SOVIET VULNERABILITIES STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00423R000100060019-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 14, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Soviet Vulnerabilities
The slowdown in economic growth represents the most visible
and serious challenge to the Soviet regime. Although the
dimensions of this problem are the subject of continuing
controversy in the West, it is clear that economic constraints will
have serious implications for virtually every area of Soviet
political, economic and social life. High rates of growth in the
1960s and 1970s permitted the leadership to satisfy the demands of
key interest groups and bureaucracies, but low growth in the 1980s
will intensify the competition among rival claimants. Low growth
will make it more difficult for the leadership to make improvements
in consumer welfare at a time when increased knowledge of Eastern
European living standards serve as a reference point for rising
c,unsumer expeczazions.
9 X1
In fact, there is mounting evidence that the economic slowdown
has been accompanied by increasing consumer discontent and by a
perceived decline in quality of life. While posing no immediate
challenge to the regime, increasing alienation and cynicism among
the young and other social ills (crime, corruption and alcoholism)
will have a detrimental impact on Soviet economic goals. A poorly 25X1
25X1
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Lastly, and potentially the most serious vulnerability is
ethnic discontent. Although there is now no widespread,
politically disruptive protest among Soviet nationality groups, the
potential for unrest and sporadic violence, especially in the
Baltic republics, remains high. Ehtnic tensions rooted in cultural
and political suppression could grow due to increasing competition
adding to the social problems confronting the Soviet Union.
managed health care system and increasing adult and infant
mortality rates will also impact directly on the size and
efficiency of the work force. Moreover, rapid industrializaiton
and urbanization--products of economic advancement--are themselves
25X1
25X1
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Slowing Economic Growth and Its Societal Impact
The list of growing economic woes in the USSR includes
declining increments to the labor force, slowing growth of capital
stock, raw material shortages and transportation bottlenecks.
Despite obvious dissatisfaction with the poor performance of the
economy, the Soviet leadership does not appear prepared to squarely
face the issue of economic reform. The accelerated public
discussion in the USSR of the necessity for economic change which
accompanied Andropov's succession has so far resulted in only
limited economic experiments to reduce the number of plan
indicators and expand somewhat the decisionmaking power of
enterprises. This modest tinkering with the system has left
untouched the inflexible pricing mechanism and central plan.
Although some Soviet officials have called for a closer look at
East European experiments, i.e., marketization along the
"Hungarian" lines, they continue to rely on the labor discipline
campaign to increase economic efficiency and boost productivity.
General Secretary Chernenko acknowledged in his Supreme Soviet
election speech, however, that increased discipline will not be
Given the bureaucratic inertia of the Soviet leadership and
the real political costs.involved in economic decentralization,
Soviet economic growth will most likely continue at low levels
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through the 1980s. Such growth rates will heighten competition for
resources among interest groups and create a tense political
climate. Soviet planners may be forced to make costly tradeoffs in
attempting to increase investment, maintain consumption levels,
keep up allocations to agriculture and avoid cutbacks in the growth
of military spending. To reduce growth in consumption would have a
negative impact on worker morale and productivity and might
ultimately threaten the stability of the Soviet system. To reduce
growth in defense spending, particularly at a time of leadership
transition, would be equally difficult, since those vying for power
would probably be reluctant to press for actions that run counter
to the biases of political and military officials alike. 25X1
The Beleaguered Consumer
Anecdotal reports from US embassy officers, foreign
correspondents, emigres, Western journalists, and Soviet citizens
underscore the continuing--and worsening--inadequacy of consumer
goods production in the Soviet Union. Shopping is a particular
ordeal with hours spent in long lines often to acquire clearly
inferior goods. A Moscow resident reported that even toilet tissue
had to be reserved by filling out special forms. Personal items--
soap, toothpaste, razor blades--can be completely lacking even in
major urban areas. Shortages extend to big ticket items, as well:
in the 1970s Moscow residents were forced to wait two to ten years
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The most pressing consumer demand appears to be for
improvement in the diet and particularly for increased amounts of
fresh meat. Soviet data show that the gap between meat supply and
demand has increased 12 percent since 1975. Since the late 1970s a
across the entire range of food items. In May 1982,
series of agricultural failures has led to acute spot shortages
meat was being rationed throughout Cent`","
Asia, a practice also reported in other areas of the Soviet
Union. In a small number of cases food shortages have precipitated
incidents of worker unrest. Strikes in Tolyatti and Gorki in 1981
reportedly were ended only when special food distribution centers
')5X1
Adding to the problem of consumer shortages is the failure of
Soviet industry to maintain even minimal standards of quality
control. Soviet merchandise is often poorly made--a fact widely
recognized by the average citizen. Friends and relatives traveling
outside the USSR are routinely asked to buy consumer goods, even
from Eastern Europe, as these are automatically assumed to be
superior to items produced at home. In the mid-1970s 25X1
lacknowledged this problem and stated that the demand
for high quality goods was rising.
