PROSPECTS FOR REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN INDICATORS APPROACH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00558R000200080002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Prospects for Revolution
in the Philippines:
An Indicators Approach
MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
Secret
GI 83-10070
March 1983
Copy 310
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Prospects'for Revolution
in the Philippines:
An Indicators Approach
This paper was prepared by bf the
Political Instability Branch, Office of Global Issues.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the.Chief. Instability and Insur2ency
Center, OGI,
Operations.
Secret
GI 83-10070
March 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Secret
Prospects for Revolution
in the Philippines:
An Indicators Approach
Many ingredients of political instability are present in the Philippines, 25X1
including deteriorating social and economic conditions, a growing insur-
gency, and greatly weakened political institutions. Marcos's dismember-
ment of a longstanding pluralistic system and his unwillingness to allow
further political liberalization after formally lifting martial law have
created a political environment that is prompting some moderate opponents
to seek more radical alternatives. 25X1
particularly in the event of Marcos's departure from the scene.
Key Judgments On the basis of an analysis of selected indicators, we believe that a
Information available dramatic slide into instability is unlikely to occur in the Philippines for at
as of I March 1983 least the next two years. President Marcos's considerable personal political
was used in this report.
skills and conservative social forces-including the Roman Catholic
Church, traditional elites with their patron-client networks, and the
military-are likely to remain strong enough to contain increasing disaf-
fection to the regime for at least a few more years. We are, however, less
certain about the stability of the Marcos regime in the long term,
These judgments concerning medium- and long-term political instability in
the Philippines are based on a systematic review of indicators of social,
economic, and political change. Specifically, we examined 21 indicators of
potential instability with reference to the Philippines. Thirteen suggest a
current worsening in the conditions that lead to instability, seven show no
change, and one is ambiguous. Supporting our judgment that political
instability is not imminent, some major indicators of instability are not
present. We have not observed:
? A precipitate breakdown of traditional authority patterns.
? A rapid increase in the variety and number of acts of civil disobedience.
? An introduction or rapid escalation of foreign support of domestic
opposition groups.
Supporting our concern about instability over the long term, the following
indicators, among others, are present:
? A decline in social mobility and economic opportunity.
? The emergence of alternative political philosophies.
? A polarization between regime supporters and opposition groups.
? A declining government financial position.
? The weakening of political institutions.
? Declining government authority over territory and security of population.
Secret
GI 83-10070
March 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
This assessment of indicators is a snapshot in time. Examined in the future
at regular intervals-for example, every six months-the indicators might
show in the next several years overall improvement, a further worsening
situation, or fluctuation. A negative shift in one or more of the major
indicators that currently shows no increase in instability-or intensification
of trends in the indicators that currently do show increasing instability-
would be cause for additional concern.
The potential for future instability is being exploited most successfully by
the Communist Party of the Philippines/Marxist-Leninist (CPP) and its
military wing, the New People's Army (NPA). The CPP also has an
increasingly potent political wing-the National Democratic Front (NDF).
The CPP/NPA does not yet have-and may never attain-the ability to
defeat the government; but its emphasis on planning, organization, strate-
gy, and tactics together with its focus on specific social issues and conflicts
make it an increasingly important threat to stability. To assess the
potential CPP threat we have evaluated its capabilities against those of
previously successful revolutionary groups in other countries.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84S00558R000200080002-3
Key Judgments
Socioeconomic Attitudes and Pressures
Political Opposition in the Philippines
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84S00558R000200080002-3
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
25X1
Criteria for Evaluating the Threat to the Political
Stability of the Philippines
Socioeconomic Attitudes and Pressures:
? Precipitate breakdown of traditional authority
patterns.
? Decline in economic mobility.
? Increased economic stress.
? Increased inequity and corruption.
? Rising national indignation about dependency on or
domination by a foreign power or foreign values
Antiregime Attitudes and Behavior:
? Withering of popular support for regime.
? Erosion of support among political elites.
? Emergence of alternative political philosophies.
? Polarization between regime supporters and opposi-
tion groups.
? Rapid increase in variety and number of acts of
civil disobedience.
? Better executed, more frequent, and discriminate
acts of urban terrorism.
? Introduction or escalation of rural insurgency.
? Introduction or escalation of foreign support of
domestic opposition groups.
Regime Capabilities and Behavior:
? Declining government authority over territory and
security of population.
? Increasing loss of control over armed forces.
? Deteriorating government financial position.
? Increasing severe suppression of outlets for legal
dissidence.
? Increasingly frequent policy changes and govern-
mental reorganizations.
? Appearance of increasing indecisiveness resulting
from conflicting policies of liberalization and
repression.
? Weakening political institutions.
? Declining capability of government for political
mobilization.
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Prospects for Revolution
in the Philippines:
An Indicators Approach
The Instability and Insurgency Center, OGI, is pro-
ducing a series of studies in which a set of indicators
is systematically evaluated to provide a degree of
rigor and comprehensiveness to the analysis of politi-
cal instability. The sets of indicators used in the
individual studies vary according to: (1) the time
frame of the study-short term (six months or less),
intermediate term (seven months to two years), or
long term (beyond two years); and (2) whether the
analysis concerns generalized political instability or
one of its subsets, such as militarily organized insur-
gency or regime collapse. In this paper, we are
primarily concerned with the likelihood of general
instability in the Philippines over the long term.
This paper examines the potential for radical political
change in the Philippines over the long term-more
than two years. The paper is presented in two parts.
The first part focuses on political instability risks by:
looking at conditions that might lead to social and
political turmoil; analyzing the capabilities of major
opposition groups and identifying the one most likely
to provoke and gain by revolutionary conditions; and
assessing the Marcos regime's capability to respond to
serious challenge. It reviews 21 indicators of socioeco-
nomic change, antiregime activity, and regime compe-
tence. In the second part, we assess the strengths and
weaknesses of political opposition groups. Specifically,
we assess their strengths and weaknesses with an eye
toward identifying the group or groups posing the
greatest long-term threat to the Marcos regime. In
doing this, we compare Philippine opposition groups
with successful revolutionary movements in other
countries.
