WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT ARGENTINA: LANUSSE'S POITICAL GAMBIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030044-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: December 10, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
ARGENTINA: Lamise's Poll iical Gambit
FfiF copy
i
1&5j
Secret
NE 659
10 December 1971
No. 0400/71A
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ARGENTINA: LANUSSE'S POLITICAL GAMBIT
When General Alejandro Lanusse took over the presidency of Argentina from
General Levingston on 23 March 1971, his leadership capabilities were widely
recognized but his political abilities were suspect. He announced that he would
return Argentina to an elected form of government and immediately set out to
regenerate the political life suspended since the armed forces seized power in 1966.
Lanusse visualizes a Grand National Accord in which deep-rooted political differ-
ences will be set aside to enable the nation to progress both politically and
economically. He is making a concerted effort to reintegrate the Peronists into the
political process from which they have been excluded since 1955. The Peronists
make up at least one third of the electorate. This effort is dependent partly on his
25X6 ability to outmaneuver/ \or otherwise persuade Juan Peron himself to
lend at least tacit support. At the same time, he must convince the military tnat he
will not give the Peronists control of the new government or even put them within
striking range. The President's problem of balancing the Peronists and the military is
compounded by a deteriorating economy that will require politically unpopular
actions to correct. Despite these and many other problems, Lanusse will doggedly
pursue his objective of an elected, constitutional government with, if all goes well,
himself at its head.
The Making of a President
General Alejandro Lanusse was to all appear-
ances the antithesis of a politician before he was
thrust onto center stage by events only partially
of his own making. A somewhat dour man from
one of Argentina's leading families, Lanusse typi-
fied the soldier's soldier. He fit well in his role as
the strong right arm of President Ongania, who
appointed him commander in chief of the army in
August 1968, and even better as the power be-
hind the throne, which he soon came to be. He
led the ouster of President Ongania in June 1970
but was content to stay behind the scene and
installed General Levingston as president.
When Lanusse did remove President Leving-
ston less than a year later, he was motivated more
by a strong instinct for survival than by driving
political ambition. Though no puppet, Levingston
chafed under the controls imposed on hirn by the
military junta and finally initiated a showdown.
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When Levingston tried to fire Lanusse as army
commander, the armed forces backed the latter,
and, on 23 March 1971, the three-man military
junta reclaimed from Levingston the office it had
earlier entrusted to him. General Lanusse was
designated to serve as president until 1973, when
he is scheduled to be succeeded by the air force
commander.
Despite public apathy toward yet another
change of generals at the top, Lanusse approached
his new role with vigor. He announced. that his
presidency would be dedicated to returning
Argentina to elected, constitutional government
within three years. The exact timing, he said,
would depend on how long it took to reconstitute
the election machinery and reorganize political
parties, which had been banned by Ongania in
1966. In this, he seemed to be expressing the
desire of the vast majority of the military to get
out of the business of government, but he recog-
nizes the many obstacles that lie in his path.
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Lanusse's Grand National Accord
It has been said that now, 16 years after the
overthrow of the populist dictator Juan Peron,
Argentina is again ripe for a demagogue. It has
been further said that Alejandro Lanusse lacks the
necessary qualities for the role. Indeed, Lanusse
does not exhibit the traits of a charismatic leader,
but he appears to be developing into an adept
politician. He will, in fact, need considerable skill
at political maneuvering, if he is to succeed in his
plan to hold national elections and permit the full
participation of the Peron ists.
Lanusse's political plan envisages the welding
of diverse political elements into some sort of
national unity, which he terms the Grand Na-
tional Accord. His first step toward this end was
to invite representatives of all politicz.I parties and
movements to participate in planning the me-
chanics of restoring political activity and moving
toward elections. Recommendations for a new
statute governing the organization of political par-
ties and for new electoral procedures were re-
ceived Crom the military and ali major political
groups except the Communists
Emerging from this process were new guide-
lines for political parties. They are aimed at halt-
ing the proliferation of small parties and factions
and at encouraging the emergence of new,
Ruling Junta, (Left to Right) Admiral Petro Gnavi,
General Alejandro Lanusse, and General Carlos Rey
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younger leadership in the traditional parties. The
development of only a few mass-based parties is
being encouraged, and younger politicians are
being given greater opportunities to achieve lead-
ership positions by the institution of political
primaries.
