AIRFORCE ACTION IN THE DECEMBER OPERATION ON THE MIDDLE DON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
--
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY E
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHI OF STAFF, INTEWGENC
WASHINGTO 25,. D. C
STAT
(FROM]
LLNSL TED OR
(INTO
'ANSeT ED BY:
~;.. ion
SUBJECT: (FOG N t i! LEI
bo ?r ix the 7 'it h a Air Army ~?Thich waa to support an act act, by three
J
'i-iies, the 3rd. Mixed Air Corps was placed under its cozrnando Th6
~iit: ' of the Corps were formed, but by the beginning of the op"rat
just beginning to concentrate on the designated airiie i we,
~
.: only the ground attack and not all 1 of the Bomber Divjsjonso he
hter- Division (2 aircraft) and parts of the Bom!~ers (14 aircraf
: fl. -y
Thanks to reinforcements the air ariiies had on the 16tha of
Particularly realc was tht? 2Oth, Fighter Divisionl, whici:.
29 aircraft C S"ich a small Aumber~ of aircraft t:as unable %C
completed their conceatratiofl on the 3rd. and, nth. day of the
-) ~ratione
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
STAT
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
.t oc 'a ,
P8G8 Y~[Z.i~t
cernber the following number of ; a raft: (Table 1)
;?L,' , of Air Army Fighter ( ou d Bomber Recce Total
Attack Day flight
56
166
170
49
96
219 ~7 137 23
4io--
:
217
Despite the good ~rork ttich had been done in the air units to
y a ir damaged aircraft in the preparatory period of the operation
? ;Th t? ne
3rd0 to
the 15th. of December), a large number ]44) of
ones still rernained0 The number of unserviceable a: rera?'t
,r particularly high in the fighter planes (32) and in thy. grounr1
c1 (24) O It is abviou.S that the number of planes to supp~x"; an
: ,(1.. four armies over a 400 km front was clearly insuffic: n;;
The /T.th, Gerinan Air Army ?s hieh, at the beginning of Lhe
? _ ) ?r; stationed opposite the SouthsWestern, Don and St: 1s n .:t
jf , . h2d about 1000 aircraft. The nth. -ir Corps of that air
: e t.in in the sector of the Bouth.Western and V~rorwzki
one} c=~r vd cif 27 b: ember s- uadrons (in `4111erovo) , 76 bob.
ron:; ( in `ia.t sin&c arid :'orozovsk ) , 1 s(uadrOf of divo bomi..e::'.
cr* ovek), ? fighter squadron, and several detachments of
;.e^onnaiSarce aircraft. In addition, it has to be noted
n,-.
~rcups of1 the 77th, and 55th. bomber scuadxons flow o c
ot, i :;r sector $ of the front.
;. A
the start of the operation the enemy aircraft was di8po4
: ::i1ot~rs: Barnbers - at ~.'i11erovo Q to 100 He ill's, at Tatsink
c- 110 ?u Ss, {orozovsk 90 to 10Yu $7's; Fighters Ain
, :~ :rniahico~ysr and Bokovsk 70 to 90 ire 109'e and ~Ie1iO's e--
::Insisance - Shalayevsk and $kosyrskaya 50 to 60 Fv*1~9's and
In the Jrc:ard airfields of Oravskfy$ ashary, Nikolayev, 'ed J
svkl. Bvet och , yerkhniy aksay, the enemy periodically stat~
)aGC 10 tO 15 e 109's and ile illy se
g DISSEMINATION f R1 ~E~~l TRANSlATION
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
7
16
STAT
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
The total number of ene{riy aircraft based, opposite the Soutar
; ; em Front aa$ bet .ejn 150 and 500, of these 250 to 300 were
,r;_~;L to io0 fi.hters, 50 to 60 artillery fire ciirectiOf s
.:~s, x.50 t ~
it is .~ important to note that in c onneoti on. with the dif f icUlt
; of the enema's 6th, Army at 3ta1tngrad a considerable por?.,
:ion
:.c n oI: t aircraft was st ctioned in the ;~irf ield3 of `'at sinsk and
. , 1L that is on the left flank of the South ~?We3tern Iront 8
_h ~. d epos t.i on gave the enemy thc; opportvAity to mnoeuvre oX
qt or cif the front
by using the same "uPP]Y facilities, but a
~
same time gave our aviation the oppo tunit ? to ope.ate agai~st
_.r irficld$.
Thus at the Ieginnthg. he operation, to c f o1l ovr~ng er?the
of t
r,;ir3t1ve strength fires in aircraft (Table 2,
~,''es of aircraft . 17th, and 2nd.
