WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE MARXIST GOVERNMENT IN CHILE: ITS EVOLUTION, REALIZATION, AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020058-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: December 4, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Marxist Government In Chile:
Its Evolutr'.;,i, Realization, and Prospects
DOCUMENT SEQV9LtS BRAPICII
FILE COPY
DO NOT DESTROY
IL Iw I'd
Secret
N2 678
4 December 1970
No. 0399/70
MY R-1 F Copy
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The Marxist Government In Chile:
Its Evolution, Realization, and Prospects
Salvador Allende, a Marxist, became President of Chile on 3 November
after a long career as a leader in that country's democratic system. The initial
panic following his victory by a narrow plurality in the election of 4
September caused an exodus of many key upper and middle class Chileans
and a rapid deterioration of the economy. Now, however, most Chileans
apparently have accepted with resignation-and many with hope-the pros-
pect of the socialist "new society" that Allende promises. This propensity
for accommodation is a Chilean trait that the new govt ~nment can exploit to
its advantage in extending its control. Allende's immediate actions after
assuming power indicate that he intends to fulfill his promises to build a
"peoples' state."
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Salvador Allende was born in Valparaiso in
1908 into a professional family active in the Radi-
cal Party, the first middle class political party of
any consequence in Chile. Like many anticlerical
Chileans, Allende's father and grandfather were
ranking Masons, an inheritance of political im-
portance that he has maintained. Allende's shift
away from his family's political affiliation came
while he was attending medical school at the
University of Chile in Santiago. At the time, dic-
tator Carlos Ibanez was in power, and Allende
chose to express his opposition by joining the
Marxist, but extremely nationalistic, new socialist
movement.
The movement enjoyed a few brief days of
glory in 1932 when Socialist air force Colonel
Marmaduke Grove led Chile's most recent mili-
tary coup. Allende's student political activities
brought him a prison sentence and, he claims,
were the reason that he did not get a government
medical post after he graduated in 1933, although
a newly elected administration was by then in
power. He settled for a job doing autopsies, but
spent most of his time helping to organize the
Socialist Party in Valparaiso. By 1937 he headed
the party there and was its deputy in the national
congress.
When President Pedro Aguirre Cerda of the
Radical Party formed Chile's first popular front
government in 1938 with the Communists and
Socialists, Allende, then 30, became minister of
health and subsequently headed the Chilean
Workers Social Security Fund. In 1945 he was
elected to the Senate, where he served continu-
ously for 25 years until he became president.
The Communists and Socialists participated
in three popular front governments under Radical
presidents between 1939 and 1948. Neither
found the experience of lasting benefit, and for
the Communist!, it proved nearly disastrous when
their party, having previously lost its three cabi-
net posts, was cieclored illegal in 1948.
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In 1952 the Socialists divided over support-
ing the presidential bid of ex-dictator Ibanez.
Allende ran for the presidency himself with some
support from the Socialists and the still-outlawed
Communist Party (PCCh). The Communists evi-
dently found in Allende many qualities that
suited their needs. They especially valued his as-
sistance in their successful fight to regain political
respectability and to build a legal and effective
organization. The 1952 effort was the beginning
of the Socialist-Communist drive to gain political
power through a Marxist-controlled popular front
adapted to Chilean political realities. The cooper-
ation has been difficult but neither party has let
the profound differences, suspicions, and conflict-
ing ambitions between the more extremist, indi-
vidualistic Socialists and the disciplined, Moscow-
line Communists destroy the joint effort. By sus-
tained use of the front both have become estab-
lished parts of the political scene, with substantial
and continuing legislative and electoral influence.
Salvador Allende has played a major rule in
keeping the alliance alive. He served as the first
president of the Popular Revolutionary Action
Front (FRAP), the name adopted for the Com-
munist-Socialist political effort in 1956 and used
until the Popular Unity (UP) was formed with
four non-Marxist parties for the 1970 presidential
campaign. Allende was the FRAP candidate in
1958 when he ran a strong second to conservative
Jorge Alessandri in a five-man race, and in 1964,
when he received 39 percent of the vote as op-
posed to Christian Democratic Eduardo Frei's 56
percent. Allende's leadership position in the
Marxist front has been obvious but never com-
plete or unchallenged. The Socialist Party's pref-
erence for the Communist Chinese and Castro
models over that of Moscow was manifested in
Allende's trips to Peking and Havana in the 1960s
and in his leadership of the Latin American Soli-
darity Organization formed in Havana in 1967 to
promote revolution in Latin America. He used his
prestige as president of the Chilean Senate from
1966-68 to popularize and lend respectability to
these activities, and in one case at least, to sup-
port them. In early 1968 he personally escorted
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the survivors of Che Guevara's guerrilla group,
which had escaped from Bolivia into Chile, across
the Pacific Occan to Tahiti to ensure, he said,
their safety "from imperialist agents."
