PROPOSED DOD STUDY OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF GOVERNMENT SECRETS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94B00280R001200110004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 27, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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DCI/IC 76-004
27 April 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee
Executive Assistant, ICS
Proposed DoD Study of Unauthorized
Disclosure of Government Secrets
25X1
25X1
b. desires a similar paper, again
answering the foregoing questions, on the work that
Proctor's people are doing on this subject.
feels that the papers need not be long; i.e., no
more than two pages each.
c. Please prepare a letter to Mr. Ellsworth in
response to his 21 April letter to Mr. Bush. The
letter should be pleasant but firm, and should include
a concise statement on what we are doing with respect
to secrecy and declassification.
REFERENCE Your memorandum dated 26 April, same
subject, SECOM-D-147
requests that you or your Committee
take the following actions to close the loop on this problem.
a. Prepare a paper on the Security Committee
work regarding this subject; what are recommendations,
what are the milestones on implementation, what problems
are still unsolved, and what is the future course of
Committee action.
2. lalso desires that a talker be
prepared for the DCI, should Mr. Bush decide to discuss this
subject with General Scowcroft. Another talker should be
prepared for discussion of this subject at the CFI.
Ts,,
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M CONFIOFAMM~ M
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
SECOM-D-147
26 April 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community
25X1 FROM
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
y
Mr. E savor wou usurp some o -
11
National Security Act of 1947 states:
Chairman, Security Committee
Proposed DoD Study of Unauthorized
Disclosure of Government Secrets
Letter to the DCI from Mr. Ellsworth,
Dated 21 April 1976
1. The broad Government-wide study proposed by /~-
The
th 1A - f th DCI' authorit
"The DCI shall be responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. "
"The DCI will ensure that appropriate programs
are developed which properly protect intelligence
sources, methods and analytical procedures. IT
ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
2. At the present time Dr. Edward Proctor, DDI, is
chairing a group of senior officials in the Intelligence Communi
the purpose of which is to develop principles and guidelines for
the, classification and control of intelligence. The goal of his
group is to protect those aspects of intelligence sources and
methods that truly deserve protection and to allow broader
access to intelligence by applying the lowest appropriate
classification and minimum dissemination controls. This
includes declassification and release to the public.
Attachment LiUonV i P -
Downgrade LO Unc asst ie ~?_ E ,^?
d 1
when removed from RBI I T4O PEFit i~,IrOYal5 GNU GLLnS~PF"l-er
-~
f d OF E. 0. 11552, AUTOGa1ATiCALLY OtDV.'
1 !
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(Insert date or event)
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4D CCNFICEPWI. 40
3. The Intelligence Community has been greatly frustrated
by unauthorized disclosures of classified information for many
years. A working group of the Security Committee completed a
study on unauthorized disclosures of sensitive intelligence sources
and methods. In its report dated 16 December 1975 (attached),
nine recommendations were made. The Security Committee has I
not reached a final agreement on these recommendations.
4. The current DoD proposal appears to go beyond
protection of sources and methods. Mr. Ellsworth indicates
Yarmolinsky's group will cover not only intelligence data and
methods, but military and diplomatic secrets as well. Such a
broad-sweeping study by people outside of government of protection
of government secrets should more appropriately be ordered by
the National Security Council rather than by a department of the
Executive Branch.
5. Such a study by people outside of government might
prove valuable at this time. Numerous studies by the Intelligence
Community have not led to a solution of this frustrating problem.
Recommendation by an unbiased public group might find support in
both the public sector and government circles.
RECOMMENDATION:
The DoD proposal goes beyond the DCI's responsibilities for
protecting intelligence sources and methods. The establishment of
such a non-government group to make a study encompassing "all
government secrets" should more appropriately be tasked by the
NSC. Cooperation by the government agencies concerned would be
greater if such a study were undertaken at the request of the NSC
rather than DoD.
Chairman, Security Committee
CONF!DENTIMM
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DEFENSE ' INTELLI'GENCE' AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
16 DEG 1975
C-52,673/DS-6
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD, CHAIRMAN, SECURITY
COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Sensitive Intelligence Information (U)
Reference: Memorandum USIB-D-9.2/57, subject as above, 8 October 1975.
