INTERVIW WITH VITALY CHURKIN/ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301760006-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 26, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM CBS Nightwatch STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network
DATE June 26, 1985 2:00 A.M. CRY Washington, D.C.
Interview with Vitaly Churkin/Arms Control
CHARLIE ROSE: President Reagan surprised a lot of
people earlier this month with the stand on the SALT II treaty.
Some say even Moscow may have been caught off guard.
We're going to speak with a Soviet diplomat who
specializes in arms control.
ROSE: Joining us now to talk about the SALT II treaty
is Vitaly Churkin, Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy here in
Washington. He heads the Embassy's Arms Control Office.
Did you pop the champagne bottles after the President
announced, as Senator Symms suggested?
VITALIY CHURKIN: Well, no, not exactly. You know, in
the arms control policy of this Administration, there is and has
been nothing to be very glad about. We we're not suprised, as a
matter of fact, by the general drift of this announcement because
I think it could easily be predicted...
ROSE: Well, there were lots of alternatives, also, on
the part of a number of people.
CHURKIN: But the general drift could be predicted, in
that, first, it will be a drift away from the current arms
control regime; and second, that the Administration will not do
it overtly, that they will try to create the impression that
actually they are trying to stay with the arms control regime.
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So, it is something which we have seen all along:
moving away from the arms control regime; but for the sake of the
public, for the sake of the allies, creating the impression that
the United States is working to strengthen the arms control
regime.
ROSE: Let me stay with SALT II for a second, then.
CHURKIN: Okay.
ROSE: Clearly, the President had said, in campaigning
in 1980, that it was fatally flawed, SALT II. But here he is
complying with it and suggesting the Soviet Union has a number of
violations, not only of this, really, but also with the ABM 1972
treaty.
My question is, it seems to the hard-liners on the right
exactly the opposite of what you suggest, which is that the
President is in fact taking that extra step on SALT II.
CHURKIN: Well, I'm not going to explain the position or
the feelings of the hard-liners. I can explain our feelings and
our position.
You should go beyond the headlines on this announcement
and you should read, which I'm sure you did, the announcement
itself, which also said that the United States is going to
augment its strategic modernization programs, which is a very
interesting turn of the policy. We have seen a lof of times that
the United States is using the fact of negotiations to augment
its strategic programs. But it is the first time that I have
seen a side using the fact that it is going to leave a treaty, to
abandon a treaty as a pretext to augment its strategic
modernizations programs.
Then this announcement says that the United States, in
fact, is going to choose which provisions to observe, of the
treaty, and which not to observe. And then what is said is that
the United States...
ROSE: Proportionate measures was what the President
CHURKIN: Well, we'll get into that later.
And then what is said is that the United States is going
to choose any moment when it can say, "No longer we are abiding
by this SALT II treaty."
And one of the positive aspects of arms control
agreements is that they provide a certain predictability to the
actions of the...
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ROSE: If the President did not want to live up to the
SALT II accord, why didn't he simply say: We no longer
recognize, or we no longer will comply. We will not take the
Poseidon out of our fleet, simply because the Soviets have not
been in compliance with it, and we don't believe that it is a
treaty that -- since it has not been ratified and is not in the
best interest of the United States, we're not going to do it?
That's exactly what Secretary Weinberger was arguing
that he should do and exactly Dick Perle...
CHURKIN: My explanation is that you see the same things
happening now which you saw happening before. You remember that
when this Administration came to power, they were saying that
they did not want arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union
at all, that they did not want the SALT II treaty, and other arms
control agreements. But...
ROSE: Well, no, that's not what they said.
CHURKIN: Yes, it was.
ROSE: No, they didn't say they didn't want arms control
negotiations, because they have negotiated in good faith in
Geneva. And Mr. Nitze...
CHURKIN: You're not right in that. They came to power
in January of '81, and the negotiations began only in June of
'82. It took 18 months for this Administration -- and I'm coming
over to your initial question -- under the pressure of the
American public and under the pressure of the U.S. allies, to
start negotiations.
The same thing we see happening now. The policy drift
is towards abandoning the SALT II treaty, whereas the rhetoric is
in favor of the SALT II treaty because...
CHURKIN: Yes. Exactly.
ROSE: What do you want the President and this
Administration and this country to do in terms of SALT II and in
Geneva?
CHURKIN: Well, in terms of SALT II, if they want to be
serious about SALT II, they want to say -- they have to say that
they're going to be serious about SALT II and they are going to
abide by that treaty. If there are some questions, which we
usually have, with respect to compliance, the alleged Soviet
violations, which do not exist, then we can discuss those
questions...
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ROSE: Well, let's discuss those questions. Because as
you know very well, they [unintelligible], I think, eleven
violations, of which three of them they point to principally. It
is the early warning system in Siberia, early warning system in
Siberia, which you say is a space tracking system. That's one.
Secondly, it is the encryption of the missile telemetry. And
thirdly, it is whether you have added an extra land-based
missile, the SS-25.
CHURKIN: It is interesting, and you pointed out
correctly that in the context of the SALT II treaty, they have
referred to that radar, which has nothing to do with the SALT II
treaty.
ROSE: But with the ABM treaty of 1972.
CHURKIN: Yes. But in this particular case the future
of the SALT II treaty was decided. It has nothing to do with the
SALT II treaty.
The second two issues, telemetry. The SALT II treaty
expressly permits all methods of transmitting telemetric
information, including encryption, including encryption.
ROSE: So that's not a violation? That's not a
violation?
CHURKIN: It is not a violation. It is not a violation.
We have been repeatedly saying to the American side:
What channels of telemetry you do not want us to encrypt? Let us
come to an agreement on those channels. Specify them in written
form in a document, so that we could know what you really want of
us.
They never said what they want. No American court is
going to qualify it as a violation once the other side does not
want to say what it really wants from the side it makes
accusations against.
ROSE: Thank you, Vitaliy Churkin.
He is the Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, an
expert in arms control.
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