The Philippines now faces a number of strains that
can affect the Marcos regime or its successor. Among
the most serious strains are a decline in social mobility
and economic opportunity, an absence of political
liberalization, and a weakening of political institu-
tions. Review of our indicators confirms this underly-
ing strain. On the other hand, continuity in authority
patterns and consistency in government policies, con-
tinued support of the government by the armed forces,
and generally effective security control over cities and
towns militate against the effects of these strains.
While on balance the strains are probably not regime
threatening in the medium term, their effects, if
continued, would likely be compounded over the long
term into a more serious situation. The following
material lays out the results of our indicator analysis.
25X1
25X1
? Precipitate Breakdown of Traditional Authority
Patterns-Not Evident
This phenomenon has not been occurring in the
Philippines. Rather, new authority patterns have
gradually been imposed on top of the old, in part as a
result of the implementation of Marcos's "New Soci-
ety" program-a plan designed to modernize the
economy and increase social equity. Many academic
and government observers argue that neither of these
objectives has been achieved; but the "New Society"
has forced the traditional oligarchy to adapt to new
circumstances, led certain Church elements to be-
come discontented with the regime, and brought new
elites-particularly the military-into the power
equation. Although this reordering of the political 25X1
influence and attitudes of national elites has intro-
duced some new uncertainties, its evolutionary pace is
not threatening to national stability.
The military is emerging as potentially the most
significant political actor and eventually may fill the
political vacuum that appears to be developing be-
cause of Marcos's intolerance of serious opposition. In
the countryside, the paternalism of the traditional
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84S00558R000200080002-3
Marcos's New Society Program
In 1971, a year before he imposed martial law,
Marcos published his prescription for the Filipino
society. His concept, called the New Society, envi-
sioned social and economic reform, a modern and
centralized economy, and a consensual political sys-
tem.
The economic cornerstone of the New Society is a
land reform begun in 1972. Critics argue that, al-
though heralded by the government for its accom-
plishments, the land reform is so riddled with loop-
holes and exemptions that it helps very few.
Two-thirds of the country's agricultural land is auto-
matically excluded, and many landowners are able to
avoid the effects of the laws by shifting crops. Most of
the large estates of the oligarchic families, however,
have been broken up and redistributed.
Another major economic feature of the New Society
program is the effort to modernize the leading export
commodity sector, coconut products, through a cen-
tralized government-sponsored trading and pricing
entity. It is also a divisive political issue involving
political and commercial interests tied to Marcos and
his closest associates. Other highly publicized New
Society and subsequent economic programs, such as
the rural credit and development project, known as
KKK (Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran), and the
urban renewal BLISS program, are largely show-
pieces, undercapitalized and ineffectual.
The political cornerstone of the New Society is the
doctrine of "constitutional authoritarianism, " which
entails the creation of a grass-roots political infra-
structure based on patron-client networks ultimately
beholden to Marcos. The major consequence of Mar-
cos's restructuring of the Philippine political system
is the higher profile and increased influence of the
military and civilian technocrats at the expense of the
legislature, courts, the press, and other institutions of
the previous democratic order.
elite has historically acted as a shock absorber be-
tween aggrieved citizens and the government. Martial
law, however, in part reduced the oligarchy's ability to
perform this function. Simultaneously, martial law
put the military in a position to wield considerable
political clout, an option it has yet to exercise fully. So
far he
military has tended to view its enhanced position more
as a reward for loyal service and an opportunity for
personal gain than as a means to establish political
power. Nonetheless, its presence is being felt more
and more, and both public and private statements of
politicians indicate that it is becoming increasingly
important in the calculations of all political actors.
The oligarchs have survived change by adapting.
Before martial law, the traditional oligarchic elite was
composed of some 400 families whose vertically struc-
tured, regionally based dominions ruled Philippine
society. As the economy modernized, many of the
oligarchs moved to Manila and diversified their eco-
nomic interests while maintaining their position at the
apex of a pyramid of rural patron-client networks that
favor continuity and stability. Most of those who
invested their wealth in the modern sector became
part of the new urban-based ruling political elite and
part of Marcos's ruling KBL (Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan) political coalition. Of those who were not co-
opted by Marcos, some have become leaders in the
moderate opposition.
The Catholic Church-another important traditional
authority network-continues to retain its consider-
able position and influence. Its emphasis on obedience
to hierarchical authority represents a force for moder-
ation and anti-Communism. Since martial law, how-
ever, the Church leadership has spoken out against
social neglect and human rights abuses, most pointed-
ly in the recent joint pastoral letter of the country's
110 bishops. More importantly, younger priests and
nuns have become involved in social issues, and,
a few have
tion of income and halting military abuses.'
been radicalized to the point of giving active assis-
tance to the Communists. Their public statements
show that they believe the Marcos regime should
institute significant reforms aimed at better distribu-
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84S00558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Secret
Church-state relations have recently become aggravated by in-
creased social activism among younger priests and nuns. F_
? Decline in Economic Mobility-Evident
This condition is gradually developing, primarily as a
result of unfavorable economic and demographic
trends. High birth rates in recent decades promise
unprecedented growth in the labor force during the
next 10 years when the economy is unlikely to allow a
similar growth in jobs. Already unemployment is 14
percent nationwide and almost twice that in Manila,
according to a Development Academy of the Philip-
pines Survey. The aspiring children of the urban and
rural poor, as well as those of the middle class, are
finding it increasingly difficult to get ahead.