1~-..a7. fir Armies
L;nor+iv
...'1
.......... -
~.r...~. _~....-......,--. fl
r"i,s.,ht rrs 166 . 5U ?-LOU
. 2W
k o/ur d attack
224 250 ??300
1arnbers
23 50 -- iO
Recanfaisance
._.r.
.n._s,....~..~, na..,....~.....-~-
As
otal 632 !C -?)2L~
an be seen from Table 2 the opposing forces vrere about.
ig:rL ,, e = o tY of ourr' air force in bocibers and ground at t '.c:k
, ~. .~~ . by the incZv~s~.oc~ Ln the riuL7ber of borr
.~ ~b can u e e.~ j: ~_ ..~ ~.nea b,:
aircraft of U-2 night bombers (over 100 ) c. ~.IT.
rl SrLi?~ f~ r r~t ~ V~1 ..
C when t he 3rd Mixed ,fir corps had r. nr~~
ot~'?S~? Of the oPp~a ~er .~i3.oY1, w
'
-~.~ated on the
?'
airfields of the 17th. Air krtly, we had a super~Qx
of one and a half in fighters.
into. accowclt that already bet ore the start
it has to be tan
:, had begun t4 use his bomberS to transt
~.e operation the enemy
- troo s encircled in atalin~'ad as well
-~ ~rLn~.t ~.on aid rations t o the p
13A DISS6i~Nt't~-TlAN EOKt~I~~ ANSiAtiON
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
STAT
?y J 1.+o 4.0 ti dr>spOi. t planeS
s.
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
I ib
t r Action , the i)on . 1
LU.--- -
i3 to the . of el' nip: avsk group and that he therefore was unab1e t O
i ~ert his a s ~n h from the ao th'e' de l"*'he :gas
waiting for
more favorable strength ratios This WS fuJ.ly borne out durin
F, battle. Of the total number of aircraft of the 4th.
!air F1e`?~t
:parted opposite the South Western Front and the Voronezh Frrot
enemy never used more than about 35% to the period from the 16t]''r.
the 31st. of December= 1942. It follows that in the area of our
s ?a:ic a no more than 3 50 -450 enemy aircraft operated 0
Thus, the actual relationship of air strength during the
: the operation was 1:1.5 in our favors
The fo1iojiing assignments had been given to the comrriaflders of
Y
.
ir armies.
4
Gu~a.rd$ : rmies o
at; the be:3inning of the operation: to cooperate with the
.. ';U 2d troops of ail attacking armies in the breakthrough of th
prior to the start of the operation : to cover the mairx
or troops in the departure position; to destroy enemy aircr f? Cv.
airfields, as well as their headquarters, reserves and troops
)in g up to the front line; by night action to exhaust the ene'nY .-a
forward defended area partichlarly in the sectors of the 1s~;
s ;fended area and during the action in the depth of the
. t~;t.. ,axed AIir Corps flew only 31 njssjons ttac :ing Cf&?y
ia:ice flightsa In the zone of the 3rd. Guards army airei=aft
-p S
bec use t:hE airfield Progress? was not yet readyo
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
;4;;T;' tati
i.ch one Me 109 was destroy'eda
the bad ~~: eat hex' the 221st Somber Division de }. ivered
Despite
y~r~ ck on the airfields of T&tsifl3k and orozovsl where abo~ :t>
i, 1EJG!
eneuiy aircraft (Yu-8$ and Y w-'52) were destroyed
Iii the following days the attack by our ground forces was more
c-ces5fu Despite the dtermined resistance of the enemy, by ~;hr aF
~.4 D~.es
-~,r:;e 17th of )ecembe~ the forward defences in the direction c t! I
~. ~~ .
T~? . thy:use.s of the ofh and 1st a G. ~ds 4 'mien` had been pierce -
~.
rm the 18tho of ecemober the sane ~?r& achieVa . by the 3rd0
iiL,rrs '?}}9th0 Of Dc~ceriber began tFe pursuit of the
~r r On the .1
,.{ l~? the entire front a
~rA this period she aircraft of the 2nd. aria 17tho Air Ar rrd.o~$
? n i ; irith t he ground troopsb xt has to be noted
...: cam.
?
.
~
). first few days our air force cou.: dcooperate k.5.thT
,.rJ in the .
~GJil~vlt
ositia.t (because of bac \-V ?
