THE VERBAL COMPONENT OF TERRORISM STRATEGY: A WEST GERMAN TEXTUAL CASE STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00434R000300270028-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: May 30, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT
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Summary
Contemporary terrorism combines selective
violence with reliance on language to articulate
terrorist motivations, beliefs, and objectives.
This paper, which abstracts a. study that was made
of major event-related statements by the West
German terrorist group Red Army Faction (Rote Armee
Fraktion,.RAF)', focuses on the language component.
The terrorist's awareness of the need to use
and his ability to manipulate language contrast
with the RAF's stated rejection of language as an
ineffective political tool. The RAF's language
objective--tied to violent intimidation--is to
overturn the central government's claims to legiti-
macy, morality, a monopoly on the use of force, and
popular support. RAF texts document the vital link
between terrorist violence and its justification.
via the language instrument and illustrate the
terrorists' competence in exploiting language's
creative potential.
The analysis concludes that. the RAF's language
component fails both because of the unacceptability
of terrorist political claims and because of the
RAF's attempt to economize with language--by
addressing multiple audiences via one text for each
.The basic research for this study was carried
out in part-under the auspices of the Director
of Central Intelligence's Exceptional Analyst
Program. The entire study is incorporated in
a Georgetown University Ph.D. dissertation
(GU Thesis 5329, DA 8401507) dated May 1983.
The views expressed herein are not necessarily
those of the US Government.
N
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Report 845-AR
May 30, 1984
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incident. The research shows how useful linguistics can be, along
with other perspectives, in understanding terrorism; and it
illustrates the political, analytical, and scientific value of a
close examination of a terrorist group's statements, which are
often the outsider's principal source of information about the
group's intentions and beliefs.
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Introduction
President Reagan and his press spokesmen described the US
action in Grenada as a "rescue mission"; the media continually
referred to it as an "invasion." West European governments
variously expressed their "understanding" of it, their "regret"
that it took place, or their "support" for it. And so goes the
daily exercise of mankind's most malleable tool--language.
In his remarks before the 1982 UN General Assembly, Secretary
of State Shultz underscored the importance of language in terms of
world affairs and individual rights:
"This hall has heard great ideas eloquently expressed. It
has also heard double-talk, platitudes, and ringing protesta-
tions of innocence--all too often aimed at camouflaging out-
rageous and inhuman acts. But we must not ridicule words.
I believe that the greatest advance in human history was not
the wheel, the use of electricity, or the internal combustion
engine. Indispensable to progress as these have been, our
most remarkable achievement was the slow, clumsy but trium-
phant creation of language. It is words that released our
ancestors from the prison of the solitary.... Is it not ro-
foundly revealing that the first victims of tyrants are--
words? No people better know the meaning of freedom than
those who have been arrested or beaten or imprisoned or
exiled because of what they said. A single man speaking
out--a Lech Walesa, for example--is more dangerous than an
armored division." (Emphasis added.)
It is arguable whether linguists or politicians have the
better understanding of language. But there can be no doubt that
those who seek or exercise political power--and those who formu-
late political leaders' statements--understand the utility and
manipulability of the language tool. Every speaker and every
political movement seeks, consciously or otherwise, to impose
his/her/its own labels, concepts, terminology, and definitions on
listeners. Yet few of us, aside from reading an occasional op-ed
commentary from the Edwin C. Newmans and William Safires lamenting
the "misuse" or decline of language, ever focus on the central
importance of language. Those of us engaged in political analy-
sis, be it professionally or as critical observers, need to heed
especially what linguists and philosophers call the "naming" or
"labeling" process.
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Is there any doubt that it makes a difference whether the
world "condemns" or "regrets" the Soviet attack on a civil air-
liner, that a violent political group is labeled "terrorists,"
"guerrillas," or "freedom fighters"? The objective of the
terrorism-related study outlined herein was not simply to gauge
the impact of a group's use of violence and of language, but to
relate the two as complementary components of the contemporary
practice of terrorism. It is the study's contention that, looking
at West German society today, the impact of the language aspect of
its terrorism experience has been significant, even though it is
seldom noticed and. is difficult to isolate.