? Increased Economic Stress-Evident
The economic downturn that started in 1980, brought
about mainly by depressed world conditions, is caus-
ing nationwide stress. We estimate that the country's
1982 growth rate was not the 3.8 percent the govern-
ment announced but near zero. There also was a sharp
deterioration in the balance of payments. Several of
the largest companies in the Philippines have suffered
major losses which have required government bail-
outs; real wages have been stagnant since 1979;
unemployment has doubled nationwide; and the num-
ber of urban slumdwellers and rural poor has dramat-
ically increased. Fragmented and co-opted labor orga-
nizations have largely failed to extract better pay and
conditions for workers. Low world commodity prices
for sugar and copra exports have caused farmers great
financial hardships.
? Increased Inequity and Corruption-Evident
World Bank studies and the US Embassy generally
observe that the economic benefits of the New Society
have not trickled down but coagulated at the top.
Overall, income distribution has become more un-
equal since martial law was imposed. The US Embas-
sy and other observers believe that, politically, it is
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
seriously diminishing Marcos's appeal, which has
been based on economic prosperity:
In the cities, particularly Metro-Manila, glaring
economic disparity continues to grow. According
to a 1981 World Bank report, the number of
urban poor increased from 24 percent to 40
percent of the urban population between 1975 and
1980. Squatters now make up 38 percent of the
Metro-Manila total population. Press reporting
indicates that slumdwellers are becoming orga-
nized and capable of articulating grievances.
Some labor groups have also become more mili-
tant since the end of martial law. This volatile
mixture means that issues such as sudden in-
creases in energy or food costs could lead to
violent antiregime actions.
In the countryside, discontent remains unrelieved,
not only because of falling incomes but also
because of government malfeasance, including
price manipulations and mismanagement of distri-
bution and marketing mechanisms. The resultant
increase in rural poverty in some areas appears to
be an important factor in leading some peasants to
support the Communist insurgency. Finally, ran-
dom media sampling suggests that among the
more articulate and politically aware there ap-
pears to be a perception that graft and corrup-
tion-long-held criticisms of the government-not
only continue in the New Society but are now
more centralized, and hence more visible and
objectionable.
? Rising National Indignation About
Dependency on or Domination by
a Foreign Power or Values-Evident
Efforts to modernize and integrate the Philippines
more fully into the world economy have increased its
foreign dependency and significantly heightened na-
tional sensitivities. According to recent editorials, the
massive infusion of foreign-owned capital, much of
which is concentrated in the manufacturing and ex-
port sectors, is creating annoyance among members of
the urban middle class. They are questioning the
regime's ability to maintain its economic independ-
ence. The issue of foreign economic exploitation is
being capitalized on by both the moderate and radical
opposition. The US bases review scheduled for April
Opposition rally poster depicts President Marcos as 'fascist"
dictator controlled by Japanese and American business interests.
25X1 25X1
has also become a rallying point for the opposition,
many of whom regard the bases as an infringement on
Philippine sovereignty. Although the US Embassy has
been unable thus far to assess the strength of the
movement, it has expressed concern that the antibases
movement is tailored for exploitation by Communist-
influenced elements.
? Withering of Popular Support for
Regime-Partially Evident
Although it is impossible to measure accurately the
decline in popular support for Marcos, recent reports
from the US Embassy suggest that the regime's
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Secret
image and credibility have fallen
The radical but weak and.splintered Social Demo-
cratic movement presents itself as the "third
alternative" to Communism and the right. Its
Jesuit-influenced philosophy combines national-
ism with Christian socialism.
25X1
25X1
government representatives at a meeting in April
1982 discussed this decline and found that significant
popular cynicism and hostility existed
? Erosion of Support Among Political
Elites-Recently Evident
The new ruling elite of businessmen, political appoint-
ees, the military, government technocrats, and some
pre-Marcos oligarchs have benefited from the system
and have been loyal to the President. Since 1980,
however, there appears to have been a growing crisis
of confidence among some segments of the elite with
regard to the government. Newspaper editorials and
US Embassy reports suggest that the confidence of
the oligarchic elite, for instance, has been shaken by
the combination of a downturn in the economy plus
financial scandals involving cronies of the Marcos
family. Similarly, the business community has ex-
pressed doubts about the government. The President
of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try, for example, recently warned that Filipino busi-
nesses across the board are facing financial difficul-
ties. Marcos has publicly accused some members of
the business elite of conspiring to foment unrest.
Reform measures designed to depoliticize economic
policy and ensure more effective economic develop-
ment are now under way. If.these are not successful,
we believe, the new economic elite may become less
supportive of Marcos and his policies.
? Emergence of Alternative Political
Philosophies-Evident
Several new opposition philosophies have been pro-
mulgated to take advantage of the perceived failure of
the Marcos regime. Most publications or speeches
stress vague themes of democratic socialism but
none-apart from the Communists-have a program-
matic plan for action:
The United Nationalist Democratic Opposition.
(UNIDO), a loose coalition of moderate opposition
parties, calls for the restoration of democratic and
human rights, populist economic policies, a halt to
corruption, and the .end of foreign domination.
Splinter groups within UNIDO advocate more
radical social change through peaceful and demo-
cratic means.
- Potentially the most attractive philosophy is of-
fered by the Communist Party of the Philippines/
New People's Army (CPP/NPA), which shrouds
its Communist ideology in a well-thought-out
program emphasizing popular grievances against
the government.
? Polarization Between Regime Supporters and
Opposition Groups-Evident
Diverse opposition groups-former traditional politi-
cians, Social Democrats, Communists, and Mus-
lims-have found areas for cooperation against the
regime. Their political pronouncements have become
increasingly left of center, nationalistic, and anti-
American. Nonetheless, we believe this drift is gradu-
al and presents no unmanageable problems for Mar-
cos at the present time. In October 1982, UNIDO
President Salvador H. Laurel made a public appeal
for a new constitution to reflect the "true sentiments
of the real opposition" and has warned of the "wors-
ening radicalization" of various groups in the country.
