SECURITY COMMITTEE--UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE FOREIGN WEAPONS/SPACE DEVELOPMENT FIELD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94B00280R001200140009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 30, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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DD/S 70-0210
2 0 JAI`' 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
SUBJECT
Security Committee - Unauthorized Disclosure in
the Foreign Weapons/Space Development Field
1. 1 have read your papers relating to this subject and your
proposal for a broader charter to review the unauthorized disclosure
field. I know you have given this considerable thought but I have one
suggestion you might take under advisement.
2. There is a great deal of information in the compartmented
systems relating to weapons/space which has received wide circulation
in Government and is now considered as being not particularly sensitive.
I think you will find that a good portion of this has also reached public
media in one form or another, for certainly it has been discussed in
general terms publicly. I believe that the really sensitive itcm.s that
are so revealing develop from our latest "finds" and for a short time
become critical issues until their purpose and definition have been
established. These same elements of information or "finds" are also
of extreme interest to the Congressional committees, to the Disarmament
talks and also have a relationship to the SALT talks.. These sensitive
elements of information or "finds" can be readily noted by DD/S&T as
something new and unusual and need to have extra security protection
until the problem is resolved. I suggest that these be given a special
identification with special controls on a temporary basis until they are
resolved for protective purposes. This would assure better handling
than simply classifying them in the system where they can quickly lose
their sensitive identification along with a mass of other information
floating around in that same system. This may be just a gimmick approach
but certainly it would permit concentration on that which is truly sensitive
as against the mass of information in the basic system much of which has
lost its sensitivity and in some cases is being publicly discussed.
a -e -man
Deputy Director
for Support
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BYE-5293-70
Copy 1 of 1
29 January 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
1. The attached suggestion by the Special Security Center
is mechanically and procedurally workable; however, some broad
considerations involving compartmented security should be given
some thought.
2. Over the years, there has been a liberal amount of
hostility expressed against the TALENT and BYEMAN compart-
mented systems. Some of.the more serious objections surround
the following points:
a. Important intelligence is so restricted in the
community as to prevent its full benefit to the
nation.
b. The system is too complicated.
c. Too much manpower is being expended.
- ANDLE 'VI/
BYEMAN-TALCEN7-l(EY(-;OLE
CONTr OL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
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3. In order to meet some of the criticism, we have tried
over the years to combine as many as possible compartments so as
to simplify the system. We have been only partially effective in
this effort. 'The continued existence of the BYEMAN and TALENT
systems has been challenged to amosv the point of extinction on
several occasions. To add another subsystem to the TALENT-
KEYHOLE complex, in the face of these broad considerations,
would, I believe, be inadvisable at this time. I believe it would
be particularly inadvisable for the Agency, which has created these
complex systems, to add further compartments in the face of the
existing image of compartmented security.
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Deputy Director of Security
4. There is considerable doubt as to whether the addition
of another compartment would prevent the type of disclosures which
are of concern. The number of clearances in the community for
access would be so large as to minimize the effectiveness of further
compartmentation.
5. It is entirely possible that the proposed concept may be
strongly pushed in the Security Committee. On balance, however,
I believe that we, who are responsible for security policy advice in
NRO matters, should not propose it.
MANDU_G VIA'
i:;YEMAN-YALE NT-KEYHOLE
uO I?~ ?OL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
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? ?
Copy-.,/ of
21 January 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
SUBJECT : Mr. Bannerman's Memorandum,
20 January 1970
1. Mr. Bannerman suggests that sensitive items be
given a special identification with special control on a temporary'
basis. The current security systems lend themselves to the
adoption of such controls without complicated modifications.
In example, the NSA routinely places sensitive items in sub- series
of the COMINT Control System. This very effectively limits
distribution. It is believed that the same procedure can be
adopted in the COMIREX for the protection of our latest "finds".
2. The following is offered as a proposal which you might
discuss in answering Mr. Bannerman's suggestion. The NSA
would be requested to compartmentalize information on foreign
weapons /space development for a period of 30 days. The hold-
down would be automatically removed within 30 days unless the
time limit was extended. This procedure would eliminate the
need for formal downgrading. A similar procedure can be
established within the TALENT Syste?, J-n
rotect
,-og
___,_
p
p o
r
weapons and space development.
3. While it is believed appropriate for the Security
Committee to recommend such procedures it is not believed
appropriate to invest in a CIA component such as the DD/S&T
authoritative policy binding on the community in the selection
of items to be placed in this hold-down category. The SIGINT
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Chief, Special Security Center
49
Committee and the COMIREX have appropriate Working Groups
concerned with. sanitization and downgrading. These Working
Groups would appear to be an existing mechanism if granted the
authority to perform the. functions desired at the community
level.
4. This suggestion is set forth as an uncoordinated con-
cept which might be saleable to the community.
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