STALIN'S GHOST IN CONTEMPORARY SOVIET POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000608520001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Cat irM" Ag ng
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 December 1985
Stalin's Ghost in Contemporary Soviet Politics
Summary
After thirty years, the assessment of Joseph Stalin's
historical role remains a controversial and highly charged
political issue. The Soviet leadership attempts to manipulate
the Stalin myth to promote regime legitimacy--steering clear of
any endorsement of the 'negative' aspects of his rule--while
elites use the Stalin symbol to promote or oppose policies
associated with his name. Like his immediate predecessors,
Gorbachev has adopted a differentiated approach toward the Stalin
issue. He has publicly praised Stalin's wartime role and the
highly centralized and disciplined Stalinist economic system, but
he has resisted any larger rehabilitation of the dictator. Some
straws in the wind suggest that Gorbachev may favor a limited
relaxation of Stalinist strictures on cultural life and on intra-
party policy discussions while 'ontinuing to tighten the screws
~- ~..-.tea AX-AJ__i_
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and questions may be directed to the
or the Chief, Domestic Policy Division, on
SOVA M 85-10221X
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Despite the passage of more than 30 years, treatment of
Joseph Stalin and his policies remains a highly charged political
issue. The images conjured up by references to Stalin are both
internally contradictory and inconsistent in their inrpact on
various elements of the Soviet populace. This presents both a
problem and an opportunity for the regime. Soviet domestic
propaganda attempts to exploit broad public nostalgia for such
"positive" aspects of Stalin's rule as national unity and social
order, economic progress and efficiency, and strong leadership--
as a means of shoring up regime legitimacy at home and marshaling
support for the USSR's international role--while avoiding
endorsement of the "negative" aspects of his leadership that
frighten important segments of the public.
At the same time, the Stalin symbol is employed in intra-
elite politics to promote or oppose various policies associated
with his name. As with the general public, however, elite
political sensitivities about Stalin are so powerful that use of
his image as a political weapon can backfire unless great care is
exercised. Indiscriminate praise of Stalin would antagonize key
elites, such as the military and the more liberal elements of the
intelligentsia, who suffered greatly during the purge years. A
blanket condemnation of him, however, would alienate those
rightwing intellectual and managerial elites who see Stalin as a
symbol of the established order and who might fear that renewing
the attack on him would undermine regime legitimacy.
Evolution of Treatment of Stalin
From his death until 1979. The dominant desire of most of
the Soviet elite and general population in the years immediately
following Stalin's death was for a relaxation of Stalinist
internal controls. Khrushchev attempted to exploit this yearning
for political ends by moving toward a limited "destalinization."
He associated himself with the exposure of Stalin's abuses of
power, ended political terror, rehabilitated many purge victims,
and permitted a "thaw" in cultural and intellectual life.
Equally as important, Khrushchev capitalized on the Stalin issue
to purge the KGB and to move against rivals within the leadership
closely identified with Stalin.
Khrushchev's condemnation of the worst abuses of Stalin
alarmed many other leaders, who were concerned that going too far
toward destalinization might prove politically destabilizing and
who feared being implicated in Stalin's crimes. Immediately
after Khrushchev's removal in October 1964, the official
denigration of Stalin was halted, and a period of uneasy official
silence about the dictator settled in. During this period Soviet
leaders occasionally commented favorably on Stalin's wartime role
or disparaged his violations of "Soviet legality." Generally,
however, references to Stalin were avoided and no clear-cut
"line" on the Stalin issue emerged.
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BOXED TEXT
Stalin as Issue and Symbol
To the various elements of the elite and the population,
Stalin evokes different images. These include:
-- national unity and power. Military might and
international prestige, Russian domination over Eastern
Europe and over minorities at home, victory in World
War II (but also failure to prepare adequately for the
war).
economic progress. Rapid industrialization, full
employment, upward social mobility.
economic centralization and efficiency. A tightly
organized command economy, strong central control over
planning and management, opposition to economic reform.
strong leadership and lack of elite security. Personal
dictators ip, a cult of Sta n es person, complete
subordination of the military officer corps, random
purges of the party apparatus.
brutalit, and repression of the population.
