ANDROPOV'S PROBABLE FORTHCOMING REASSERTION OF POLICY AND AUTHORITY OR A FROSTY NEW YEAR TO ALL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000100330031-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: December 20, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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NIC #9181-83
20 December 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM 25X1
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT : Andropov's Probable Forthcoming Reassertion of Policy and
Authority or "A Frosty New Year to All"
1. The Supreme Soviet session scheduled for 28 December and the Party
Plenum that should preceed it are likely to give us not only a glimpse of
Andropov but also, and more significantly, of the health of his political
coalition and of the policy outlook for the coming year. I expect that
Andropov will be healthy enough to consolidate his power and affirm the
policy direction he has set during the past year -- a direction which
promises even frostier US-Soviet relations in 1984 than in 1983. In these
circumstances, it will be important to keep in perspective the fundamental
reasons for that policy direction and not to allow the impression to arise
that it is due wholly or even mainly to current US policy.
2. The atmosphere in Moscow is not conducive to a Central Committee
Plenum and Supreme Soviet happily ringing out 1983 in favor of an even
brighter 1984. A year ago Andropov's accession to power had met with both
general apathy among the population at large and hope among its more
politically engaged segments -- not just in the party but in the
intelligensia as well - that the long period of Brezhnevite stagnation was
about to give way to a more promising era under more enlightened
leadership. Today, diplomatic, clandestine, academic, and journalistic
reports from Moscow agree: The city is gripped by a sense of foreboding if
not outright fear about the future. The roots of this situation lie in
Andropov's leadership and the nature of his coalition, the major policy
choices this coalition has made, and the continued opposition to even
measured change by the entrenched bureaucracy protected by old Brezhnevites
at the top (primarily Tikhonov and Chernenko).
3. Although Andropov's original coalition was composed of disparate
elements, its dominant personality was Ustinov whose outlook has been shaped
by a career devoted to ensuring Soviet security not through the creation of
a peacceful international environment but through the building up of Soviet
military strength. Further, Andropov's own institutional strength lay in
the KGB. Now, a year later, Ustinov has been joined in Moscow by the
CL BY Signer
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like-minded Romanov while KGB officials have fanned out in the party and
state apparatuses (for instance, old Andropov KGB colleagues into Central
Committee posts, erstwhile KGB general Aliyev into the Politburo as a full
member and into the Council of Ministers as First Vice Chairman, and ex-KGB
head Fedorchuk into the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Andropov's illness
has probably made him more dependent than ever on Ustinov (and most likely
the KGB) lest Chernenko or one of his erstwhile supporters attempt to
challenge his leadership. One can therefore speak of an Andropov-Ustinov
coalition that draws its main policy inputs from the KGB and the Ministry of
Defense, with their emphasis on domestic and international order through
repression of real and imagined challenges.
4. Domestically, this has resulted in a neo-Stalinist approach,
different from pure Stalinism in that the KGB does not dominate the party
institutionally and there is, so far at least, no mass terror, but similar
to Stalinism in the imposition of discipline through repressive methods
(publicized executions, terms of imprisonment prolonged by administrative
fiat instead of the more cumbersome and therefore self-limiting rigged
judicial procedures, tightened ideological controls over cultural
activities.) In the one area where Andropov has attempted to be more
innovative -- economic managment -- his experimentation with
decentralization is so timid that it is almost fated not to change the
existing system but be absorbed by it, as is apparently already happening
even before its scheduled implementation on 1 January.
5. In foreign policy, the Andropov era has been marked so far by the
major INF setback and no visible progress in any other international issues
of importance to the USSR, such as Afghanistan, Sino-Soviet relations, or
the Middle East. Indeed, the saving grace for Andropov's record is that the
world does not conform to the Soviet image of a two-person zero-sum game and
that every Soviet difficulty or setback does not automatically translate
into a U.S. gain. Still it is in the US-Soviet arena that developments have
been most worrisome to the USSR. There have been the aforementioned INF
setback, the loss of the Grenada foothold in the Caribbean, and, most
disturbing, the US Administration's ability to sustain a tough posture based
on the rebuilding of US and Western military power. Faced with the dilemma
of either making diplomatic concessions significant enough to change this US
policy or risking seeing it continue and the international situation become
more tense, Moscow has chosen the second course and thereby made its own
situation worse. The primary cause for that choice is the preference of the
Andropov coalition to base Soviet security on the USSR's own efforts
unencumbered by significant diplomatic concessions. To be sure, this
approach - which can be called security autarky - is but the intensified
application of the traditional Soviet search for absolute security through
the creation of absolute insecurity for everybody else. But its intensified
application has come at a time when greater, not lesser, concessions were
required to achieve Soviet foreign policy objectives. This security autarky
also affects domestic policy as it requires unchanged and possibly even
increased defense priorities at the expense of the consumer, who is to be
kept in line by tighter police controls. But that repressive tendency
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defeats the intent of the already timid decentralization experiments whose
purpose is to inject greater individual responsibility and creativity into
economic life: creativity simply does not thrive in an increasingly
repressive climate.