:cet?.n~! any ener~e~ air flFF
: :L:w. over t,nEir jrfieds ) during the fa11atring days enemy vpp
i
. increased consideXlablpo our air force did no
b with {?h enemy aircraft ??hieh were EJa'%Qa opposite
h
. , j ;D~ E-;'; -?4'!PSt e~'TE Front but also with a number of fight~.r dett ch'-
~- i1 .sere being sent up from a southerly directiarlo
.,; r craft etas .:.ore active on the l7thi of )ecu;iber- at day 517 enemy flights were ctad by our troops which
: 1g ~
t the sane number as ours (577) e The app
n ?s ftioe made the :ark of our (T_ia "'
with the result that in the grade ;.1r vrrr;
ch r_ore difficult
Air Corps the ground attack aircraft could not
.fl t.he 3rd. .Tixed use of its laC~~ of figIzter coven;
task camp~ ~etely because
~ its
videe tai at several det~. ~chmvnts of wound ddition this condition was aggravated by the lack of technical
r Bonne t a
As it can be seen, because of meteorological conditions an-1
z ci number of aircraft , our ~: lr force was only able to fulfil
7i the ;~ner-y on the field of battle helped our ground t'o roes cc r_-
,_;.;"d er(b:LY. There vrere many clear examples of our air force d sbt
pz rtion Of its assignment .
Only one of the tasl:s - cooperation v ith the ground troop:
', ri s;he breakthrough of the enemy defence line p was aCCOLnPIIshe
.:t,isf aictori1yo Conducting a large number (over 1200) direct att4 c ,,
STAT
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
onf th
.ir Action
e__)o
_
.. rent of infantry for . counter attack in the area south of Novo#ieIF-
-
f icid of battle A serious weakness was the poor manner in itch
~. 2nd. A1~ Army, lasting for ti-co hours, the enemy infantry a f + &,
.rh heavy losses that the counter attack T?ras disrupted.
it has to be mentioned that the presence of the core anderso '
air -'orriations at the command posts of the ground force f or r at
considerably improved joint action between the services on
: ound troops detailed their posltiofigo Our aircraft fi?e~._uent1y =ad
! rant e time in finding the locatiof of our trot~p8 before att ae -
:7;c:idertS occurred ;hen our air force, not being able to locat -3 OUT
troops accurat ely, delivered their strikes ~.O to 15 km away
z:~;:~ he dei?^ed target.
The Twst inteive air action during the whole period took p1~ ;
-,J:3 zone of the 3rd, yards Army. U~V3pite the strong enemy air
ti ;1tion in this soctor, the fighter aircraft of xh~~ 1sta ~iixed
is ~D _s ware able ;o provide air cover for our troops tlwoughout
l_1 o.
Ht:AGB 1~7u~r:K
On the 20th. of 0ecember , the enemy cbhcentrated about aj reg.
km Yrest of #;oir alitva) e Thanks to an attack by aircraft of
o J, ration.a a.rid the activity of the ground Uttac:k aircrc.f .
gr e. :
L
in t hr :5
r&ssista1zce to the ground troops in the direc .ion os the
Ir the ,:hole period from the 16th. to the 2o~ha of
c.;rber . 3A
covering "ii.ssions :ere flon by the fighters nd 332
ions against the enemy in thy: fiold of battle ~iera flcn by t.hc~
c ; d attack aircraft. icir action on the f cold of battle acc' ur t ed
x le costa uctioD of up to 3o tanks, 50 gins, 2 gnriunition tlopets i
,
~
r.motor vehicles F transports, and personnel of the ere :nyo .'he
.E;z~t3ss conducted 25 air battles in z?thieh 21 enemy aircraft iJarc
-: troyedo .
During the first phase of the operatiof, the it force teas ab1
,,
,t-rough its night and day attacks, to digit the enemy's work of
:rear services and the for-;ard movement of reserves. These tLsks
fulfilled by the limited foreee under the direct control of he
umaM of the 17th. sir Aziuy (the 221st. Bomber and units of the
I3A DISSEMINATION RAH5LATION
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
a (4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
kir action on the Bon
X62 Night Bomber Divisions) . These forces,
~, .
ene. iy's airfields, dealt severs;
,of.s .luboiaya,
the railtray stag'!
Millerovvo, andt the enema reserves in the c reaQ
... i erovo, awienka, and t~ashary.
The shortage of r Ircraft during the attack neverthe1ess~ provtid
:=.gnif icant .