One need only note the labels "hot autumn" and "peace move-
ment" in the context of the German debate over intermediate-range
nuclear missiles to realize that major elements opposed to govern-
ment policy, though only a small minority of the population,
succeeded in winning acceptance of carefully crafted political
labels--and, with them, acceptance of the credibility and legiti-
macy of their "movement" and its aims and methods. Had we not
acceded to using the coinages of these groups--which threatened to
bring about a "hot autumn," adopted exclusively for themselves the
mantle of "peace" advocates, and claimed the numbers and unity to
be called a "movement" (as opposed, say, to "anti-war protes-
tors")--the issues, debate, and political momentum would have been
quite different. By letting them usurp these particular labels,
we basically denied ourselves the same labels and their attributes.
Countless similar examples could be cited.
The focus of this particular case study, the RAF terrorist
group, has been active in the Federal Republic of Germany since at
least 1970. German terrorists have relied heavily on a variety of
linguistic means in verbally attacking the German establishment.
In doing so, they have created new verbs, adjectives, and compound
nouns, in the process eroding vital parts of the German political
lexicon, besides fomenting a series of highly visible, violent
events. Their crude comparisons of present-day Germany with
Germany's Nazi past, though devoid of any basis, still gnaws at
the country's most exposed nerve.
It is not coincidental or insignificant that these same labels,
and the recourse to linguistic tactics by violent political actors,
are reflected in the statements of leaders of the radical anti-
nuclear Greens Party. For instance, speaking on the intermediate-
range nuclear forces (INF) issue before the Bundestag in July 1983,
Petra Kelly charged that the Kohl government was "criminalizing" the
"nonviolent" peace movement. She called the government's acceptance
of the NATO policy to site new intermediate-range nuclear missiles
in the FRG illegal, anarchist, and an "enmity toward humanity"
(menschenfeindlich). Kelly warned, as RAF terrorists repeatedly
have, against a recurrence of "genocide," of Hitler, and of the FRG
becoming an "American [military] rear area."
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This latter theme, with the FRG viewed alternatively as a
recovery zone for those US forces perceived to be subjugating the
Third World (per the RAF) or as the "final battleground" in a per-
ceived scenario of the superpowers waging limited nuclear war in
Europe (per the RAF and the Greens), is common among critics of the
German political establishment. Such critics, focusing on the FRG
as "victim," accuse the German establishment of making the country
available for US purposes at the cost and peril of German national
interests. Indeed, one of the so-called peace movement's most
violence-prone groups, "Krieg dem Krieg" (War Against War), takes
its name from the RAF's own credo used in communiques since 1977.
A central fact of terrorism is its objective of obtaining
enough political power first to harness public attention and then
to dictate political events. The Rand Corporation's Brian Jenkins
years ago claimed that "terrorists want a lot of people watching,
not a lot of people dead." His comment is still relevant. Indeed,
it is the rare terrorist group that inflicts violence without at
the same time propagating some rationale, explaining its objec-
tives, and damning perceived wrongs and injustices. (Purists
among terrorism analysts would argue that the lack of any stated
political message disqualifies violent actors from the "terrorist"
label--itself a denunciation. Without any political message, they
become "criminals" or "crazies," as criminal psychologist
Frederick Hacker has said.)
Where contemporary terrorists actually have achieved "stra-
tegic," not just "tactical" success, e.g., in Nicaragua, they have
succeeded in convincing and intimidating political bystanders as
well as in coercing their various terrorist targets. To under-
stand the tactics and appraise the prospects of terrorist groups
and their campaigns, one therefore must examine what such groups
are saying and how they exploit the manipulability of language in
pursuing their objectives.
Case Study and Methodology
With this thesis as the study's premise, published RAF event-
related texts or communiques (also known as Kommandomeldungen or
Bekennerbriefe) were examined for the period 1972-81. The objec-
tives were to:
--determine the terrorists' attitudes toward and skills in the
use of language and its importance in their operational
considerations;
--relate relevant findings of contemporary linguistic studies to
a specific field of political analysis; and
--corollate the linguistic and content manifestations of one
terrorist group diachronically across a spectrum (of 10 years
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of RAF texts) in order to define broader categories of
terrorism and gain both political and linguistic insights.
Various disciplines and perspectives are useful in such an
effort. Insights and approaches were drawn from content analysis,
linguistics (and its subfield of pragmatics), psychobiography,
sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and threat (or risk) analysis.
The tendency of politicians has been to denounce and dismiss
adversaries' statements as propaganda. As terrorism increased, we
often tended to label its users weird, if not suicidal, and to
look for elements of psychosis in their statements--opening a new
field of applied research to the psycholinguist. Political ana-
lysts and the policymakers they support need to recognize terror-
ists', revolutionaries', and other anti-establishment adversaries'
statements as "political" keys to their beliefs and plans, motives
and aims. We can find in their statements the core of their world
and operational views, just as we have used the "operational code"
and-other methodologies to unlock the thoughts and values of the
ruling Soviet elite.