25X1
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Soviet citizens are dismayed, moreover, by the perceived
disparity in Soviet and East European living. standards. 25X1
in questions posed to 25X1
propagandists at public lectures they frequently question the
necessity of Soviet subsidies to their Warsaw pact allies in view
of the higher standard of living that these countries are thought
to nave.
Soviet citizens are also aware that the burden of consumer
shortages is not shared equally--a perception that exacerbates
discontent. High party officials are entitled to shop at special
stores closed to the general public. These stores insulate the
Soviet aristocracy from chronic shortages, endless waiting in line,
rude service and other harassments that daily plague ordinary
folk. They also provide the elite with all kinds of goods the
proletariat never lays eyes on and at cut-rate prices--French
cognac, German radios, Japanese cameras, imported chocolates,
etc. These privileges are carefully parceled out according to
rank, with the very top leaders eligible for the "Kremlin ration"-=
enough food to feed their families luxuriously every month, for
free. Status determines access to other scarce goods, as well with
access to new housing and cars based on employment, bureaucratic
II
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Corruption and the Second Economy
The inefficiencies of the Soviet economic system have produced
a burgeoning second economy that, according to US academic experts
account for 25 percent of the Soviet GNP. For the average citizen,
bribery or "blat" has become an essential element for making daily
life possible--providing desired goods where the state does not.
High level involvement in corruption is also extensive. The
political elite seem to have developed a caste mentality and are
strongly motivated by a desire to preserve and extend their
privileges, especially for their children. Leonid Brezhnev was a
prime offender in this regard, promoting the career of both his son
and-son-in-law despite their reported involvement in corrupt
practices. Certain universities and institutes have become 25X1
recognized as the province of party, government and military elites
for their offspring, where blat is a key entrance requirement and
ghost-written theses for the "golden youth" are the rule.
25X1
Among the more conscientious segments of the leadership, many
officials fear that corruption--fueled by the inadequacies of the
planned economy--is itself eroding the party's legitimacy,
undermining public respect for law and order and diminishing the
party's capacity to get the country moving again. 25X1
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communism as "fighting for its life against inefficiency and 25X1
corruption." He emphasized that the struggle against this internal
weakness was the biggest threat the Soviets faced.
described the last years of Brezhnev's rule as one of tota?5X1
paralysis, citing his inability to remove corrupt officials who
were personally close to him.
25X1
elites holdin 25X1
g jobs in nonparty
institutions are increasingly speaking out against party abuses of
at least some military officers
believe the party has lost its ideological bearings and many young
government officials have lost confidence in the party's ability to
Impact of Consumer Discontent
Dissatisfaction with the living standard lowers productivity
and promotes economic inefficiency in a variety of ways. City
dwellers take long lunch hours to shop in order to avoid longer
lines after work. Material deprivations and inconvenience
contributes to a general malaise in the work force that also lowers
productivity, such as when wage incentives lose their effectiveness
because quality goods are scarce. As Brezhnev acknowledged at the
25th Party Congress, "increased incomes alone do not mean a real
increase in living standards." The shortage of a number of goods
reduces the possibility of material labor incentives. Corruption
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and the "black market" further weaken the social fabric, divert
'25X1
resources and hr- eaLen control.
