POWER POSITION OF G.M. MALENKOV AND OTHER SOVIET LEADERS DURING THE STALIN ERA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A001900300003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 30, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/03: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001900300003-5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within themean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form It prohibited.
SECRET/CONTROL - US OFF1CIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT Posner Position of G.M. Malenkov and
.other Soviet Leaders. during the Stalin
Era
REPORT
DATE DISTR. 30 July 1953
NO. OF PAGES 4
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
25X1
25X1
The following report represents an. .?n ff cia1 analysis of the.relative status
of Soviet Premier Malenkov end other top Soviet officials during the Stalin Era..
Conmients'have been-made where the factual material needs explanation, but no
attempt has:been.made to evaluate the opinions expressed..
1. Through I.V. Stalin's private cabinet and the Secretariat and Orgburo of the
Central Committee of the. Commuai-st Party of the Soviet Union (bolsheviks ),
G.M. Malenkov reached., in.1946, the poa4.ticm of Deputy Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR-.and member of the Politburo.of the CPsU(b). By promoting
Malenkov to high Government positions
.,Stalin intended to raise MaLenkovla
huthority.outside the Party also and to build up his reputation as a statesman.
2. In connection with.Malenkpvle rise to power through the Party, it is important
TO note that he was the main supporter., interpreter? and executor of Stalin's
decisions and authority over the Party. The other members of the Politburo
were ovex'whelmed with Government functions and were thereby almost removed from
the daily iirection and, life of the'Party1 Although Zhdanov, like Malerikov,
was not occupied with any State functions) he operated in a completely different
sphere in the Party,and was not concerned with its internal problems. Similarly?
Malenkov w'as not acquainted with Zhdanov's sphere of activities.2
Because. of his prolonged intimate collaboration with Stalin,. Malenkov became
acquainted with Stalinys characteristics-earlier and better than the other
leaders. He realized that it would be better for his career to enjoy,. as
long as possible, the favor. of the great chief. For this reason, Malenkov
very cleverly interpreted and implemented Stalin's intentions, without ad-
varol-ng hie., own views or attempting to increase his own authority.
Zhdanov did, not possess the` characteristics of Malenkov, although his loyalty
to Stalin could not be doubted. Zhdanav was more. intelligent and had a larger
number of admirers both inside and outside the Party than Malenkov. Zhdanov
acknq ?'edged' ,$talii to wisdcml., but also pushed himself forward. The fact that
SECRET/CONTROL ~ US OFFICIALS. ONLY
NAVY I . IAIR X. FBI AEC
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/03: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001900300003-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/03: CIA-RDP80-00810A001900300003-5
siscI /C0NTROL - US OFFICIALS OTTLY
he died at the height of his glory serves to prove a widespread opinion that
Stalin, did not like the manner and..the extent.of Zhdanov's rise to power. Stalin
would allow certain frictions in his immediate vicinity without personally taking
part in them only so long as the danger was not too near to him.
Few Ijarty and Qovernment leaders enjoyed the same favor of and intimacy with Stalin
as,Malenkov. Hews acquainted with a number of Stalin's thoughts and decisions that
he took against the other top members of the hierarchy. Malenkov knew how to keep
his thirst for glory in check-in front of Stalin. Zhdanov did not know how to do
this, and was? therefore,- relegated to second place in Stalin's: favor. Malenkov not
only imitated Stalin outwardlbut cynicism and lack of feeling are his characteristic
traits. Thanks to the great confidence that Stalin had in him, Malenkov had succeeded,
even in the earlier period,, at the time of the great purges, to be Stalin's terrible
plenipotentiary in the carrying out of important assignments. According to credible
reports, K.K. Rokossovskiy, K. Ye..loroshilov, and also A.I. Mikoyan owe their
lives to Malenkov, after the latter`kiad settled, in Stalin's name, the scores with
Nikolay Yezhov. Voroshilov,,,otherwise, was inclined toward Zhdanov and was, there-
fore, warned in a friendly manner by N.M. Shvernik after A.S. Shcherbakov's sudden
death in 1945. .After the death of Shcherbakov, who had been an intimate friend
and admirer of Zhdanov, the latter himself tried to establish closer contact and
collaboration with Malenkov,.in order not to be isolated.
