THE SOVIET COMPUTER LITERACY PROGRAM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
ILLEGIB
The Soviet Computer
Literacy Program:
Problems and Prospects
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
SOV 85-10193X
November 1985
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368
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~`" *f Directorate of Secret
Z Intelligence
The Soviet Computer
Literacy Program:
Problems and Prospects
This paper was prepared byl (Office
of Soviet Analysis, with a contribution from
SOYA. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Defense
Industries Division, SOYA,
Secret
SOV 85-10193X
November 1985
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The Soviet Computer
Literacy Program:
Problems and Prospects
Key Judgments As part of an overall plan to speed up the rate of scientific-technical
Information available progress, the Politburo has endorsed a program to introduce as many as 10
as of 30 September 1985 million personal computers (PCs) into secondary and vocational-technical
was used in this report.
schools over the next decade, both to enhance basic understanding of
computer technology and its applications and to aid in the teaching of other
subjects. Technical and political problems promise to frustrate the pro-
gram's implementation during the first several years, but, if these road-
blocks can be overcome, the program will provide some significant long-
term benefits in industrial development and modernization.
On the political side, the increased use of PCs is a potentially serious threat
to party control. Equipped with word-processing software and a printer, a
PC could revolutionize the samizdat (Soviet underground publication)
process. Moreover, PCs provide plant managers with a sophisticated tool
that could be used to challenge production quotas and supply figures set by
the State Planning Committee and the ministries. Implementation of the
literacy program also is being slowed by opposition from officials who view
the widespread use of PCs as a threat to the traditional state monopoly of
information in the USSR. There is still a significant pocket of resistance
that favors the collective departmental method of computing, which relies
on large mainframe machines and allows computer use to be more easily
controlled.
The most serious obstacles facing the schools are the lack of trained
teachers and shortages of equipment. The Soviets' own PC will be
manufactured in small quantities for at least the next few years and
probably will continue to have reliability problems. A deal for a Western-
built turnkey computer plant is the favored option under consideration by
the Soviets. COCOM restrictions pose a major obstacle, however. The sale
of such a plant would involve the transfer of restricted microelectronics
production equipment to make high-speed microprocessors, which have
weapons applications. Importing large numbers of PCs may be the best
short-term option, but shortages of hard currency and the fear that relying
on imports might stifle development of domestic computer production will
limit Soviet purchases of Western equipment.
iii Secret
SOV 85-10193X
November 1985
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The long leadtimes that have been factored into the computer literacy
program are indicative of the difficulties facing the USSR in its campaign.
The first-or "preparatory"-stage is to take place during the upcoming
12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90), but the main part of the program is not
scheduled to be implemented until the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans
(1991-2000). This extremely slow developing program reflects the current
state of affairs in Soviet computing:
? Computer hardware developments lag those in the West by anywhere
from four to 10 years according to Intelligence Community estimates.
? The software industry has virtually no experience in developing software
for PC applications.
? The computer industry has not been able to produce reliable equipment
in significant numbers.
? Computer users are consistently frustrated by poor-to-nonexistent techni-
cal service and the lack of spare parts for their computers.
? There is a lack of demand for personal computers at the plant level
because industrial managers have few incentives to take the risks
associated with incorporating such new technologies.
Despite these obstacles, which will certainly postpone the payoffs of using
computers in the classroom, the literacy program should benefit Soviet
automation efforts in the 1990s by:
? Providing the computer industry with a large domestic market for PCs
and supporting equipment. This should stimulate technical and industrial
development as the industry reaps the benefits of large-scale production
and increased funding for R&D.
? Helping to alleviate the critical shortage of computer programers both by
beefing up training programs in technical schools and by creating more
interest in computers among students.
? Breaking down some of the resistance to computer use caused by
"computer phobia" and ignorance of the potential of PCs in industry.
The Soviets are aware that these benefits will not be realized for some time
and that the literacy program will not, by itself, make enterprises run more
efficiently. Despite the expected delays, the leadership sees the program as
an important component of Moscow's overall effort to foster intensive
economic growth through the increased use of computers and automated
systems.
