JPRS ID: 8399 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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i6 APRIL i979 ~ tFOUO SlT9~ " i pF i
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~t.~t.5 L/g399
1G April 1979
' r
TRANSLAI'IONS ON USSR POLITICAL
AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 5/79)
U. S. ~aINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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h'C);t UC~'I~' I:GlAt, USI: ONI,Y
~ Jl?l25 L/8399
~6 Ap~~.]. 19'l~
TRANS~,ATIONS OIV USSR pp~.~TICAL
, ANp SOGIOI.QGICAI. AFFAIRS
(FOUO 5/79)
CONTENTS PACL:
1 NT'ERNATI ONAL '
Mo~cow Journ~l biRCUa~e~ RelAtions W1Ch Turkey
(V. Alenik; MEZEIDUNARODNAYA ?.HIZN, No 3, 1979)............ 1
Soviet Book Dealg WiCh U.S. Senate, Foreign Polic:y
(AMERIKANSKIY SENAT I VNESHNYAYA YOLITIt~A, 19iJ3).......... 8
NATIONAL
Soviet People Like Novel Abaue ilkrainian Jews
(Anatoliy Rybakov Interview; lr1 STAMPA, 2 Mar 79)......... 19
SovieC Cerman V~.llage in Siberiu Visited
(Norhart Kuchinke; STERN, 22 Feb 79) 23
- a - [IIT - USSR - 35 FODU)
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l~Uk i)!~ I~ I;C 1 AL US ~ dNI,Y ,
f N'CI:12NA'I'1UNAL '
a
t�IUtiC()W ,fOl1RNA~ bT5CUSS[.S 1tI:t.ATInN5 WITH TURK~Y
Mnscow MC'!.}1DUNAItODNAYA z(I?!N in Russian No 3, 1979 ~igned to press
'LO Feb 79 pp 16-21
[Article by V. .~lenik: "Fruirs of Good-Neighbnrly Policy: Soviet-Turkish
Itelattons at the Current Stnge"]
['1'extJ 'I'lie strengthening of SovieC-Turkish ties since the 25th CPSU Congress
is one proof of the succes~ of Che lnnd of the soviets' foreign policy aimed
at developin~ equal friendly relations with neighboring states regardless of.
thetr social system.
~s is known, relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey have ~ rich and
highly instructive past. The very geo~raphical poaition of the two coun-
tries and ttieir peoples' common interests in maint~ining nnd strengthening
peace and security in the region are factors conditioning the need to develop
relati~ns of friendship, ~;ood-nei~hborliness and mutually beneficial coopera-
tion. And when forces which have no interest in such a development of Soviet- ~
'l'urkisli relations succeed in clouding them, it is precisely those forces
wl~ich proEit rather than the peoples of the two countries. It is no secret
to anyhody that tti~ posi.tive development of Soviet-Turkish relations does not
:;uit we~tern imperi~list circles, since such development hinders the imple-
- mentation oE the North Atlnntic bloc bosses' plans for uaing Turkey's military
~nci economic potent-ial and its territory against the 5oviet Unian. With good
;�elations witti tlie USS(t those circles find it much more co;nplicated to secure
I ~-~.~:n 1'~irkey restrictions oE its sovereignty to the benefit of NATO interests
~ncl ta encro~lct~ upon its rig}~t to an independent and sel~'-sufficient foreign
E~ol icy .
'I'hat trile~ited and Earsi~i~ted ~olitician and creator of the Turkish republic,
Kemal ~l'atiirk, saw and understood well the imperialist nature of the West's
~?ulicy toward Turicey. He clearly recognized the danger of that policy for
'I'urkey. In tlie L~nce oE such danger, he noted, Turkish policy must be based
un ~~rt~iciples providin~ for a nationwide struggle by the entire Turkish peo-
~~le a};~~Lnst imperialism, which is striving to destroy their national
cx.isteiice. ~1~
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t~c~iz o~~rr.c:rn~, U51: c~Nt,Y
'l'I~e ~:ntc:nte power~, K. A~~turk sCr.e~yed in Au~ugC 1920, in striving tn
in:~ure Eor them~el.ves cnntinued posyesnion of tl~~ east nnd the onporCuni~y
tu cxn:loie cire MCe~mprin~; ~1] out to deytroy ~nd cru:~h u~ ~hnd, mnreaver,
w1Ch cl~~~lr w~~1th nnd mihhl, ~re atrempCin~ to hi~~der the ISo1~h~viks, who .
nr.e accompliyhing the liberarion of ~1.1 oppressed m~nkind ,1nd extending ~he
hand of friendsliip to our oppres5ed na~ion.C2~
'1'he evenCy t~?king place in the near ~~nd Middle East region tn our time
tc~~tif.y to ttie topicnlity oE those words ev~tt Coday. K. Ataturk also under-
;3toad clen~-ly Ch~C '1'urkey's securiCy and independence ~nd its economic
cleve].npmenC largely depend on tlie ntt~ure ~nd level of rel~tCione wi~h neigh- `
horl.ng et~teg, not lenyt the 5ovie~ Unton. 'Chat is precisely why Che idea
of independence and Che great benefiC to 'Curkey oE friendship and good-
neighhorly coop~rntion with our country runs Chrou$h all his statemenCs on
'iurkey's relatians wiCh the 5oviet Union.
A yubst~nti~l patlili~s been covered in the developmenC ~E SovieC-Turkish
?�el~tioiis since At:~turk's time, despite a certain period of coolness to
whicii they wer.e sub~ected. In recent years particularly ma;jor ch~nges hnve
heen nbticrved in tliem, thanks to efforts undertaken by both sicles.
L. I. Ilrezhnev stressed in his report at the 25th CPSU Congress thaC 5oviet-
1'urkisf~ cooperation "from the chiefly economic sphere is spreading graduaZly
to economic questions also."~3~
Tt~e steady upward development observed recently in Sovict-'Curkish relations
t~as finallv led to ma~or chan~es in them. However, sigr3 of such changes
have been noted more or less clearly even before. The now traditio:~al con-
tact:~ and meetings between the two countries' leaders have played an in-
valuable role liere. Back in 1967 a joint communique on the results oE
'I'urkish Prime Minister S. Demirel's visit to the Soviet Union and the soviet
leaders' talks ;aith liim stressed that "in relaCions between the 5~viet Union
and Turkey there ure no questions that would lead to a clash of their funda- _
mental interests."
'Tt~e 1972 declaration "on tlie principles of ~ood-neigt~borly relations i~eCween
the USSI2 ~nd 'Curkey" was an important landmark in the development of relations
E~rimarily in tl;e politi.cal field. The document stressed the two cocntries'
clesire to ctevelop ties ~nd cooperation in accordance with the traditions oE
pe.ace, frtendship and ~ood-neighborliness established hy V. I. Lenin and
K. Ataturk.
Ushertnt; In exeensive new opportunities for expandtng~all-round, mutually
beneftcial Sovtet-Turkisl~ cooperation based on m~itual understanding and
trust, tlie declarntion ut the same time exposed the falsity and unsoundness
ol' ~istie~rt.lons made by some circles both i~~side and autside Turkey casting
cluubt on tlie sincerity of the Soviet Union's Leninist course of developing
};enui~iely ~ood-netgl~t~orly relatlons with the Turkish republic. This document
2
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rc~ii ai~ rtc; i n~, utii; c~tvi,v
r.l.oqur.�r_.l.y er.st lEiev Clinr 'l'urkey cttn nnly s~e n r~adiness ~or friendHhl.p Flllc~
mueual..ly beneCict~il c:bO~pl'iICI.OtI on the part nE ity nnrttiern ne:tghbor. '1'hp
yl.des mutu~lly be:Li~ve thnr the 1972 SovieC-'furkish declnr~riun is ~n
lmportr~nr dncumenC insuring the ~CrengChening of good-neighborliness, mutu~.l
under~r~ndin~, good will ~~nd cooperatinn. Ir fu1Ly nccnrds with the main
~imy nf eh~ Ein~l acC of the cnnference on gec:urity And Cooperaeion iti ~urupe
und iv ~cquiring new nnd bro~der signific~nc~ in tiqhC of thi;~ docum~nt.~4~
it is ht~hly indicr~tive thnr Chig lofty apprai~al of Che decl~r~tic~n ~oas made
by Che twn sicles S yeary aEter ~CS approval ~nd publicntion.