Beyond the impact on labor productivity, dashed consumer
expectations could have more far-reaching consequences for the
Soviet system. For much of the post-Stalin period, the combination
of improved living standards, stable prices for basic commodities,
job security and opportunities for social advancement formed the
basic ingredients in a tacit "social contract" between the regime
and its people ensuring political stability. A decline in the rate
of growth of consumption or--even worse--a drop in the standard of
living eventually could threaten that social contract and with it
/9r VA
Regime Response
The regime has reacted to some of these problems as if it
believes there is a linkage between popular perceptions of well-
being and political stability. In a September 1981 article
appearing in the authoritative journal Kommunist, Konstantin
Chernenko warned that the party's disregard for the "social
interests of any class is fraught with the danger of social tension
and of political and socio-economic crisis." Brezhnev also
demonstrated considerable apprehension about the popular mood. In
1981 he described the food supply as the central "political"
problem of the current Five-Year Plan. Perhaps in response to this
perception in the leadership, a food program, established in 1982,
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was designed to translate higher farm spending into more food for
the consumer.
25X1
During Andropov's short tenure a number of additional actions
were announced to improve consumer well-being. The service sectors
operating hours were extended to make shopping less of a burden for
the public. The recently announced 1984 economic plan features
higher output targets and resources for the consumer, with
production of consumer goods slated to increase four percent. A
special consumer goods program is also being developed for the next
Five Year Plan. Most recently the Politburo announced that an
experiment was underway in the consumer goods and service sectors
of several regions of the Russian Republic to improve overall
efficiency. 25X1
The regime has also employed the traditional palliatives.of
ideological exhortation combined with measures to increase
discipline. Many of Andropov's initiatives appear designed to
increase personal responsibility and accountability.throughout the
Andropov's campaign against corruption, however, was even more
dramatic evidence of this approach. In a number of well-
orchestrated public relations moves including a visit to workers in
a Moscow factory, dismissal of several government and party
officials for less than adequate job performance (if not outright
criminal activity), and media exposes, Andropov sought to shak.e off
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the lethargy of the late Brezhnev years and dramatically call a
halt to the lax personnel policies of his predecessor. The regime
obviously hoped that such actions would improve economic efficiency
and increase economic productivity from the managerial level on
down.
Moreover, his anticorruption campaign sought to refurbish the
party's standing with ordinary Soviet citizens. Brezhnev's
tolerance of corrupt and incompetent officials had increased the
resentment of ordinary citizens who do not have the "political
pull" necessary to take a. short cut to the good life. Particularly
in the wake of Poland, the Soviet leadership has gone to some
lengths to.demonstrate that the flaunting of privilege will not be
tolerated and that officials are not above the law. The death
sentence imposed on'the former director of Moscow's gastronom No.
1, once a purveyor of delicacies to the Soviet elite, was a strong
signal of Andropov'
places.
intent to crackdown on corruption in high
It is still too early to determine how vigorously Chernenko
will pursue this strategy; although his election speech strongly
endorsed it as a line "which will be pursued permanently and
rigorously." The expulsion of a Deputy Minister of Tractor and
Agricultural Machine Building for abuse of office announced on 7
March indicates at least that the policy still remains in force.
Yet the utility of the campaign is limited by the fact that so many
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higher officials, including those representing Chernenko's main
power base (the party apparatus), are vulnerable to corruption
charges and therefore likely to resist anything more than a
cosmetic drive to purify the party.
25X1
The regime's attempts to diffuse consumer dissatisfaction also.
are being undercut by the psychology of rising expectations. In
the past, the Soviet leadership has confronted a relatively pliant
populace, whose material expectations were modest and whose
acquiescence and inertia in the face of disappointment are
historically documented. Improvements in the standard of living,
however, have whetted the appetite for continued improvements.
Increasing contact with the West and even comparisions with Eastern
Europe have caused Soviet citizens to be less appreciative of their
lot and more resentful of government policy. While the older
generation is still probably inclined to compare the present
situation with the stark deprivation of the pre-war and immmediate
post war years, the younger generation seems much less inclined to
use this standard of comparison. They are particularly attracted
to Western fashions and products and measure progress by how much
their standard of living improved from one year to the next.
Social Malaise
The Soviet leadership is also faced with a growing social
malaise that reflects underlying social discontent as a prime cause
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of lagging productivity growth, and undermines regime policies.