Unrestrained KGB use of terror, forced
collectivization, lack of worker job security, strict
ideological controls on cultural and intellectual life,
tight restrictions on non-Russian nationalities and
religious believers.
social order and cohesion. Discipline across the
board, harsh penalties for crime and deviation, a
shared vision of social goals, puritanical norms for
family and private life.
END OF BOXED TEXT
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Since 1979. By the late 1970s several developments impelled
many citizens and lower-level elites to move toward a more
positive appraisal of Stalin:
o Economic growth rates declined and class lines hardened,
causing many Soviets to recall with nostalgia the "good
old days" under Stalin, when rapid industrialization
created vast opportunities for upward social mobility.
o The memory of Stalin's repressions ebbed, official
ideology grew stale, and popular cynicism about regime
propaganda increased.
o Society became less orderly and disciplined, and social
pathologies such as crime and corruption grew.
o Many citizens unfavorably contrasted the drift of policy
under Brezhnev with the tough leadership associated with
Stalin.
since the late 1970s has indicated
that many ovie citizens rom various walks of life have become
increasingly attracted to the Stalin symbol.
Soviet youth are especially inclined to see Stalin as a positive
and heroic figure. A recent USIA poll of Westerners who have had
extensive contact with Soviet elites suggested that about 85
percent of senior Soviet officials and 67 percent of middle-level
officials felt that the Soviet people need a strong leader,
although many of them preferred a leader more tolerant and
"sophisticated" than Stalin was.
As a consequence of these phenomena, in 1979, on the 100th
anniversary of Stalin's birth, the regime articulated an official
policy on the public portrayal of Stalin's historical role
designed to exploit the Stalin "myth"-and, in particular, the
World War II years--to legitimize the system and strengthen
patriotism. The new party line portrayed the dictator as a
"complicated" leader who deserves credit for his contributions--
particularly his wartime leadership of the country--but whose
"errors and blunders" and "gross violations" of law cannot be
ignored. A 1979 article in the authoritative party journal
Kommunist took the same tack, calling Stalin "neither an angel
nor a demon," and this view of Stalin became standard.
By maintaining that each aspect of Stalin's activity must be
considered discretely in its own particular historical context,
the regime ruled out an overall evaluation of Stalin and
attempted to ward off inferences that Stalin's personal
"excesses" were in any way endemic to the Soviet system or that
other Soviet leaders could be linked to his deeds--notions which
have been anathema to the regime since Khrushchev first exposed
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Stalin's crimes in 1956. In actual practice, however, the
official line--by providing for both positive and negative
portrayals--has encouraged a continued veiled debate.about Stalin
in the Soviet media.
Current Debate Over Stalin. Brezhnev's death and the
ensuing leadership review of internal policy in a succession
environment have given impetus to the debate within the Soviet
elite over how to deal with the Stalin issue. Some Soviet
commentators have pushed harder to extend the selective
rehabilitation of Stalin as war leader to more sensitive areas of
his rule, while others have voiced criticism of his policies.
Stalin's wartime role remains a controversial issue. Over
the past year and a half, propagandists have unleashed a flood of
new films and printed materials in celebration of the 40th
anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Much of this
propaganda provides extensive and positive treatment of Stalin's
leadership.
But recent media references to Stalin have not been
uniformly positive. In two major World War II documentaries--a
film on Marshal Zhukov's life released in December 1984 and a
March 1985 television film--Stalin was shown ignoring or
rejecting the advice of military leaders to prepare for war. A
previously unpublished section of the memoirs of former Politburo
member and close Stalin associate Anastas Mikoyan that appeared
in a recent issue of an important historical journal also
presents a negative picture of Stalin. He is depicted as
rejecting warnings of other leaders on the eve of the war and
failing to give strong leadership after the Nazi attack. A
selection from Zhukov's reminiscences published in Izvestiya in
May 1985 and a tribute to former Defense Minister Ustinov in a
March 1985 issue of Sovetskaya Rossiya portrayed Stalin as
highhanded and unfair in his treatment of subordinates.