After Zhdanov?s,death, important events took place which may be considered as a
reflection of Stalin"s tactics such as the assassination of personalities who
were potential obstacles to`lhis dictatorial omnipotence. An extensive purge
took place in the Leningrad organization,which had been mainly instrumental in
Zhdanov's elevation" Nikolay,A. Voznesenskiy and Aleksey A. Kuznetsov, friends
,of Zhdanov, were expelled from the Politburo of the CPSU(b).3 Even Zhdanov's
son was removed from hie position in.the Party. There are no indications that
Thdanov was, Or had worked, against Stalin. Stalin merely did not like the fact
that Zhdanov was gaining an increasing number of sympathizers, in spite of the
fact that the number of his enemies among the intellectuals, whom Zhdanov attacked
violently, was also increasing.
7, However, Zhdanov's death brought in. its wake the rise to power or activization of
certain personalities: with Stalin's appr val. These included M.A. Suslov, who
becamee,candidate of the Politburo in 1948, and A. Ya.Vyshin.sk.iy.,.who could speak
more freely regarding foreign political and legal matters "and who was given a
free hand in the choice of appointees to the foreign service.
8. On the basis of Malenkov's deliberate tactical "withdrawal" or his work concerned
with internal Party problems,' it-would be incorrect -to draw the conclusion that
he was, temporarily out of favor, even at the time when Zhdanov had better chances
to become Stalin's heir.
9. At the founding session.of the Cominform, Zhdanov and Malenkov were the representa-
tives of the CC of the CP$U(b), i.e., Stalin's plenipotentiaries. Zhdanov's
report and.the official attitude of the CC of the CPSU(b) are-well known. Zhdanov
and Malenkov, particularly Malenkov, had no special attitude or opinion of their
own concerning the policy of the Cominiorm. During the session, Stalin and
V.M, Molotov were kept informed of all developments. The delegates of the CC;of
the CPSU(b) had to be consulted before each move was taken and, generally speaking,
life was, easy for the Soviet delegates until the appearance of the Yugoslav re-
st,stance. Zhdanov and. Malenkov presented a common front in the interests of the
domination,oi the Kremlin over the other parties.
10. The Kremlin had decided to found the Cominform in,order to set up.again an organ.
which ,would replace the Comintern 'and facilitate the establishment of the Kremlin's
domination over the international working-class movement. It was easier for the
Kremlin to impose upon the member and non-member parties of the Cominform laws of
life and work which had been ."adopted" than to have to haggle with each individue.l
party regarding its line of policy. On the other hand, under the post-war conditions,,
it would have been.tactless,with regard to world public opinion, to give direct orders
SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/03: CIA-RDP80-00810A001900300003-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/03: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001900300003-5
SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY
~3-
to the other parties in the world, without the existence of such a recognized medium
as the Comintern had been or the Cominform'was to become. At the founding session,
the Cominform was pgrtrayed as a,consultative body and as an organ for the exchange
of experiences., without power over the other parties. It was in the Kremlin's interest
that such a view about this organization should prevail as long as possible.
11. 11oweyerl Yugoslavia's example has completely unmasked the Cominform. It has, shown
that it pursued different aim.ee 'It bras. formed primarily. for the purpose of sub-
jugating Yugoslavia and the East European countries. If we point out that the
Cominform was composed of men selected from the member parties by the. Soviet
intelligence serice, in cooperation with the Orgburo of the CC of the CPSU(b),
and that the Soviet intelligenceservice had full power over them, then we know
how this organization oyerated, Yugoslavia was.y of course, an exception, because
her delegation was aointed in Belgrade and not in Moscow. In the eyes of public
opinion and Communist Parties, the Cominform should have appeared as a body superior
to the CC .of the . CPSU(b), but actually it has never been so, The Cominform has
always been unequivocally under the direct leadership of Moscow. All resolutions,
directives, newspaper articles, and other publishable materials had to be approved
in Mosc4
19. The centralized power over the Cominform was in the hands of Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov,
and Ma.lenkovo These.persons were the guardians of the Cominform gospel. The official
Soviet representatives were mere . civil' servants, especially Suslov.
