN PEACE PRIZE WINNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200090026-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: December 12, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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Enclosure No. 1
A-928 from TOKYO
Report by Dr. Paul F. Langer dated 12/12/ ' on Meeting with Kaoru Yasui:
MEETING WITH A LENIN PEACE PRIZE WINNER
Introduction
On November 19, I had an opportunity to listen and talk to Lenin Peace
Prize Winner, Professor Kaoru Yasui, Yas:;_i's important role in the inter-
national peace movement and his close relation to Moscow and Peking may
justify this brief account of my meeting with him. I have kept my own inter-
pretations to a minimum leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions.
. Professor Yasui is presently Dean of the Faculty of Law and professor
of international law at one of Tokyo's larger private universities, but his
claim to fame is his .leadcro ip in the Japanese "peace movement" and the
international position which he has been able to create .for it and for himself.
Yasui is the founder and chairman of the Japan Council Against A- and H-
Bombs known in Japan as Gensuikyo. This organization is one of the most
important Japanese pressure. groups and certainly the one which most
directly affects Japan's rearmament policy and the U. S. military position
in Japan. Gensui o has been largely responsible for maintaining at a very
high level the Japanese people's sensitivity to nuclear matters. It has also
been in the forefront of the left-wing struggle against the presence of
American military bases on.Japanese soil and against the Security Pact
with the United States. At present, Gensuilga is especially active in organ-
izing opposition to the proposed visit of U. S. nuclear-propelled submarines
and the stationing of F-105D fighter-bombers in Japan.
Every. year in August, ar;: _-I.nd the date of the Hiroshima bombing,
Gensuikyo holds a world conference against nuclear weapons. This confer
ence (which I attended once as an observer) has increasingly developed
into an international forum for Communist propaganda and now serves as
a platform from which .Communist proposals for a nuclear-free zone, for
the dismantling of U. S. overseas bases, and for support of the national
liberation struggle can be effectively presented.
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With the development of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement during
the late 1950's into a major instrument of international Communist policy,
Yasui's stature in the Communist world. has increased correspondingly.
He and his family have been the house guests of Khrushchev at the latter's
summer villa on the Black Sea, and Moscow has conferred on him its
Lenin Peace Prize. At the same time, however, Yasui for several years
now has been a frequent and welcome visitor to Peking where he has had
interviews with Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders. Last year,
upon returning from Moscow, Yasui and his daughter were again received
by Mao Tse-tung. There is ample evidence that Yasui continues even today
to enjoy intimate and excellent relations with both Mosco-;w and Peking -- or
perhaps I should say that both are wooing him. The conflict between Mao
and Khrushchev poses not merely a very delicate problem for Yasui
personally. With the growing bitterness of the Sino-Soviet exchanges and
open Chinese opposition to the partial nuclear test ban, Yasui as the ? policy-
Maker of the anti-nuclear movement, is faced with a severe dilemma.
ori~e sa aect of
discussion in Japan and abroad. For a number of reasons, it is unlikely
that Yasui is an actual Party member, although his speeches and behavior
clearly support Communist policies. Yasui makes no secret of the. fact
that his ideology is, that of Marxist-Leninism. He told me so himself.
Background of a Lenin Prize Winner
Whether Yasui is a Communist constitutes a fav L b'
in pu _ is affairs. Yasui is an excellent speaker,
The interesting thing is that Yasui once was a fervent nationalist
who expressed strong sympathy for the German National Socialist movement.
As a result,. the Allied Occupation authorities purged him after the war as
an ultranationalist, something for which Yasui (like many other Japanese
in similar circumstances) has probably never forgiven the United States.
It seems that these two experiences have had a good deal to do with Yasuijs
postwar behavior.. There is no doubt that Yasui is suffering of a guilty
conscience and that he is trying to offset his prewar and wartime records
through postwar support for the extreme left wing. By being the most-.
active proponent of the "peace movement" in Japan Yasui apparently
believes he can erase the memory of. his nationalist past.