Thus, on the i$ h. of Z eceraber our roconnai sance ob
.,erved a large fortiard movement of enemy reserves by road and ~Io :g
-e rail lines Rossosh V r'atrafahovka, antemirovka i:ar en :k,
e1cLai1t,venskaya Chernishkovskiy. Only the general shortage of
'- ircraft prevented the delivery of a powerful strike at these
The activity of the night bombers, who utilized liberally
opportunity for action, had a consicb rable .nfluer~ a oar
icr fi:~ent s. The inability of our air force to disrupt the rail rove
,cnv enabled the enemy to move two fresh infantry divisions in o
,:ec.4or of the litho : rrny of the Voronezh x`ront as 1?,ell as to move re..
r es opposite the left flank of the South-:astern Font in time
l .,.,..ac the attack of the 5the 'l'ank .-rvtye
iily hl
iV W J l~. C
J
^ ,:~ n^b o-
group of the 3 oth. Ni. it c3omber Regiment (16 U-2
it), o er2ting in the zone of the 1st. Gurds Army, #'lew`
13 , .on 3 r that is, 5 to 6 flights for every serviceable aR.rcra.f ,
Cood results and the high effectiveness of the airra?
T?oer'~ the result of good organization of its operational v_:
ar`~ilo
' 'a , 3
tmander, after receiving his orders from the commander of the
Night Bomber Regiment Q As is correct, they operat
31f1 air strips 5 to 15 kms behind the front line. The Regiment
t t h. Air Army, f l ew to the commander of the air force unit , con.
.med the targets with him, and then issued his orders to hls
Df the battle. In every one of the long reinter nights
rail
he
~~~
or. missions. In the night of the 16th. to the 17th 0 o':
,- 3
perSCnnel.
s
..
Each airstrip sent out a post equipped with signal rockets
or torches) and connected directly by telephone with the airsbip
..
3A E TA !''?' T
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
20.
besides striking at the
STAT
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
he flight personnel knew the exact location of each of these out
:.
i 31' as the distance and direction of the target tfom
?;)osts 3 as iAe
?:;here.
immediately of the departure of G.
Each outpost was infoflaed
to give s1gna1 3 to assist the aircraft in find ~
i
.~..~.~ht and $tdr~i~ c.~
7 The flight from the outpost to the target was de-
t.erm ?~e and course of f light The next flight did not de
~.n ed by t3.
part until the post reported the return of he first one@
be started by a aconnaisance Of. the position of the Lr ou d
~' .
T 9A~. to re:~ark that the poor1 r organized signal
y
~eMCRg
~ ~ 11
.ir
-
?s aux ~ command posts of he 2nd. Air Array
~,e~ bet~,yeen the ~.l~.~~ ~'y ~
:D.(J their air units supporting the Found troops of the tithe array s
. ,~= s
cz.zetract from the effectivones~ of thtr activity di.:
:.~ka,ryrous~.~.? e~. ;
fact the auxxliar"~ ccr~?,
,_. ,,. f ,, attacks In aotu~l
,,~~.~.~.~ st sets days of the
i liJ.ry=d osta turne relay for the staff of the 2nd. Ai r:
.~. into re~'
if
in practice this resulted in the dolay of trans:ttance o ser s &t;u of the departure of flights. Thus on the second day of
aircraft discovered our tanks in trje area o
he eperE.t ipn, enotfly
started to bomb these heavily. 3ecause ;f 1 aik
I~2:gran g and t
.. , aircovar for these troops was no' p:o~
tiC03Ii"1uL~.2Cat~?fli1a, t~.ii1E~-J
.Ldpct , rlkiougi: `~ enough fighters for the task were availablc,
~ ,, .
Besx.?o.es that g the air units and foraations were not farLiar
RVu&t 14n. As a result of this daily opEv^atiors b;i
the around s1
\,opsa
~ mber) the air force could not operate because L.
~~~e 24th. of - ~,,ce ~,
11 low ceiliag)o An exception Z?ras tl~~ ~:.; L
b ;d ~~Teather (fog ~ sn~f a ,
nn isance 2fld attaci.r;
rGR~ A~TIO d IN TH P IOD O~ THE PI RSUIT
yid
Dur t fec: days of the pursuit (from the 21st to
~.r~the first
December E;hen 52 missions were floes (rc~cv a
on the E:ithdrat'ing enemy) Thzis our ground forces operated ~:ithopv .?ing ;.sere destroyed or made unserviceable + about;:
~?ation the folwo~r
100 tanks, 150 guns of vary ' ous ealibre 30 armored vehicles, 15
and azmnnunition, a ierge number of motor vehicIes,
~. pot ;flt ~ of FGA .. ~ n
af' enemy der sonneL In addition, the fighters conducted over 200
r~R a1 battles ~ W hich 95 enemy aircraft were shot dos-in and 14
-~ ~~l,.es in
nmaged
ir ' ou~ troops
coves our ~
foxcaa~
ant
st
bL
~.~sc?rt s far ?ur ound attar k ~d bomb'$ with a clearly unravora
f t n: Up
i
ng
? o other aircraft ( at the beginn
g
~'? ~: to of ~~,lter~ ~
round attack and bomber air''
many
g as
.
