RECENT COMMUNIST LOGISTICAL AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080070-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: February 21, 1973
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080070-1
Secret
NSA review completed
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Recent Communist Logistical and Manpower
Developments in Indochina
Secret
ER IM 73-19-2
21 February 1973
Copy No. 5 2
25X1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 February 1973
RECENT COMMUNIST LOGISTICAL AND MANPOWER
DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
1. Heavy Communist supply activity continued throughout
Indochina during the period, and the first new personnel infiltration groups
were detected moving south since the cease-fire.
2. Supply deliveries through North Vietnam continue to move
toward both northern Laos and South Vietnam and include ordnance as
well as food and other types of cargo. The surge of supplies previously
detected in North Vietnam has now reached the Laotian Panhandle, where
supply activity is peaking. In Cambodia, new roadbuilding has strengthened
the Communists' supply system, and detected vehicle activity is proceeding
at a very high pace as supplies move between southern Laos and the more
southern regions of South Vietnam. Within South Vietnam, Communist
elements are expediting resupply to alleviate shortages in some areas and
to support combat operations. The Communists plan to continue delivery
of supplies from Cambodia and to encourage population resettlement in
areas under their control.
3. On the manpower side, Hanoi apparently has renewed limited
infiltration of personnel to the south for the first time since the cease-fire.
Although no new regular infiltration groups (either of infantry units or
replacements) have been detected, 15 special-purpose groups - totaling
more than 800 specially skilled military and civilian personnel -- are
scheduled to enter the infiltration pipeline in the next several days. Regular
infantry troops trained in the recent induction class in North Vietnam will
be available for disposition in North Vietnam or for infiltration to the south
in a month or two.
Note: This memorandum, prepared by the Office of Economic Research.
Comments and queries are welcome. They may be directed to
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080070-1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080070-1
4. Although there have been no major redeployments of Communist
combat troops into or out of South Vietnam since the cease-fire, a North
Vietnamese administrative services regiment -- the 239th -- has deployed
from northern Laos and is currently transiting the Panhandle headed for
South Vietnam. Other noteworthy redeployments have included the
movement of elements of the South Vietnam Liberation Army and the
Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), previously located in
Cambodia, back to their former base area in Tay Ninh Province. Logistical
elements in eastern Cambodia may also have moved closer to the South
Vietnamese border.
5. The large movement of armor and artillery units toward South
Vietnam is discussed in the Appendix. This movement was started before
the cease-fire. It has been on a scale at least equal to the initial buildup
of armor and artillery forces for the offensive in the spring of 1972. More
important, these forces are deploying farther south than ever previously
observed.
Recent Communist Logistical Developments in Indochina
Logistic Activity in Southern North Vietnam
6. Detections of logistic activity in southern North Vietnam continue
to show a mixed picture: heavy resupply activity appears to be continuing
there but at a pace slower than in the pre-cease-fire period, when logistic
activity was particularly heavy. Significant cargo detections at Binh Tram 18
in the Vinh area included a 14 February report of the shipment of more
than 300 tons of supplies (nearly 250 tons were listed as ordnance) through
its area. A small part of the ordnance delivered was specifically earmarked
for South Vietnam, but most was to go to northern Laos. The destination
of several other significant supply movements around Vinh was not available,
but it is likely that some of this cargo was also en route to southern Laos,
Cambodia, and South Vietnam.
7. Meanwhile, large quantities of supplies -- believed to be mostly
ordnance - are still moving to northern Laos. On 14 February, Binh
Tram 18 reported that it had delivered about 240 tons of cargo -- mostly
ordnance -- to northern Laos. An intercept the next day revealed that an
associate of Binh Tram 18 was using 20 vehicles a day to transport cargo
to Binh Tram 11, which operates along Route 7 in northern Laos. In
addition, on 9 and 10 February, railroad cars arrived in Thanh Hoa Province
carrying cargo destined for Route 65. To date, roughly 2,000 tons of cargo
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080070-1
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