In addition to statements such as this, we have
observed a growing willingness of moderates to partic-
ipate in public forums with individuals leading more
radical movements
? Rapid Increase in Variety and Number of Acts of
Civil Disobedience-Not Evident
We believe that more recent acts of. civil disobedience
have failed in the Philippines because of a lack of
organization, public cynicism, and the superior en-
forcement capabilities of the government, particularly
in the Metro-Manila area. However, some demonstra?
tions, both in Manila and in the provinces, continue to
be reported by the Embassy and in the press. A broad
alliance of moderate and radical opposition political
parties, labor groups, students, and clergy joined in
May 1981 to demonstrate against and boycott the
16 June presidential elections in which Marcos ran
virtually unopposed for a six-year extension of his
term. There has been no further attempt at mass
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
elections have drawn only limited support
? Better Executed and More Frequent and Discrimi-
nate Acts of Urban Terrorism-Not Evident
Urban terrorism has declined since martial law was
lifted in January 1981. Acts of urban terrorism by
various opposition groups have generally been met
with a hostile public response and have not affected
the regime's ability to rule. Government antiterrorism
efforts have been effective, especially in Manila.
Terrorism peaked in the 1979-80 period during the
height of the "June Bride" urban terrorism campaign
and since then opposition activity in the cities has
been mostly nonviolent.
? Introduction or Escalation of Rural
Insurgency-Evident
The level of Communist (CPP/NPA) insurgency,
however, is increasing in the countryside.' Yearend
official figures for 1982 show a 33-percent increase in
incidents over 1981. The government estimates that
since 1978 the number of NPA regular guerrillas has
doubled to 6,000 and the number of popular support-
ers is more than 180,000. The insurgency, previously
confined to relatively isolated areas in Samar, Luzon,
and Mindanao, is spreading to more populated areas,
particularly the Misamis Oriental and Davao del
Norte Provinces in the south.
Front (MNLF)-is declining.
? Introduction or Escalation of Foreign Support of
Domestic Opposition Groups-Not Evident
kiissi-
dents in the pines continue to receive only
moderate support from abroad. Aid levels do not
appear to be growing and, in fact, may be diminish-
ing.
UNIDO and the Social Democrats
receive some material support from expatriate Filipi-
no dissident groups. The old-line, pro-Soviet Commu-
nist Party, the PKP, and the CPP/NPA, have been
forced to be largely self-reliant, and the absence of
significant foreign support has inhibited the growth of
the NPA insurgency. Beijing ceased supplying the
CPP/NPA with financial and military aid in the early
1970s. In early 1982 President Marcos and his Armed
Forces Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver claimed
publicly that theNPA was receiving arms from
abroad, presumably from the Soviets, after several
AK-47 and AK-50 assault rifles were discovered in
NPA guerrillas are becoming bolder, conducting larg-
er scale raids (occasionally involving as many as 70 to
several hundred guerrillas) on more highly populated
targets in broad daylight. Their objectives appear to
be to illustrate their strength, and conversely the
government's weakness, and to procure arms from
overrun government arsenals. The authorities also
note an increase in selective assassinations in rural
areas. On the other hand, the Muslim insurgency in
the south-led by the Moro National Liberation
support from Libya, other Arab countries, and Ma-
laysia, now receives only modest external assistance.
? Declining Government Authority Over Territory and
Security of Population-Evident
Despite eight years of martial law, which enhanced
the power and authority of the executive and post-
martial-law institutionalization of those powers, the
government has been increasingly unable to guarantee
the security of outlying villages because of the wors-
ening insurgency. The chief constraints to the mainte-
nance of government authority are geographic-the
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
75X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Secret
Insurgent Activity in the Philippines
egros
ccide'n_fal
I SUIiiF
avall
Luzon
Clark
,Airbasd
tnam
South.
China
Sea
aIays1p,
Philippine
Sea
Philippines
8icol d~ ?~'
Ce/ebes Sea
Samar
S,- NUTO:
Region or province with
increased insurgent activity
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Philippines has more than 7,000 islands-and budget-
ary. The areas of weakest authority are in geographi-
cally remote northeast Luzon; the Bicol; traditionally
lawless and isolated Samar; and parts of non-Muslim
central and eastern Mindanao, which are also areas of
active insurgency.
Until late last fall the Communist insurgents had
generally been contained by government forces. Re-
cently, however, they have become bolder, raided
towns in Mindanao in groups of several hundred
during daylight hours, and in one instance held a town
hostage for an entire day before voluntarily retreat-
ing. The US defense attache recently reported that
NPA guerrillas effectively control some isolated ar-
eas-notably parts of Luzon, the Visayas, Samar, and
eastern Mindanao. Last year, the armed forces tried
unsuccessfully to offset Communist gains through a
pilot counterinsurgency offensive in the Bicol and a
hamlet relocation project in Mindanao. The govern-
ment's most recent scheme, "Katatagan," touted as a
multipronged program to reduce the dissidents' grass-
roots support, is too new to be evaluated.
The government's writ remains strong in the densely
populated and developed regions of the country. Mar-
cos has sharply reduced the random violence of the
freewheeling, gun-toting pre-martial-law period.
? Increasing Loss of Control Over
Armed Forces-Not Evident
We believe that the military is loyal to Marcos, and a
coup is unlikely as long as he remains the head of
state. Since the imposition of martial law in 1972, the
military has nearly trebled in size from a strength of
55,400 to over 156,000 in 1981. The officer corps has
increased threefold, which has meant rapid promo-
tions for many. At the same time, the military has
assumed a major economic and local political role.
Every member of the general staff sits on a corporate
business board, although rarely do they become active
in everyday business affairs of the firms. Moreover,
middle- and even junior-grade officers pursue outside
financial activities. According to US Embassy observ-
ers, Marcos allows military officers to take advantage
of their official positions to better themselves finan-
cially in order to deflect potential dissatisfaction.