These could become even more troublesome for the regime during a
period of economic slowdown. Increasing alienation and cynicism,
especially among young people and other social ills--crime,
corruption and alcoholism--are likely to increase. The pervasive
police powers of the state when coupled with the population's
traditional passivity towards depravation should be sufficient to
maintain political control, but reliance on administrative controls
and repression will not reverse the malaise. The Soviet leadership
will be challenged to avoid the continuing erosion of the "quality
of life" that has become the regime's real basis. for legitimacy.
Youth Alienation
The gap between aspirations and the ability of Soviet society
to fulfill them appears to be fueling a loss of faith in the
Communist dream that is particularly pronounced among the young.
In a poll
1982, Soviet youth demonstrated
i n February
desire for material comfort and a
stable career that is in striking contrast to official emphasis on
"socially productive labor" as the key indicator of success. While
46 percent of those questioned chose
"favorite work and the respect of their comrades" as their goal, a
group almost as large (34 percent) named the "quality and prestige
of their possessions" as their definition of success. Such
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materialism suggests a failure of socialist propaganda and official
ideology.
25X1
Leadership statements underscore concern for such attitudes,
not only because they lead to political apathy but also becuase
they increase young peoples' susceptability to foreign
influences. At an ideological plenum held last June, Chernenko
enumerated the shortcomings of Soviet youth as: "failure to
understand their civic duties, political,naivete, parasitism and a
refusal to work where necessary for society." A public lecture
held in Moscow in January repeated Chernenko's attacks on the
corruptive influence of Western ideas on Soviet young people and
advocated more effective internal propaganda--a summons
enthusiastically taken up by Komsomolskaya Pravda (the newspaper of
the young Communist League). 25X1
The revival of religion among the young also appears to be an
increasing worry for the leadership. 25X1
Andropov was specifically concerned 25X1
about this issue. Statements by various republic party officials
indicate that religious sects are becoming more active and
successfully attracting younger members into their congregations.
According to the number of
persons marrying in the church and submitting to the rite of
baptism is increasing.
was also sufficiently concerned about this problem to direct party
workers to pay more attention to atheistic work.
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Finally, Soviet officials have deplored the growing evidence
of pacifism on the home front. Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the
General Staff, complained in a speech given at a 1981 ideological
conference that Soviet young people were underrating the threat of
war emanating from the West. Reporting after the invasion of
Afghanistan suggested that some young people were attempting to
avoid the draft. Such examples could indicate that Soviet young
people are less willing to make the personal sacrifices necessary
to maintain a high degree of military readiness.
Violent Crime
While economic crimes are vexing for the regime, involving as
they do a large segment of the Soviet elite, violent crime appears
to be on the rise as well. The magnitude of the problem is
reflected in increased press coverage of this problem. In 1981,
Pravda reported an upsurge in street crime in Eastern Siberia,
blaming prosecutors, police and the lax attitude of the public.
Official concern also is reflected in the recently announced
changes in the criminal code, stressing longer periods of
orlyl
Official ideology is hard, pressed to explain the upsurge in
violent crime, as such behavior is considered to be a by-product of
bourgeois influences that in theory have been eliminated. As
Soviet press commentaries and sociological studies themselves
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indicate, however, alcohol abuse, family instability and low
educational levels are major causes. A 1971 study of crime in
Moscow found that 70 percent of those convicted of homicide
committed their crimes while drunk.