Recommendations for constitutional and
electoral reform are open to publiL debate until,
according to Lanusse's electoral calendar, the gov-
ernment's final decision is made on 31 May 1972.
Recommendations by the Coordinating Com-
mission appointed by the President include op-
tions on a four- or six-year presidential term and
on two methods of electing a president. The first
calls for direct popular vote for president and vice
president by party lists. The second would estab-
lish an indirect election by the new congress in
which the president and vice president could rep-
resent different parties. Both methods call for
run-off elections if a majority is not achieved on
the first ballot.
The most controversial provision is that the
constitution can he amended by decree with rati-
fication automatic if the new congress does not
call for a constituent assembly within three years
to consider the amendments. There is widespread
opposition to this in political and juridical circles,
but President Lanusse seems intent on obtaining
the changes he believes necessary to thc success of
his plan.
Reorganization of the political parties is
moving slowly and there appears little likelihood
that they will be ready by next May to settle on
presidential candidates. In this case, it is likely
that Lanusse will opt for the indirect election of a
president by congress. This method would pro-
vide Lanusse with another pressure poiht and
would facilitate the promotion of his own candi-
dacy through a confederation of provincial parties
if other avenues have been closed off.
Lanusse's original conception of the Grand
National Accord may well have had a grand alli-
an:e of the leading political parties nominating
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and electing him as the only major national candi-
date. Indeed, the new law governing political par-
ties provides for the formation of confederations
and electoral alliances, although as yet this has
not been utilized. Two political coalitions have
developed over the past year but so far ilave
demonstrated little popular appeal and have had
little success in smoothing over traditional polit-
ical divisions.
President Lanusse seemed to be counting on
the Hour of the People movement?a loose coali-
tion of moderate Peronists, Radicals, and smaller
parties?but in recent weeks has appeared to be
less interested. The movement has declared that it
has no intention of running agreed-upon candi-
dates, and recently it was dealt a blow by the
shake-up in Percnist leadership. Jorge F-aladino?
one of the original motivating forces behind the
Hour of the People?asserts that his dismissal as
Peron's chief political representative will have no
effect on the coalition. He was strongly criticized
by other Peronists for his role in it, and it is
questionable whether Peronist support will con-
tinue.
The National Assembly of the Argentines is
a coalition of the left: Communists, left-wing
Peronists, and smaller leftist parties. It attempts
to pattern itself on the Popular Unity front of
Allende in Chile or the Frente Amplio in Uru-
guay. It has held successful rallies in Buenos Aires
but is too small to figure prominently in elec-
tions, particularly as long as the Communist Party
remains illegal.
It has been over five months since Lanusse
officially opened the season for pi iitical reorgan-
ization, and so far the Grand National Accord?
insofar as it relates to political parties?has not
made significant progress. The divisions that have
afflicted Argentine politics for decades remain,
and, despite the new regulations, there is little
evidence that political leaders are willing to sub-
merge their differences in an effort to organize
mass-based parties. The Radical Party has made
little or no effort to draw its major factions back
Special Report
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together; rather, there are hints of even more
infighting.
All the major political parties are having
difficulty in attracting new members. Public
apathy toward the parties probably stems from
skepticism that the promised elections will actu-
ally be free and open as well as from disenchant-
ment with the traditional parties and their lead-
ers. Politically aware Argentines are skeptical that
the military will allow Peronist candidates com-
plete freedom of action. They have ample histor-
ical justification for believing that, if the elections
actually do take place, the resulting government
will be closely watched by the armed forces.
The Key to Success.., or Failure
Juan Peron and his diverse group of follow-
ers will play a major role in the outcome of
President Lanusse's ambitious plan. Peronists
make up approximately one third of the elector-
ate but have been effectively excluded from full
ELECTORAL CALENDAR
1972
1 Feb Evaluation of organization of polit-
ical parties
31 May Decision on constitutional reform
and electoral system
30 Jun Organization period for political
parties ends
15 Aug Printing of provisional voting list
Oct Convoking of elections
15 Dec Completion of voting lists
1973
25 Mar Elections
25 May Installation of new government
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political participation since Peron was ousted
from power in 1955. Lanusse has correctly per-
ceived that there is little chance for political sta-
bility without their participation. To reintegrate
them into political life, howovor, Lanusse must
overcome both Peronist suspicion and military
opposition.