Allende frequently stresses that the road to
revolution and socialism is different for each
country and that Cuba's way is not that of Chile.
It is Allende's pragmatism that has kept him ac-
ceptable to the Communist leaders despite their
own orthodoxy and opposition to the Cuban and
Chinese "aberrations." The Communists not only
reject the armed revolutionary path as unsuited to
Chile, but also consider its advocates and practi-
tioners a real threat to their party's careful
buildup of legal political power. They have been
particularly upset by the rapid growth since 1967
of the terrorist Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR), which operates with the encourage-
ment and support of several Socialist leaders. The
MIR will be tolerated, however, as long as it does
not embarrass the government by its activities.
Correctly assessing a leftward shift among
Chileans under the Christian Democratic govern-
ment of Eduardo Frei, Communist leaders de-
cided that the 1970 presidential election was a
timely opportunity to push their own popular
front strategy. After Guevara's failure, Castro,
with some Soviet urging, had toned down his call
for revolution in other Latin American countries.
Probably for the same reason his strong attacks
on orthodox Communist parties, includinn the
PCCh, stopped. The Chilean congressional elec-
tions in March 1969 showed a decline in the
Christian Democratic vote and an increase in the
National Party vote, indicating fragmentation and
polarization of the middle and right combination
that had given Frei such a large majority in 1964.
The Communist Party decided to organize
an electoral coalition of leftist and Marxist forces
in which it would play the guiding role. Two
major aspects of the coalition would be the in-
clusion of non-Marxist groups, particularly the
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declining but still large Radical Party, and the
organization of thousands of local campaign com-
mittees under PCCh control. The Communists
believed that both would serve as curbs on the
Socialists, who dislike and distrust the Radicals
and have little organizational ability.
The So.:ialists maintained their discordant
views throughout the creation of the UP in the
last half of 1969. The Communists, however,
were determined to maintain the collaboration
because they realized that the Socialists appealed
to intellectuals and many other Chileans disillu-
sioned with the PDC and wary of the disciplined
PCCh and of its close ties with Moscow. Some
Socialist leader: opposed the choice of Allende as
the party's presidential candidate, and it was only
the strong support he drew from Socialist grass
roots that led to his nomination by the party in
August 1969.
Three smaller leftist groups-the Social
Democrats, the Popular Independent Alliance,
and the breakaway Christian Democratic leftists-
called MAPU-joined the coalition. The struggle
over who would be selected as the coalition flag-
bearer became so intense that by the end of 1969
the impasse threatened to destroy it. The Com-
munists insisted that the carefully worked out
program was the essence of the Popular Unity and
the candidate merely an instrument for the reali-
zation of this pluralistic effort to build a new
society and, eventually, a socialist state.
Allende, with the tenacity that is frequently
described as his outstanding characteristic, re-
fused to give in, despite rumors that he had done
so. Finally, in late January 1970, the lack of
agreement on any other choice tipped the scales,
and he was nominated as the UP candidate.
From the beginning of the campaign it was
the Communists who provided the drive and the
organizational skills that were ultimately to bring
about Allende's victory. They concentrated on
the organization of more than 8,000 local cam-
paign committees. The Communists frequently
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complained that the Socialists were uncoopera-
tive, unorganized, and unenthusiastic in their
campaign efforts; the PCCh also believed the
Socialists were taking dangerous risks through
their continued collaboration with the activities
of the M I R.
There were no last minute dramatic develop-
ments in the campaign. Few Chileans saw any of
the candidates as outstanding, and none of them
managed to build an appeal or an urgency suf-
ficient to attract the many unaffiliated and un-
decided voters. On election day, 16 percent of the
qualified voters stayed at home-a high abstention
rate for Chile.