Some of the social problems contributing to crime--the high
divorce rate, for example--are part of. the price of increasing
industrialization and urbanization, and Soviet officials can do
little to mitigate their impact. In the case of alcohol abuse, the
regimes' vested interest in preserving political control may
conflict with its desi'e to reduce alcohol consumption and its
related crimes. Pent-up social discontent is more easily managed
if it is confined to public drunkenness and domestic disturbances
rather than taking the form of political demonstration or
The Role of Women and the Family
"Our problem now is to do away with the family and to free
women from the care of children. Women grow worn out in the petty
household work, their strength dissipated, their minds growing
narrow and stale.*. The backwardness of women, their lack of
understanding for the revolutionary ideals of man decrease his joy
and determination to fight." Lenin - 1920
Certain aspects of the Marxist-Leninist creed do not sit
comfortably on Russian culture and the disappearance of the
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individual family is one of them. Early Soviet theoreticians
attacked the reactionary "bourgeois" family in order to liberate
women and serve the political goals of the regime. Young people
would be properly schooled in the virtues of the collectivity, with
selfish individual interests brought under control. Traditional
child care functions would be taken over by the state, freeing
women to enter the labor force and help "build socialism." 25X1
The attack on the traditional family was all but abandoned in
WW II but, due to a variety of pressures, the family today is ill-
equipped to deal with many of the problems characteristic of modern
society,--divorce, alcoholism, youth alienation, etc. Although the
Soviet Unio.n has the highest female labor force participation rates
of any industrial society, the government has not delivered on its
promise to lessen the burden of childcare and housework. According
to Soviet data, although men and women devote equal time to paid
employment, women devote an extra 28 hours a week to housework
compared to 12 for men. While the high percentage of women working
outside the home has greatly supported the leadership's goal of
rapid economic development, women have not moved up the career
ladder on par with men and their salaries are only 65 to 75 percent
9 Y1
The failure of official policy to substantially improve the
quality of life for Soviet women explains in large part the falling
birth rate. Soviet women, particularly in European Russia, are
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having fewer children and increasing numbers of abortions to keep
their family size small. The task of creating a stable family
appears fraught with so much difficulty that, as recent articles in.
Noviy Mir suggest, some women are rejecting marriage and
childbearing altogether. The falling birth rate impacts adversely
on the country's labor resources and the leadership's goal of
eocnomic success. Rising levels of al choli sm and drug abuse among
Soviet women, additional indicators of discontent, also weaken the
family's ability to provide a stable environment and inculcate
Or,yi
Divorce rates are high as well. According to a number of
Soviet sociologists the family is shrinking, dissolving and doing a
poor job of creating the "new Soviet man". Soviet economic
policies have often created additional obstacles to stable family
life. Living conditions, particularly shortages of houses for
newly-weds, scarcities of daily consumables, and the daily chore of
searching for them all impact negatively on the family.
Soviet Health Care
According to Soviet data, the USSR is the only industrial
nation in the'world with a lower life expectancy now than 20 years
ago. Death rates rose significantly for every age group between
the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, increasing 49 percent from its low
point in 1964 of 6.9 per 1,000 to 10.3 per 1,000 in 1981. Males in
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their forties were hardest hit, with life expectancy for the
average Soviet male falling from 66 years in 1965 to the recent
figure of 62. Infant mortality rates, moreover, are high, may have
risen during the 1970s and reflect sharp differences in the quality
of health care available in European and non-European parts of the
country. Lowered life expectancy plus high infant mortality rates
threaten labor force expansion--a key ingredient in the
leadership's strategy to help the economy.
25X1
Investment in the health care system has declined, which
exacerbates these problems. In 1965, 6.6 percent of the budget was
allocated to health while in 1982 this figure had dropped to 4.8
percent. At the same time the age distribution of the population
has-shifted markedly in the past 20 years--with the share of those
over 60 increasing from 9.4 to 15.4 percent. The elderly have a
higher incidence of serious illness, making greater demands on the
health system. The projected economic slowdown, however, could
force the Soviet leadership to make further cutbacks thereby
compounding the health problems of the population as a whole.
Those categories of socially marginal expenditures which are least
visible, i.e., health and education, are most likely to be
11 r_'%1 A
It is not only the regimes failure to allocate sufficient
resources to health care that has led to problems. Lack of
preventive care, poor training of medical personnel, and technical
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bottlenecks have also taken their toll. A major difficulty is that
the Soviet system focuses on curing disease rather than preventing
it. Soviet statistical data show that diseases which are easily
controlled in other countries run rampant in the Soviet Union.
Influenza, for example, kills tens of thousands of babies annually,
and rickets remains a serious childhood illness. Whereas 70
percent of cervical- cancer cases in the United States are
identified early in their potentially treatable stages, 60 percent
of Soviet cases are not recognized until they are terminal. 25X1
In addition, the Soviet Union's economic plan has given low
priority to producing equipment necessary to the practice of modern
medicine. According to a published study by a US doctor, the USSR
operates only a few dozen kidney machines, and its few hundred
available pacemekers are imported. Disposable equipment--syringes,
needles, tubing, and bedding--are in short supply. The low
priority given to other consumer-oriented sectors results in
additional shortages. When output goals in other sectors are not
met, the supply to the medical sector of such.nonmedical goods as
automobiles, building materials, and textiles becomes erratic.