Active duty and retired senior officers also hold
important positions in government ministries, and
provincial and constabulary commanders have be-
come more important in many rural areas than the
civilian government officials. Although the military
now faces budgetary constraints, and some officers
may be resentful of the retention of senior officers
beyond normal retirement age, this is not likely to
affect the armed forces' subservience to civilian rule
under Marcos.
? Deteriorating Government Financial
Position-Evident
Although President Marcos's ambitious development
plans brought about a 5- to 6-percent annual national
economic growth rate during the 1970s, excessive
public and private borrowing and a decline in prices
for all major exports greatly increased the nation's
foreign debt which has consequently weakened the
country's overall financial position and limited the
government's financial options. The public sector is
responsible for about half of last year's record $18
billion foreign debt, nearly triple the 1978 debt of
$6.6 billion. As a result, the country's creditworthi-
ness has declined since 1980, the prices of principal
Filipino exports will likely remain low, and, although
new loans probably can be attained, they are likely to
be of shorter term and bear higher interest rates.
Under these circumstances, President Marcos will
have to lower his development sights and will not be
able to use fiscal policy to improve his political
position, except for perhaps a brief period-after
which conditions would likely become worse
? Increasing Suppression of Outlets for Legal
Dissidence-Ambiguous
We do not believe governmental suppression has
actually increased since the lifting of martial law in
January 1981. Nevertheless, the early December ar-
rests of 10 editors and journalists from the Manila
publication We Forum-the only major legal opposi-
tion newspaper-demonstrate that the level of sup-
pression continues to be substantial. Notwithstanding
the token liberalization since the end of martial law,
Marcos has been reluctant to ease restraints over
opposition activity. The end of martial law improved
the climate for the moderate opposition by allowing
somewhat freer political activity. The US Embassy,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Secret
however, reports little discernible progress in the
liberalization of the media. Strikes, although now
permissible, are restricted to what the President con-
siders nonessential industries, and the opposition re-
mains subject to prosecution in military courts under
subversion charges.
? Increasingly Frequent Policy Changes and Govern-
ment Reorganizations-Not Evident
President Marcos has been pragmatic in the day-to-
day management of his policies yet resolute in his
adherence to the general political, economic, and
social policies that he embarked upon a decade ago.
Despite rising criticism over the lack of genuine
popular participation, we see little prospect of Mar-
cos's returning to a system similar to that which
existed in the pre-martial-law period. Substantial
governmental reorganization did occur during martial
law when Marcos sought to enhance his power and
authority; since then, however, there has been little
structural rearrangement. Between 1972 and 1975
Marcos conducted periodic purges of leading bureau-
crats, judges, and military officers; but thereafter he
concentrated on political oppositionists and labor
leaders. To deflect public criticism of his "one-man
rule," in 1981 Marcos set up a 15-member Executive
Committee empowered to make major political and
economic decisions. The Committee, currently com-
posed of 10 members, has yet to consider a controver-
sial or crucial issue.
? Appearance of Increasing Indecisiveness Resulting
From Conflicting Policies of Liberalization and
Repression-Not Evident
Marcos has not appeared indecisive; rather he has
been selective in using his powers of repression be-
cause of his concern for domestic and foreign public
opinion. Liberalization has been accompanied by peri-
odic crackdowns designed to establish the limits of
acceptable opposition behavior. Following the lifting
of martial law in January 1981, for example, the
government eased up on its antiopposition activities;
but this period of liberalization ended in August 1982
with the announcement that a special 1,000-man
secret police force was being established to counteract
an alleged plot by Muslim secessionists, Social Demo-
crats, and Communists. Numerous anti-Marcos labor
leaders and some politicians were then detained.
? Weakening Political Institutions-Evident
The martial law period effectively destroyed previous-
ly existing democratic institutions that helped shape
and set limits to factional conflict for more than two
decades after independence from the United States.
Most national and local institutions in which rival
centers of power used to compete legally were elimi-
nated or restricted. Despite national and local elec-
tions since the end of martial law, the National
Assembly and town councils are now essentially rub-
berstamps. Put simply, there are few institutional
restraints on President Marcos's powers. What re-
mains of the pre-martial-law political institutions are
being further eroded.
? Declining Capability of Government for Political
Mobilization-Partially Evident
The government's ability to garner public support is
waning. While Marcos remains in control, denial of
free political expression has made the radical opposi-
tion more attractive, rule by executive decree has
impeded the growth of new political institutions, and
the loyalty of some formerly supportive elites is
dissipating. Most important, according to US Embas-
sy personnel trip reports and statements by the Philip- 25X1
pine Government and Church officials, popular per-
ceptions of government performance, though never
high, appear to be declining. Furthermore, the lack of
a recognized successor to Marcos has raised anxieties
about the future.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84S00558R000200080002-3
Characteristics of Previously Successful
Revolutionary Movements
Leaders:
? Total commitment to a cause.
? Passionate desire to succeed.
? Considerable interpersonal skills capable of inspir-
ing both supporters and neutrals and translating
ideas into action.
? Organizational talent.
? Common experiences, social class, and ethnic back-
ground with target population.
Programs and Plans:
? Clearly articulated goals able to be understood by
the populace.
? Promises to redistribute the social, economic, or
political resources of a country in a way that offers
immediate rewards to the many.
? Political statements on other issues and grievances
emotionally appealing to key sectors of the
population.
? Coherent strategy and tactics to focus and coordi-
nate activities.
? Flexibility to allow support for a "united front "for
the purposes of subverting or co-opting other oppo-
sition groups.
Organization:
? Sufficiently sophisticated to have functionally spe-
cialized and organizationally disciplined
departments.