One major shortcoming of the established content-analysis
approach to text analysis, however, is its focus on word- and
phrase-level meaning. Modern linguistics long ago moved its
research onto the broader plane of text-level meaning and contex-
tual meaning, the very areas most crucial for political analysis
and also most troublesome to those seeking to apply computers to
translation. By examining entire texts, singly and in their
intertextual relationships, as this study attempted to do, one can
better grasp trends, patterns, and meaningful contrasts in and
between texts. Many of those contrasts, in turn, have their basis
outside the domain of language, in the political and social
environment of the speakers themselves--in this instance in
terrorist cells.
The decision to study the German RAF was for several reasons
an appropriate one. The group, active for more than 10 years, has
had several generations of leadership. It is in a country rela-
tively similar to the US in social structure, demography, level of
industrialization, and cultural values. The RAF clearly shares
with the earlier US Weathermen group and the terrorist Japanese
Red Army basic roots in the student-dominated, anti-Vietnam pro-
tests of the 1960s. Tactically, though suffering severe personnel
losses engendering at least three generations of leaders, it is a
sophisticated terrorist entity whose primary targets have been the
United States (the US military in particular), the West German
establishment, and NATO. In short, excepting perhaps the totality
of pro-Palestinian and radical Shia terrorism, the RAF has posed a
more direct danger for a longer time to US interests, facilities,
and officials than has any other terrorist group.
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The analysis undertaken for this study involved close exami-
nation of early RAF (so-called Baader-Meinhof) literature concern-
ing group doctrine, its assessments and borrowings from Marx and
Lenin, and initial attempts to "talk" young Germans into becoming
revolutionaries. Although those attempts clearly failed, the
early treatises--especially those of Ulrike Meinhof and Horst
Mahler--provide the foundation and ideological wellspring of the
RAF to this day. Scholarly appraisals of these early tracts
agree, for the most part, that "action" per se is foremost in RAF
thinking ("das Primat der Praxis") and that the grounding in Marx
which they express lacks the will to accept or assimilate all of
Marx. This is particularly true in the context of violence,
revolution, and the terrorists' conviction that the demise of
capitalism, while foreordained, must be expedited.?/ Moreover,
such philosophers as Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, and Johan
Galtung left an imprint on the earliest RAF leadership which still
colors the group's thinking.
There are also, of course, uniquely German factors behind the
RAF's development. Germany's Nazi past and the moral indignation
of some youth over perceived German "complicity" in Vietnam and
elsewhere in the developing world have played a vital role. Per-
sonal frustrations and individual psychological factors developing
from familial situations played a part in certain cases.
From its inception the RAF captured the attention and often
the imagination of the West German and other Western publics. The
Western media initially likened them to Bonnie and Clyde. Many
Germans soon felt the RAF to be a threat to German democracy and
stability, reminiscent of the brown fascism which brought Hitler
to power. (Jillian Becker's title, Hitler's Children, seeks to
capitalize promotionally on this point.) On the other hand, the
RAF failed in its attempt to mobilize a large number of support-
ers; nor did it spawn similar guerrilla formations.
The RAF has always held that the German worker, for whom the
group has claimed to be waging its struggle, is hopelessly coopted
by German material comforts and is beyond the reach of revolutionary
ideals or motivations. Secondly, the RAF, like so many terrorist
groups which must operate in fear of being identified, penetrated,
and apprehended, is a staunchly exclusivist, hierarchical entity.
It has never attained the size or organizational complexity of the
Italian Red Brigades, but such were never RAF goals. Thus, we have
seen emerge in West Germany and West Berlin, not a series of RAF
The "primacy of practice" (the RAF's slogan) and worship of
"action" are not drawn from existing ideologies, Marxist or
others, but from "New Left" frustration with ineffective
conventional, nonviolent forms of popular resistance.
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units, but of other, less tightly knit groups, including the Revolu-
tionary Cells (RZ), the former Movement Two June, and various ad hoc,
smaller groups. Indeed, the RZ has capitalized on this key contrast
with the RAF in calling for the spontaneous creation and operation
of other "Revolutionary Cells.."