1. (FOUO) This memorandum responds to your request that the Ad Hoc Working
Group, which prepared the report forwarded with reference, look into the
broader aspects of subject problem.
2. (U) A just-completed DIA study on this subject prepared by Colonel'Richard
L. Cary, provided much of the material contained in this report. Input was
also furnished by CIA; LtCol E.B. Haworth of the Air Force;
Mr. John R. Brock, General Counsel of DIA who prepared the legal brief
attached to this report.
3. (C) DISCUSSION:
a. (C) SUMMARY: In preparing this study, we analyzed reports of
investigation dealing with unauthorized disclosures of sensitive intelli-
gence information in the news.media covering the past two years. Note
was taken of recent Intelligence Community action to examine the effective-
ness of present regulations and procedures to cope with this difficult
problem to include the review of dissemination lists; introduction of
color-coded Defense Intelligence Notices (DIN's) by DIA to emphasize
sensitivity, warn of criminal penalties, and insure that recipients re-
ceive only information of concern to their particular office; and brief-
ings of high-level officials to insure they are familiar with security
review procedures. Additionally, note was taken of the general feeling
that there is a lack of any enforceable legislation for punishing personnel
found to be making unauthorized disclosures to reporters. Our primary
recommendation is that there is an urgent need for a central office of
record to track action taken by member agencies concerning leaks which
jeopardize sensitive sources and methods. Additionally, it was noted that
we repeatedly and erroneously express concern with leaks which allegedly
damage sensitive sources when in fact the information concerned is from
the source rather than about it.
b. (U) NO ONE OFFICE OF RECORD: Currently there is no one office
in the Intelligence Community which maintains a complete record of those
unauthorized disclosures of sensitive intelligence information which
Jeopardize important collection programs. As a result, there is no
1 I.'I----------7 A~ljp'9.V----------.
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effective Intelligence Community-wide system for ensuring that appropriate
investigation of these leaks is conducted and that the extent of real
damage to sensitive sources and the costs concerned may be determined. Such
data could prove most useful for supporting needed legislation with criminal
sanctions for "leakers" and for informing Congress of the cost to the tax-
payer of unauthorized disclosures which compromise sensitive and costly
intelligence collection programs.
c. (C) LEAKS ARE LOCAL: The timing and nature of unauthorized dis-
closures indicates they are being made in the Greater Washington area by,
other than action officer level, personnel interested in supporting a
particular cause or policy (see enclosure 1 for listing of leaks and
apparent motive for unauthorized disclosure). Not all of these leaks
originate in the Executive Branch of the Government.
d. (FOUO) Investigations of unauthorized disclosures of sensitive
intelligence to representatives of the news media have been conducted
primarily to attempt to identify the person(s) making such unauthorized
disclosures. Such attempts have been unsuccessful primarily because of
investigative restraints and the wide dissemination of intelligence reports.
It is believed that insufficient effort has been made to assess the real
damage to sensitive sources and methods. In many instances, we have been
prone to accept assessments indicating grave damage to sensitive sources
and methods when, in fact, the compromised information was from, rather than
about, the source and/or method concerned.
e. (FOUO) The agencies in the Intelligence Community which produce
intelligence reports have repeatedly reviewed the dissemination given such
reports in order to reduce the number of recipients, if possible. In spite
of such efforts, there is still legitimately a relatively wide dissemin-
ation of these reports within and outside of the Executive Branch of
Government which, together with investigative limitations, make it difficult,
if not impossible, to identify the person(s) making unauthorized disclosures.
f. (FOUO) All so-called press leaks do not necessarily result from
intent on the part of the individual to disclose.classified information. In
some instances inadvertant disclosures are made simply because the in-
dividual is not aware that he is in fact providing classified information.
It is not difficult under this circumstance for a capable aggressive in-
vestigative reporter to extract classified information from several un-
witting persons together with other sources (such as congressional testimony),
combine- ' such information and prepare articles containing material which the
Government maintains is highly classified.
