NORTH KOREA: GROWTH OF THE HELICOPTER FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T01298R000200180001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
25X1
Directorate of Secret
67eoel,420
North Korea: Growth
of the Helicopter Force
NGA Review
Completed
NOT MICROFILMED
For Data Entry
Secret
EA 85-1 111 C
June 1985
Copy 293
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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
North Korea: Growth
of the Helicopter Force
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared byl bf the
Office of East Asian Analysis.
Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
assisted in its preparation. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
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Secret
began acquiring them for both attack and troop-carrying roles.
North Korea: Growth
of the Helicopter Force 25X1
Summary North Korea's illegal purchase of 86 US-produced Hughes 500 helicopters
Information available in 1984 and 1985 is but one of a series of steps taken since 1974 to build a
as of 25 April 1985 larger and more flexible helicopter force. Imports from Poland and China
was used in this report.
as well have helped raise the size of the force to over 250 from a mere 25
aircraft, with North Korean interest in acquiring helicopters paralleling
broad international trends. Following the successful use of helicopters by
the United States in Vietnam, a large number of developing countries
Once able to perform only transport and support functions, the North
Korean helicopter fleet is expanding into a force that should be capable of
more complex operations. The large number of newly acquired MI-2 and
Hughes helicopters are being integrated into the operational force, but
predominance of light helicopters seriously limits the number of troops that
can be carried, but helicopters could be used to infiltrate small teams into
the South. In this regard, North Korea's Hughes helicopters pose a special
threat because they are indistinguishable from the 195 Hughes 500s in the
South Korean inventory. 25X1
Domestic production will play a prominent role in further growth of the
force. North Korea recently initiated serial production of a version of the
Polish MI-2 utility helicopter, which can be fitted with guns, rockets, and
antitank guided missiles
Secret
EA 85-10111C
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Although North Korea is committed to expanding its helicopter force, we
believe that future growth will be constrained by the need to consolidate
and train new units and by growing pains in mastering series production.
Even so, we anticipate that North Korea will fit more of its helicopters with
antitank guided missiles to improve its edge over South Korea in armor-
antiarmor capabilities and train more aggressively to use helicopters in a
troop insertion role.
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aecrei
Building the Inventory
Expanding Missions
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North Korea: Growth
of the Helicopter Force
Introduction
The acquisition of sizable numbers of Polish MI-2
helicopters and US Hughes 500s since 1980 has
significantly altered the North Korean helicopter
force. The 25-helicopter force of 1973 expanded in
1974 with the acquisition of MI-4 helicopters from
China. In 1976, North Korea used the MI-4s to form
Table 1
The North Korean Helicopter Force a
1973 13 12
0 0
25
1974 13 54
0 0
67
1980 13 53 2
6 0
92
1981 13 53 4
3 0
109
1983 13 53 6
1 1
128
1984 13 53 10
4 45
215
1985 13 53 10
4 86
256
a This ) table does not include the indigenously produced Hyoksin-2 25X1
All figures
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simple transport and support functions. North Korea
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We believe that North Korea has a sufficient number
of helicopters-Hughes 500s not yet in service and
MI-2 to form at least two addition-
Building the Inventory
North Korea's interest in attack helicopters in the
early 1970s reflected broader international trends.
Following the United States' extensive use of attack
helicopters in Vietnam, a large number of developing
countries decided to acquire them.
We believe the growth of the North Korean helicopter
force from 25 aircraft in 1973 to over 250 today
reflects a progression involving three major turning
points (see table 1).