The RAF's corpus of writings encompasses doctrinal texts;
event-based communiques, letters, and exhortations to supporting
groups; political declarations not tied to violent acts; and court
trial (defense) statements. Two former German terrorists have
published autobiographies; neither of them had belonged to the RAF,
however. The number of available RAF interviews can be counted on
one hand, and each was either conducted with written questions or
subjected to editing. (Imprisoned RAF members, as a group and
individually, have been uniformly uncooperative with persons seeking
to draw political or psychological profiles of them.)
The statements by Mahler in his conversations with Interior
Minister Gerhart Baum_/ cast considerable light on the motivations
and aspirations of the first RAF generation. They clearly spell out
the moral indignation of the group, its utopian thinking, and its
despair over traditional means of protest. Having failed to attract
proponents of its revolutionary approach and continually criticized
by the nonviolent West German left, the RAF evolved into an isolated
group of terrorists who have sought to: 1) prove their ability to
perform significant terrorist acts, thereby building their case for
the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare while embarrassing the
government; and 2) communicate their political thinking, view of the
future, pleas for support, and justification of violence. The
latter have been increasingly obscure texts limited to the time of
the actual attacks.
Basic Findings
The study of RAF texts revealed a great deal about the terror-
ists, their attitude toward and skills in language, and their moti-
vations. The texts issued during the 43-day Hanns-Martin Schleyer
kidnapping/murder incident clearly show the growing frustration and
despair of the RAF terrorists as time passed without the desired FRG
Government capitulation. The tone of the texts--laid down in adjec-
tive selection, sentence and text length, sentence rhythms, and
types of labels and denunciations--illustrates changes in the
writers' emotions. Initially almost superhuman in their sense of
confidence and control, the terrorists lost that momentum within
five days, resorting to hapless reiterations of previous (unmet)
3 Der Minister and der Terrorist: Gespraeche zwischen Gerhart
Baum and Horst Mahler, Jeschke and Malanowski, eds. (Reinbek/
Hamburg: Spiegel, 1980).
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demands. In the end, they were almost pleading to be spared the
need to kill their victim (Schleyer), an act necessary only for them
to save face.
The decade-long set of texts illustrates variances in the
RAF's language-based claims to specific events. The text writers,
for example, routinely resort to passive voice or impersonal verbs
in describing unintended injury or killing of victims; but they
use active (and action) verbs when they are intent on proving
their control over external events and their victims' lives. Here
the RAF also relies on military vocabulary, both in keeping with
standard revolutionary practice (theirs is a "war against imperi-
alism") and to emphasize its power, retention of the offensive,
and level of commitment.
Terrorism is a group phenomenon. The first person singular
never appears in any RAF text. The texts stress "we-they" dichoto-
mies, tending to say less about the RAF (in positive self-appraisal)
than about the enemy (negative comments about imperialism, the US
and FRG Governments, and prevailing power structures generally).
Terrorism, defined in terms of a set of violent tactics, rests
on a program of threats and the means. necessary to lend those
threats ample credibility to create political leverage through fear.
The RAF texts, however, are virtually devoid of specific linguistic
threats or commands, the kind identifiable via traditional content
analysis; for example, there are few "if..., then" or grammatically
imperative constructions. Rather, these linguistic forms of threats
and commands are realized pragmatically through indirect linguistic
means at the level of the entire text rather than sentence units.
Thus, one cannot find the explicit threats that most policymakers
and security managers want to see identified.
A basic critical finding concerning the RAF's use of language
and reliance on written texts to reach its "audience" is that, with
very rare exceptions, there is only one text (message unit) for each
RAF attack. That is, the group issued a single statement (always
after the attack, never in anticipation of it) and made no recourse
to a second pronouncement (the Schleyer operation was an exception).
Viewed tactically, such a practice is a strong indication that the
elitist RAF indeed has sought no broad constituency of political
support, desired no'dialogue with the radical German left (as
Meinhof once did), and engaged in no major recruitment campaigns.
Indeed, a 1982 RAF letter published in a West Berlin alternative
newspaper called for a united front but explicitly excluded any
thought of new RAF units or recruits--in marked contrast with the
more egalitarian Revolutionary Cells.
RAF commentary on language, though less specific than that of
the RZ terrorists, documents the RAF leadership's concern that the
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group's statements accurately reflect its politics and not be sus-
ceptible to ambiguity, misinterpretation, or government manipula-
tion. RAF leader Gudrun Ensslin's ire over a support group's use
of the vital label "political prisoner"'in a way which could have
included Rudolf Hess in its meaning is but one illustration of
such concern with language and labels. Similarly, RAF reference
to "forced feeding" (Zwangsernahrung) of hunger strikers, rather
than the government's preferred neutral term "artificial feeding"
(kiinstliche Ernahrung), was explicit and carefully calculated to
convey that the state itself was committing violence and human
rights abuses in keeping RAF hunger strikers alive.