'1't~e poylrive onward developmenC of political, trade, er.onomic, culturnl ~nd
~ sporry Cles hu~ naturnlly led to the n~ed to introduce new element~ lnto ~he
cwo cnuntries' rel~tions which would stimulnCe the further expuu~ion and
deepening of coopernCion, ita apread to new r~reas and the egtabliehment of
ttiiy cooperntion on u more durable nnd long-term legal bnsls. Appropriate
accordy ~o Cl~ts eEfect were achleved by the two countries during rhe becemUer.
1975 ol'Cict~l visit to Turkey by A. N. Kosygin, ch~irman of the USSit CounciL
oE Mintyters.
'I't~e sides' intention--ensttrined in the 3oint communique--to prepure ~ politi-
c:A1 documenC on the principles of goad-nei~hborly and friendly cooperueion
Uetween tt~e U5SR and Turkey and to sign it in the immediaCe fuCure ~t the
next summit meetinp was of great significance.
ln accorci~ince with the above accords on agreement on developing economic
cooperation on a long-term basis, an agreement on scientific and technical
cooper~ntion and an agreement on cooperatiott in prevenCing the t~i~acking of
civilian aircraft were signed in Marcli 1977 during Turkish Foreign Minister
I.S. C~iglayangil's visit to the Soviet Union. AC the same time the sides
Affirmed tl~eir intention to prepare and sign a political document..
l:r.onomic ties, of. whict~ there are long-standing and good traditions, 1~ave
~~layed a substantinl role in creating an atmosphere of good-neigl~borliness
and Ertendship in Soviet-'1' '~h relaCions. Back in the prewar years textil~
combines were construc[ed tne cities of Kayseri and Nazilli with Soviet
technic~l und financial coll~boration.
Iluwcv~~r. economic ties t~ave gained really wide scope since an agreement on
~:on5tructtrig a number of major industrial enterprises in Turkey with soviet
coll~iborntion was si~;ned in March 1967. The commitments made by the soviet
sicle under this ag,re~ment t~ave been met in full. Such ma~or industrial
enterprtses as ti~e Iskenderun Metallurgical Combine, the Izmir Oil Refinery,
the Seycttyhehir Aluminum Plant, the Iiandirma Sulfuric Acid Plant and the
Artvin P1.-~nt Eor producing woodpulp fiber buards have been constructed and
commi5siuned in 'furkey witli soviet collaboration. Some ottier industrial
entei�priscs and pro~ects have r~lso been consCrucCed.
New :~};reement~ and contr,lcts on cooperation in expanding the metallurgical
cnml?In~~~ cl~e ,1lumin~im plmnt nnd the oil refinery and also in constructing a
3
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'
numbcr of ma~ar new indueCrinl enCerprises in Turkey have recently been
eoncluded between the Soviet Union and Turkey and are being auccessfully
implemented,
'fhe construction af a dam and reservoir on the Akhuryan (Arpa-Chai) Uorder
riv~r--pro~ecra which will make it poseible to irrigate large areas of ~.and
on boCh sides of Che border--has been underway for several years now, A
particular feature of that construction work is Chat the dnm and reservoir -
not only aYe being constructed by combined efforts in a~oint undersCand3ng
[na p~yakh] 6ut also will Be the first ~ointly commiesioned pro~ect and a
symbol o~ good-~neighborlinesa.
The redrawing of more than 600 km of the Soviet-Turkish lgnd border, which ~
was carried out in a spirit of compleCe mutual underatanding, played a sub- +
sCantial role in creating, developing an~ sCrengrhening the atmosphere of
good-neighborliness in relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey. The
work oE demarcating the Soviet-Turkiah sea barder and the border in Che flooded
section of the Akhuryan reservoir is currenCly proceeding succesafully.
Naturally, the existence of a sCable, preci.sely ploCted border between two
nei~liboring states and rhe aUsence of any kind of claims on each other can-
not but h~ve a favorable effect on their political and other relations. .
Cont~cts and ties along military lines are also developing. As is known, -
Eor ~ long time Turkish ruling circles dared not go against the NATO leader-
ship's directives and held back from establishing similar ties with the
5oviet Union. However, the groWing sense of realism finally prevailed~
Army general K. Evren, Turkish deputy chief of general staff~ pail an offi-
cial visit to the Soviet Union in spring 1976. N. G. Oga:kov, USSR first ~
deputy defense minister and chieF of general staff of Che Soviet armed forces, ,
paid a visit to 'I'urkey 2 years later. It is estremely important that the
continuation and expansion of contacts and ties were advocated during,the -
meetings and talks o� the two countries~ military commanders. General K~ Evren,
now Turkish ~hief of General Staff, has been invited ro pay a return v~.sit to .
_ the Soviet linion. ~
[n November-December 1978 warships exchanged visits for the first time in ~
the history of Soviet~Turkish relations. A detachment.of Soviet ve~sels
vigited ttie Port of Stamboul. '"The Soviet vessels," the ~ournal (YURYUYUSH)
[us tranyliterated] wrote, "symbolize the USSR's peaceloving policy toward
'Curkey pursued since the first days of the Octaber revolution." Turkish
warships in turn visited Odessa for several days.
The aEorementioned contacts have demonstrated the usefulness of extending
good-neiFiiborly relations to such spheres as the military sphere.and have ~
enabled the Turkist~ high command to see for itself that the Soviet army, ~
st.~ndin~ guard over its people's peaceful labor, threatens nobody and,
~~ossessin~ as it does tremendous might, is an important factor in maintain-
trl~; and strengChening international peace. The contacts along military
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~ t~(~k (1C~'TCtl1t. U51~; UNt~Y
lli~u~ lic?ve conLYlbuCed Co I'urthar gtrengChening the bQ1i~C ~mnng broad s~c-
- eiurts ~C ~1~~ Turki~h pupuJ.~~tion that Chere i~ na dan~er Co Turk~y from Che
Sovlet Uni~n, de~pite ~tie 1y~.ng as~erCions of ~ome WesCern cirale~.
, '1'he results of 'Turlcish Prime Minister I3. EceviC' ~ June 1978 QCf ~.C~.A~. viait
ro the Sovi.et Union ~r~ ev:tdence of the �urCher atrengthening and Qxpansian `
of SovieC-Turkish rel~tinns and their filling witlt more wetghty eubstanc:e. ~
In 'Turkey i~self, right up ~n the time the visiC took place, an a~mosphere
favorable to the Sovier Uninn w~s created nnd this is accaunCed ~ox by m~ny
reasons: Primarily recognition by the brnAdesC sectinns of the Turkish
public that the 5oviet Union's efforts are beneficiul in conenlidut.tng peF~c~:,
securtty and cooperntion for the peoples in rhe near and Middl.e E~r~ti region
, and ~lso underatandin~ the sincexity and Eriendlinese of sovieC pol�lcy. Ir
ie indicative ehat a refus~l to accept some false ideas and concepre has ~
also been obaerved in Turkiah ruling circles. This has been confirmed by
official public atntemenCa Chat Turkey does noC see a Chreat to itself from
the Sov.Let Union and has no inCention of being a NATO outpost and speurhead ~
on lt~ youtheasC El~nk. 'The increaainRly loud voic~ of the progrescive
clemocr~tic movement in 'furkey calling persistenC~.y for Turkey's more reaolute
cleparture from a proweaeern orientation and for further rapprochement wirh
the Soviet Union nnd other Aocialist communiCy countries in a11 areas of
~elations ha~ also been of important significnnce.
B. ~cevit's visit to the Soviet Union, his talks with L. I. Brezhnev and the
fruitPul talks in the Kremlin were of cardinal significance from the view~
point of further developing rel~tions between the two countries. Spes~king at
a dinner in honor of the distinguished Turkish guest, A. N. Kosygin stressed
that the Turkish prime minister's visir continues and further develops the _
beneficial proceas of spreading SovieC-Turkish cooper~Cion from the mainly
economic sphere to include political questions. "Such a development,"
A. N. Kasygin noted, "is law-governed, since political relations as a rule .
become more durable and more sCable through the expansion of practical,
businesslike-like ties and contacts and they, in turn, have a stimulating
effect ~n the course of economic and other caoperation among states."