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The Soviet Computer
Literacy Program:
Problems and Prospects
Soviet Objectives
In January 1985, the Politburo approved a statewide
program for the development, production, and effec-
tive use of computer technology and automated sys-
tems up to the year 2000. The goal of this program is
to reequip the national economy of the USSR on the
basis of computer technology and microelectronics,
thereby increasing labor productivity, raising product
quality, and improving management and decision-
making. The first area to be targeted is the machine-
building sector, where Gorbachev has given a high
priority to further automating the manufacture of
such complex goods as automobiles, tanks, aircraft,
and electronic systems.
The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Coun-
cil of Ministers also passed a resolution ' in early 1985
to foster widespread applications of computers in
Soviet education. While envisioning improvements in
the teaching process for many subjects, the resolution
is targeted mainly at familiarizing students with
computer technology, programing, and applications-
thereby supporting the modernization program. The
approach calls for "teaching students practical com-
puter skills and equipping them with knowledge about
the broad use of computers in the national economy."
According to a variety of Soviet statements, the
program's objectives are to: (1) provide the domestic
computer industry with a large, steady market for
PCs and related equipment, (2) help ease the critical
shortage of skilled programers, and (3) break down
some of the resistance to computer use on the part of
industrial workers and managers.
This literacy program is to be implemented on two
levels, according to a recent Soviet newspaper article
by corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences
Andrey Yershov. (Yershov heads a department of the
computer center at the academy's Siberian branch
and is in charge of a group of projects on computer-
ization and the introduction of personal computers in
secondary schools.) The first level of instruction,
which will be introduced this September, consists of a
general introduction to the basic principles of comput-
ers and computer programing. This will be accom-
plished in the form of a mandatory course entitled
"Fundamentals of Information Science and Computer
Technology," which is to be offered in every Soviet
secondary school. Schools which are not equipped
with computers (probably the vast majority in the
early years of the program) will offer a "computer-
less" version designed to give the student a chance to
master the theoretical and cognitive aspects of the
course. The course will begin in the ninth grade and is
expected to occupy about 60 hours of teaching time.
In addition, about 100 hours will be spent on practical
exercises in school computer laboratories (see photo).
The second level of instruction, which presumably will
be implemented during the later phase of the program
as more PCs are installed in the classrooms, involves
more intensive study of programing and computer use
and will occupy 80 teaching hours and 300 hours of
practical exercises. Yershov envisages that, by the end
of the century, at least 1 million students will be
participating in this stage of the program.
In vocational-technical schools, new specialties are
being introduced covering the use, design, and pro-
duction of computer technology. According to Yer-
shov, these schools should turn out at least 200,000
computer specialists a year. In addition, students who
have gone through the second-level program in a
secondary school will be eligible to enroll in a techni-
cal school, or tekhnikum, for advanced training as
systems and applications programers.
' "On Further Improvements in General Secondary Education for
Young People and Better Operation of General Education
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Students in a secondary school in Moscow
learning how to program computers.
In a public lecture in Leningrad on 20 September
1985, an official provided insights on Soviet percep-
tions of personal computers.
Audience Question: What is a personal computer?
Answer: It is a computer for work or home use. Some
17 million have been sold in the United States. Many
of our colleagues (referring to the speaker's panel)
have them. For example, I was at the home of an
American, and he called up on his computer a full set
of current data on the US economy. They can also be
used to play computer games. A rich country like the
United States can allow itself computers. They cost
perhaps $800 to $1,000. A person chooses between
buying a car, a television, or a computer. We here are
just beginning to approach computers in a serious
way.
after the revolution. Aleksandrov publicly lamented
that the Soviet Union fails to make efficient use of
even the small number of domestically produced
computers because of a shortage of trained personnel
and inadequate awareness among middle- and top-
level Soviet managers of the potential of computers.
Concern over the primitive state of PC awareness in
the USSR increasingly has become a subject of public
discussion (see inset).