Yasuits personality has also had something to do with propelling
him onto the speaker's platform. ? He is not an ivory tower scholar but
craves involvement bT
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Enclosure No. 1
A-928 from TOKYO
enamoured with the sound of his own voice. In Japanese he is, of course,
very persuasive but he can be an effective orator and debater even in
English -- a language in which he is na-ich less fluent. Yasui enjoys being
the center of attention. His rather feminine features and appearance
conceal a very ambitious and dynamic man whom many Japanese observers
classify as "a dedicated opportunist. "
I have known. Yasui and his family (i. e., wife and daughter) for some
time, having met him first several years ago when I attended (in the
capacity of an ooser. ver) the Gensuikyo world congress in Hiroshima, and
I have since established some ;r_d of a personal relationship. Thus, I had
the opportunity to spend an evening at Yasui's home immediately after the
Soviet Union resumed its most recent nuclear test series. .In 1961, I also
met Yasui's daughter in Moscow (where she was then studying Russian liter-
ature at Moscow University) when both of us attended a, "Japanese evening"
at Lumumba University. While I am thus in a good position to size up
Yasui, my desire to maintain an open channel for .communications with the
,:apaflese anti-nuclear leader ha prevented me at times from questioning
him as sharply as I might have wanted to and has forced me occasionally to
refrain from putting some embarrassing questions to him for fear of
endangering our relationship. This consideration also affected my discus
sions with Yasui on November 19.
Background of Yasui's Visit to the United States
This is Yasui's first real visit to the United States. I say "real"
because Yasui has passed through Anchorage several times on his way to
or from international peace conferences in the Soviet Union or Europe.
Two years ago, elements in the American peace movement apparently sug-
gested that Yasui might wish to come to the United States and present his
views It seems that these plans crystallized only this year and that he made
application for a U. S. visa late in .October, Yasui has been invited or is
:being sponsored by a rather motley group which includes Linus Pauling (an
occasional participant in. the Japanese anti-nuclear world conferences) as
well as Cyrus Eaton and the extreme left wing National Guardian, a weekly
that is better known in pro-Communist circles abroad than her ein the
United States.
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According to Yasui, the U. S. En b~a:ssy and especially Ambassador
Reisohauer strenuously and consistently opposed Yasui's visit to the
United States but the Department of State eventually decided to grant a
visa as a result of the efforts made on 'behalf of Yasui by members of
Congress and other "friends. " At least this is Yasui's version. The
U. S, visa was apparently issued only on the eve of Yasui's scheduled
departure from Tokyo, November 14.
Yasui planned to spend about twelve days in the United States before
proceeding to a meeting of the World Peace Council in Warsaw (which has
since taken place). He expected to visit ten U. S. cities, make thirty
speeches, and meet with a number of well-known figures, including
UN Secretary U Thant. Yasui expressed the hope of returning to the
United States in the near future for a longer stay.
The following account reflects the gist of Professor Yasui's remarks
addressed in English to a group of American and Japanese students at
UCLA; of a brief personal conversation Yasui had with me after the meetu
ing; and of a twenty-minute discussion at the UCLA student cafeteria
where I and some five or six Japanese students and professors conversed
with Yasui in Japanese. For convenience's sake, I have arranged the sub-
stance of Yasui's remarks under topical headings.
YASUI'S VIEW- OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT'
Like most Japanese left-wingers, Yasui is greatly pained by the
conflict between Moscow and Peking. Not only does this conflict raise
ideological: questions for him, but it plunges the Japanese peace movement
of which he is the leader into confusion.
This was illustrated at the anti-nuclear world congress in Hiroshirri-
in August.of this year when the Chinese representative used this forum to
attack violently the Soviets and their position on. the nuclear test ban and the
Soviet delegates and their Japanese Socialist allies responded more or less
in lend. The world conference was turned into a battleground between the
Moscow and Peking representatives, as well as between the Japanese
Cormunists who generally incline toward adoption of the Peking line, and
the Japanese Socialists who. are reluctant to alienate the Chinese, but tend
to ._.ppart Moscow on the test ban and on peaceful co-existence, The result
has been that despite Yasui's frantic efforts to cover up these differences,
mc~' of the Socialists walked out of the world congress and left the Japanese
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anti-nuclear movement to the Comrr,unists and pro-Communists. As so
many times in the past, the movement, in Japan is now once more split into
at least two camps.
on him.