'Phe sifinin~; oC the political document on the principles of good-nPighborly
~ ;inc] Er:tendly cooperution between the USSR and Turkey as a result of the
Moscow talkti esaentially marks the beginning of a higher stage in the develop-
ment oC Soviet-Turkish relations.
1:mbracing as it does virtually all areas of cooperarion between the two
neighboring Q~~tes, the document sums up what was already achieved in the
relations between our countries and it stipulates clearly the tasks, ways
and trends of further stimulating and expanding coopera[ion in the foresee-
able f.utur~. The document, whose content fully accords with the spirit and
letter of the final uct of Che Conference on Security and C~operation in
Europe, stresses primarily--and quite understandably--the political aspects
of Soviet-Turkish relations. It is difficult to overrate the significance
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1, , ~
~'OI~ q1~~ICIr1L Ubi, nNLY
oE tt~~ ~idee determinnCion enehrined in it Co dev~lop relations of good-
nelghburlines~ and co~peraCion on the basis of reapecC f.or each oth~r'n
Hover.eignty, equality, way of life, eocial sy~~em and terrirarial ineegrity
and noninCerfQrence in internal affairs. Mutual eecurity and bene~its nnd
also thei.r derermination to maintain both countries' bordera ~s borders of
good-neighborlineas and friendly cooperation. 'fhe sides' pledgEd carefully
to observe the principles of nnnuse of force or the Chreat of force in their
mutual relationa and also eo refrain from allowing Cheir terriCory to be used
" for commiCting aggresaion and subversive acts aga3nst other states are par- ;
ticularly meaningful~ 'The document provides tor cooperAtion beCween the
sid~s in international organizatione ~nd conferences, the expansion nf opinion
exciianges and cooperation in deepening ehe process o� detente and spreuding iC
ra all regions of the world and also in question~ of disarmament and the
� sCruggle against imperialism, coloriialism and racial discrimination.
'The part o� the document.relating to the developmenC of economic, trade,
scientific and Cechnical cooperation and culCural, art, scientific and sports
excliu^hps is also extremely important.
'Cl~e overwhelm~r.F; ma~ority of the Turkish public has welcomed the results of
the visit. Along with the political document, Che signin~ of Che Sovist-
'Iurkisti agreemene ~n demarcatinp the c~ntinental shelf in the Black Sea and
also the accord achieved in Moacow on furCher subst~ntial expansion of trade
and eco~iomic cooperation has caused great satisfacCion in Turkey. The coun-
try's political opposition pgrties also gave a generally positive assessment
to the visit and the Moscow talks--a fact which confirms that the course of
developing and strengthening friendly, good-neighborly cooperation with the
- Soviet Union has most wiciespread suppcrt in Turkey.
The Turkish newspaper POLITIKA mounCe~ a poll to el3.cit the atCitude of Che
counCry~s populat~ion Co this visit and the development of cooperation wir':~
the USSR as a whole. Here are som~ of the comments raade. Guner, a worker,
saic~ "we are gladdened by economic and political cooperation and positive
mutual relarions between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The peoples of Turkey
and the Soviet Union want fraternity and friendship." Gunaydyn, a studenC, ;
said "the visit is undoubtedly very important and useful to our people. ,
We know tt~at the Soviet Union helped our country during the National Libera- ~
tion H~ar without imposin~ any terms. Tuna, a housewife, said "I think that
Ecevit's visit will be useful for developing relations between our country
and the Soviet Union." Chakqr, an official, said "Che tireless struggle
waged t~y ~he Soviet Union to halt the arms race and insure peace and frienc'-
ship amon~ ttie peoples f rustrates the plans of those enga~ed in instigating
war in our region."
The broad positive reaction among all secCions of Turkey's populaC3on to tt~e
results of the visit attests, above all, that a kind of profound psychologi-
cal breakthrough has on the whole been accomplished in favor of the broad
development and strengthening of multifaceted ties and cooperation with the
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I~Okt ~~"rICIAG U5L ONI,Y
USSR. In othex worda~ Che conviction that the Soviet Union is Turkey's
gnod nei~hbor end prnfiC~ble pttrtner has be~ome Che predominant conviction
amona tI ~ Turki.st~ public,
Sov iet-Turkish relaCions have recently been developing actively in accordance
with Che agreements reached. Suffice it to say Chat in the second half of
197$ alnne aix Turkieh cabinet miniaters paid business trips to the Sovi~t
Union. For the �ir.sC time in the hietory of 5oviet-Turkish relation~ a 3~
year Crade agreement was signed in November which will lnsure severA.lfold
_ growth in commodity turnover beCween the two couneries in the period 1979-
1981. As a rasult, trade will talce its proper place in the complex o�
relations between Che two countries.
The third session of the Soviet-Turkish Mixed TnCergovernmental Commissinn
on Economic Cooperation t?eld in Moscow in October 1978 ended with positive
results. It discusaed quesCions of considerably enlarging a mPtHiiULgical
And an aluminum plant and an oil refinery and conatructing two large Chermal
- electric power stations, a hydrogen peroxide p'l~nt and certnin oCher enter-
prises, as well as cooperaCion in other aphres, including Cotally new ones.
Considerable progress ha~ recently been noted in the development of cultural
and sporting ties. Contacts in thase sphere~ are beiug transformed increas-
ingly actively into mutually advantageous cooperation which, in addition to
ttie tradition~l e~change of artisCes, figures in the arts and sciences and
sporC~men, manifesta itself in forms such as making a~oint feature movie
and invit:tng S~viet chor.eographera, conductors, sports coaches and so forCh
to work iii Turkey .
Thus the I~olicy aimed aC developing friendship and good-neighborliness is
benefitinn the peoples of both Turkey and Che Soviet Union. At the same
time, despite the results achieved, there are broac~-unutili~ed opportunities
for further strengthening mutually advantag~~ous multifaceted cooperation.and
extending it to more new spheres. Success in realizing the above-mentioned
opporrunicies.largely depends on the mutual desire to further expand rela-
tions in ehe various directions envisaged in the political document. And ~
careful aiid unserving fulfillment vf the obligations imposed on each side
in accord;ince with the provisions of that document assumes spectal signifi-
cancc in Chis context. -
FOOTNOTES
1. K. Ataturk, "Selected Speeches and StatemenCs," "Pro~ress" Publishing
}iouse, Mascow 1966, p 182.
2. Ibid., p 101.
3. Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress, Political Publishing Hous~, 1976 p 15.
4. See PRAVDA, 19 March 1977.
CUPYRIGHT: Obahchestve "ZNANIYE", "MF,ZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN", 1977
CSO : 1800 ~
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W ~
' ! .
. FOR OFFICIAL U5~ ONLY
INTEItNAT IONAL
~
SOVIET BOOK DEALS WITH U.S. SENATE, FOREICN POLICY
Moacow AMERIKANSKIY SENAT Y VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA (The American Senate and '
Foreign Policy) in Ruseian 1978 eigned to presa 13 Feb 78 pp 1-2, 232, ~
217-227
[Title, publication data, annotation, description, Cable of contenta and
conclueion from book by Ye. I. Popova]
[TextJ ~
PP 1-2 ~
"Amerikanakiy senat i vneshnyaya politika 1969-1974" [The American Senat~~and
Foreign Policy, 1969-1974J, Ye. I. Popova. Institute of the USA and ~
Canada, USSR Academy of Sciences. Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," Moscow, 1978.
- Signed to presa 13 February 1978, 4300 copiea, 232 pp. ~
. P 2 !
The book examines the role played by the U.S. "~nate in the development of '
U.S. foreign policy in the late 1960's and early 1970's, when Washington
began to reorganize its foreign-policy courae as a result of the overall
warming in the international climate. The book indicates the participation
of the Se~ate ~,n ~hat reorganization, the atruggle in Congresa concerning
~ such queations a~ arms limitation and the turning point in the relations
with the USSR~ the NATO crisie and methods of oveicoming it, and the ,
defeat in Vietnam and the aearch for new vereiona of a policy in Asia.