Soviet interest in computerization appears to stem
from the concern that the USSR is forgoing many of
the educational, industrial, and scientific advantages
that are apparent in the Western "computer revolu-
tion." The literacy program will contribute to the
computerization effort by fostering a greater accep-
tance and general knowledge of computers and their
uses. It should also help alleviate the serious shortage
of skilled programers and computer users by creating
a pool of people who can more readily benefit from
advanced training and by identifying talented stu-
dents for accelerated teaching programs. USSR
Academy of Sciences President Anatoliy Aleksan-
drov, one of the first to call for a literacy program, has
described the achievement of computer literacy as
important as the drive to eliminate basic illiteracy
Not all Soviet scientists are so enthusiastic about the
increased use of personal computers. The director of
the academy's Institute of Automation and Electro-
metry, Yuriy Nesterikhin, said in a recent newspaper
article that the Soviets must approach the use of PCs
carefully because they are a "borrowed idea" and
"must be translated to our language and correlated
with our conditions." Nesterikhin favors the idea of
the collective "departmental" method of using com-
puters, relying on large mainframe computers that are
more easily controlled.
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The Soviet Agat Personal Computer
The Agat is the Soviet Union's first and primary
general purpose microcomputer or PC. According to a
Western expert who has operated the Agat, the disk
operating system (DOS), read-only memory (ROM),
and interface software are copied directly from the
popular Apple II. The system uses a color monitor
and has a 64-kilobyte internal memory. Although the
system is transportable, it is not truly portable. F_
the Soviets are
experiencing some serious problems with the Agat:
Agat has been unreliable.
problems with both the hard-
ware and software and that the Soviets lacked the
sophisticated technology and industrial base to
produce advanced microelectronics.
to 30 percent slower than the Apple II computer on
which it is based. the disk drive
was noisy, and the 64K of internal memory was not
expandable.
Soviet Industrial Deficiencies
The biggest obstacle to the implementation of the
computer literacy program is supplying and maintain-
ing the necessary computer equipment. According to
the Academy of Sciences' Yershov, more than 50,000
computer labs equipped with 1 million PCs will be
needed just to implement the first, or preparatory,
level of the program. To give an indication of the
immensity of the task, a recent Trud article reported
that the Soviet computer industry is scheduled to
deliver about 1,300 PCs to schools this year and that
200 classrooms equipped with foreign-made comput-
ers for ninth-grade students will open this fall. During
PC purchase negotiations with the Japanese and
Australians, the Soviet indicated that they plan to
equip each school with a single module of 16 to 20
Although the Agat was produced in limited quanti- 25X1
ties by late 1983, progress has been slow. We believe
only a few thousand are slated for delivery in 1985.
By contrast, the Apple IIc was introduced in April 25X1
1984 and industry sources estimate that almost
900,000 units will be produced by the end of 1985. 25X1
Moreover, in the nine years that Apple has been
producing its Apple II series of PC, 3.6 million units 25X1
have been sold.
computers. According to this scenario, approximately
265 schools (or less than 1 percent of all secondary
schools in the USSR) will have their own computers
this year.
the USSR is about eight years behind the West
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in the development of computer technology.2 The
Soviets have particular difficulty producing personal
corresponds to Intelligence Community estimates of a lag of four to
10 years in the development of various aspects of computer
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computers. The primary Soviet-produced personal
computer-a copy of the Apple-has been plagued
with performance and production problems and is
unlikely to meet the needs of the computer literacy
program, either quantitatively or qualitatively, for at
least the first phase (see inset).
struction technique is prohibitively labor intensive and
not readily adaptable to mass production. Yevgeniy P.
Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of
Sciences and head of the Academy's recently formed
Department of Information Science, Computer Tech-
nology, and Automation, stated in a recent journal
article that the Soviet Union produces only "dozens"
of PCs per year (see inset). In addition, a recent Soviet
newspaper article pointed out that the Soviet comput-
er industry meets only 5 percent of its small-computer
needs. Yershov provided some more optimistic figures
when he stated in a recent newspaper article that
more than 1,300 Agat personal computers will be
delivered to Soviet schools during 1985. Even this
number is dwarfed in the West by IBM alone, which
sold 1.5 million of its PCs and PC Jrs. in 1984.