Departmental units able to operate independently
when faced with a break in communications, dis-
ruption of the chain of command, or loss of key
leaders.
? Organizational adaptability to meet changing
requirements.
? Discipline over individual members.
? Extensive political intelligence networks.
? Well-developed propaganda mechanisms.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84S00558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84S00558R000200080002-3
Secret
On the basis of our comparison of the major opposi-
tion groups in the Philippines, we believe that the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's
Army (CPP/NPA) is in the best position to take
advantage of political instability in the Philippines.
Even though the party is still in the defensive stage of
its protracted, rural-based struggle and faces formida-
ble odds against Marcos and the military, it continues
to gain adherents. The United Nationalist Democratic
Opposition (UNIDO), the best known to the average
Filipino, is poorly organized. The Partido Komunista
ng Pilipinas (PKP) is small, active primarily among
labor groups, and believed to be infiltrated by govern-
ment agents. The Social Democrats have been inac-
tive since 1979-80 when its ranks were depleted by
arrests and unpopular radical tactics.
For the CPP/NPA to succeed, there must be an
intensification of current negative trends and proba-
bly a negative shift in other key indicators that
currently do not point to instability. Certainly in the
medium term it would also require a major change in
the support given the regime by the military. In our
view, if conditions were beginning to deteriorate
sharply, the military would continue to give its com-
plete support to the regime. Political stability would
also be bolstered by the traditional Filipino tolerance
of adverse economic and social conditions and propen-
sity for compromise. Continuation of the regime's
previously demonstrated flexibility would further
counterbalance negative trends, although at some
point a combination of deteriorating conditions and
increased CPP/NPA organizational abilities might
allow the Communists to prompt or take advantage of
serious instability in addition to the insurgency.
The Communist Party of the Philippines/
New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
The Maoist' CPP/NPA grew out of a split within the
old-line, pro-Soviet Philippine Communist Party
(PKP) in the 1960s. Most of the armed cadres and
active younger members joined the CPP/NPA, which
adopted a strategy of rural-based protracted warfare.
Despite vigorous government attempts to suppress it,
the party has grown steadily-from around 2,000 in
1970 to a current estimated level of 6,000, F
25X1
25X1
Vigorous Leadership. The leadership of the
CPP/NPA Central Committee is young, well educat-
ed, and adaptable. 25X1
past differences among the three top lead- 25X1
ers-Secretary General Rafael Baylosis, Chairman
Rodolfo Salas, and NPA head Juanito Rivera-have
been resolved; if so, the CPP/NPA is now more
unified in its goals and tactics than at any time in its
history. Although policy implementation is closely
monitored from the top, we believe that considerable
responsibility is delegated to regional party commit-
tees because of their geographical isolation.
Well-Organized Programs and Systematic Planning. 25X1
Unlike other Philippine parties, the CPP/NPA has a
substantial political action plan as well as an ideology.
CPP/NPA strategy calls for a protracted armed
struggle based on the support of the rural populace.
The guerrillas claim to follow a code of proper
conduct in their relations with the peasants, and party
propaganda stresses agrarian reform and other popu-
lar measures. Each facet of the program is concrete,
directly challenges government policies, and is intend-
ed to exploit their weaknesses. The program includes 25X1
IThe insurgents in the
countryside have enjoyed relative success, enough to contest govern
political structures. The energy and resources devoted by the
government to countering these rural rebels threaten to drain assets
critically needed to maintain support in urban areas, particularly
Manila. The development of serious urban violence on top of that in
the countryside, particularly if the two were coordinated, could
constitute an unmanageable security problem for the government.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84S00558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
specific measures for a progressive tax structure, land
redistribution, nationalization of major industries, and
nullification of "unequal" treaties.
CPP/NPA strategy is known only in broad terms,
the
party's propaganda effort focuses on the government's
economic failures and nationalist issues rather than
Marxist dogma.
Burgeoning Organization. The CPP/NPA's distinc-
tive combination of "democratic centralism" and
"territorial organization" made up of 15 self-govern-
ing regional party committees gives the party both
resilience and flexibility. Its rural orientation gives it
a grass-roots character, and its broad geographic base
makes it difficult for the Philippine security services
to focus their enforcement efforts. According to US
Embassy the CPP/NPA is
currently giving top priority-with some success-to
organizational efforts, in addition to trying to main-
tain a significant level of insurgency. These efforts are
directed at expanding links to potentially sympathetic
non-Communist opposition groups-especially stu-
dents and labor union members-as well as at improv-
ing the party's own cell structure. The party uses its
nationwide political front organization, the National
Democratic Front (NDF), as the basis for these
organizational endeavors.
Although the CPP/NPA almost certainly plans to
rule alone in the postrevolutionary Philippines, it has
issued a direct appeal to all sectors of society includ-
ing students, clerics, government employees, the intel-
ligentsia, the middle class, minorities, and even the
"traditional elite opposition."
the CPP/NPA has begun openly to solicit foreign
support from "all socialist" and "progressive" govern-
ments-so far with little success-and to identify the
United States as a "target of the people's just attack."
Inroads With Labor. Of the estimated 7 million wage
earners in the Philippines, only an estimated 2.2
million belong to trade unions. There are no nation-
wide industrial unions, and the small, local unions
that do exist are badly fragmented and ideologically
split among leftists, moderate oppositionists, and pro-
government groups. Recently, labor rights issues have
prompted a record number of strikes directed at
indigenous Filipino firms. The government, recogniz-
ing the potential political influence of the labor
movement, has co-opted the largest labor confedera-
tion by providing labor leaders with seats in the
National Assembly and using preemptive detention as
a means of defusing labor-government confrontations.
The increased labor agitation has given the
CPP/NPA opportunities for recruitment and propa-
ganda.
According to Embassy assessments
Ithe party has
embarked upon a program this year, called the New
Ascent, to encourage awareness in the workers' move-
ment and increase the number of party-led strikes.'