Allende's slim victory on 4 September, a
36.6-percent plurality, was not the result of an
important swing to him or to Marxist ideas. It
was, rather, the product of a carefully contrived
popular front effort keyed to current Chilean
realities, including cynicism and the failings of
Allende's two opponents. The winner's showing
was only a few percentage points higher than the
combined Communist and Socialist vote in the
1969 congressional elections-a result that may
explain the cavalier treatment afforded to the
other four UP components in the division of
cabinet posts in the new government.
Christian Democrat Tomic claims that those
who voted for him (28.1 percent) signified their
approval of far leftist programs. Alessandri's atti-
tude following his defeat by only one percentage
point was equivocal. At first he did not concede,
and after some urging said that he would contend
the congressional runoff but would not serve if he
won; such action would have triggered a new
election. Following the ultimate PDC decision to
support Allende in the runoff, Alessandri re-
quested that no votes be cast for him.
The panicky reaction of many wealthy and
influential Chileans immediately following the
election further weakened the opposition, and
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efforts to undertake a military coup against Al-
lende never got off the ground. The shooting of
the commander in chief of the army just two days
before the runoff was turned into a major ad-
vantage for Allende. The public shock over the
assassination was widespread, and most people
believed the charge that it was an attempt by
Allende's opponents to overturn constitutional
order. Perhaps more importantly, the assassina-
tion united the politically divided armed forces
behind Allende's legal right to the presidency as
nothing else could have done. It canceled for the
time being the prospect of any military move
against Allende.
The electoral victory seems to have been
something of a surprise to all the UP members
except the Communists, who, with the Socialists,
moved quickly to consolidate it. They asserted
influence and control in key areas of the media,
the government, and the universities. They re-
vealed a sure sense of the real centers of power
that left the opposition groping. The presence of
scores of UP members in these and other fields
was an advantage quickly expanded, and many
leftist Christian Democrats enthusiastically joined
the UP efforts. The drive was selective, thorough,
rapid, and very effective. It ranged from death
threats to various stages and forms of intimida-
tion.
The three Santiago television channels
backed Allende's claim to the presidency. All but
a few of the newspapers and radio stations swung
behind him, and the number that held out dwin-
dled fast under threats and pressure. His presi-
dency was presented as inevitable, and coopera-
tion was recommended as the best course. There
was a strong propaganda effort to restore public
confidence and to paint a Popular Unity govern-
ment as merely another step in the political proc-
ess that Chileans boast is more advanced than
most.
Allende's personal qualities may prove as
important as his ideology to the pace at which the
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Marxist transformation of Chile is accomplished.
A vain man with a strong regard for himself as a
leader of unique abilities, Allende is luxuriating in
his triumph in his fourth attempt to become
president. Since 4 September he has demon-
strated his ability to shift tactics almost con-
stantly in effectively corralling support and divid-
ing opposition. He is a master politician with
extensive experience in the political system that
he intends to make destroy itself. His personal
knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of his
supporters as well as his opponents is nearly un-
paralleled among Chilean political figures, and his
ability to exploit the knowledge is the real basis
for his long pre-eminence in the country's politi-
cal life.
"A man so various, that he sccm'd to be
Not one, but all mankind's epitome:
Stiff in opinions, always in the wrong;
Was everything by starts, and nothing long;
But, in the course of one revolving moon,
Was chemist, fiddler, statesman, and buffoon:
Than all for women, painting, rhyming, drinki:ig,
Besides ten thousand freaks that died in thinking."
folio Dryden
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Faced with a bitter internal struggle for
power among the factions of his coalition, Al-
lende first put his closest and most reliable Social-
ist colleague, the strongly anti-US Jose Toha, in
the one post he considered critical-the Interior
Ministry. He then named Communists and Social-
ists to the key ministries and other government
posts, despite his repeated assurances that he
would have a "pluralistic government." Although
he has instituted many economic measures sure to
appeal to the poor and middle classes, he has
proceeded cautiously in major economic moves.
He has complained of the "harsh legacy of cap-
italism" he received, but he has sent his repre-
sentatives to talk soothingly to businessmen. Al-
lende's reported plans for a congressionally ap-
proved negotiated nationalization of major for-
eign mining industries and his personal assurances
to other foreign investors will moderate economic
problems during the transition period. Should his
government renege on these assurances at any
time, he could claim with justification that he had
promised to build a socialist society in whatever
way seemed best for Chile.