The book is intended for acientific workers, histr~rians, and anyone with
an interest in~U.S. foreign policy.
p 232 ~ �
TABLE OF CONTENTS
� Page
Introd~ction 3 ~
Chapter I-- The Role of the Senate in the Formation of
U.S. Foreign Policy ~
The "rebirth of Congresa" aince the late 1460's . 8
The Senate'8 foreign-policy functions 22 ;
Seaate groupings 36 ;
8 �
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' Chapter II The 5enate ~nd Che Nuc].ear Nnnprol~.�eraelon TreuCy G~
The conten~ of the ~rPaCy. The ACtitudo of the government
and Congress to it G8
OpponenCe of the treACy 5~
~ The moderaCe group 63
- Adherents of the treaty 68
Debate reaulte 8~ ~
- Chapter TII 'The Question of Strategic Arms LimiCation 86
The Senate and the 1972 Moecow agreementa 88
The 1973-1974 diecuasions 111
Chapter IV AlCernative Policiea in Aaia 137
The turning point in tha U.S. China policy 137
Vietnam, 1969-1972: Leave or remai.n? 149
' 19?3-1974: Cambodl.a and questions of m~.l�ltary and
econamic aid Co the Indochina government 163
The American miliCary preaence in Aaia 184 -
ChapCer V-- Problems of European Policy in the U.S. 5enate 192
The reducCion of American armed forcea in Europe and
Che Vienna negotiations 193
Relationa with NATO allies 204
Concluaion 2L~
Index of names 228
~ _
PP 217-227 -
CONCLUSION
In 1969-1974 the Senate exerted a aubRtantial influence upon Che formation ~ ~
o; U.S. foreign policy. That i.ufluence followed basically three direc-
ticns legislative activity, propaganda, and the development of a
foreign-policy couree on the basis of feedback, Chat i~, the assimilation
of the lessons provided by the preceding period and the consideration of the
new situaCion, both within the country and throughout the world.
The SenatP's legislative effect became more intensified in all. areas of
foreign policy, and thaC inevitably meant an invasion inCo the sphere of
actions of the executive authority. That led to an expansion in the
conflict between the two branches of authority, to the aggravat~on of
the "Congress vs. Che Preaident" problem. Congress set definite limits
to the pres~dent's powers in the field of foreign policy, in particular
by the adoption in July 1973 of a apecial decision that limited the presi--
dent's right to begin and to wage a war without Congressional sanction,
and the Watergate ecandal ended the struggle of the early 1970's with the
complete defeat of R. Nixon.
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The S~ngee'e propggendu acCiviCiee aleo increaeed. The foreign-policy
diecu~eione were eccompani~d by an Appe~l to tihe publlc. In the
etatemente made by eenator~ over television and in tihe prase, and
~emetYmes at Congreegional me~rings (for exampl~, those againet the Vietn~m
War), and in the egitational activities of v~xious public orgeni~~tiinng
l~nked with varioue bloce in the SenaCe, propaganda battlea were waged on
qu~stions ~nvolving relgtions with ehe US'SR, the mil~,tary budget~ the
Pentagon's influence, etc. In thie etruggle, all the groupings thge were
f~ghting one another aCtecnpCed, wieh each grouping uaing ite own meChods,
to raise WaehingCon's ehaken prestige in the counCry's public opinion.
Ae a result of the fac~ r,hgt the late 1960's and early 1970's were a period
o: Waehington's re-exemination of iCa foreign pol3cy, there wae an
especially strong manifestatio~t of that important Congreseional function
which official American historiography calls "repreeentaCion of the
intereete of r,he people," but which the liCerature of the radical-critical
tr~nd callg representaCion of the interesCe of varioua groupe of thQ
bourgeoieie~ and which could more correcCly be defined as the function of
feedback in the intereste of protecting capitalism as a whole.
in executing thie function, the Senate, in Che course of iCa hearings
and debates, ascertained thoae conditiona which were unfavorable for
American imperialiem~ end a~et down methods for adapting Co the changing
situation. That process did not go in a smooth or automatic manner. It
evolved in the etruggle of differenC veraione of a foreign-policy course,
which were backed up both by the interests of individual bourgeois groupa,
and 31so by the atte~npt to unit all the veraions by the cammon task of '
adapting the foreign policy to the new ratio of world forces.
The increase in the role of Congress, which had pr~viously been observed
periodically in U.S. hiatory, confirmed that parliamentarianism fulfills
a function that ie beneficial for capitali.sm, by participating in the
re-examinarion and correction of the political course, and Chus, from time
to time, it acta as a deterrent on the tendency to the intenaification of
the execuCive authority. As in the past, the increase in the activity of �
the Senate and of Congresa ae a whole was closely linked with the upaurge
of mase movementa~ by the heightening of the atmoaphere of diacontent,
and by the fall in the country's authority on the international ecene.
All theae phenaaena pointed out the neceaeity to make definite changes
in the country's foreign policy, and the Senate played the role of an
important link in that reorganization, which occurred against a background
of conditione that were changing to the detriment of imperialism.
The internal placement of the forcea in the Senate wae determined by the ,
presence there of three groupinga that have not been formalized, but
which conatantly sprang up there the conservatives, liberals, and
moderates, the numbers of ~lhom varied by years and depending upon the
nature of the queation being diecusaed. The foreign policy was re-examined ~
in the struggle among theee groupings, and discusalons~wiCh the weighing of
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all the pros ~nd ~on~, ~nd ~h~t led eo eh~ d~v~lnpm~nti uE ~n alx~rnative
�orQign-policy course.
The consarv~tiv~e~ who in ].969-1974 counted in their ranks approximately
4U or~ nt rimee, somewhnt more thgn 40~ epnators~ predominantly Republic~ne
and Sauthern Llemocrate, plnyed the role of the defender~ of ~he o1d
course, supporeing ite eucceesiveneee. mhe grouping defended th~ eloweet,
and only the extremely neceee~ry, adaptaCion to tha new requiremen~e of
life, tha min3m~1 conceesione to the idea of detente, to the moode of
public opinion~ and to tha gradunl eourge of th~ naeional-liberaeion
movemente. It usually prevailed in the Senatie and forced its epecifiC
dacieione upon it.
The liberals, Che number of whom v~ried around the total of 30-35 (baeically
Northern Democr~te)~ gGt~d as critice of. the obsolete policy of Che Cold
War, and epoke out in favor of a ze~lietic recognition of the facC
that the U~S. noeitiong had been,weakened; they demanded ~t~at aetention be
directed to the urgent neceseity of imprnving the internal eCate of
the "eYck society," and to reinforce the founclatione af Che regime. In
their epecific propoeals they were defe~ated more frequently than they
were vicCoricue, but after a definite amo~nt of tima had elspged, thoae
~ proposalg found recognition and~ albeiC partially~ were implemented 3n
governmental policy. I1y playing thie role of preliminary plannera, tt~e
liberale, however, even ,~n this function of theire, manifeated lack of -
consist:ency, and their c,lass limitation. Their poaition wae characteri.zed
by concesaiona to the rightiata, by conetant ahiftings of varioue membera
of the grouping to tha right, to the camp of the moderates. But neverthe-
less their critical atatementa violated the monopoly of the official views
that had formed and contributed to the re-examination of the previoua
policy of inflexible imperialism.
The moderates moat frequently avoided any platfoYm atateruenta or formulating
of principles, preferring prac2ical arguments in each apecific inetance
and seriving to find a"middle line" betweeri the conservatives and the
liber~ls. That was promoted by the indefinitenees of its boandaries,
by its frequent divieion into the rightist moderatea (the moderate
conservativee) and the leftiat moderates (the moderate liberals). Hawever,
its role wae very aubstantial, inasmuch as the "middle line" proposed by
itusu~lly me~nt that very courae that the government had adopCed, and it
is not by accident that one of the basic parametera pertaining to the
moderates was their aupport of the preaident, which was ahaken only by
Watergate.