' Less than 10 percent of the strikes were party led in 1981.
12
2.5X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
secret
A CPP/NPA propaganda ses-
sion in north central Luzon lo-
cuses on local grievances and
the oppressor classes (identified
as US imperialists, urban busi-
nessmen, and rural landowners
in winning popular support. I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
The CPP/NPA directs its appeal to all sectors ofsociety.
were instigated by the CPP/NPA and other leftist
parties, moderate union leaders also have opposed the
government ban on strikes in a lengthening list of
"vital industries" and other measures inhibiting orga-
nized labor. The creation in 1981 of a new leftist labor
confederation, Solidarity (PMP)-an umbrella of
trade unions,
-is an impor-
tant indicator of the improved capability of the radi-
cal left to organize and challenge the government-
sponsored Trade Union Congress of the Philippines
(TUCP). TUCP controls 75 percent of the Philippines'
2.2 million organized workers.
Students: Lifeblood of the Party. The CPP/NPA
recruits most of its leaders from the prestigious
University of the Philippines (UP) and Ateneo de
Manila and its rank-and-file guerrillas from trade and
technical schools. The CPP/NPA student front-the
Nationalist Youth Corps (KM)-has established front
organizations of its own.
almost every major college and university and the KM
dominates student politics and newspapers in Manila
and Davao. Thus far, the party has concentrated on
proselytizing and recruitment. SAMASA, a party
considered by students to be a front for the NDF,
swept every student council seat in the August 1981
UP elections. The elected student council chairman
and vice chairman have been associated with the
League of Filipino Students and Youth for National
Democracy, both alleged NDF fronts.
On the surface, overt student activism appears to be
related to campus issues'and is not nearly as violent as
in the early 1970s, indicating that the CPP/NPA is
still a long way from being able to count on students
as a reliable political force. The US Embassy believes
this quietude reflects cynicism more than acceptance
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Secret
of the system. The Embassy cites broader grievances
concerning political reform, social equity, national-
ism, and the economy as the underlying immediate
student issues. Higher education has provided oppor-
tunities for social mobility, but the current economic
slump and rising underemployment may prompt stu-
dent unrest which, as was demonstrated in 1970 and
1977, can have a dramatic political impact. Although
the students are unlikely to be a reliable ally of the
CPP/NPA, the party might be able to manipulate
them for demonstrations and other actions.
The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP)
Analysts agree that the small, pro-Soviet PKP is
badly factionalized, lacks effective leadership, is infil-
trated by government agents, and has no developed
strategy. Filipino government officials believe that its
pro-Soviet posture does not appeal to a broad sec-
trum of society.
Most of the
older leaders of the PKP participated in the defeated
Huk rebellion of the 1950s and 1960s. These prob-
lems, coupled with their dogmatic Marxist focus and
interpretation of social problems in the Philippines,
and their inability to relate their propaganda to the
concerns of most Filipinos inhibit the PKP from
gaining any appreciable mass strength.
The aging and out of touch PKP party leaders appear
incapable of organizing anything more than small and
generally peaceful labor demonstrations. They are
aware that the government watches party activities
closely and that members will be quickly detained if
they step out of line. The PKP probably would need a
new generation of leaders and drastically revised
recruitment and propaganda techniques to become a
serious threat to the regime.
The United Nationalist Democratic 25X1
Opposition (UNIDO) 25X1
plans to take added risks or resort to violence.
The best-known Filipino oppositionists are the rem-
nants of pre-martial-law political parties that have
formed a confederation called the United Nationalist
Democratic Opposition (UNIDO or UNDO). Accord-
ing to Embassy reports, UNIDO is unified only in
wanting to end the Marcos regime. In the past, it has
had neither a cogent political philosophy nor a practi-
cal political action plan. UNIDO has lived with
Marcos's authoritarianism for 10 years and has no
Nevertheless, UNIDO is making an attempt to orga-
nize into a national political party. In 1981 its mem-
ber parties, composed primarily of the Philippines
Democratic Party (PDP), the Social Democratic Party
(SDP), and Laban-a party which opposed Marcos in
the 1978 election-began to shed some of their
personal rivalries. UNIDO has also recently adopted
nationalistic and left-of-center positions. It now es-
pouses "democratic socialist" ideals and calls for the
dismantling of American military bases and other
forms of "neocolonialism." Moreover, it has tactically
cooperated with Communist and other leftist labor,
student, and political front organizations. The latest
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
example was a joint political rally held in September
1982 in Bacolod, Negros Occidental, which drew a
government-estimated crowd of 20,000. A US Embas-
sy observer described the tone of the meeting as
highly nationalistic and strongly anti-US/Marcos.
The Social Democrats
The Social Democratic movement was founded in
1970 by Jesuit priests, led by Father Edicio de la
Torre, and called Christians for National Liberation.
The movement has since been taken over by Father
Romeo Intengan and renamed the Partido Democra-
tico Socialista Pilipinas (PDSP).
Schisms based on differences over strategy and tactics
divided the movement in 1978 during the interim
National Assembly elections. Radical Eduardo Ola-
guer branched out to form the "Light-a-Fire" move-
ment and was responsible for a number of arson
incidents from December 1979 to January 1980.
Another faction, led by Carlos Serapio, favored an
alliance with the CPP/NPA. Emmanuel Cruz, the
founder of "Sandigan," the military arm, and his
followers merged with the Serapio group to form the
Christian Socialist Revolutionary Forces (CSRF).
The urban terrorist activities by these splinter groups
have given the Social Democrats a reputation for
radical violence. Nevertheless, its proclaimed goals
for a post-Marcos society remain moderately socialist.
Defense Minister Enrile has publicly stated that the
Social Democrats are a more significant threat than
the Communists because their "moderate" Christian
philosophy is more readily accepted by the populace.