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g. (U) Normally, the assignment of TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL
markings should provide adequate protection to the vast majority of intelli-
gence reports. The assignment of inflated classifications or the placing
of unwarranted restrictive handling caveats, or both, on such reports
degrades the entire information security system.
h. (U) There is now legislation "on-the-books" which has primary
application to the leak problem, specifically Section 793 of Title 18,
USC. Notwithstanding this, however, there has been reluctance to effect
criminal prosecution of person(s) making unauthorized disclosures to rep-
resentatives of the news media. A legal brief on the "Legal Authorities,:
for Protection of Security Information; Punitive Actions Applying to
Breach of Security" prepared by Mr. John R. Brock, General Counsel of DIA
is contained in enclosure 2. Mr. Brock concludes that "The espionage
statutes and other miscellaneous provisions, are in my opinion more sig-
nificant as enforcement tools than could be indicated by the limited number
of incidents in which they have been used." In addition, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary currently has under study Bill S-1, Criminal
Justice. Reform Act of 1975, which would provide some additional measures
for dealing with this difficult problem.
i. (U) A degradation of the information security system and of the
morale of our personnel is a natural consequence of seeing continued dis-
closures of highly sensitive information in the news media combined with the
feeling that little can be done to prevent such leaks.
j. (U) Many recipients of intelligence information are unsure as to
what specific information is classified. The classification guide is an
essential part of the security program. Vast sums of money are expended
in safeguarding classified information and great detail given to controlling
and accounting for classified documents. But not enough attention seems to
be given to the actual act of classifying information. When some official
classifies information, this causes such information to be entered into a
system of guards, safes, locks, alarms, vaults, security investigation,
controls and accountability--not to mention the very complex and expensive
industrial security program to protect the production of classified hardware.
Quite often classification actions are subjective and without any sub-
stantial basis for classification in the first place. Up-to-date classi-
fication guides, in proper content and in a usable format, covering all
plans, programs and projects are considered necessary in order to provide
for consistent and justifiable classification actions.
k. (U) When unsuccessful in satisfying their story requirements through
normal public affairs channels, news media representatives frequently de-
velop their own sources. Often, officials in the Washington area, particu-
larly those newly assigned, are at a loss as to how to react to aggressive
3
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00
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reporters when direct contacts are made. They are unaware as to what
extent policy permits or encourages their cooperation with the news mdeia.%/
Officials who are called on to brief reporters are in a particularly
vulnerable position when the subject being briefed has many aspects that
are classified.
1. (FOUO) In addition to tightening up personnel, physical and in-
formation security procedures, there are a number of other actions that
the intelligence producers/disseminators can take. These include the ex-
pedite authorized releases to the public of leak-prone information after a
proper security review (see enclosure 3 for additional recommendation).
4. (FOUO) CONCLUSIONS:
a. Highly sensitive intelligence information can be protected over
extended periods of time only by severely limiting access to such in-
formation.
b. There is an excessive amount of source and technical data in
general dissemination reports.
c. While measures must be taken to reduce the number of leaks, it
will be difficult to completely eliminate such unauthorized disclosures
because of the nature of our open society, with its aggressive and competent
investigative reporters and special interest, groups.
d. A central office to maintain a record of bona fide unauthorized
disclosures of highly sensitive intelligence information for the Intelli-
gence Community is needed. Currently such a record is not available.
Additionally, some agencies/departments expend much time and effort
investigating these leaks, while others take little or no action as a
result of such unauthorized disclosures.
e. DIA investigation of the leaks of information during the past two
years has disclosed that most involved information from, rather than about,
a sensitive intelligence source.
5. (FOUO) RECOMMENDATIONS:
a. That USIB member agencies support Senate Bill S-1.
b. That the IC Staff be assigned the task of recording leaks to the
press of sensitive intelligence information and action taken by the USIB
member agencies to investigate and otherwise combat this difficult problem.
Such effort should include the cataloging of those sources and methods
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compromised by past leaks and the real damage to sensitive collection
programs (e.g. compromise of sensitive sources and methods) rather than
expending an inordinate amount of time and effort in dealing with "in-
formation" disclosed by the leaks concerned. Much assistance, including
computer time, could be provided by CIA, since it is colocated with the IC
Staff and currently has the nucleus of a program.
c. That producers of intelligence take positive action to review in-
telligence reports prior to their publication to ensure that they do not
contain information which could reveal and damage sensitive sources and
methods.
d. That detailed source and highly technical data not be included in
general dissemination reports but provided only to those relatively few
officials with a clear need-to-know and interest in such information.
e. That detailed paragraph marking be required in all intelligence
documents.
f. That security classification guides be prepared for all intelligence
documents.
g. That a vignette be prepared under the cognizance of the IC Staff
for presentation to senior officials in the Washington, D.C. area who may
have dealings with news media representatives. The presentation should
deal with the philosophy, procedures, and restrictions governing their
relations with the news media. It should explain how and why sensitive
sources and methods can and must be protected. This vignette could take
the form of a film strip and portable projector self-contained in an attache
case. The presentation should be no more than 8-10 minutes and made
available to an official to be viewed at his own convenience by merely
flipping a switch. (DIA has on hand several recent briefings presented to
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) and his principal
assistants which can be made available).