Because of fuel shortages, for example, only 30 percent of the gas
requirements for emergency vehicles. are being met.
25X1
The regime has put more pressure on the managers of the health
care system by dramatically airing the failures of the Ministry of
Health at the March 1982 meeting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.
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The Ministry was criticized for neglect of outpatient polyclinics
and emergency care as well as the insensitive and uncaring attitude
shown by health service personnel. The press has also extensively
publicized the shortcomings of medical care in rural areas and the
need for greater repsonsiveness to the population's requests. and
complaints regarding health services. Regardless of these
resolutions and decrees, unless the regime spends more money on
health services, there is little likelihood for significant
improvement in the future. 25X1
Soviet Nationalities
The multi-national character of the Soviet state remains a
latent but potentially serious political vulnerability. While
.Soviet nationality policy' has contained political protest and
helped create a non-Russian native elite with a stake in the
system, the leadership's hope that modernization and
industrialization would cause nationalism to "whither away," has
not been realized. Non-Russian ethnic groups continue to maintain
their attachment to traditional cultures and resist assimilation
into the dominant Russian culture. At times, moreover, minority
ethnic bitterness over educational, language and cultural policies
that discriminate against them has flared into open political
protest.
The granting of linguistic, cultural and to some extent administrative
autonomy combined with strong central controls and the presence of Russian
overseers.
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In fact, the regime may face increasing difficulty in
balancing its nationality policy with broader economic and social
goals. Although the Soviet leadership has publicly acknowledged
the need to improve economic performance, the nationality problem
greatly complicates decisions on economic organization. Measures
designed to promote flexibility and initiative on the local level
are resisted by the leadership because they imply loss of central
political control. Resource allocation decisions could become more
difficult as well, with Soviet planners facing simultaneous demands
for modernizing the industrial plant in European Russia, exploiting
the resource-rich areas of Siberia and providing industrial
development and needed social services to Central Asia. In an era
of declining economic growth, competition among ethnic groups for
scarce economic resources could increase along with ethnic
resentment that these choices are dictated by Moscow. Minority
ethnic groups may become more acutely conscious of their second
class political status in the Soviet Union, where they are
virtually excluded from the most sensitive political positions and
limited to assignments in their own republic with a Russian prefect
serving as an important agent of central control.
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The Baltic. Some of these strains are already apparent in the
Baltic where they have led, on occasion, to sporadic violence and
dissident activity. The favorable economic conditions in these
areas--a comparatively high standard of living, and a good
technical base--combined with a manpower shortage have attracted
large numbers of Russian immigrants. The continuing influx of
Russian settlers has brought with it increased demands for Russian
language schools and pressure to use Russian in business
transactions. The promotion of Russian at the expense of various
Baltic languages has spurred the development of anti-Russian
feeling and sparked political protest. Agitation over this issue
reached serious proportions in Estonia in the fall of 198'0 when
thousands of students in Tallinn demonstrated against the
compulsory use of Russian and the scarcity of Estonian language
publications.
Native groups clearly recognize the link between
industrialization, Russian immigration and Russification
pressures. In Latvia and Estonia, petitions have been circulated
by the local citizenry protesting various industrial projects
because they would necessitate the importation of Russian
workers.. In the late 1950s such protests even involved the party
elite in Latvia. This nationalist opposition led Moscow to purge
much of the native leadership.