Suslov mainly
followed the same road as.Malenkov, and it was believed that he.owed his rise to
power to Mal:enkoV. It Was . Malen,' ov who informed Stalin about various personalities,
especially in the later p-riod when it had become clear that Stalin had serious
plans concerning Malenkov. Suslov never opposed anybody. He did not even oppose
Zhdanov, when working.in the Propaganda Department of the CC of the CPSU (b).
13. P.F. Yud3 , an old agent of the Soviet intelligence service, was in fact its repre-
sentative in the Comi.nform. Be maintained contact with the majority of member-
delegates, of individual parties. The Bulgarians? delegate Vladimir Poptomov was
very angry with Yudin.because the latter had refused, during the mass arrests of
Bulgarians in Moscow at the tip of Ni}o1,:ay Yezhov, to go to Georgi Dmitrov and
ask him to "intervene" against the arrests. Yudin declared at that time that he
had to guard his own skin, although he had taken an active part in the purges of
that period.
14aa L S.Ktusb.hev's:rise to power was not surprising. Even during Stalin's life-time,
he was Malenkov?s most likely successor in the field of organizational work in the
Central Committee.. It wa4 true that Khrushchev earned Stalin's favor partly because
of Malenkov, but he also earned it mainly because of his own capabilities in dealing
with the Ukrainian problem, It could also be added that Khrushchev had helped
Malenkov in his day, whenKYirushchev was Malenkov's senior in the Central Committee.
The rise to power Of T{ irua.hchev, MaD,A...Bagirov" and others should not. be ex.-
plaind by differences of policy, because such differences . did not exist. In his
advancement, Bagirov was, in addition to his capabilities, merits, and Beriya's
friendship, also helped. by_the national.movement (he is a Moslem).5
15. It would.be inappropriate to.indulge in any forecasts concerning the fate of Soviet
leaders, because the present leadership will probably have to maintain abalance of
parer for a long period of time. It is true that such a system as that in the USSR
Will not be able. to maintain a balance of power on the basis of the division of power
into several sectors In view of the fact that the people at the top.of the pyramid
in Moscow are not used to such a "democratic" allotment of sectors or "independence"..
they swill not be able'to come to terms and will fight for prestige. Stalin's death?
regardless of the loyalty of his subordinates toward him, could not fail to raise the
whole problem of the established order of things, but it will not raise the problem
of basic policy, which ii the legacy of the bureaucratic system and which has. been
built up in the USSR cver.a long period of time.
le ommeente Zhdanov was Chairman of the Council of the Union .of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR from March 1946 to February 1947.
SECRET/CONTROL US OFFICIALS ONLY'
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/03: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001900300003-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/03: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001900300003-5
SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY
C -. Zhdanoo?s os,itions during this period included Secretary
o e n ngrad Party organization .from..1934 to 19+5 and Chief of the Allied
Control Com d:sstion in-Finland `from 1944 to 1918.
Corxmient Kuznetsov was a member of the Central Committee and of
the Secretariat of the Central. Committee of the.CPSU(b), but he was-not a
member of the Politburo.
Comment- Although Suslov frequently appeared with members of the
Po. uro and was listed at the bottom pf f -a lit of Politburo members,: he was
not a member of this group. At this time, however, he was.a member of the Org-
buro and the' Secretariat o-t-the Central Committee.
7X1
appear t a e is not a Moslem. See Bolffheviik of July 1950.
SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/03: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001900300003-5