Allende, at 62, makes no particular secret of
some personal indulgences such as philandering
and drinking and expensive tastes in art and auto-
mobiles. They are less likely to tarnish his image
as a Marxist and a leader than they are to under-
mine his reportedly uncertain health and lessen
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his ability to control the ill-assorted forces that
make up his government. He may be tempted to
allow some of his quarrelsome collaborators to
make the inevitable mistakes that call for scape-
goats while he concentrates on the activities and
maneuvers that he considers most important.
Allende's most significant action has been
the selection of a predominantly hard-line, mili-
tant cabinet, a choice unexpected by those who
hoped that he would move slowly to impose
Marxist controls. Socialists and Communists
dominate the key posts, either as ministers or in
positions of control such as deputy ministers or
heads of government corporations.
The make-up of the cabinet reflects the de-
termination of the Socialists to assert from the
start their predominance in setting policy. With
Allende's backing they held out for the two top
ministries, interior and fureign affairs, and in ad-
dition received housing and the secretary gen-
eralcy of the government. A significant number of
Socialist technicians with Cuban experience have
also been named to crucial jobs. The Communists,
fearful of PS domination of the trriministration,
insisted on and received four ministries too, al-
though Minister of Economy and Development
Vuskovic does not admit he is a Communist.
Vuskovic has long been chief economic adviser to
Allende, who ,i,imrently has given him command
of that vital area of the UP administration. With
the porkbarrel ministries of finance, public works,
and labor also in their hands, the Communists
have the leverage to achieve ultimate dominance
of the economy. The PS reportedly was glad to
saddle the Communists with the problems of
these difficult departments while Socialists took
posts important in setting broad policies. The
Communists, however, are assuming increasingly
obvious influence in the policies adopted by the
government.
The Radical Party ministers of mining, de-
fense, and education, are not outstanding per-
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sonally, or in these fields, and are not likely to
control their dcb tments. Their appointments
are primarily political payoffs and non-Marxist
window dressing. The remaining four posts were
divided among the three small UP members. Of
the nominally non-Marxist ministers, only Agri-
culture Minister Jacques Chonchol is outstanding.
He was the chief architect of the controversial
PDC agrarian reform program and is a far leftist
who broke with the Frei government and party as
too moderate. During nearly ten years with the
UN fie served for several years as agricultural
adviser to Fidel Castro.
Interior Minister Jose Toha, a ranking Social-
ist journalist who has Allende's full confidence, is
the key figure in the new government. His Com-
munist deputy, Daniel Vergara, also has extensive
Jose Tolia been named as chief
executives. He also
runs all the police and security forces in Chile.
Toha has disbanded the crack riot control groups
within the national police, as Allende had prom-
ised, and there is strong indication that the police
will also be the first focus of government moves
to rid the armed forces of possible opponents.
The new commandant of police is a mediocre
officer reportedly chosen for his malleability.
Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda is a
leader of the extreme left wing of the PS, but his
initial public statements are consistent with the
Allende government's obvious effort to create an
powers and is de-
scribed as tough and
brilliant. There is no
vice president in Chile,
and Toha is first in
succession if Allende
leaves the country,
dies, or is incapaci-
tated. Toha also di-
rects the adminis-
tration of the 25 prov-
,},- inces, where, in the
? most important of
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international image of responsible behavior. His
rapid recognition of the Cuban Government will
not be unpopular in Chile and may set off a trend
among other Latin American governments. These
countries may, however, loo'< less kindly on his
giving a year's asylum to exiled Bolivian guerrillas,
as some of Chile's neighbors' greatest fear of
Allende's government is that it will support dissi-
dent movements against them.
The minister of defense is a 69-year-old Rad-
ical with a long record as a teacher at the military
academy and as an admirer of Allende. His choice
seems to have been a move to reassure the armed
forces that no strong hand would be exercised by
the government in their affairs, at least for the
present. The same message is projected in the
selection of retired officers as subsecretaries and
of senior, respected officers as commanders in
chief of the three services. The three service com-
manders had all demonstrated their belief in Al-
lende's constitutional right to the presidency fol-
lowing the election. The commander of the air
force, who reportedly has ties with Allende, has
indicated that he wants to go ahead with earlier
plans to purchase planes from the US in order to
foreclose a switch to other sources of supply. Top
army and navy officers have also said that they
want to firm their commitment to US and West-
ern European sources of equipment and spare
parts.