Lanusse, himself, was imprisoned for four
years by Peron and was regarded as a staunch
anti-Peronist. With this background, he has the
credentials to carry out a rapprochement with the
Peronists without being open to the charge of a
sell-out. Nevertheless, as political activity inten-
sifies, apprehension in the military is almost
certain to increase and add to Lanusse's problems.
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When Lanusse announced that he would
work to turn the government over to a constitu-
tionally elected president and congress, he was
fully aware that the Peronists made up the largest
electoral bloc in the nation and would in all
probability win national elections. He therefore
devised tactics aimed at turning this Peronist
power to his advantage or at least neutralizing it.
His tactics were along two lines. First, he
hoped to convince the former dictator to support
the Grand National Accord or at least not oppose
it actively. Secondly, the President hoped to di-
vide the basically moderate Peronists from those
who advocated an uncompromising hard line or
even a violent approach to achieving power.
Various inducements have been dangled be-
fore the old dictator in an attempt to gain his
cooperation. The Lanusse government has already
taken steps to rehabilitate his image in Argentina
and has hinted at a willingness to go much fur-
ther. This appeal to Peron's vanitj has been
coupled with an apparent willingness to contrib-
ute financially to support his splendid exile in
Madrid. Peron is widely believed to have stashed
millions of dollars in Europe before he was over-
thrown in 1955
I he has
asked for, and received, $50,000 from th3 govern-
ment and ha5 applied for the presidential pension
available to him under new regulations. Other
possible inducements include re;nstating Peron in
the army with a retired general's pension, al-
though this would be strongly opposed by the
military. 25X1
The second part of Lanusse's two-pronged
offensive has produced more immediate results.
His effort to attract the more moderate Peron-
ists?and particularly labor?has met some degree
of success. Large segments of the Peronist labor
movement, and particularly the leadership, have
cooperated in varying degrees with Lanusse.
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Moderate Peronists in the political sector have
also demonstrated a willingness to work with him.
One of the first things Lanusse did to attract
Peronists, or at least blunt their opposition, was
to lift the wage ceiling imposed by Levingston.
Although this contributed to inflation, it
launched the President's drive toward the Grand
National Accord on a positive note. Subsequent
meetings between government officials and top
labor leaders inaugurated a working relationship
that has minimized labor problems over the past
eight months. In fact, some national labor leaders
have indicated that they would prefer to improve
upon their relationship with the current military
government, and particularly President Lanusse,
rather than deal with an intermediary layer of
Peronist politiciens that might result from elec-
tions.
Following on this overture toward labor,
Lanusse turned to the politicians. Peronist politi-
cal leaders were included in the discussions that
preceded the promulgation of the new political
parties Ratute. Their opinions were sought on the
other questions, such as electoral and constitu-
tional reform.
Lanusse hopes to tarnish Peron's image in
the eyes of the working masses?many of whom
view his return as ranking in importance just
behind the "second coming"?by demonstrating
:hat it is the aging dictator himself, not the gov-
ernmei:t, who has ruled out his return to Argen-
tina. Toward this end the government has indi-
cated that there arc no legal barriers keeping
Peron out of Argentina ard has dropped the
charges of statutory rape stemming from Peron's
keeping of a 16-year-old mistress following the
death of his wife Eva.
Lanusse also made a strong appeal to the
Peronist masses when in September the body of
Eva Peron was removed from a secret burial site
in Italy and turned over to Juan Peron in Madrid.
Before her death in 1952, Eva was worshipped by
the working class as much as or more than her
Special Report
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husband, and the Peronists were outraged when
her body was spirited away from its place of
honor in the Labor Ministry following Peron's
ouster. There is still some doubt as to whether her
remains will ultimately be permitted final burial
in Argentina, but Lanusse's action in ending the
16-year-old mystery has, at least partially, accom-
modated another long-standing Peronist demand.