that is, the character of the leadersh'p, etc. , are of real importance. In
response to my questions, Yasui repeatedly remarked that he "fully under--
stood" the Chinese reasons for their policies and statements, but carefully
refrained from explicitly endorsing t:em. Even so, it was obvious that,
as in the case of most Japanese, at least Yasuits emotional sympathies lie
with the Chinese. On the other hand, he is aware of the fact that the
Soviet Union commands great power on the international scene, that
"peaceful co-existence" is a potent slogan in Japan and that he. personally
has politically profited from the honors which the Soviet Union has heaped
Yasuits replies to some of my questions about Sino-Soviet relations
together with what is known of his activities in Japan suggest that he has
made strenuous efforts in Tokyo, Moscow, and Peking to reconcile the two
contending Communist viewpoints, not only insofar as they affect the
policies of the Japanese anti-nuclear forces but also in their impact on the
unity of the Communist-sponsored international peace m.overnent.
Yasui stated that last year when talking to Mao Tse-tung, he could
sense the seriousness of the conflict between Mao and Khrushchev. He
expressed the view that this conflict has three principal reasons: differences
bet~.;een Chinese and Soviets with regard to the interpretation of Marxism-
Leninism; concrete problems standinj between the two Communist powers;
and a clash of personalities.
Yasui feels that the personality aspect of the Sino-Soviet conflict
has become more pronounced recently., Although a convinced Marxist, he
stated that even in relations between Socialist countries the personal factor,
Sino-Soviet relationship, the gist of his reply was that relations between.
the two Communist power centers (power centers is my term) might improve
When I sought Yasuits reaction to the question of the future of the
Chinese policy, Yasui replied that he thought there could very well be some
but that such improvement would take considerable time. He did not think
that the conflict could disappear in the immediate or even the near future,
In response to my question as to whether a change in the Chinese leadership
after the. death of Mao. Tse-tung might bring about. some adjustment in
adjustments, but he doubted that these would be very drastic.
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CHINESE FORi IGN AND NUCLE.? R POLICIES
In response to my and several other. persons' questions, Yasui
addressed himself from time to time to the issue of Chinese foreign policy
and Chinese intentions.
Yasui asserted- as one might expect, that Communist China has a
1. gitim_,ate ri crht to be a member of the United Nations and that the Peking
.regime quite rightly refused to enter the United. Nations as a fa ror. He
stated on several occasions that the Chinese were not necessarily keen on
becoming a member of the United Nations because "there were still a
number of concrete and practical problems" that would have to be resolved
before Peking could consider membership. While he avoided being more
s:eciuic, it was obvious that what he referred to was the Taiwan problem
and the presence of the rival Chinese Nationalist regime in the United
i-.a.tions. It was my impression that Yasui's statement reflected what he
had been told in Peking by the Chinese Communist leaders.
A second point Yasui made concerned the Chinese Communist posi-
tion on the use of force. He denied that the Peking regime had ever advo--
cated aggressive action, denied that the Peking regime had contemplated
the use of force even with regard to the Taiwan problem, and defended the
Peking regime in its handling of the Indian border issue. He implied that
anyone who took the trouble.of studying; the facts would find that Pekingts
a
ti
n
c
o
s toward India had been fully justified.
Interesting was Yasui's answer to niy question regarding his view of
the Communist Chinese position on the nuclear test ban treaty. Here he
obviously found himself confronted with a dilemma. On one hand Yasui
leads a movement that has been consistently pressing for a nuclear test
ban. On the other hand, strong opposition to the Chinese stand would
alienate the extreme leftist and Communist elements, i. e., the activists
in the Japanese peace movement and deprive Gensuuil o and Yasui of
su
rt in P
ki
ppo
e
ng,
Yasui proved himself the perfect diplomat precariousl
oerati
g
y
n
.
between Moscow and Peking: he supported the test ban treaty and at the.
sari e time
i
i
i
e
m
n
m
z
d its importance. He pointed to the danger that the
:'forces of peace" might as a result of the conclusion of the treat
l
t
y
e
down their guard and consider the battle largely won. This, he said, was
a real danger and the Chinese had clearly-recognized it. The nuclear test
ban treaty, he stated, could only be considered a very first step. It must
.be followed by other steps leading to complete and total disarmament.