More than half of the cabinet ministers are
not only figureheads but also men of unimpres-
sive backgrounds, notable primarily as party regu-
lars, whether Marxist or not. They will be over-
shadowed by the experienced Marxists named to
such powerful posts as head of the Central Bank,
press secretary to the president, and chiefs of the
copper, development, housing, and other official
corporations. It will be in the already well-estab-
lished areas of the Chilean Government controi
such as these that the real policies and decisions
will be revealed. Allende's administration has
many such channels for changing national insti-
tutions without apparent violation of democratic
norms or Chilodn laws and traditions.
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The Popular Unity:"rogranu
The Communist leaders considered the UP
program the heart of the popular front movement
and the candidate merely its instrument. One of
their hesitations over Allende was the belief that
his "highly personalistic style" might inhibit the
full execution of the program. The Communists
also have the most concrete plans to transform
the economy and expand their own political base
and control. The Socialists want to prevent this
outcome, and some Radical= and other non-Marx-
ists now show signs of realizing that they have
committed themselves to a line of development
without receiving anything in return except a few
meaningless jobs.
Like the Communists, Allende realizes that
some immediate bread and butter benefits will go
far to mask the obscurities and the real purpose
of the programs. Building on the enthusiastic re-
sponse to his offer of "forty immediate meas-
ures" during the campaign, Allende's first cabinet
meeting emphasized such steps. They incluiJe
emergency housing programs, free milk for all
children, improvement of wages and social secu-
rity benefits, and a crackdown on all price in-
creases. The administration, however, already is
blaming the financial constraints inherited from
the Frei government for the necessity to modify
some of its grandiose spending plans. At the same
time, large-scale nationalizations are being justi-
fied by UP spokesmen as the only means of
covering a growing budget deficit.
One of the government's first challenges has
come from the homeless, who counted on Al-
lende to ease their plight. Squatters have taken
over not only empty urban land but also new but
unoccupied housing that had been assigned to and
paid for by lower cuss workers. In the Santiago
area more than 4,000 dwelling units have been
seized since the election in September. On 17
November protesting homeowners stopped traffic
on a major highw.:y for 24 hours. On 22 No-
vember Allende himself visited one of the areas
where housing intended for air force personnel
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had been seized,, He argued that the occupiers had
taken dwellings that rightfully belonged to others
of their same social class. Allende said that he
would never use force to oust the squatters and
pledged to go to the courts, The courts, in turn,
could call on police to oust the occupiers, thus
permitting Allende to keep his promise.
The 1971 wage poli 'y is geared to solidify-
ing labor support for Allende. Most workers are
scheduled to receive a wage and salary readjust-
ment at least equal to the 1970 increase in the
cost of living. A new escalator feature will redis-
tribute income among wage-earners by granting
substantially larger increases to lower-paid groups,
and a ceiling will be imposed on "high wages."
Prices will be rigidly controlled and companies
will be expected to oftset the additional profit
squeeze by expanding output.
The government has taken over two partly
US-owned companies and intervened in a labor
dispute in a third, perhaps as a warning that the
administration is willing to force private enter-
prise to cooperate. The take-overs were precipi-
tated by complaints of Communist-led labor
unions and carried out under a 1945 law. In one
case, that of a grain and feed operation, the
government's action is in lin!~ with recent state-
ments of Agriculture Ministt Chonchul, who
claims that agrarian reform impiies a change in all
of society, including control of industries serving
the agricultural sector.
The administration has not yet indicated
how it plans to complete the process of national-
izing the US copper companies. President Allende
announced last week that he intends soon to
present legislation nationalizing copper as well as
banking and insurance. He may include some sort
of constitutional reform to amend private prop-
erty guarantees.
The timing and extent of the transformation
that Allende and his backers plan for Chile will be
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affected by several factors, among them economic
developments and strong differences within the
UP coalition. The rapid move of Socialists and
Communists into positions of control throughout
the administration indicates that little regard will
be paid to giving even the appearance of the
pluralistic government that Allende has so fre-
quently promised. 'ncc bitter rivalry between the
two parties, moreover, may be sharpened sooner
under this arrangement than in a government
where other parties share more fully.
Events since 4 September indicate that there
is unlikely to be any effective expression or unifi-
cation of opposition to the government in the
short run. In the long run it may become impos-
sible. Chileans who were inclined to act to pre-
vent Allende's assUmption of power equivocated,
nursed their divisions and uncertainties, or
bungled. General Schneider's assassination has
been effectively turned against them all.