6. Andropov's illness has compounded the difficulties inherent in his
regime's policy choices. How can Andropov project to his country an image
of firm direction at the top -- and retain credibility as a leader who wants
to face facts squarely -- when he disappears for four months -- and has his
spokesman attribute his absence to a cold? More importantly, his precarious
health has at the very least retarded the building of a loyal country-wide
coalition in the party-governmental apparatus where few will commit
themselves to a leader who may not be there tomorrow. It is doubts such as
these that probably made Gosplan Director Baybakov bold enough to publicly
contradict Andropov one day after he called major economic reforms necessary
and lesser bureaucrats to resist whatever slight changes Andropov has
promulgated. The net result is that Andropov has not moved the country
forward; rather, the increasingly repressive internal climate, the worsening
international situation, and uncertain leadership have created a sense of
despondency about the future that is worse and more widespread than in
Brezhnev's time.
7. It is likely that Andropov is aware of this mood and probable that
he hopes to use the CC plenum and Supreme Soviet meeting to at least improve
it by projecting a renewed sense of direction. Indeed he may already have
set the process in motion. Since his apparent return to office routine in
the Kremlin, which according to eyewitnesses occurred in early December, two
consecutive Politburo meetings have reafirmed important tenets of his
economic program (nationwide use of the brigade system and the effective
implementation of the decentralization experiment in two All-Union and three
Republic ministries) and a Central Committee resolution pgblished in Pravda
was the strongest attack in a long time and certainly during Andropov's rule
on a regional party organization -- (the Moldavian apparatus where Chernenko
started his rise to the top.) The specific targets of the Politburo
statements and CC resolution were different but probably related: in the
first instance, the stifling bureaucracy and in the second, those at the top
who protect it. Indeed, Chernenko, by condoning this Central Committee
resolution which will widely be perceived as showing his inability to
protect his Moldavian confederates, has probably taken another step in his
march to political oblivion that began with his speech nominating Andropov
for the post of General Secretary.
8. This renewed Andropov political vigor suggests he intends to use
the coming period to reaffirm his policy -- thereby reassuring the country
that it is in capable hands -- and to strengthen his coalition's ability to
see at least its domestic policy through.
-- The reaffirmation of policy will probably take the form of speeches
explaining the current situation and resolutions presenting
Andropov's policy response. In the international context, this
will probably entail an analysis that will conclude that the
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situation is tense and complex but that the world is not on the
brink of war. Operationally, this analysis will more likely than
not translate into a rise in the announced defense budget and a
call for increased vigilance -- a call that will dovetail with the
domestic stress on discipline and productivity.
-- The strengthening of his coalition will require personnel changes.
Andropov has made a number of them in regional bodies (and will
probably make more of them through the party "elections" being
conducted for him by Gorbachev) and in the Central Committee
apparatus. But, contrary to expectations, he has so far made only
two changes of note in the Politburo -- elevating Aliyev to full
member and moving Romanov to Moscow and the Secretariat. This
coming session, however, will probably be his last chance. His
precarious health makes it imperative to show the
party-governmental apparatus that he is in charge and the
aforementioned reports of Politburo meetings and Central Committee
resolution suggests he intends to do so. In my estimation,
therefore, both the exigencies of the situation and political
indicators favor at least some personnel changes at the top. But
Andropov's decreased stamina has probably increased his reliance on
Ustinov, a development which, combined with his own philosophical
orientation, probably ensures that any Politburo changes will give
an even more neo-Stalinist, security-autarky cast.
9. Other outcomes are, of course, possible. Although policy
reaffirmation is almost certain, it could be accompanied by continued
personnel stability at the top. The strongest argument for this eventuality
is Andropov's health which, despite his return to work, continues to be so
poor as to preclude a public appearance. Consequently an even more
intriguing development would be the partial retirement of Andropov through
the voluntary or forced resignation from one or both of his more important
posts, (General Secretary and Chairman of the Defense Council) and retention
only of the Chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Although
possible, such a turn of events is unlikely because acquiescent retirement
by a General Secretary runs counter to Soviet political practice and because
there are no indications of any new coalition uniting around a viable
challenger to Andropov.
10. No matter what the outcome, however, this plenum will also affect
the next succession. If the outcome is unclear on political alignment, the
short-run result will be probably the continued vacillating application of
Andropov's policy, and, in the longer term, increased maneuvering for the
succession with policy disputes possibly developing. If, on the other hand,
the outcome is a strengthening of the Andropov coalition (as I expect) the
short-term result will probably be a somewhat more adroit execution of its
policy, increased ability for the two dominant senior Politburo members -
Andropov and Ustinov - to shape the next succession, but possibly also the
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emergence of even more pronounced policy differences during that next
succession if, as is probable, the Andropov coalition policy's continues to
be generally ineffectual.
11. If policy reaffirmation is indeed the outcome, Western
understanding of what brought it about will have an important bearing on how
soon Soviet foreign, and possibly domestic, policy can enter a more
constructive phase. Should blame for Moscow's hardened stance be attributed
primarily to Western policy, as an increasing number of commentators are
doing, there will be less incentive in Moscow for a reconsideration. If,
on the other hand, the underlying reasons for Soviet truculence are kept in
mind, the greater the possibility that the USSR will make greater efforts to
reach admittedly limited accommodations with the US sooner rather than
later. In my analysis, it is therefore important to keep in mind these
essential points:
-- The driving force behind Moscow's truculence is the neo-Stalinist,
security-autarky orientation of the Andropov coalition.
-- Although Andropov's illness has conveyed a sense of Soviet
disarray, Moscow's unwillingness to reach negotiated solutions with
the West -- especially on INF -- has not been the result of
decisions not taken but rather of decisions taken by the Andropov
coalition.
-- Moscow is likely to persevere and even proceed more intensively
along those policy lines until it becomes convinced that they are
self-defeating both in domestic and international terms.
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