The Soviet computer industry also has been unable to
provide its customers with adequate maintenance
support. According to recent articles in the Soviet
open press, industrial and economic enterprises are
having trouble obtaining reliable technical service for
their computers. Problems cited included a lack of
spare parts, shortage of trained personnel, and an
incentive system that actually encourages shoddy
repairs. The head of the Soviet institute responsible
for purchasing foreign-made PCs for the literacy
program, academician Boris Naumov, admitted that
servicing computers is currently beyond the power of
most schools. Naumov said that allocation decisions in
the early stages of the program will be based on the
ability of the schools to provide maintenance for the
PCs.
Acquiring Western Computers
The most attractive vehicle for meeting long-term
program objectives, while simultaneously improving
Yevgeniy Velikhov is an Academy of Sciences' Vice
President and Chairman of the academy's Informa-
tion Science, Computer Technology, and Automation
Department. This department was created in March
1983 to oversee the introduction of computer technol-
ogy and automation into all areas of Soviet society.
He also chairs the Automation of Scientific Research
Council and the Interdepartmental Scientific and
Technical Council that is dually subordinate to the
Academy and the State Committee for Science and
Technology (GKNT). We believe that Velikhov super-
vises a number of classified research programs that
have weapons applications particularly the program
to develop directed-energy weapons. Many Soviet and
Western observers consider Velikhov to be the most
likely candidate for the position of Academy presi-
dent when the present incumbent, Anatoliy Aleksan-
drov, steps down. Velikhov is also active on the board
of theforeign trade association V/O Litsenzintorg,
which imports and exports patents and licenses.
domestic production capabilities, probably is the pur-
chase of a Western-built turnkey computer plant.
Such a plant could be operational within two to three
years of a signed agreement and would prove an
effective mechanism to transfer Western production
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technology and know-how. The Soviets have already
started negotiations with several Western companies
to build a PC plant in the USSR. A British journal
reported that, during Gorbachev's visit to England
last December, Soviet officials met with representa-
tives of a British computer firm to discuss the con-
struction of a turnkey PC plant that could cost up to
Soviet interest in a Western-built turnkey plant has
centered primarily on a facility to manufacture so-
phisticated 16-bit machines of the IBM-PCXT class.
This is the area where the Soviets need the most help,
and the acquisition of an entire plant would be an
attractive method of quickly obtaining an indigenous
capability. The Soviets also recognize the importance
of the more powerful PCs for industrial and economic
management applications and are eager to make them
more widely available as part of the industrial mod-
ernization effort. They are probably less interested in
a plant to build the smaller eight-bit PCs-although
they would probably settle for this if necessary-both
because they can buy this type of computer more
readily from the West and because their own industry
is capable of producing eight-bit PCs in limited
numbers and may be capable of mass-producing them
in the near future with only limited Western assis-
tance.
To satisfy the immediate requirement for computers,
the USSR, spurred by recently relaxed COCOM
trade controls on certain PCs,' negotiated with several
' Under new rules set by COCOM, Western companies are allowed
to sell low-powered, eight-bit microcomputers to the Soviets with-
out a license. These machines process data eight bits at a time,
rather than the 16- or 32-bit rates of more powerful business
computers. They have fairly small memories and would be sold in
the West for $100 to $500 each as home computers. Sales of more
Western and Japanese firms to buy PCs and related
equipment. The Soviets appear to be interested in
buying modules of PCs linked together in networks of
16 to 20 units, with one teacher station to monitor the
students' activities and one printer for each module.
At least two potential suppliers of these PC networks
have been approached. An Australian newspaper re-
cently reported that a domestic computer manufac- 25X1
turer was close to concluding a deal with the Soviets
to provide 5,000 educational microcomputers for a 25X1
test run in 300 schools (16 computers per school). If
the trial run is successful, the Soviets have reportedly
promised longer term contracts to equip 80,000
schools with the same system.
the PCs involved are small, eight-
controls.