In 1974 the acquisition of 42 Chinese MI-4s and the
formation of a tactical regiment marked an earlier
decision to move beyond the use of helicopters for
su en y able to acquire helicopters from China or
because it decided to seek an outside source of supply
in anticipation of difficulties in initiating domestic
production. Possibly both considerations came into
play, for in 1974 the French backed out of a commit-
ment to allow the North Koreans to coproduce the
Alouette III helicopter. 25X1
In 1976, North Korea moved to acquire light, utility
helicopters, specifically the Soviet-designed and
Polish-built MI-2. Light helicopters have become
popular because they are less expensive and more
agile than medium- or heavy-lift helicopters. In Po-
land, MI-2s have been armed with guns, rockets, and
antitank guided missiles. North Korea arms its heli-
copters with similar weapons
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By the early 1980s, North Korea began to diversify
and improve its light helicopter inventory through
additional purchases, as well as reinitiation of a
domestic production program:
the transaction shipped 86 Hughes model 500 helicop- 25X1
ters from the United States.
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further ship-
ments were halted by US Government action in early
1985.
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Expanding Missions
Paralleling the growth and diversification of the
North Korean helicopter force has been a progressive
use of these aircraft for more complex missions.F__-] 25X1
Before the mid-1970s, when it acquired MI-4s from
China, North Korea employed helicopters primarily
for transport and support functions. When undertaken
in a nonhostile environment, this is a relatively simple
US investigations into the illegal diversion of Hughes
helicopters to North Korea show that between March
1983 and November 1984 intermediaries involved in
The insertion of troops behind enemy lines is more
complex, requiring specialized training and the use of
weapons. This mission is particularly important to the
North Koreans, whose doctrine calls for sowing confu-
sion in the enemy's rear and disrupting supply of
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Table 2
Helicopter Characteristics
Range
Operating Troop
Maximum
Weapons
(nm) a
Radius
(nm)
Capacity
Speed
(knots)
MI-2
320
160
7
113
Guns,
rockets,
ATGMs
MI-4
240
120
12-16
110
Guns,
rockets,
ATGMs
MI-8
200
110
24
140
Guns,
rockets,
ATGMs
Hughes
260
130
4-6
145
Guns,
500
rockets,
ATGMs
Alouette 270
III
150
6
110
Guns,
rockets,
ATGMs
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could trans-
port up to 800 troops in a one-time lift, either in
attacks against airfields or in occupying positions
immediately behind South Korean defenses. The
much smaller Hughes 500 and MI-2 helicopters
combined have a capacity to provide a single lift for
an additional 1,200 troops, if all were used in this
role.
ists into the South.
? With its speed, maneuverability, and small size, the
Hughes 500 is especially well suited for use in
insertion/infiltration. Because they are visually in-
distinguishable from South Korea's own 195
Hughes 500s, they are ideal for inserting teams of
SOF troops, or small numbers of agents and terror-
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North Korea is experienced in arming helicopters. At
it has been fitting helicopters with
small wings, pro ably for mounting guns, rockets, and
ATGMs
Soviet Union and the United States.
We believe North Korea has mounted AT-3s on
helicopters, but successfully firing the TOW from a
helicopter would require a stabilized sight mecha-
nism, which we do not believe North Korea capable of
producing at this time. There is no evidence of North
Korean employment of helicopters to launch air-to-air
missiles, a capability thus far maintained only by the
Prospects
25X1 Although North Korea is committed to continued
expansion of the helicopter force,
of be moderated the need to consoli-
date and train its newest units. Moreover, we expect
North Korea will continue to experience growing
pains in mastering series production of helicopters,
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We anticipate that the North Koreans will continue to
fit more helicopters with ground attack weapons,
probably including ATGMs, and to expand training
in an antiarmor role. Over time, all types of helicop-
ters in North Korea could be equipped with antiarmor
weapons. The lighter Hughes 500 and the MI-2 can
mount weapons only at the expense of transporting
troops, but the Hughes is particularly well suited to
use as a light antitank platform and serves in this role
in Israel and Kenya in addition to South Korea.
As pilots become more skilled, North Korea may start
training its Hughes 500 and MI-2 units in coordinat-
ed exercises involving ground forces. Troop insertion
training would marginally improve the North's advan-
tage in mobility. I
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