THE AUGUST NAM MEETING IN ZIMBABWE: US VULNERABILITIES AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000101030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 3, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: The August Meeting in Zimbabwe: US Vulnerabilities and
Possible Responses
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
The August NAM Meeting In Zimbabwe:
US Vulnerabilities and Possible Responses
Summary
The harshly anti-American tone of the April ministerial
level meeting of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) suggests that the
level of anti-US rhetoric at the summit scheduled for 26 August
to 7 September in Harare will be substantial, probably exceeding
that of previous summits. NAM political dynamics and the
extensive material support by Cuba and other radicals to Zimbabwe
for the meeting will work against efforts to limit anti-US
posturing. Moscow almost certainly will not be disappointed with
NAM rhetoric on South Africa, disarmament, and Central America as
its views are similar to those of many Nonaligned members. The
Soviets are well positioned to capitalize on the NAM meeting --
with proven support among radical NAM members and an "active
measures" capability in Zimbabwe. Nonetheless, US public
diplomacy could help minimize the inevitable political fallout.
Potentially useful tactics include: exposure of Soviet and Cuban
efforts to manipulate the NAM, preemptive deflation of the
meeting's inevitable anti-US pronouncements, publicity for the
views of NAM moderates, and challenge of the Nonaligned
credentials of Soviet client states.
This memorandum was prepared byl I Subversion
Analysis Branch, Office of Global Issues. Comnents and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion
and Instability Center,
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I I
The August NAM Meeting In Zimbabwe:
US Vulnerabilities and Possible Responses ~~
Background
From 26 August to 7 September approximately 5,000 to 7,000
people, including 101 heads of state, will converge in Harare,
Zimbabwe for the Eighth Nonaligned Movement (NAM) Surmiit. Prime
Minister Mugabe succeeds India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
Harare was persuaded by Havana last year to accept the NAM
chairmanship, giving Zimbabwe only 16 months to prepare for the
meeting. Mugabe probably believed that the NAM chairmanship would
enhance his credentials as a Third World leader, establish
Zimbabwe as a key country among the "Frontline" states, and focus
greater world attention on southern Africa.
As host of the Nonaligned surrmit, Zimbabwe is responsible
for authoring a working document prior to the meeting, a draft of
which will probably be circulated among NAM members at the UN in
New York soon. Positions on many issues -- for example, South
Africa's apartheid -- have changed only slightly since the late
Strong Criticism of the US Expected
Based upon the NAM's long track record and the strong anti-
US hostility expressed at the recent NAM Foreign Ministers'
meeting in New Delhi, we expect that the draft and final NAM
communique will be strongly anti-US in tone.
o The final document from the New Delhi meeting criticizes
the United States by name more than any previous NAM
document. We believe that most, if not all, of the
critical references to the United States will be
incorporated into the Harare NAM draft.
o Eliminating strong anti-US language from the draft will
be difficult. Although NAM members seldom have
difficulty in adding new items to a draft, deleting
language established in previous documents is difficult.
For example, at the foreign ministers' meeting in April,
India tried to draft a more moderate document, but
radical members' insistence on adherence to previously
agreed upon language and the US attack on Tripoli on the
eve of the meeting prevented the adoption of a more
moderate document.
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Moreover, Zimbabwe's financial difficulties in hosting the
conference make it vulnerable to pressure from radical NAM
members. The US $40 million reportedly budgeted for the summit
represents a substantial strain on an economy facing slow
economic growth (2-3 percent), a large budget deficit (more than
10 percent of GDP), and inflation projected to reach 20 percent
this year. To limit the strain, Zimbabwe is accepting
contributions from other countries (see appendix for a
listing). In our view, Harare's ineptitude in negotiating deals
with a number of potential contributors is likely to allow more
corrmitted radical members -- most notably Cuba -- to provide
desperately needed services and equipment for the summit.
Cuba's past track record in the NAM suggests that it will
exploit this position to good effect. During previous summits,
Cuba has lobbied effectively for a variety of pro-Soviet
positions -- for example, on Afghanistan and Cambodia -- forcing
moderate NAM members to compromise more than they would like to
for fear of harming NAM unity.
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Anticipated NAM Agenda
Final documents for all NAM meetings contain two sections:
economic and political. We expect that the economic section of
the Harare communique will replay the usual litany of Third World
demands -- for example, establishment of the New International
Economic Order (NIEO) and treatment of natural resources such as
Antarctica as the "common heritage of all mankind." Because NAM
members usually avoid commenting on problems among the
Nonaligned, both the economic and political sections can be
expected to concentrate on the policies of non-members. Besides
the United States, South Africa and Israel are frequent targets
of NAM resolutions; occasionally NAM rhetoric also targets
Western allies such as France and Great Britain.