Even if this were true, government arrests have
thrown the movement into disarray and weakened its
credibility
Like the PKP and UNIDO, the Social Democrats
suffer from divisions over leadership, tactics, and
ideology. The largest, best organized, and most mod-
erate faction-the Philippine Democratic Socialist
Party (PDSP)-espouses a Christian form of worker
(not state) socialism. Its estimated 2,000 to 3,000
members are most active among the urban poor and
small service workers, primarily in Manila and Da-
vao. It has not targeted the peasants or the middle
class and is far from accumulating a critical mass
base. Its small military wing-Sandigan-lacks fi-
nancial resources and has been devastated by govern-
ment arrests
The radical methods of the other major faction, the
Christian Socialist Revolutionary Force (CSRF), con-
tradict its public calls for a moderate government
patterned on the West German model. It urges eco-
nomic sabotage, massive civil disobedience, selective
assassinations, and urban terrorism. We believe the
arrest of its key strategists-Carlos Serapio and
Emmanuel Cruz-in July 1980 has left the CSRF
without effective leadership and accounts for their
inactivity since then.
On the basis of our assessment of the indicators
reviewed, we believe that political stability in the
Philippines can be sustained during the next several
years of Marcos's tenure. Regime-threatening insta-
bility in the medium term would appear to require a
number of preconditions, most of which are not now
present:
? A sharp decline in military support or capabilities.
? Significant foreign support for opposition groups.
? A decline in President Marcos's self-confidence or
political skills.
? Continued worsening of the economic situation.
? Increasingly sharp division among the elite.
There is no room for complacency, however. The
Communist insurgency is growing in strength and
spreading, socioeconomic pressures are worsening,
and vocal opposition to the regime by political elites
and the populace is increasing
The indicators point to the CPP/NPA as the opposi-
tion group best positioning itself to take advantage of
adverse socioeconomic developments, public hostility
to the regime, and any serious breakdown in Marcos's
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Secret
They hope to achieve sufficient popular support under
a "united front" by 1985-86 to move into a vaguely
outlined "offensive stage." The CPP/NPA's own
extraordinary rate of growth has enabled it to step up
its NDF efforts, particularly with labor and student
groups. However, the CPP/NPA's serious shortage of
weapons, lack of established foreign support, and the
government's preponderance of coercive power have
largely kept it in the strategic defensive stage
Although the moderate opposition remains more
prominent, the indicators show the moderates to be
seriously factionalized and divided over strategy. Fur-
thermore, the moderates are concentrated in Manila
and lack viable national political organizations. This,
is not to say that they would not come out ahead in
the event of a post-Marcos power struggle or lengthy
transition period in which a new government re-
mained weak and unconsolidated. The population, for
example, tends to be drawn to popular figures rather
than ideologies. Even in a succession crisis, newly
freed political loyalties are more likely to be won by
moderates rather than by radicals. Furthermore, po-
litically powerful players in the current government
will almost certainly survive Marcos, and the will
continue to command,money and patronage.
Although the ultimate goals of the democratic and
Communist opposition leaders remain in conflict,
alliances between them-particularly through the
NDF-for the purpose of confronting the Marcos
regime or a similarly authoritarian successor govern-
ment are possible. While the moderate opposition
would like to build a national political organization,
opportunism and ineffectiveness continue to under-
mine its efforts. By contrast, the CPP/NPA displays
an earnestness and dedication that has attracted such
diverse supporters as peasants, workers, clerics, and
intellectuals.
Nevertheless, the CPP/NPA still faces important and
possibly insurmountable obstacles. We believe that its
future ability to promote or take advantage of rural or
urban upheaval will depend upon a continued weaken-
ing of the economy and government unwillingness to
allow greater political participation. While the latter
is often destabilizing in traditionally authoritarian
countries, in the Philippines it would mean a restora-
tion of traditional institutions. Between 1945 and the
imposition of martial law in 1972, seven presidents
were democratically elected in the Philippines
25X1
25X1
Militarily, the NPA needs to establish more secure
base areas from which to launch more ambitious
campaigns. Politically, the NDF needs to become
more sophisticated to win the middle class and per- 25X1
suade moderate opposition leaders to join it in alli-
ance. The multiplicity of class interests as well as the
Filipinos' strong Catholic faith and commitment to
democratic principles will require the CPP/NPA to
continue to stress nationalism and social and econom-
ic equity rather than Marxist dogma if it is to have a
serious chance of prompting or taking advantage of an
upheaval.
There also are important factors that militate against
political instability. The most obvious is President
Marcos's political talents and adaptability. His prag-
matic policies, consciously conceived to maintain his
legitimacy, tend to anticipate problems and minimize
the danger that an unforeseen political crisis will
arise. Thus, he has lessened the impact of criticism
leveled against his authoritarian style by numerous
symbolic gestures. In response to critics of his eco-
nomic programs, he has surrounded himself with
competent technocrats and has made serious efforts to
end corruption and improve economic efficiency.
Another important stabilizing element may be the
capacity of the polity to absorb change. Many West-
ern observers believe that the Philippines has a high
tolerance for economic deprivation and political op-
pression, and may be receptive to authoritarian rule
for a considerable time to come. The political system
is being challenged by continued modernization. His-
torically, modernization has tended to raise popular
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Secret
expectations. The Philippines, which ranks near the
bottom in ASEAN in per capita growth, will have
trouble meeting these expectations.
The strength of a turnabout in the economy will
depend not only upon an end to the worldwide
economic recession but also upon sound economic
policies firmly administered. While Marcos may be
able to carry this off-based on the personal position
he has built up for himself-it is less certain that a
successor would have the political assets to carry out
major programs to fruition.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29 : CIA-RDP84500558R000200080002-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29 : CIA-RDP84500558R000200080002-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/29: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000200080002-3