Aside from continued ambivalence about Stalin's behavior as
a wartime leader, there have been new signs of controversy over
his general reputation. Some elites have pushed for a broader
rehabilitation of Stalin:
o An authority on Lenin described Stalin in a November 1984
Sovetskaya Rossiya article as a vital supporter of Lenin
in 1917 and one of a new "finely honed type of
professional revolutionary."
o A May 1985 Sovetskaya Rossiya literary review article
tried to exonerate Stalin from persecution of peasants
during collectivization and to present him as the voice
of moderation and mercy during the "tragic events" of
1933.
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o In 1983 a novel by Ivan Stadnyuk, which portrayed Stalin
as a basically sympathetic figure and was attacked in the
media in 1974 for historical inaccuracies, was pulled out
of obscurity and awarded the State Prize for'
Literature. The Komsomol's literary journal Molodaya
Gvardiya recently serialized another Stadnyuk novel,
which praises Stalin not only as a wartime strategist but
also as a compassionate person.
o A historical World War II novel by the conservative
editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta, Aleksandr Chakovsky,
serialized in 1983-84, showed Stalin as a wise and firm
diplomat who outshone Roosevelt.
At the same time, critical media references to Stalin
continue to appear:
o A January 1984 Izvestiya article stated that Stalin's
erroneous nationalities policy was "refuted" by Lenin
during his last days. Last year articles by two Central
Committee officials in the journal Voprosy Filosofii
repudiated Stalin's theory that the class struggle
intensifies as socialism develops--which he used to
justify repression of ethnic and social groups.
o The reformist economist Yevgeniy Ambartsumov in a 1984
Molodoy Kommunist article criticized Stalin's adherence
to only the repressive aspects of Lenin's teachings.
o Literaturnaya Gazeta in April 1985 and Izvestiya in May
1985 implicitly condemned Stalin's purges.
o The prominent poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko--whose poem
published in Pravda in 1962 was one of the most famous
public attacks on Stalin in the Khrushchev period--has
again publicly derided him. A new Yevtushenko poem in
the 9 September Pravda indirectly maligned Stalin
(without naming him y mocking Trofim Lysenko--the
pseudo-geneticist who was a favorite of Stalin. The poem
also criticized Stalin's refusal to allow the USSR to
enter the computer age and his repression of Bulgakov's
innovative novel Master and Margarita.
The proliferation of both positive and negative references to
Stalin suggest heightened debate over whether to move toward
greater reform or greater repression in various areas--including
economic, cultural and nationalities policies.
Gorbachev's Position
Like his immediate predecessors, Gorbachev appears to have
adopted a differentiated approach toward the Stalin issue. A
self-described friend from their student days at Moscow State
University law school--the emigre former Czech Communist Party
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secretary Zdenek Mlynar--has written that in 1952 Gorbachev
confided his distaste for Stalin's arrests of political
opponents. Also, there are some indications that he has resisted
the efforts of leaders who want to go further in rehabilitating
Stalin. On the other hand, he clearly sees a political value in
evoking Stalin's name to gain support for some of the policies he
is promoting.
In his 8 May 1985 speech commemorating the 40th anniversary
of the defeat of Nazi Germany, Gorbachev referred to Stalin as
head of the State Defense Committee which, together with the
Central Committee, guided the party's "gigantic" war effort.
Gorbachev praised the "efficiency" of Stalin's centralized war
economy, which was guaranteed by the "immutable authority" of the
state plan, "discipline and strict responsibility," "initiative"
of workers and scientists, and the "organizing abilities" of
industrial managers. This statement could be read as Gorbachev's
own prescription for economic success and as an appeal for
support for his discipline and order campaigns. Gorbachev
probably was also sensitive to the need to allay fears that he
would institute radical liberalizing changes and to rally support
among the military and conservative elements in the bureaucracy
and population. Gorbachev balanced these positive remarks,
however, by listing "miscalculations on our side" as one of the
factors that contributed to the early wartime defeats.