Peron's Divided House
President Lanusse's attempt to attract at
least the tacit support of certain segments of the
Peronist movement has been aided by existing
divisions within the movement. Peronist labor has
three major factions: the "participationists," who
have long advocated working with the govern-
ment; the orthodox "62 organizations," which
have ranged from moderate to militant; and a
small minority of extremist unions?such as those
in Cordoba?which consistently advocates con-
frontation tactics. The political sector has been
similarly divided. The factions include the neo-
Peronists, who preach the social and welfare doc-
trines of Peronism but without Peron; the moder-
ates, who are willing to work through the Hour of
the People coalition with the Radicals; the hard
liners, who oppose any cooperation with the
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Mobs Demonstrate for Peron's Return
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government or other parties; and the extreme
leftist fringe, which is actively working toward
the violent revolution it believes must come.
For years, Peron has perpetuated these divi-
sions. The sirnultaneou:, existence of moderates,
hard liners, and extremists has provided him with
several options in pursuing the ultimate goal of
bringing Peronism back to power in Argentina. He
could at one and the same time negotiate with the
government, play the role of loyal opposition,
and seek to subvert the sysLem. The divisions have
also served to prevent any one politician or labor
leader from achieving sufficient power or influ-
ence to pose a serious threat to Peron's leader-
ship.
In recent weeks, there has been a major
shake-up in the Peronist leadership along with
several pronouncements from Madrid of a forth-
coming reorganization aimed at unifying the
movement. Jorge Paladino, Peron's personal rep-
resentative in Argentina and leader of the Supe-
rior Couhcil of the Peronist movement, has been
Evening, 8 October
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Lanusse Denounces Colonel? Revolt
25X1
eased out. Hector Campora, described as little
more than a yes-man, has been named to replace
him. As chief negotiator, Paladino had been the
Peronist most closely identified with President
Lanusse. He had also been the driving force be-
hind the Hour of the People. It is not cleat
whether the downgrading of Paladino resuIted
from the criticism he received because of these
roles or whether it was simply that Peron wanted
to be in complete control as negotiations with
Lanusse enter the crucial phase.
The shake-up touched off considerable con-
fusion. There was even a shoot-out at Peronist
headquarters. Nevertheless, both the labor and
political sectors now are led by men little noted
for their leadership, and both sectors are focusing
on reorganization. Cannpora arrived in Buenos
Aires on 26 November, after talks with Peron in
Madrid, and announced that he was empowered
to negotiate with the government and to reorgan-
ize the movement. The youth sector and the mom
extreme Peronist factions reportedly are being
upgraded and will be represented on a nine-man
superior council.
9 October
A BUSY 24 HOURS
Tanks Roll to Crush Rebelliot
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Peron faces difficulties in unifying factions
that have long worked independently of one
another, but his prestige as the ultimate leader
remains unchallengeable. Many, perhaps most, of
the leaders wish that Peron would "stay in his
rocking chair in Madrid," but none would dare
openly to challenge his duthority. Ultimately, it
seem, Peron will find it necessary to move either
toward support of Lanusse's political plan or into
more open opposition. It is doubtful that any
unity he achieves can stand up under the strain of
his decision./
A decision by Peron to support the Grand
National Accord would go a long way toward
ensuring the ultimate success of Lanusse's plan.
On the other hand, a decision to oppose La-
nusse?for instance by nominating for the presi-
dency Peron or some other candidate unaccept-
able to the military?would even more surely en-
sure the failure of the Lanusse effort to restore a
viable elected government to Argentina.
FOR LANUSSE
25X1
The Military - The Ultitnate Arbiter
If Peron and his followers hold the key to
success for Lanusse and his political plans, it is
the military that will have the final word. It took
armed force to oust Juan Peron in 1955, and the
mere suggestion of a Peronist eturn to power has
been anathema to the military ever since. Twice
since 1955 the Peronist vote has been circum-
vented to elect a civilian president from the ranks
of the Radical. Both times, the president was
removed when he was unable or unwilling to
contain the surging Peronists. The success of La-
nusse's maneuvering will therefore doubtless be
determined primarily on the basis of the role the
Peronists are accorded or seem capable of achiev-
ing in the new government.
When Lanusse assumed the presidency, he
retained his position as commander in chief of the
army. With this dual role he is in much greater
control of his destiny than were his predecessors.