A politically knowledgeable Chilean believes
that only two percent of his co'-ntrymen felt
personally threatened by Ah-nue's plans at the
time of his inauguration. Their influence-anc,
possibly their number-is much larger, but for a
variety of reasons there seems at present to exist
in Chile little disposition to express criticism of
the government. This situation is due partially to
a national predilection for accommodation as well
as to a cynical acceptance of political change. In
addition, the threats and intimidation used by UP
representatives and their massive take-over and
redirection of 90 percent of he Chilean media
and of cultural and educational activities have had
a strong and pervasive psychological effect.
It is apparent that a high priority has been
placed on controlling the security forces as soon
as possible. The efficient, well-armed paramilitary
national police, a volunteer force larger and better
trained than the mostly conscript army, has re-
ceived immediate attention to ensure control over
it by Allende confidants. The investigative police
has received similar treatment.
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the PS and other Marxist
groups are improving the r own militia forces. The
claims of extensive opposition plotting made by
the Marxist press and by Allende himself have
helped to create a climate of fear and mistrust
that, pe-haps because it is unusual in Chile, is
extremely contagious.
The government reportedly is establishing a
new counterespionage organization that will be
commanded by a former army officer ousted
from the service on charges of subversive activities
and ties with the M I R.
the
military intelligence services will provide the re-
sources for the new organization and that the
primary sources of information will be the largely
Communist-controlleu local committees. Com-
mittee members will be asked to report on activi-
ties in their neighborhoods and places of employ-
ment. These local committees could develop into
informant groups similar to the Cuban Commit-
tees for the Defense of the Revolution.
For the time being Allende appears to be-
lieve, probably rightly, that the military consti-
tutes no inreat to him. The assassination of Gen-
eral Schneider silenced most officers or pushed
them into the role of defenders of the constitu-
tional government that, for good or bad, is Al-
lende. Although many officers may fear that he
intends to distort or destroy their institution,
their capability to mobilize action proved inade-
quate at the only time they might have acted.
Allende will try to ensure that the possibility does
not recur, although he apparently believ.:s that he
can and should postp )ne any move to rid the
armed forces of possible opponents.
The Christian Democratic Party is still
Chile's largest, both in legislative and electoral
strength, but it was badly divided by Tomic's
support for Allende. Former President Frei hopes
to reunite it behind his prestige and to build an
opposition force, particularly in Congress and
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through PDC-owned news media. Frei himself has
said, however, that the odds against the survival
of democracy in Chile are ten to one. The deep
mutual dislike between the PDC and the National
Party and other conservaijv:vn Allende opponents
makes unlikely any effective cooperation between
them.
As long as Allende forces are certain of suf-
ficient PDC votes in Congress to help pass UP
legislation, they will probably continue to use
parliamentary procedures. When and if the PDC
becomes less cooperative, Allende may introduce
the desirability o, constitutional changes in the
legislative system; he may mere!y govern by de-
cree. This is presently a procedure he could adopt
without contravening the constitution. In fact,
the Chilean chief executive has many broad
powers that Allende will find useful.
In the ir-ternational field, Allende's govern-
ment is initially favored by the reluctance of
many Latin American, West European, and other
countries to "prejudge" him. Many who do not
like his idcology believe that to appear unfriendly
will radicalize his government all the more
quickly. Others are counting on the obvious in-
ternal problems within his coalition to impose
moderation. Chances of moderation seem less
possible since Allende named his top officials;
chances of increased internal friction seem
greater.
Some neighboring countries are particularly
nervous over the effect Allende's go) ernment will
have on their own situation. Argentina is the most
nervous but hopes to remain on friendly terms,
thus keeping well-informed on developments in
Chile that might affect Argentina.
Allende's recognition of the Cuban Govern-
ment on 12 November will be popular in Chile,
wher a w,1e spectrum of political and business
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groups has long favored it. Chile voted for the
entry of Communist China into the UN, and
recognition, of the government in Peking is likely
to con soon. Relations with North Vietnam,
North Korea, East Germany, and Albania will
follow, although Allende's promises in this regard
may be tempered by economic considerations. On
16 November Chile and North Korea established
commercial relations for the first time.
The Soviet attitude of caution toward the
new government seems prompted in large part by
fear that Aliende may sooner or later se;.k Soviet
financial assistance, although Almeyda's
friendliness toward Communist China and the
Socialists' fear of excessive dependence on Mos-
cow may also be inhibiting factors.
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