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Such essential measures included the destruction of nuclear weapons and.
the dismantling of (American) overseas bases. Then, turning to an
interpretation of Chinese behavior, 5Ya sui asserted that the Chinese posies
tion was "essentially one of sounding a strong warning against the dangers
of misinterpreting the implications of the treaty. " The Chinese were thus,
according to Yasui, merely calling, on the forces of peace to maintain
extreme vigilance. In this way Y"asui justified the Chinese position
although he admitted that the language in which the Chinese couch their
?,:arning" to the peace fighters might be a bit violent. Or the whole
and here he reflected the attitude of the Japanese left wi.ncr -- Yasui
attempted to minimize Sino-Soviet differences on the nuclear issue,
YA SUf.' S VIEW OF THE UNITED S T`ATES
In a subtle but :rather effective way Yasui painted an image of the
United States as an imperialist power where the grovaxning ""forces of peace"
were struggling hard to influence domestic and foreign policy.
successfully made their influence felt. "The forces of peace had even-
tually won out" and at the last moment he, Yasui, had been granted a
visa so that he, the peace fighter, was now in the United States, able to
tell the American people the truth about the japanese peace movement and
enjoying his first opportunity. to assess personally growing. strength
of the "forces of peace" in the United States.
the U. S. ambassador in Tokyo had strongly opposed the granting of such
a visa as not being in the U, S. interest, because his (Yasui's) American
friends in the peace movement and some members of Congress had
Thus on one hand, Yasui frequently accused United States policy,
for instance, by showing the picture of a.horribly-deformed child born in
atom-bombed Hiroshima and by asserting that U. S. nuclear testing at
.Bikini violated all international norms and la=qrs. On the other hand,
Yasui asserted that he had obtained his American visa despite the fact that
OBJECTIVES OF THE TAPANESE, AND INTERNATIONAL PE ACE MOVEM:ENTS
In presenting his views on the present state of the Tapanese and inter-
national peace movements, Yasui made ten major points. None of these is
new or shows any striking departure from earlier Communist pronounce-
meats on the problem of war and peace, but Yasui's statements are inter-
esting in that they illustrate how effectively the peace movement can be used
for the purpose of undermining the bases of U. S. and free world foreign
and military policies.
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The ten major points Yasui made were the following:
(1) The peace movement's aim in Japan, as elsewher e,
is to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective inter-
national control -b which he failed to define. (In recent years the term
"effective international control" has been fully integrated into the Commun-
ist peace propaganda.) Yasui draws from this the conclusion that the
Japanese peace movement must defend to the last Japans s so-called peace
constitution, io e., the present constitution which forbids the use of force
in the settlement of international conflicts. This spells, of course,
opposition to any revision of the constitution which would remove the
restrictions preventing Japan from establishing regular armed.force,s.
(2) The peace movement welcomes the partial nuclear test
ban treaty as a first step toward victory of the movement, but it would be
dangerous to overestimate the significance of the treaty and to relax the
people's vigilance. This formula neatly combines support for Moscow's
and for Peking's views of the test ban treaty. Yasui stated that while the
peace fighter's aim must, of course, be a speedy agreement on the prohibi-
tion of production, stockpiling, use and spread of nuclear weapons, the
immediate objective is to oppose (American) underground testing, which
remains legal under the present treaty arrangements. He pointed to another
."flaw" in the present arrangement, viz., Article IV which permits a with--
drawal from the test ban treaty and to the fact that France has refused to
sign and even announced that it will proceed to test nuclear weapons.
France was singled out for attack, but China remained unmentioned..
Yasui also referred to a long open letter he had written to Chairman
Khrushchev and to President Kennedy stressing the need for.an agreement
on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. He stated that Khruschev had
honored him with a 7, 000-word reply, but "unfortunately the American
ambassador in Tokyo had refused to pass on his (Yasui's) letter to the
President of the United States. " He strongly implied that the "ruling
circles" in the United States were not interested in discussing seriously,
a complete ban . on nuclear weapons.
(3) Yasui stressed that nowadays no military alliance can
assure the security of a nation, and that, on the contrary, such alliances
endanger peace. From this flowed the demand for the dissolution of mili-
tary alliances and for the abrogation of the American-Japanese security
pact,
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(4) The peace movement urges the closing down of all foreign
military bases since '"such a measure would help to relax international
tensions and reduce the dangers of war. " Yasui, boasting of his expertise
in the field of international law. asserted that the existence of (American)
military bases on foreign soil infringes on the sovereignties of the
countries involved and that the Ti. . S. military presence in Japan constitutes
a particularly clear-cut violation of international law. Ile professed to be
convinced that the very existence of U. S. bases on Japanese soil is endanger-
ing the survival of the Japanese people who strongly object to the U. S. use
of Japan as a "front .line position in the American nuclear war strategy.