Not only has Lanusse derived strength from his
positio.i as army commander in a system where
the chain of command is rigidly adhered to, but
the majority of the senior officers, at least, are in
Evening, 9 October
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agreement with his effort to withdraw the mili-
tary from direct responsibility for governing. The
inability of the Ongania and Levingston admin-
istrations to deal effectively with Argentina's
myriad problems prompted the growth of a
strong back, tr, the-barracks sentiment.
Nevertheless, an undercurrent of opposition
to Lanusse has surfaced twice in his eight months
in office. This opposition has been almost exclu-
sively among colonels and lieutenant colonels,
and, although it has at times stirred into some-
thing more than a nuisance, it has never posed a
serious threat. This apparently rather loose con?
spiratorial group known as the "colonels' move-
ment" has, however, survived two attempts to
eliminate it and continues to present a possible
nucleus for future, more serious opponents.
The colonels' movement has suffered from a
lack of leadership and a resultant inability to
coordinate plans and actions. The philosophy of
the officers involved is basically ultra-nationalist
with strong statist leanings. Despite their espousal
of populist economic programs, these would-be
ideologues outlined a basically rightist political
line in their manifesto last May. The colones
sought adheients by playing or, the themes of a
sell-out to foreign monopolies?i.e., US business
interests--and the reappearance of the serne old
tried-and-found-wanting politics under La nusse's
Grand National Accord.
In May, President Lanusse moved to break
up the conspiracy before the colonels could make
their move to oust him. Little disciplinary action
was taken beyond the forcible retirement of a few
of the known leaders and the reassignment of
others. In October, an apparent attempt by La-
nusse to again pre-ernpt the plotters touched off
the revolt in the garrisons at Azul and Olavarria.
Threatened with reassignment to distant prov-
inces, the leaders in Azul and Olavarria revolted
and called on units around the nation to join in.
Caught unprepared, the hoped-for allies never
joined the rebel cause. In his role as remmander
in chief of the army, President Lanucse assumed
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personal direction of quellinc the insurrection. He
dispatched troops to the rebel-held area the night
of 8 October. By the following evening the revolt
had been crushed and the President was giving his
daughter away in marriage to a popular music star
in the society wedding of the year. l_anusse's
coolress under pressure, plus the fascist leanings
of the rebeis, inspired messages of support from
the usually apathetic public.
In the wake of this mini-revolt, Lanusse
moved more strongly against the dissidents. He is
using year-end assignments and promotions to
place officers personally loyal to him in strategic
positions. The naming of General Sanchez de
Bustamante to command the important First
Army Corps in Buenos Aires is a prime example.
General Sanchez de Dustamante is the military
representative on the Coordinating Commission
that made the recommendations on constitutional
and electoral reform and has become a leading
political spokesman for the President. Similarly,
General Lopez Aufranc, a loyal Lanusse sup-
porter, commands the powerful Third Corps in
Cordoba.
The placing of Lanusse's own men in key
assignments may add to discontent in the army,
already resentful of being used as his personal
tool. But, over the short run at least, it should
have the desired effect of strengthening the Presi-
dent's position. At the same time, it is always
difficult to determine just how deep personal
loyalties go. For example, Lanusse himself played
the leading role in the ouster of President
Ongania, to whom he owed his post as com-
mander of the army. There have been hints that
both Sanchez de Bustamante and Lopez Aufranc
harbor ambitions of their own.
President Lanusse appears to have secured
his position for the next few months, but as the
political situation begins to crystallize in the first
half of 1972, he will probably become more open
to military criticism. If the President seems to be
losing the initiative to the traditional political
forces, or if the Peronists cc out of the
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reorganiz,iion phase of Lanusso's political plea as
by far the strongest party, new coup talk is not
unlikely. Likewise, continuing deterioration of
the economy could provoke those officers at-
tracted by Brazil's economir success under a mil-
itary regime to undertake active oposition to
Lanust.e and his plan to return to a civilian-b? seJ
govern men t.