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In March 1985, representatives of a Soviet trade
organization initiated discussions on the possibility of
buying a large number of Apple Ile and IIc personal
computers. Soviet officials have also contacted com-
puter firms in other Western countries, setting off
intense competition. Several press reports indicated in
July that a Japanese trading company had outbid 26
computer firms from around the world (including the
US firm Apple) to win a contract to export 4,000
eight-bit personal computers and an undisclosed num-
ber of printers to the USSR. This is the first known 25X1
contract that the Soviets have signed with a Western
or Japanese firm for the purchase of PCs.`
The Soviets have also been actively seeking more powerful PCs to
train advanced programers in technical schools and universities and
to take advantage of their data base and graphics capabilities to
increase the productivity of research and design work. In December
1984 the Academy of Sciences placed an initial order for 50 IBM
PCXT computers, declaring that it intended to purchase a total of
10,000 during the next year or so.
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We believe the Soviets will focus their PC purchases
on a relatively small number of suppliers to ensure
that the incoming computers are compatible, both
with each other and with Soviet-produced models, and
to reduce the complexity of the arrangements for
maintenance and replacement. The Soviets will have
to work closely with Western suppliers to establish a
network for providing spare parts and installing and
servicing these machines. The Soviet record in ensur-
ing follow-on support to considerably less ambitious
Western-supported projects-such as major industrial
complexes-has been spotty at best. These support
activities also could drain resources from indigenous
Soviet developments and could lead to a dependence
on Western equipment.
Despite the approaches being made to Western com-
puter firms, the USSR probably will limit PC pur-
chases to 4,000 to 5,000 machines for the coming
school year. The scale of such imports will be limited
by the need to preserve hard currency, the problem of
providing service and spare parts for the PCs, and the
desire to develop a domestic PC production capability
Domestic Opposition
Importing computers from the West appears to be an
option that is strongly opposed by some Soviet scien-
tists and industrialists who fear this would stifle
development of indigenous computer production.
Opposition is also likely to come from party and police
officials who perceive widespread use of computers as
a threat to the traditional state monopoly'of informa-
tion in the USSR. In a society which tightly controls
access to duplicating equipment, the prospect of mil-
lions of personal computers-each a potential printing
press when coupled with a printer and word-
processing software-alarms the political leadership.
PCs could revolutionize the samizdat process. Floppy
disks and cassette tapes would expedite the person-to-
person transfer of information. Intercomputer elec-
tronic communication, while probably subject to state
monitoring and control, could threaten the regime's
control of information. Aside from the "subversive"
threat, use of PCs for transmitting data over comput-
er networks or as a means of remote access to state
data bases could increase the prospects of compromis-
ing state secrets or leaking embarrassing information,
which the state now routinely suppresses.
The Soviet press has also raised concerns about
computer crime and the use of computers to generate
false information. Central authorities probably fear
that, if computerization leads to electronic record-
keeping replacing paper documentation, embezzle-
ment or report padding by managers skilled in com-
puter manipulations will become almost impossible to
detect. Falsification of data by factory managers is
already a serious problem in the Soviet Union, and a
major increase would probably further erode the
integrity of the statistical data upon which the central
authorities base their planning and management deci-
sions. ' ..
committee or higher party officials.
Increased use of computers also could provide factory
managers with the means to evade instructions hand-
ed down from central authorities. Managers might
use their computer resources to work out alternative
production, supply, or marketing variations to demon-
strate that the instructions from the State Planning
Committee or the ministries are far from optimal for
their enterprises. If factory managers acquire comput-
er skills but party officials do not, party officials could
find themselves at a disadvantage when economic
decisions are being made. Managers might use studies
generated by their computer staffs to rebut advice or
instructions from the secretaries of the factory's party
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Additional opposition comes from officials who fear
the social consequences of computerization. These
concerns have been raised with increasing frequency
as the pros and cons of computerization have become
a subject of discussion in Soviet academic journals. A
series of articles in the scientific and theoretical
journal of the USSR Academy of Sciences reviewed
studies of the computerization experience in the West.
These and other articles have pointed out that some of
the undesirable social effects of computerization
might occur in the USSR. The formation of "utilitari-
an, rational" values, which would undermine the
official ideology, and greater social inequality are
some of the key concerns raised in these discussions.
Some authors remind their readers of computer-
created unemployment in the West and warn that
computerization may entail significant costs to those
segments of society least able to meet the demands of
the computer revolution.