The remarks offered by Gorbachev on this occasion appear to
have been carefully calibrated to present a modulated picture of
Stalin as a complex figure worthy of both praise and blame for
specifically identified actions. This approach is consistent
with Gorbachev's insistence that official spokesmen must discuss
problems more openly so as to enhance the credibility of regime
propaganda. Thus, in his speech to the December 1984 party
ideological conference, Gorbachev recommended a more realistic
portrayal of Soviet history, stating that although the USSR has
achieved "great victories," it has experienced "errors, failures,
and mistakes" as well. A Pravda editorial of 17 January 1985
elaborated this theme, arguing that history must be examined in
all its complexity and not "rewritten or erased." Matter-of-fact
media references to some other controverial Soviet historical
figures, such as Khrushchev, have increased over the past year or
suggests that Gorbachev is not 25X1
in favor of any genera rehabilitation of Stalin. He reportedly
opposed a proposal made in the spring of 1985 to change the name
of Volgograd--site of the USSR's greatest wartime victory--back
to Stalingrad before the World War II anniversary celebrations.
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Politburo member Grigory Romanov strongly supported renaming
Volgograd and his clash with Gorbachev over this issue became
part of an ongoing political battle between the two men, leading
to a "very serious" situation prior to Romanov's ouster from the
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Despite Gorbachev's efforts to tighten discipline and
strengthen social order, there are straws in the wind suggesting
that he might be inclined to move in the direction of limited
relaxation of strictures in some areas of Soviet life:
o Yevtushenko, in a bold mid-December speech to the Russian
Republic Writers Union leaked to western journalists,
insisted that Soviet writers must confront politically
sensitive topics that have long been taboo. He called
for honest accounts of Stalin's purges and the
collectivization of agriculture, and frank treatment of
current corruption among privileged Soviet officials.
The failure of the Soviet press to report his most
critical remarks in its account of the speech suggests
that he was testing the limits of official toleration of
criticism. But Pravda's publication in September of his
poem critical of Stalin's repression of writers and the
regime's. willingness to let him address the Writers
Congress suggest that his general position on this
question has the support of some Soviet leaders.
o The new draft of the CPSU Program published in October
includes a negative reference to the "personality cult"--
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It is possible that Gorbachev--although probably an admirer
of Stalin's centralized economic organization and tight
management of society--is also more inclined than some leaders to
permit expanded internal party discussion of policy options.
Yevtushenko's speech, the publication of his anti-Stalinist poem,
and the appearance of a few other literary works by relatively
liberal writers, suggest that Gorbachev may be seeking ways of
making cultural life more appealing to Soviet intellect ven
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Prospects
The Stalin issue will remain a political "hot potato" and a
bellweather of regime priorities as Gorbachev fleshes out his
programs in the coming months. The regime may find it easier to
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deal with the issue of Stalin's crimes in a few years, ifter
Stalin's few remaining lieutenants have left the scene. But the
party formula of selective rehabilitation harbors fundamental
contradictions. The regime's desire to create a more neutral and
believable historical record conflicts with its determination to
convey the impression that Stalin was an aberration in an
otherwise flawless system. The attempt to exploit the Stalin
symbol as a source of legitimacy conflicts with the goal of
avoiding association of the leadership with the negative aspects
of his rule. Moreover, if Gorbachev moves very far to expand the
parameters of permissible discussion of the Stalin period, it
could prove difficult to control the process. As happened during
the cultural "thaw" under Khrushchev, a limited relaxation of
strictures encourages pressure from intellectuals for further
liberalization. This, in turn, tends to generate
counterpressures within the elite that could reverse the
process. These dilemmas will not be easily resolved.
1 Vyacheslav Molotov--Stalin's foreign minister and premier--was
readmitted to the party in March 1984, on his 94th birthday,
after a gap of over 20 years.
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