Other Obstacles
The ultimate objective of the Grand Na-
tionai Accord appears to be to inaugurate an
elected, civilian-based government with Lanusse
at its head. Ho must, of course, overcome the
Peronist and military obstacles, but there are
other hurdles in his path. Chief among these is
golfing himself elected. Lanusse has publicly re-
nounced any intention of putting himself forward
as a candidate, but he has left the door open for a
draft. flis potential candidacy has also been
floated publicly by various cabinet members and
political six'. tismen. There as yet has been no
attempt to put together a Lanusse electoral party
or front, arid the questien remains as to what
organization he plans to use. A confederation of
provincial parties or a coalition of Peronists and
radicals have been suggested, but both pose con-
siderable difficulties. The risk and the difficulty
would, however, be reduced if the president were
to be elected by congress rather than by direct
popular vote.
Lanusse is also hampered in any potential
campaign for the presidency by ',1??: damned-if-
you-do, damned-if-you-don't conflict between
Argentina's economic nee:-.'s and its political real-
ities. It is probably partly for this reason that he
has embarked on a series of official visits that
bear 'he marks of politicking from abroad. He has
already met twice with President Allende of Chile
and has traveled to Peru to talk with President
Velasco. His trips to these "progressive" nations
have met with favor among leftist elements in
Argentina and have enhanced the President's
image as a statesman. By the end of the first
quarter of 1972 he will have balm-iced his travels
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25X1
ideologically with trips to Paraguay, Ecuador,
Colombia, and Brazil. By the time he completes
his itinerary he will he one of the most widely
traveled Latin American presidents in recent
years. His effort to reassert Argentine influence
and leadership in the hemisphere also will not be
lost on opinion-makers at home. They ;:re increas-
ingly concerned over the aggre3sive drive for lead-
ership being waged by Argentina's traditional ri-
val, Brazil.
The Lanusse drive toy) ard elections and re-
generation of the Argentine political scene could
also be sidetracked by a turn for the worse in the
economy or a marked upsurge in urban violence.
Either condition would increase political insta-
bility and make elections a risky undertaking in
the eves of the military. The Lanusse government
has had significant success in combating terrorism
in recent months, but the Argentine terrorists are
still second only to the Uruguayan Tupamaros in
activity in South America. The People's Revolu-
tionary Army?the action arm of the Argentine
Trotskyist party?is currently in a state of up-
heaval following the arrest of most of its top
leaders, but it is still the most active of the several
terrorist groups in the country and could yet pose
a serious problem for Lanusse.
The government has had a good deal less
success in coping with economic troubles. In
September, stop-gap measures, including wage
and price controls, curbs on imports, and new
currency exchange regulations, were imposed.
The government has had considerable difficulty in
devising a longer term program to replace its
temporary measures. The latest attempt at a long-
range program is weakened by the government
effort to avoid overly ant3gonizing any major
group, and has little chance of significantly re-
tardirq the inflation rate or spurring the econ-
omy Labor has been promised a maintenance of
real wagc:, and an attempt has been made to
balance off other special interest groups. Never-
theless, the program is being sharply criticized
from all sides, and Lanusse will have considerable
difficulty in selling it to the country.
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The problems with the economy and terror-
ism come together in the industrial interior city
of Cordoba to create a powder keg with a rela-
tively short fuse. Riots in Cordoba contributed, at
least indirectly, to the downfall of Lanusse's two
predecessors, and strikes and terrorist incidents
have continued under his administration. The
unions in Cordoba, particularly the large auto-
motive workers unions, have long been more ex-
tremist than others around the country and many
of them have been infiltrated by Trotskyists.
Cordoba is the birthplace of the Trotskyist ter-
rorist group, the People's Fhvolutionary Army.
Lanusse is thus faced wh the problem of keep'r
the lid on in CordeiJd without appearing too
arbitrary or repressive to the rest of the nation.
The government's tendency to drift while
Lanusse was hospitalized recently for a kidney
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25X1
operation has helped to iliustrate that he has
indeed made himself the indispensable man in
Argentina today. He is a strong leader and a
tough-minded individual who is not deterred by
problems or adversity. He is expected to return to
his job with full vigor. He has committed himself
to a political solution of Argentina's many
problems and will pursue this goal with single-
minded determination. Many obstacles must be
overcome and even insiders have been reported to
give him no better than a 50-50 chance of a
successful transition to an elected government,
now scheduled to take place on 25 May 1973.
Within the government and th? military, however,
it is generally agreed that if Lanusse can't do it, it
probably can't be done.
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