3 Enclosures a/s
Q
GEOR A. HARIAS
Chaff n, o king Group on
Unauthori d Disclosures
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
UNCLASSIFIED 1 ONFIDENTIAL SECRET
TO
Attached are the papers you
requested on the Security Committee
deliberations and Dr. roctor's activities
in regard to secrecy and compartmentation.
STAT
STAT
~x~..l~ Ado K1
w
STAT
STAT
4/28/76
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL j j SECRET
FOIM NO. 237 Use previous editions ^
1-67
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?
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
SECOM-D-148
28 April 1976
STAT
FROM .
SUBJECT
11
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community
In(
Chairman, Security Committee
Intelligence Information
1. This memorandum is in response to your request of
27 April 1976 for information about the Security Committee's actions
regarding unauthorized disclosures of sensitive intelligence infor-
mation.
2. A working group of the Security Committeeccompleted a
study on unauthorized disclosures focusing on those appearing in
the news media covering the past two years. The recommendations
were rather broad and to a certain degree will probably overlap some
of those which are being considered by Dr. Proctor's group. The
Committee has been considering which recommendations should be
forwarded to USIB, but to date has not arrived at an agreed upon
paper. It is again sc eduled for iscu on a our12May
meeting. ng. Recommendations will then be sent to USIB for their
approval and implementation in the community.
3. Some of the major recommendations being considered
are as follows. Additional ones are attached.
(a) That the IC Staff be assigned the task of
recording leaks (community leak data base) and action
taken by member agencies to investigate and otherwise
combat this problem.
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(b) That producers of intelligence take positive
action to review intelligence reports prior to publication C.
to ensure that they contain no information which could d I
reveal and damage sensitive sources and methods.
g
g
y
data not be included in general dissemination reports.
(d) Use of detailed paragraph markings where
feasible.
(e) That security classification guides be O J C
prepared for all intelligence documents.
4. Probably the major problem now being encountered is
resources. The costs for establishing a leak data base could be
c nsi le, and since we are co-located with CIA, it was felt ,'
that they would have that burden. They are reluctant to agree to ~/
such a proposal under these circumstances. The manpower required
to carry out other of these recommendations could also be
To undertake extensive reviews of material, educational programs,
etc. , require extra burdens to be placed on already over-extended
per sonnel.
STAT
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technical
(c) That detailed source and hi
hl
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RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES
1. Conduct a review of current hard-copy distribution categories to
identify those recipients who have a valid need to be informed of current
intelligence information in general terms, but who do not have a "must know"
need for the type of highly-detailed reportage contained in intelligence
publications.
2. Institute the use of a publication similar to the Executive Summary
(EXSUM) as a substitute for NIB/DIN distribution to those recipients who
do not require such detailed information.
3. Establish new and more restrictive distribution list for high-leak
potential intelligence reports. Utilize such lists to further reduce
dissemination of "high-risk" items. Also utilize authorized disclosures
via special high-level ad hoc groups,formed for this purpose.
4. Carefully edit reports with high-leak potential to remove sensitive
source data and collection capability indicators. Also, reduce unessential
technical details, wherever possible.
5. Encourage high-level policy planners-to seek assistance in sanitizing
intelligence reports that they consider suitable for release to the press.
6.- Establish an indoctrination program for all personnel concerned to
acquaint them with:
a. The real threat to sensitive and costly intelligence collection
programs posed by unauthorized disclosures.
B. The means of preventing such disclosures.
c. Possible ways to reduce the impact of an anticipated unauthorized
disclosure.
d. The personal responsibilities of each individual in this endeavor.