Party ideologists apparently are among those most
concerned with the social and political implications of
computerization. The party journal Kommunist
warned against the "computer fetishism" demonstrat-
ed by officials who advocate computerization "at any
price" and who see universal introduction of comput-
ers as a cure-all for economic and organizational
problems. A candidate of philosophy, whose articles
have appeared in both the party journal and the
journal of the Academy of Sciences, has pointed out
the need to understand clearly the dangers inherent in
uncontrolled and unlimited computer application. He
criticized the work of the Academy of Sciences and
the State Committee for Science and Technology for
focusing on the scientific and technical problems of
computerization while ignoring or neglecting social
and political problems.
Outlook
Although the payoffs are not likely to be realized until
the 1990s, the computer literacy program is regarded
by the leadership as an important component of
Gorbachev's plan to revive the economy through
"intensive" growth in productivity. The program will
augment industrial modernization efforts by spurring
demand for domestic PCs, increasing the supply of
computer programers, and eroding some of the resis-
tance to computer use, mainly at the plant level. The
seriousness of the obstacles and the backwardness of
the Soviet PC industry, however, have led the Soviet
leadership to take an extremely cautious course that
will effectively delay widespread realization of these
benefits until at least the early 1990s.
The ultimate success, both of the literacy program
and of the computerization effort in general, will
depend on the Soviets' ability to manufacture and
service at least hundreds of thousands of reliable PCs
and to overcome user resistance at the enterprise level.
Upgrading the performance of the computer industry
will require significant Western assistance, at least in
the short term, in the form of a turnkey plant or the
direct sale of computers and related equipment. We
believe the Soviets will be able to mass-produce the
less powerful eight-bit PCs needed for the school
program in the near term, but the production of the
more sophisticated 16-bit business computers, which
will be needed for industrial applications, will contin-
ue to be a problem for the near future. Production
difficulties in this area, unless the Soviets can obtain a
turnkey plant, will hinder efforts to automate indus-
trial facilities.
The pace and success of the program also will depend
on the willingness of the leadership to take the
political risks entailed. A cautious approach, with
tight controls on the provision and use of PCs, will
impede familiarization with computer technology and
stifle innovative applications. On the other hand, loose
controls could lead to unauthorized use and possibly
precipitate a backlash.
Extension of the literacy program to include the
teaching of other subjects by computer will be delayed
by the need to develop Russian-language educational
software. The software will have to be internally
developed because of the general shortage of quality
software of this type, even in the West, and because of
Russian-language requirements. In view of the limited
capabilities of the Soviet software industry, the devel-
opment of course software, needed in the second phase
of the literacy program, will be a problem area for
some time.
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The most serious threat to US interests posed by the
literacy program is the potential transfer of a turnkey
plant that would provide the Soviet computer industry
with much needed Western production know-how and
equipment. A turnkey facility for even eight-bit PCs
could significantly enhance Soviet production capabil-
ities. Since COCOM restrictions on eight-bit comput-
ers were relaxed in January 1985, the Soviets have
intensified their efforts to acquire a vertically inte-
grated plant capable of producing the entire range of
microelectronic devices and peripheral units-such as
microprocessors, disk drives, and printers-that make
up a personal computer. Experience in producing
these subsystems would benefit the computer industry
generally.
The transfer of an eight-bit PC plant could also
provide an opening wedge for later acquisition of
technology to produce the more sophisticated 16-bit
PCs required for many military and industrial appli-
cations. The higher speed microprocessors used in
these PCs have a range of weapons signal processing
and guidance applications. In manufacturing, 16-bit
microcomputers are suitable for wide application in
process, inventory, and machine control as well as
information management systems. They are particu-
larly useful for highly efficient computer-aided design
tasks routinely applied in the West in the development
of complex products such as custom integrated cir-
cuits. Component improvements, in turn, fuel further
advances in computer and other advanced manufac-
turing technologies vital to Soviet efforts to improve
industrial efficiency and productivity. Although PC
turnkey plant sales are currently prohibited by US
and COCOM regulations, West European vendors in
particular are interested in such sales.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/22 : CIA-RDP86T00591 R000400490004-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/22 : CIA-RDP86T00591 R000400490004-4
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/22 : CIA-RDP86T00591 R000400490004-4