Thus, the Senate's activities reflected the fact that Che U.S. ruling
- circlea were not acting as a single, monolithic whole. Against a background
of the transition "from confrontation ~to negotiations" there arose serious
differences of opinion in queationa concerning the relations with the US5R,
the changing of inethods as a result of the defeats auf�ered by the previous
policy, and the priority of domeatic needs. Events have shawn that the
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Sennti~ ia noC e"do-nothing collection of ~p~echifier~," n purely
propagenda forum, bue, inetead~ occupieg g d~finiee place in tihe mechn-
niem of developing the country's Foreign policy, by advancing and eubetanti-
~ring poseible alrernativee in ChaC policy.
The nlternatives 3n the foreign-policy coura~ which were propoeed in Ch~
Senat~ were of a r~th~r eCable naCure. ~
The conservatives' progr~m, ~C the baeie of which lay Che ~ttempt,
factually ep~aaking, to preserve the Co1d War, and rhe 1~ck of desire to -
make ~ny serious rQCOneideraCion of the otd course. m~nifesCed itself
as early ae 1969 in connection with th~ Nucl~ar Arme Nonproliferation Treaty,
when 16 coneervatives spoke out against the ratification of Che treaty
in general~ and the ma~oriCy of the remaining ones voted in �avor o�
amendmente concerning the opportunity for the United Statea to transfer
nuclear arms to its NATO allies, to ennul the treaty unilaterally, etc.
In connecCion with the subsequent negotiationa concerning arms limitation,~
the poaition of the rightiete wge characterized by their emphaeis upon drag-
ging nut the agreement with the USSR, in forcing upon the U5SR un~ust
terms which would assure thQ auperiority of the United States. Th~ 1972
Jackson Amendment, the acceleration of the Trident program in 1973, the
approval of the appropriations for the latest MARV (Meneuvering AnCir~dar Ve-
hicle~sy~tem, the attacks upon the Vladivostok Accord ns being "unilaterally .
, profitable for rhe Ruaeiane" all these reflected sufficiently clearly the
intereate of the military-induetrial complex. The rightiats' liae ie
typified by Che pl~ying upon the chauviniatic emotione, incited by
atatements abqut ''~loeing," "capitulation," "the c~nveraion of the United
Statea int.o a v~cond-rate country," etc.
The policy proposed by the coneervativea for Asia also had anti-Sovietism
as its initial point. Rapprochement with China was ~uetified by the hostile
poaition of the Maoiat leaderahip with reapect to the USSR. Although the
extreme rightists B. Goldwater, J. Buckley, R. Long, etc. continued to
be afraid of "Red China," epeaking out againat its incluaion in the
United Nations and in favor of retaining the reliance upon Taiaan, most
of the conservativea became more and more firmly resolved in their hopes
concerning the "coincidence of intereats" with Peking. They defended
until the last opportun~ty any direct military intervention in the
countries of Indochina and supported all the appropriations for aggression
in Vietnam, with the basic argument of Ch$ rightiata being the "national
intereats" of the United States in SOutheast Aeia, which were interpreted
as the "containment of communism" and leaderahip ~.n the "defense of the
free world." When moat of the conservatives, as early as 1973, Were
farced to agree [o the banning of operations in Cambodia and Loas, as
well ae to the limitation of the preaident's military powers, thP group
of extreme conservatives atill voted against those proposals; afterwards,
some of the righti~te put their hopea, albeit short-lived ones, upon
theeconomic "gid" levere, which, it was propoaed, could maintain the -
bourgeois, pro-American tendenciea in the furthEr development of the
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cnunt�ri~e of Ind~chine, mh~ coneerv~tive~ unanimouely aro~e ~g~~.n~t uny
currnilment of rh~ Americnn troop~ deployed in th~ A~ian ragiun of the
Pacific Ocean.
Wlth regard to ~urope, thE~ conaervative~ Cnok ~ cour~~ nf overaoming ehe
cri~i~ of Ael~n~iem wi~h t:hQ oid of ehe complete reinEor~ement of NATO,
which would have mennt rhEs a~tual nonCinuaCinn nf the military confront~-
tion with the Waraaw Pact cnuntriee and the dragging out of the V3ennA
negotiACi.oue, wh~ct~ would hAVe be~n inevitab~.e, inaemuch ae it wae
propoaed Cd conducC them rrnm a"poeition of eCrengeh.'' 'rhe eupremacy
and adminieeration of th~ Unitad Staees in Europe wA~ op~aly oppoeed in
this conservative program to the influence of the USSR and wae accrnnpanied
by a requiremant of e.xerting pressure upon the al~iee witti the aim af
forcing the~n to increage Gheir monetary contributinne to the cauee o�
- "~oint defense."
Aa a whole, it wne a cour~e aimed ~t the erma race, military preseure,
~nd int~rference in the affaire of other countries~ and aimed at leaderehip
on the bagie of force in the inCereet~ of drfending gnd reinforcing
the poeitione of American imperialiem.
In principle, the liberale pursued the eame final goal, defending, in
the atruggle againat eocialism, the bourgeoie system and inCernational
leadership of the United States. However! they propoaed operating with
a greaCer coneideration of rhe real-life ratio of world forcea. They
proposed acknowledging, in a number of inetancea, the insolvency of
the m~eheds of exerting direct military interference and dictatea, and
reconm~ended proceeding from the inevitability of coexiatence with socialist
states. They epoke out againet the idea of the "world policeman,"
feeling that that idea -~as beyond Waehington's capabilities, although
they did not re~ect the role of the United States as a"world leader."
The determining factor ir. their poaition was not only the more sober
evaluation of the plr~cement of forcea on the international acene, but also
the attanpt to resolve, in the interests of eocial etability, the moat
~cute domestic probleme, Chat is, the idea of the priority of domestic
t.ieks, which idea had formed under the infl~ience of the large-acale masa
prorest movementa in the United 3tatea in the second half of the 1960's
~nd ti~e early 1970's.
A peculiarity of the liberal argumentation wae the constant moralizing,
the pacificiatic phraseology, in Which the United States was depicted
, as a Craditionally peace-loving atate, and the chief task af American
foreign policy was decl~red to be ita moral leaderahip, the salvation of
mankind Eraa nuclEar cataotrophe~ etC.
An important plece in the liberals' program was assigned to the pro~lem of
atzns limitation, which problem. was in the center of the reorganization
~ of the international relations.
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In 1969 Che entire liberal grouping, except for two senators, supported
the Nuclear Arme Nonprollferation Treaty and voted in favor of iCa
ratification without any etipulations or amendments. AfCer organizing
en ~ctive oppoeition to the Qxpeneive plane for the Sentinel and Safeguard
antimiesile defense eyeteme~ the liberale emphaeized that the re~ection
of Chose eyeteme, or et leaet Cheir auspeneion, would be an incentive for
achieving a etate of accord with the USSR. The liberal grouping spoke
out againeC the righeiare' attempte to add onto rhe reaolution concerning
the ratification of the 1972 Moscow agreementa certain amendments that
con�irmed Che unequal approach to the furrher Soviet-American negotiationa
concerning strategic arme limiCation, and the principle o� American
supremac:y. That Erouping expreseed a positive aCtitude toward the 1974
Vladivostok Accord and, in a 17 January 1975 resolution proposed by
E. Kennedy, W. Mondale~ and C. Matthias, came out in favor of adopting
at the Soviet-Americen negotiations the principle of equaliCy in both
the quai~titative and qualiCative aspects of armaments. The liberal
alternative aleo included a certain reduction of the appropriatione for ~
varioua types of atrategic weapona (Trident, B-1, eCc.), and it was
indicated that the forced development of arme wae not only reducing the
domeatic social programe, but was also incompatible with deCente.
_ Moreover, it could not serve ae a"trump card at the negotiatione."
However, the liberals' opposition was not profound. Inatead, it was
purely verbal and did not go beyond the confines of changing the methoda
oE conducting succeseful foreign policy. In defending the principle of ,
equality at the negotiatione with the USSR, the liberals advanced the
idea of "reciprocal vulnerability," or "equilibrium of terror," which
could not be a genuine basie for reducing armament. After auffering a '
~ defeat in their amendmenta to the appropriations for military programs,
they usually voted unanimously for the military budget without those
amendments, in ita entire volume. Waging propaganda against the extreme
manifeatations of militarism and the excesaive influence of the Pentagon,
they acted in complet: con~olidarity with all the reactionary forces in
"censuring" the Sovi~t actiona involved in protecting the gains of
socialiem and the national-liberation movements.