Between the Schleyer incident in September-October 1977 and
mid-1982, there was no reported RAF attempt to engage the German
left in a meaningful political dialogue. In July 1982, a long
tract attributed to the RAF broke this silence but offered little
more than a rambling plea for more anti-imperialist struggle
alongside the RAF. No RAF texts are on record in the group's
entire existence that warn of or announce actual attacks. A num-
ber of alleged RAF intentions have been reported in the media--
everything from poisoning Stuttgart's water supply to using
missiles against Lufthansa in 1977--but no written texts of the
threats are available. Thus, no basis exists for seeking to
predict specific RAF terrorist events based on prior, written,
textual evidence.
What one does find in a detailed examination of such event-
based texts as those used for this study, some 29 in all, are
insights into the group's thinking and its evolution; its attempt
(in a single text) to reach differentiated audiences with similar
arguments; its reluctant acceptance of the need to communicate at
all; and its attitude toward and capability for producing linguis-
tically effective statements.
The investigation yielded several new insights and reinforced
others. First and foremost, terrorist statements remain the most
readily available and potentially productive avenue into terrorist
thinking. The most promising approach to terrorist (and perhaps all
political) texts is investigation at the text level by analysts with
native-speaker competency working on originals. (Translation all
but destroys text-level and contextual meanings in the sociocultural
context of the writers. Nuances are lost, metaphors overlooked,
epithets overplayed or unseen.) The assessment technique seems to
require both a content-analytical and a text-linguistic appraisal.
Psycholinguistic insights can be very helpful if we agree on the
meaning of the term psycholinguistics, which does not merely connote
psychologists reading translated texts.
Analysis must not stop with quantitative or statistical data
but must examine on a text-level basis the questions of labeling,
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threats, speaker emotions, logic and argumentation, metaphors,
text cohesion and development, and other related questions. These
and other text features (present or absent) enable us to infer
other things about the intended audience of the terrorists, the
terrorists' sophistication, their attitude toward claimed constit-
uencies, and their ability to articulate their political beliefs
and the seriousness of those beliefs.
The texts contain the most persuasive arguments the terror-
ists can muster to enlarge their following; they constitute a
crucial body of information for comparison with other data, e.g.,
opinion research on popular responses. Terrorism is, after all,
only the most extreme pole along a continuum of sociopolitical
frustration and anger in those societies where it appears. As
such, the texts prepared by terrorism's users provide the politi-
cal analyst or country specialist with the most starkly defined
portrait of the political opposition, generational conflict, youth
discontent, or general social malaise in the areas where it
surfaces.
Terrorists in the FRG are the most extreme example of a grow-
ing sociopolitical alienation, much of which is felt by Germans
aged 35 and under. These young Germans are gradually assuming the
most influential positions in German politics, industry, labor,
education, and the media. Indeed, at least half of the identified
German terrorists were preparing for, if not already at work in,
these professions.
Excepting the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, most of the world's
terrorists since Castro's takeover have not managed to build their
efforts into a revolutionary challenge capable of turning out the
state or regime enemy.. In Western Europe, at least, this is due
largely to the prevailing factors of Western anti-violent legal
and moral values, basic social and economic well-being, viable
political pluralism, and effective and accepted government insti-
tutions in all branches. From another perspective, West European
terrorist groups--German ones like the RAF in particular--have
failed to convince their would-be constituencies of the truth of
their accusations and criticisms or of the likelihood that a new,
better "revolutionary" order would result from their terrorist
efforts.
The conclusion this study reaches--from the standpoint of
both linguist and political analyst--is that, just as physical
violence cannot go on unimpeded, neither can terrorist statements
and claims go unanalyzed or unanswered. Whether US concern is
over the Soviet Union's ability to manipulate European attitudes
toward NATO and US security policies or over a terrorist group's
impact on a given population, the task for our analysts and public
diplomatists is the same: We must effectively identify and reject
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the adversary's labels and assert our own. In the poignant words
of one German commentator, "...a conspiracy of silence...will
always benefit the party capable of spreading the greatest fear."
This holds equally true for the broadest strategic nuclear context
and for the growing number of terrorists.
Prepared by Bowman H. Miller
632-3351
Approved by F. H. Capps
632-8182
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