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-1- 1 I 1
the recent
economic slowdown and subsequent deterioration in food supplies has
also had a souring effect on relations between the Baltic peoples
and their Soviet masters. The Baltic republics' have traditionally
enjoyed a relatively plentiful supply of meat and dairy products
but local citizens now blame the Russians for the reversal in the
situation. In late 1976 meat virtually disappeared from Latvian
markets. Residents of the republic were convinced that locally
produced food stuffs were being exported to the RSFSR. A rash of
violent incidents during 1977-78, including the sabotaging.of
trains headed for the Russian republic and the setting of fires at
Russification pressures are somewhat less severe in Lithuania
due to the predominatly rural character of the republic and the
small number of Russian immigrants. Lithuanian nationalism,
nonetheless, is very strong with the Catholic Church playing a
central role. Despite regime pressures on believers and
restrictions on the training of new priests, Soviet officials
acknowledge that 75 percent of Lithuanians maintain their ties to
the Church. In 1979 the Church even spearheaded a petition drive
Although the Baltic people cling tenaciously to their language
and culture, long term demographic trends favor the regime's goals
of political control and assimilation. Native birth rates are very
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low and the influx of-Slavic settlers has continued. With time
these native groups will become a minority in their own
republics. While Moscow's disregard for Baltic sensitivities over
language and economic policies may result in continued social
strife, in the long run the changing numerical balance will be to
the regime's advantage in reducing conflict and in increasing the
Central Asia. The demographic trend in Central Asia is opposite of
the one in the Baltic. Birth rates in the Muslim republics are
from 1.5 to 2.5 times higher than those in predominatly Slavic
republics a.nd if the present rates continue by the year 2000, 20-25
percent of the Soviet population will be Muslim in orgin. Soviet
leaders are probably much less sanguine about the ultimate success
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The growing population in Central Asia is already increasing
pressure on the regime to increase allocations for industrial
development and social services to avoid-a decline in the standard
of living. Central Asian political leaders, conscious of'their
numerical strength, have demonstrated a good deal of assertiveness
in lobbying for pet projects. At the 26th Party Congress in 1981
the party first secretaries in. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan pushed for increased funding for water diversion
projects. The strong representation of local interests to Moscow
could increase over time, exacerbating nationality tensions.F_25X1
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Shifting demographic patterns could also have a negative
impact on the Soviet military. It is estimated that by the end of
the decade Muslims will constitute some 30 percent of the draft
pool. These recruits are the least likely to have mastered the
Russian language making their assimilation into the armed forces
that much more difficult. At present, Central Asian draftees are
often relegated to rear services, menial positions and construction
troops. Even Defense Minister Ustinov in his Armed Forces Day
Address in 1982 acknowledged that Central Asians were under
represented in the officer corps and that discriminatory practices
against Muslim recruits still prevailed. The presence of a higher
percentage of Muslim draftees within the military will place
additional pressures on the regime to integrate them more
errectiveiy into the military as a whole.
The strong grip that the Islamic faith has on the peoples of
Central Asia and the strong sense of national identity it fosters
is yet another problem for the regime. As an alternative ideology,
Islam competes for the loyality of various Central Asian ethnic
groups. The regime has moved directly to counter this threat by
limiting the opportunity for religious training and restricting
public observance of the faith. Yet, according to Soviet
sociologists and Western newsmen, virtually all Soviet Muslims
continue to marry i-n the faith, bury their dead in their own
cementaries and observe a host of distinctive customs that the
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' I I
regime has struggled for years to eradicate. Local officials are
troubled, moreover, by the continued existence of Sufi brotherhoods
(secret religious groups) which once formed the backbone of the
militant anti-Soviet movement in the Caucusus. 25X1
The Ukraine. The Ukraine, the largest and most politically
important non-Russian republic, poses problems for the regime as.
well. A strong Russian presence has never been established in the
Western part of the republic. The Uniate Church, although illegal,
remains an active center of nationalist activity. As in the
Baltic, the active promotion of the Russian language has created
tension between Ukrainians and their masters. Local leaders have
also on occasion resisted Moscow's economic directives. Pyotr
Shelest eventually lost his Politburo seat--in part--for too
vigorously championing Ukrainian interests. While the Soviet
leadership has moved quickly to rein in nationalist manifestations,
there remains a pervasive sense of Ukrainian ethnic identity and
pride in Ukrainian language, culture, and history. 25X1
Conclusion. Sporadic but considerable nationality discontent still
exists in the USSR. The Soviet Union does not, as the Soviets
contend, consist "of a single and friendly family of over 100
nationalites jointly building communism." Soviet emigres confirm
that ethnic identity matters very much to Soviet citizens and that
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there is a wide gap between official claims of ethnic harmony and
reality. Although the leadership has so far successfully managed
the nationality problem by a mix of tolerance and repression, the
potential for destabilization remains. Declining rates of economic
growth, the prospect of reduced social mobility or increasing
contacts with the outside world could exacerbate nationality
tensions. Against this possibility the considerable coercive power
of the system and its' ability to play one ethnic group against
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another will probably suffice to keep things under control.F--l
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