The liberal alternative of the policy in Asia was also of a dual nature.
It atipulated a poaitive attitude toward rapprochement with China
with appeals for a gradual approach, caution, the development of chiefly
economic tiea, so ae not to undermine the detente. Reacting to the
profound domestic crisis caused by U.S. aggresaion in Vietnam, and
expressing acute uneasineas as a reault of the lack of pramises in the
war and the unreliability of putting one's hopea on the corrupt regimea
in Indochina, the liherals developed the thesie that the United Statea
do n~t have any ma~or "strategic," "national" interests in that region or
any circumstances for military intervention. Under the influence of the
' broad anti-Soviet movement in the country, they extended a campaign of
critir_izing the government's actiona, made spproximately 30 proposals
concerning the de-eecalation of the war, and achieved the adoption of a
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resoluCion concerning Ch~ 1im~.tntion o~ the preaidenC's m~.lieary pnwers.
Matty of Che 13berale came ouC in ~avor of the reduction of the U.S.
mil~.~ary presence iii ehe Aaian region as a whole (the 197G discussion),
alChough Che ~~aesCion of the ~ctual nonintervenCion or wirhdrawal wae =
not posQd: the sub~ecte rhat were brought ea the fnreground were the
economic methoda, the reinlorcemenr of the alliance with Jspan, etc.
The amendmenta intrnduced by the liberals were insignificant in nature
and, as a rule, were rejected.
The policy in Europe which wae proposed by tt?e 1lberals differed from
the conaervativea' vereion in the requirement to reduce the U.S. military
preaence in Chat region. The liberals emphasized Che dan~er of a
confrontaCton Chat wa~ capable, at any moment, to develop into a war;
the necessity to take into conaiderAtion the increased weight of the
European "center nf power," and, in general, to overcome the numbnesa
that was typical of the "Co1d War knights"; the lack in ~uropQ of any
"threar to the national security of the United States"; and, finally,
as in other queations, the prioriCy of the domestic needs Che
opportunity, by reducing military expenses in rurope, to save approximately
$1-1.5 billion and to reduce uriemployment in the country by creating
~obs not dt foreign basea, but "right here at t~ome."
, Behind theae argumente that were brought to the foreground by the liberals
were such concrete, "buaineae-like" motivations as referencea to the
woraening state of the economy, eapecially the increase in inflaCion
and the inatability of the dollar because of the gold drain for roi�eign
military expenses (the 1974 diacussion was carried out during a period of
increased economic crisie in the United 5tates); the appeal for the
reinforaement of the "political inatitutiona" that had been undermined
by the lack of reaolution of the acute problema pertaining to the citiea,
education, poverty in the midst of abundance, which problems were .
causing mass discontent and threatening the social etability; and
indications of the possibility of transferring a larger ahare of the
burden of NATO expenaes to U.S. allies.
Thue, the sub~ect at hand wae not some kind of profound re-examin~tion
of the fundamentals of the imperielistic policy of the United States in
Europe, but only limitations evolving from the reduction in the proportion
_ and influence of the United Statea. The demand to reduce military
presence meana not the renunciation of the reliance upon NATO as the
chief bulwark in Europe, but only the reducCion of the direcC military
dictate, with ttie expanaion of military-economic cooperation with the
allies (the "redistribution of the burden"). The liberals came out in
favor of the continuation of negotiations wiCh the Warsaw Pact countriea
that had been begun in Vienna, the rapid completion of which, incidentally,
they were not counting on.
The lack of any profound, fundamental differencea bet~reen the conservative
program and the liberal one manifested itself in the minimal nature of
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those pracCical steps which were ~dvgnc~d by ~he libe~alg. They
propoaed reducing only ehe "permanent~ worldwide, Rround~forces" military
preaence of Che United Starea Che most mobile air and naval forces
were not aEfected. The requireinent to reduce Che American Army of
300,000 men in ~urape became increasingly indecieive with every paseing
year: by 50 percent (1971), by 40 percent (1973), or by 25 percent (1974),
with some of the liberals agreeing ro the reducCion only ouCgide of
Europe or only as a result of exces~, ~upport aervices.
Aa a resulC, whttt was imporCnnC was not so much the concx~ee proposals made
by the 'libera~.s (especially since those proposnlg were usually Moe
accepCed by the Congress), ag the overnll approach embodied in Chem,
the npproach to a European policy that proclaimed a more realiatic evalua-
tion of the U.S. capabilitiea than the conaervaeivea had made. That
approach facilitared Che implementatian nf the slogan "fran confrontation
Co negoCiaCiona," and the atatements Chat were directed againaC the
excesses of ehe militaristic demands of the Pentagon, which had been
uuilding up people's fear of the mythical "S~vieC threat," contributed to
a certain restraining of the military-induatri~l complex, exerting a
definite influence also upon public opinion both within the Unired States
and outaide iCs conf inea.
~
~ The moderates' alternative was characterized by the attempt Co find a -
compromiae solution between the necesaity of adapeing to the new conditiona
- and the maintaining of the canm?and poaitiona of the United States, and
hence, by a pragmatic approach to each concrete aituation.
In the queation of limiting etrategic arms, the moderatea' program
was summed up ae the recogniCion of the neceseity of negotiations and,
at the same time, the retention of all the Pentagon's military programs
(although, unlike the coneervatives' course, without their excessively
forced development). The moderate senators voted in favor of the Nuclear
Arms Nonproliferation Treaty (seven with stipulationa; ten without any
conditions). During the ratification of Che 1972 Provisional Agreement,
a considerable n~nnber of them aupported the Jackeon Amendment, but many of
the moderaCea attempted to weaken ita formulation and voted against the
Pentagon's demand, which was advanced a~ a condition far the "recognition"
of the Moscow agreements, to appropriate additional amounts for the Trident,
the B-1, and other "exotic systeme." In connection wi~h the further
negotiatione for atrategic arms limitation (SALT-II), the moderates'
position was characterized by atatementa concerning the "dramatic change
in the world" which one would have to take into conaideration, by the
demand that the negotiations not be dierupted, by verbal consent to the
principle of equality, and, eimultaneously, by the attempt to haggle a
bit more, using as the "t~~~ump card at the negotiations" the development
of new military programs. The approval by the moderates of the
accord that had been achieved in Vladivos;~ok was accompanied by their
vote in favor of accelerating underground tests. However, in all the
instances thac were mentioned, there was a manifestation of the tendency
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~a~t c~r~~tc tnc, lt5t: ONt,Y
- on eh~ pnr. e o~ th~ moderi~~~~ to 131uit ~h~ t'c.~nC~~dn' ~~appe~iCp~ ~ompwhaC
(eh~ 1973 MCTntyr~ Am~ndm~nr ag~?inpt Che ~~Ce1~rnCion of the 'rr3den~
nrogrnm; the ~tCc~npt to poeCpon~ cerCnin al~nr~~prietC idne Eor c~ caun~arEorc:e
weapen itt view nf kh~ poe~lUle artuinm~nC nf agre~ment with eh~ USSR 3n
J.974) ,
In connection with qu~scidns of A~ian ~nd ~urap~~n pnlicy, Ch~ modar~tie
gr~up e:cpre~~ed suffici~nCly c1e~rly the go~l of tihe maximum rer.ention
by Che United Stn~e~ of iC~ lend3ng role in rhoe~ regian~, rtie continua-
tion df interferenc~ in eheir internnl ntf~irs, spettking nbnue ehe danger
of fa111ng into isnl~tioni~m, of creating by U.S. withdrgw~l vt~rioue
vaccums which "would inevitauly be filled by ~he USSR," ~e we11 as tiLe
"vitnl, long -term interesta" of the United SCat~s both in Asiu and ~n
Curope. However, the mnderare cour~e di.Efered trom th~ conaervaeive
course by ite greater flexibility and, in th~ f~ce of for~ign-pol~cy
defegts, gtipulttted cert~in departure~ from the previous globhl clc~�Lng.