(5) Yasui called for opposition to any measure that
"encourages the development of conditions leading to nuclear war.-" Under
this innocuous heading he elaborated as follo is: Professor Bernal of. the
World Peace Council recently expressed opposition to the use of the Polaris
.submarine as a "mere transfer of nuclear weapons from land to sea.
Yasui fully agrees with him and opposes also the introduction into Japan of
the (dual capable) F-405D fighter-bombers by.the United States as a
measure "enhancing the possibility of nuclear war. " Yasui and his peace
movement are therefore seeking to develop a strong Japanese mass move-
ment against such (American) policies while lending maximum support to
similar movements 'directed against U. S. war policies elsewhere in the
world.
resolution regarding an African nuclear-free zone is, of course,
deserving of full support.
(7) The peace movement desires the strengthening of the
United Nations to enable this organization to assure international security
and prevent nuclear war in the Far East. This statement turned out to
be an introduction to Yasuif s renewed demand for the admission of
Communist- China to its "rightful place" in the United Nations as a measure
aimed at relaxing international tensions. Yasui went on from here to
recommend the conclusion of a regional security pact between Japan, the
United States, the Soviet Union and, of course, Communist China.
nuclear-free zones everywhere, and especially in Europe and Asia. The
UN
(6) Yasui asserted that the German Government already
wants nuclear weapons and that now also Japan is in danger of becoming a
"jumping-off place" for imperialism. The international peace movement,
he argues, must therefore work strenuously for the establishment of
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(8) Yasui expressed solidarity with the "national independ-
ence movements against colonialism and racial discrimination. rr Colonial-
iani and racial discrimination, he stated, are encouraging conditions for
n--:clear war. This in turn led to a strong attack against "a UN trustee-
snap system that serves as camouflage for (American) colonialism0
?asui elaborated by stating that Cidnavwa falls into this category and must
returned to Japan,
(9) An effort must be made to redirect the economy from
a. ear-oriented one.to a peace-oriented one, i. e. , Yasui urged the reduce
Lion of military budgets and so on (and opposition to any increase in the
modest Japanese defense budget).
(10) The Japanese movement for aid to the A-bomb victims
c= 11iroshima and Nagasaki must, be expanded into an international one.
Yaqui expressed the hope that the United States would give "warm and full
cooperation and extend support'and. succor to the victims of the tragic
e tints in Japan. " He stated that such a movement could be an important
factor in the struggle against accidental and "planned creation of new
A-bomb victims" (and, no doubt, would prove a most effective instrument
of anti-American propaganda).
Yasui's presentation of the program of the. Japanese peace movement
constituted from a propagandistic point of view a very able performance.
He appeared to his American audience in the light of a peace fighter free
of political ties, of a man who was merely defending the cause of humanity
and who appealed to the conscience of Christians everywhere. His often
emotion-charged and eloquent argumentation presented Communist
objectives in a way as to make them understandable, or rather palatable,
to an American non-Communist audience while carefully avoiding the
impression of promoting Communist policies.
Yasui stated on several occasions that the Japanese .people are
watching the U. S. peace movement with much sympathy and concern, that
they realize how great are the obstacles in the path of the American move-
rnent (implying that in an "imperialist" country, the struggle of the fighter
for peace is, by necessity, a difficult one). He praised the Women's Strike
for Peace which, "despite accusations of Communist infiltration leveled
ainst it by the Un-American Activities Committee, " had persisted in the
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defense of peace, and finally, he linked up his praise of the American
peace movement with a strong endorsement for the recent Negro integra-
tion. march. in Washington. Lenin Peace Prize Winner Yasui somehow had
succeeded in !in'.dng- the cause of peace with the Communist position on
disarmament, with accusations against the United States for its treatment
of minority u scups, . and with Communist attacks against U. S. military
alliances and bases overseas, U. S. land- and sea-based nuclear weapons,
U. S. opposition to China's admission to the United Nations, and U. S.
insistence on continued underground testing.
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