there wer~.our Q
e
abJ flL ,
h
e E
ers these cirQ 1St ces, the decision ~y t
crft as fight)o Undernder
rt the left f7ank (the 3rd.
to suP~
~
;:or~mand of the 17th. Air At~ty
s
~~ th the f~ormationshaving a larger
:ua~s and 5th. ' .anr Army) ti
t
t~ a
sters, l~aS cot~ect .:. ~bi.8 de. ror int~e adat;ua
~
rcentage of fig~;
? of our advaitroops created some dif f :lank.
f
J;:
L
.
The relati.ve.- ~, {in r&.atit~n to the ;.hole attacK) e~lfa,
~1~. small
and the n concentrations of his stre~~ ;
orIt~r in aircraft ~
tflG 31st. of ecembe3', 1942, 4
t. airfields i$o enem7 aircafrft we destroyed.
}}}
..ti
,_i A
J .5
- the head, uc.rters of-the aur. armies, in the pe.oa
r~crd of
.
..~, a ter tlori. itn increase in th e activity
t7;.E i.n
fields irrou-a have had to be~ade at the coat of reducing t~.?
;:~e ~. a..~.
;x,
~,~w,ort~ . troops on the batt~.sFie~.*.~s and this ti?las
against the enemy
wt r, It has to be noted that, due to to g, od r~eccr.K
by the ~iir force, the strikes on t^.rge ;s beyofc
wncu conducted ~. ~.
. Thus, for example, acco: ding to
,n1, G; ds .rer most effectiva
i
-~: of the ., horta.ga of airera~t or air force was u'iable
aeC~.~ta
,~ fulfil ~ all the tasks detanded on a front of four armies, for
t important tasks as the destruction of enemy air
reason ,:
: ,. t i"ldss the disruption of rail traffic etc., on
~
the ~ ? ~rf
I3A IORM FUK
,riZVTAT 93w)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
Wareaired &s ~~reLl as
d
STAT
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
Y s .s=s~NCE T1.MTIO
air coyer of around- 'troops of
The successful action of
the battlefield doing a
e breakthrough of the def efld .d: gone was, ' to a:. Feat degree,
p)=t3ib1e bKr the s ewefee of the air CO ndE'rs at the ground
Made
fa- c
hand posts. Thanks to this arrangernaft', coordinated action betc7 en thA units of the 17th. Air Army ald the ground forces was
ory in the directiofl of the 1 i ti~rmt t.uring the 1 it st
.,.~.t~.sfact~, e
^eetors of the front ~;hiCh resulted in' an almost equc1 dispcrs.,
phase of the attack. The geratest cfeakriess i~c obtain 1ng joint c :tici.;
. . . he fact that the ground traope vrei'e Tjeak in givii" accurate
1.nf ors ration concerning their actual dispositions during the ba{tt - c
Fhis reduced considerably the effectiveness of tI air f crceThe described operation shows of what trendous impoiaZ=Ce
t h or afiZation of a good system of comrnur.~ication, particul.'l:Y
(;.f radios with air force f ormatiofs (and units) is in the cork: ' t
: a battle. The coordination as planned by the staff of the 2n,, .
a;ix' Arm; 'ras si~ffCiciently Drell corked out but it 'failed to achie ?,~
ti ' ? d result because of the lack of radio stations at the
i Ji ary C OTDlQ posts.
The following defi of envies of our air Force during the the o eration have to be noted:
1 0 The failure of manoeuvre of our airs: aft between the ', r -t
our air force beti,een four advancing armies. The , air orma .o n.
Au :1;i:i e t?he organization of control and the disposition C) C t:h'
.aug' t only in the sectors of the armies to which they had b--ea as }-
aircraft w=as so organized in the 17th. i,ir Army that fighting
thti
in a majority of instances, concentt'ating his strength on
enemy i
.
narrow ., s f . enuently able to achieve e/ ualitynarrow sectors, d ,
possibility was not exploited in full measure and aB a result
zones of the neighbeiing armies wou:.d have been pas Bible'
often, superiority, in the air.
2 . The partiCularly poor coordinatiof of. ground and a s r #orc
e
during t ne pursuit of the enemy into his rear areas. Our air f ore
13A pI$SEMLNATION TRANSLATION
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
H 26 __
the lit wf fg possib1 e a
STAT
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R001100010002-2
? ?a__f.-ar.:?r .r+w^.a