Rnpprochement with Mnoidt China, which }~nd begun dt Che b~ginning o� the
1970's, wag viewed by tha moderates as n counterbalancp to Soviet influ-
ence nnd ehe libernting struggle oE the peoples of Indochina, but ar
the eame time there was developed tt~e idea of a"half-turn," of supporCing
a balance berween the USSK and Chinese people'e Etepublic (a "balanced
policy"), unhurriednese in rhe carrying ouC of that course in general,
particularly the preservation for a definite amount of time of "two
Chin~s" (although mention wes also mac:~ of returnin~ Taiwan to Chinu in
Chc~ future) .
In Indochina the moderate position mennt the attempt to drag out the de-
escalation of rhe war so as to achieve, if not an "honorable peace," then at
least the preservation of a support in South Vietnam. They hoped to
achieve this not by an expAnsion of the military offensive (the moderates
did not ~pprnve the extension of military actions to Cambodia and i.aos; -
proposed, for the most parC, the concentratian only upon air action~g; etc.),
but by means oC diplomatic negotiations in paris or with the aid of the
United Nations, the convoking of an Asian international conference. They
allowed renunciation of direct military interference by the United States
and the gradual reduction oE the aid to puppet regimes, but only in the '
lr~deEinite future. Thus, that course was reduced to the alogan, "leave,
buC not ~mmedic~tely," and only after reinforcing pro-American regimes as
base points Eor the further U.S. policy in the Asian region.
~
After che final collapae in Vietnam, the moderate version retained Che
requirement for American military presence in Aaia, but the tasks that
were brought to the foreground were those pertaining to the Buropean
poticy (especially in connection with the economic difficulties and the
nolitical criaes of 1974). The moderate pragram with respect to Europe,
having as its initial point the very same idea of Che leading role of the
United States, which was allegedly protecting "its security " overseas,
included [he nonconaent to any conaiderable reduction in the American
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military forcea or NATO, nnd only some o~ eh~ moderaee senators voted
in 1974 �or th~ reduction of 75,000 men, which was depicted ae a
"Crump card +at the negoriations" in Vienna, bue the reconsideration of
ehut poairion wae coneidered to be poaeible when the Atlantic ties are
reinforcad.
A11 three foreign-pnlicy courses th~t were proposed in the Sen~tie in .
1969-1914, as hga been notad, were aomewhat alrered under ehe influence ;
of evente, but, with regard to their basic direcCion, remained stable:
the conservgtives gravitated toward a policy of the past, the liberals
came forward as iniriatora of a tactiical re-examination, and Che
~ moderates,atCempeed in a pragmatic manner to unite both views, adapCing
to the current conditions. In the scruggle among the alternatives,
the U�S� poaition on the considered intexnational questions was formed.
That struggle was one nf the essential factore thae derermined ehe
fluctuaCiona and zigzaga in W~shingCon's Cactics. Without changing the
imperialiaCic essence of the U.S. foreign policy, that struggle was
neverCheless of importance, undermining the course of monopoly imperialism '
and revealing cerCain add~tional opportunities for the struggle waged by
the progressive forcea for the peaceful coexistence of sCates with
opposing social sysCema.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "tTaukA," Moscow 1978.
5075
CSO: 1800
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~'OR 0~~1:CrA1, tJS~ C)NLY
NATxQNAL
,T -
~ SOVTCT P~QPI,~ LTKE NOVEL ABOUT UKRAINIAN JEWS
Turin LA.STAMPA in ItA13an 2 Mar 79 p 3
[InCerview with Anatoliy Rybakov, author of novel on Soviet Jews, "Heuvy
Sand," by Livio zauotCi]
(~'ext] Moscow. The season's liter~ry evenr is, abave all, political.
The novel "T~age11~ pisok," which in It~~lian would sound like "Sabbia
pesante" (Heavy Sand], is 200 pages long. It gets inside a Jewisti saga
in a northwest Ukrain.ian village From the beginning of the cenCury to the
Nazi occupation during World War II. This sub~ect has been taboo in the
Soviet Union. 'rhe auClior, Anatoliy Rybakov, 67, is himself a Jew. Hia
real name is Aronov. Howeve~, he is unknown to most readers. He :is a
realist, a social repor.ter more Chan an inveatigaCor of the soul. He is
also a solitary person, ahy, in conflict with ~mbitions ttnd di.sturbing
ideas that are sometimes contradictor.y.
He participates passionately in the Jewishness of his characters, and he
reaffirms their racial identity even before, if noC against, Che fact that
they are Soviets. Nonetheless, some critics close to the "disaent" deny
that he has the right to represent the traditions of Israel in Russia.
They question his ability to do this, criticizing him for having allowed
, himself to be assimilated by the regime. They recall his rem~ssive and
comfortable coexistence with Stalinism. Furthermore, iC was the magazine
OKTIABR, old bulwark of Slavoptlile nationalism, that published "Heavy Sand."
'The ma~~zine is anything but free of susp3ciona of anCi-Semitism. However
it ts not just any publication. These are the reasons for the uproar
caused by the novel, a best seller already sold out.
To borrow the ttiree issues of the magazine wiCh the Rybakov novel .from the
Lenin Library it is necessary to get on a list and wait for months before
obtaining them. The black market price of the book at Kuznetski~ is more
ttian 2Q times t}~e cover price, 40 rubles, equivalent to almost 45,000
lire. For some classics, Bulgakov or Ma3akovskij, and the protagonists
of the literary fringe, Okud~ava, Baranska,ja, Trifonov, this is normal.
But this never happened to a well-ali.ned author who was brought up in the
shelter oE the writer's union.
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What makes hundreds of readera write to Rybakov?. For weeks the mailman
has been making ~wo tripe a d~y with g�u11. sack a~ the attraceive wooden
dasha, in which he has 11ved for 15 years witih is wife ~usC outside
Peredelkino, the village 25 kilometera from Moacow where PasCernak lived
and is buried. ~
"Many [leCters], but not all, ai~ �rom Jews. They say different things: '
the pride o� seeing testimony to the courage of the Jews in war after so
meny have to1.d only abouti their ~esignation; curiosiCy about the characte~s;,
of the novel wh~lch some consider autobiographical and therefore peop].ed:~~''
with persons who really existed. Altogether, Chey are an expression of
solidarity for the people who fight and suffer."
He is not tall but robust. He wears a heavy sweater to protect himaelf
from Che 20 degrees below zero during these days of Russian winter when the
heaCing system does noC entirely keep the cold out of the house. The
writer sinke h~s hands intu the boxes fu11 of envelopes and scattered sheets
of paper. He pulls some out random].y. He glances at the signaturea that
are by engineera, farmers, atudents, men and women, most of them from the
western regions of Che USSR. ~
True SCory :
(Question] How do you explain so much interest?
[Answer] I do not know. Perhapa because I have been the first to deal
with a delicate and tragic sCory of this kind. Perhaps because there are
many people who are waiting to recognize themselves by finding their own
past. ' .
[QuestionJ What led you to write "Heavy Sand" and why now?
[Answer] The material is authentic. I simply reworked it. These Jewa, ~
who pass from the Czarist ghettos in the difficult years of the Bolshevik
Revolution and the Civil War--and found the strength to love each other and '
to live peacefully before taking up arms against the Nazis--are the relatives
of an,acquaintance. He told me about their 3oys and sacrifices, their '
nobility and weaknesses. I t~ansferred all this into the town of my parents
because I knew it well. In 3 years I wrote and rewrote. I had entitled
it Rachel, ~he name of the main protagonisC, then I preferred "Heavy Sand,"
recalling that in that part of the Ukraine the earth is soft and sandy,
while for the Jews in my story it was so heavy that they were buried in it.
[Question) Is it by chance that you wrote it now?
[AnswerJ I thought it was the right time. There may have been other
moments in the past and perhaps there will be others in the future. The idea,
the need to do it, came to me now. I believe it was necessary. It is diffi-
cult for me to give any further explanation.
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[Queseion] "l~lenvy Sund" ha~ nroused inte~^eeC, but A1so cone~ernatlnn.
Tltey sdy ~hAt its Jews ar~ not ~lways ~uehenCic. They s~y Chat you came to
know ehem after havin~ never met ~hem �or a long C:ime.
[Answerj They s~y I won a SCalin prize.~.