7. Publish security flyers periodically to remind all concerned of the
threat posed by unauthorized disclosures. Such flyers should be disseminated
to both personnel involved in the production of intelligence reports and
to recipients of intelligence information.
8. Institute a system of staggered distribution of high-leak potential
items, utilizing EXSUM, ORCON or otheijhighly restrictive security markings,
for initial distribution in order to reduce the attractiveness of such items.
9. Consider the usage of special "no copy" paper for highly sensitive
items identified/selected for extremely limited local distribution.
ILLEGIB
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DoD Study of Unauthorised Disclosure of Government Secrets
Talking Paper,
w
Proposal
-- A broad study of unauthorized disclosure of government
-- Study effort chaired by Adam Yarmolinsky.
Panel to consist of people outside of government.
The study to give some .improved insight into the nature
and sources of the problem.
Panel's Terms of Reference
-- Will address itself to the problem of securing better
protection for those secrets, including not only intelligence data
and methods, but military and diplomatic secrets as well. It will
examine:
- Motivation for disclosure.
- The impact of mistrust and alienation in popular
attitudes toward government.
- The feasibility of better methods of selecting and
training persons handling classified materials.
- The affects of over cla s sification and delayed
declassification.
- The tradeoffs between wider dissemination and
better protection of secrets both within and outside of
the government.
- The possibilities for reducing unnecessary dissemination
of secrets within,-goviitnment.
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DCI Authority
The National Security Act of 1947 states:
The DCI shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Executive Order 11905 states:
The DCI will ensure that appropriate programs are
developed which will properly protect intelligence sources,
methods and analytical procedures.
The DCI will establish a vigorous program to downgrade
and declassify foreign intelligence information as appropriate
and consistent with E. 0. 11652.
Actions Currently Underway
Dr. Proctor's Group:
- Dr. Proctor is chairing a group of senior intelligence
community officials concerned with guidelines for classification and
control of intelligence,
- The goal of this group is to protect those secrets
which must be protected, and
- Provide for broadest possible dissemination to those
who have a need-to-know intelligence information.
- Includes declassification and release to the public.
-- Security Committee:
- A working group of the Security Committee recently
completed a study on unauthorized disclosures of sensitive intelligence
sources and methods.
- Covered reports of investigations dealing with unauthorized
disclosures appearing in the news media over past two years.
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ILLEGIB
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP I D
TO:
D/DCI/IC
ROOM NO. I BUILDING
REMARKS:
FROM:
DCI
ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION
FORM N REPLACES FORM 3r,8 (47)
1 FES 505 -241 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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DIRECTOR OF IN' AIR
DAN:
What does order say on this.
On attached I have scribbled some
thoughts. If I am clear in my recollection
that the order gives DCI the lead
on this then we should advise Elsworth
(as I scratched out in rough on pages
attached) that a. he is free to
he wants. but b) I have the lead on this
and if the study is to have any affect
on policy- the guy should make his stuff av
available to us mn timely fashion.
I think I need a consicse statemnt on
what we are now doing on a. secrecy
b. declassifification...... Please darft
pleasant but firm letter tp
Ellsworth for prompt mailing..... GB 4-R25
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'UNCLASSIFIED I I AWMIDENTIAL I I SECRET
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
3
S/MC
4
DDS&T
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
D/DCI/IC
9
D/DCI/NI
10
GC
11
LC
12
IG
13
Compt
14
D/Pers
15
D/S
16
DTR
17
Asst/ DCI
18
AO/ DCI
19
20
21
22
we-
/91/= /. ,,1 e
s Z_ g- , te A.-,cG'
Executive Secretary
3637 (1-75)
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
Honorable George Bush
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20501
r
being studied are, o course, o gene
21 APR 1976
A broad' study of unauthorized disclosure of government secrets is going
to be undertaken at my initiative. The study effort will be chaired by
Adam Yarmolinsky. A panel of. people outside of government will be con-
stituted and focused on the problem. I am especially interested that
the study give us some improved insight into the nature and sources of
this problem. The terms of reference agreed with him are attached.
When the panel has been formed and the list of its other members is
completed I will send it to you. Adam will want to talk to you in more
detail about the objectives of the study and how it should proceed.
You may want to follow the study as it proceeds since the problems '
al concern
f f
Warm regards.
.1) 16
wW k