Evidence to date suggests that several issues are likely to
get high priority in Harare:
o Southern Africa. We believe that southern African
issues will probably have the highest priority at the
meeting.
delegates will probably call or economic and
political sanctions and that South Africa will be
condemned for its activities in support of UNITA in
Angola. In addition, there are indications that some
members may replay the idea that the US attack on Libya
created the atmosphere for recent South African attacks
on Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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o Disarmament. We expect that the surrmit will endorse the
arms control initiative of the Group of Six --
Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania
--for a US-Soviet test ban with the Group providing
verification assistance. We also think that the
communique, which will probably replay the April New
Delhi meeting's praise for Gorbachev's arms control
proposals, may also attack recent US decisions regarding
SALT.
o LDC Economic Problems. Re-energizing the Nonaligned
approach to global economic problems -- particularly LDC
debt and the NIEO -- will also be an important agenda
item. While some NAM members oppose the proposal
because of fears that it will split the Group of 77 (G-
77), India is seeking the establishment of a standing
committee on economic issues whose function would be to
create a NAM position vis a vis international economic
conferences and organizations.
o NAM Chairmanship. Selection of the next NAM chairman
will be decided in Harare, with the primary contenders
being Argentina, Nicaragua, Peru, Yugoslavia, and
Indonesia. While to date only Nicaragua has formally
announced its candidacy, we believe that Peru's
President Garcia is the strongest contender. Many
members believe it is Latin America's turn to head the
movement and Peru has the support of key moderates such
as Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia. In our judgment,
should there be difficulty in reaching a consensus for
Peru, Yugoslavia could be a compromise choice.
Soviet Exploitation of the Harare Meeting
The Soviets will almost certainly not be disappointed with
NAM rhetoric on South Africa, disarmament, and Central America as
their views are similar to those of many of the Nonaligned. On
some issues, like Afghanistan, Soviet allies -- for example, the
Cubans and Nicaraguans -- will block efforts to single out Moscow
for criticism.
In addition to the support that Moscow can expect from its
allies, the Soviet Union, in our view, is positioned to influence
and exploit the Harare Summit through its own means. Although
officially limited to 32 diplomatic personnel, Moscow has over 50
nationals in Zimbabwe. ~
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The Soviets are likely to use several means to try to
influence the meeting and exploit it for propaganda purposes. 25X1
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The Soviets are also likely to use the
Third World press, particularly media within Zimbabwe, to create
the right climate of opinion for the meeting by planting articles
critical of US foreign policy, particularly US policy toward
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US Prospects for Influencing the NAM
In our view, the prospects for positive US influence at the
NAM meeting are slim. While US representations to individual
members could restrain some from contributing to anti-US debate
or agreeing to language criticizing the United States by name,
the radicals -- for example, Cuba, Libya and Nicaragua -- have
little to lose by attacking the United States. Other members are
probably willing to risk offending the United States, believing
that we will not jeopardize relations over NAM rhetoric.
Moreover, consensus procedures in the NAM make it difficult for
even sympathetic countries to thwart radical initiatives without
dividing NAM unity.
The tactics used by other non-member countries to deal with
the NAM offer few lessons. Countries such as China, Sweden, and
West Germany provide support -- including overt financial
assistance -- to protect their interests. But, because the
United States has consistently been a major NAM target, direct US
efforts would be viewed with suspicion and it is unlikely that
moderate NAM members would be willing to channel assistance to
the NAM on our behalf. Other countries -- such as Albania,
Burma, and Paraguay -- deal with the NAM by totally ignoring it.
Unfortunately, since one major NAM objective is to provoke US
action on LDC demands, studious inattention to the NAM by the
United States is only likely to provoke greater NAM efforts.
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Appendix
Aid To Zimbabwe for the Sum it
Aid Extensions
Country
Algeria
PLO
Sweden
West Germany
Aid Offers Being Negotiated
Country
East Germany
Egypt
Gulf States
Iran
Italy
Turkey
Aid Accepted
US$ 1 million; Arabic, French and
English translators
Unspecified number of villas;
French, English and Spanish
translators, plus airfare and
salaries; 200-300 technicians
(typists, publishers, and
translators)
200 Peugeot 504s
US$ 1.5 million; free ship-
ment of construction equipment
for villas; foodstuffs
Five luxury buses
Carpets and stoves; 10 mini-
buses; 10 language and inter-
national organization specialists
US$ 500,000
Motorcycles
US$ 715,000 for tele-
communications equipment
Office equipment
Of fer
1,000-man security force;
intelligence training
Automobiles
Security equipment; personnel
110 Mercedes automobiles
ti
Buses
Airport radar
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