[QuesL�lott] Yes, they ulgo eay rha~,
" [Answer] ~Jhen I xeceived the pxize, we wroee ~bour oCher things, the
grand bu~.ldings, the great abnegnCions.... I hAd ~Lways wo~:ked As an
engineer in the autmm~bile transporC~tion sector. I was among truck
drivers and I described their lives. It w~s honest work. When they
publlshed them I cvas ~?0 years old. I Fel~ Chat I was little more than a
boy, with an entire life be~ore me and a11 the time to do everything I may
have deaired. I beggn to write "Hettvy Sand" more tihan 20 years later, with
the wounds of war and diseASed lunga thAt reminded me ev~ry day about my
old age, and it was no longer life thati was before me, but deaCh. It ia
a time wtien one can no longer write just anything, to waste Che little
remaining energy. I der_ided to wriCe the essentials of whaC I feel and
wt~at inCerests me.
[Question] The magazine you chose to publish it was also disorienCed.
The fame of. OKTIA}3R contradicts what it appeara Che spirir of the novel
was to be.
[Answer] I made no choice. In fr~ct, another magazine, whose ediCor
finally gave up on it, was supposed to publish it. So I went to OKTIA33R.
Its label as a conservative organ was well known to me. I had contribuCed
to it years ago. But thaC reputation was made for it by Vsevolod Kocetov.
The new editor, Aleksei Ananiev, wants Co change it and I believe my novel
helped him. I thank him very much. He has behaved with courage and
dignity.
Racism .
[Question] Wt~o are these Jews in "Heavy Sand"?
[Answer~ I still remember the old man who said to me: "We are Jews noC
beca~ise of the blood that ~lows in our ve3.ns but because of what spills
out of our veins."
[Question] There are those who say khat after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact
the Soviet press began, for diplomatic reasona, very cautiously to give
out information on the anti-Semitic policy of Hitler's Germany. The Jewish
population o� the USSR thus was supposed to have been caught in many cases
unprepared for the Nazi invasion. What did the Soviet Jews know about
ehe German race theories?
[Answer] I personally knew about them. When in 1933 Hitler seized power,
our press explained what fascism, racism, Hitlerism was. We all knew it very
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we11. ~~rtainly we could not iMagine thnC the solurion of the Jewish
' quesrion for Hitler meant extermination, the uproo~ing of Che entire people
of I~rapl. Nobody could have imagined this, because it wtta beyond hum~n
imagination. The Jews, however, knew about racism, what it was. For this
reasor. moaC of them evacuated toward the ea:~t as Che armies of Che Third ,
Reich advanced. Tlie protagoniat of my novel, Racl~el, was among those who�r
did not want to believe it, She had been in 5witzerland, had known the ~
Germans; said they were a magni�icent, civil, cul.tured nation; iC could ~
noC be true that they would assassinate children and old people. She '
remained, ind~icing many others to stay G~ith her; and she dies reaist~ing :
in the ghetto--another victim of the illusion of the enlightenmenC. ~
[Question] Does Rachel, her husband Jacob, and their children have any
political educaCion? ~
[Answer] No the are nor art members--if that ia the I
~ Y P y question. Neither
am I. I wanted to write about a proud and courage:ous people, the Jewish ~
people, of their feelings and national dignity, wltich do not prevent them
from living peacefully with other people: Byelorussians, Ukrainians, ~
Rusaiana, live and die together with the Jews. I told about a people who,
like all the others, has its saints and criminals, its honest and dishonest
people. But since in every ghetto there was resistance--at Warsaw, at
Minsk, at Vilnius--as a writer I believed I had the right to present my
characters as undefeated men and w.omen. We must affirm mutual reapect
among peoplES and among individuals. "Heavy Sand" is intended to contribute
to this.
[Question] Does a Jewish~~condition exist today in the Soviet Union?
[Answer] Personally, I do not feel it. In what sense do you mean? ,
[Question] But the Jews are not ,just any people anywhere in the k*orld--
because they are a people who are dispersed, who live therefore in a special ~
situaCion, forced to assimilate the culCure of other peoples. The old man
said it: "The Jews are the blood they have spilled." .[end of interview]
~ ~
Rybakov is also Aronov. "Heavy Sand" is nut a novel about the Soviet :
Jews, however, nor is it their history. Perhaps it is only an aCtempt to
present ttiem as a people: enough to arouse inte~rest and polemics beyond
the ordinary, another sign of their existence. ,
'COPYRIGHT: 1979, Editr LA STAMPA S.P.A
6034 ~
CSO: 3104
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~~~oa c~Frr.r.rnr. USr ON[,Y
NA~IONAL ~
f
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SOVIFT GCRMAN VILLt1GE IN 5TBERIA VISITED
Hamburg STERN in German 22 Feb 79 Special SupplemenC pp 1-7
[Arttcle by Narbert Kuchinke: "Little Germnny in Siberid"]:
[Text] Yodsosnovo wms founded in teari3t times. Today,
the vil..lage of 2,000 peoplP, with ita Schneiders,
Schmidts or Kaisers, ia e model kolkhoz wikh huge -
yields ("We ~re wallowing in plenty"). STERN reporCer
Kuchinke visiCed these "Soviet citizens of German
nationality."
The bre~kfast table has been laid. There is vodka and winq', meat, ham,
Comatoes, cucumbers. "Prost" [your hea.lth!], s~ys Friedrich Friedrichovich
Schneider; "be our guest." We raise and clink our glasses. "Nazdrovye."
In a Cerman village. In Podsosnovo--which means "under the pine trees."
We had arrived a couple of hours before, at 4 in the morning. It took 4
tiours by Jet from Moscow to Novosibirsk, and then half an hour by small
plane to Barnaul. There we boarded a train for Slavgorod. Another 8 hours,
and then a bumpy 2-hour ride by c~r into the Alta Mountain~, to Podsosnovo.
We h~ve reached the end--the end of the world--4,000 ice-cold kilometers
east of Moscow.
Friedrich Friedrichovich Schneider is the boss here. He is respoasi.ble for
tl~e 2,Q00 "Soviet citizens of German nationality" (their official designa-
tion) living in Podsosnovo, responsible for the Haases, the Heimbuchs, the
Schmidte, ttie Kaisera--and the Schneiders, who alone make up 20 percent of
the poputation.
After our arrival, Schneider, whose houseguests we will be for 5 days,
al.lows us 3 hours' sleep. Then the village program for the West German
guests begins. In the kindergarten, the neatly lined up little ones sing
German and Russian folksongs and recite poems. Then, for. 3 hours, youths
perForm on the piano, the violin and the accordion. After that an exhibi-
tion g~me by the local volleyball team, followed by a Western-Eastern pop
concert uf the local youth band.
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'The vill~~~ i~ f~eing ~g, iC~ ~du~in~ fr~m th~ ~RG, if w~ w~r~ dn ~~en~~
vigit. A~how for eh~ c~m~rgg? PrnduC~d in ~,rd~r to div~rt ~Ct~neion from
eh~ difficult eiCuaeian of other S~vi~t G~rm~ne whn w~nC to, bue ar~ nnC
~1lawed, to go Cn rh~ W~~r?
Pod~o~novo Y~ Amang Che Ri~h~~t K~lkhoz~g di the Snvi~r Uninn
~'h~ cordiglity, ehe ho~pit~lity in Pod~ognovo is g~nuine. Th~ ple~~ur~ ~e
b~ing ~b1~ Co w~lcom~ C~rman~ ig a~ noeic~gbl~ ~g ehe prid~ in b~ing abl~ to
di~play nne'~ 1~Ee'~ work.
i'adgn~novo i~ ~ knikhoz, ~n agriculrur~l production eoll~~eive. In c~ntrn~t
with mogt kolkhozea in rhe USSR, whinh do nnt ateain the produCtion pregerib-
- ~d by Mn~cow--either because they are podrly adminigtered or because their
m~mbers l~ck true motivation of performanc~--thig kolkhoz do~g we11.
~t dd~s go we11, in facr, th~t it i~ mm~ng th~ riCh~gt in th~ Soviet Union.
And thig despite the f~ct the gteppe nounCry ts not exactly f~rtile. But
the SetCl~~g have built sophistic~ted irrigution gy~temg h~rp and planted
trees to protect the harvegt f rom sand~tbrms.
Of the 7,000 shpep~ the 1,300 head of cgtt?e, the 66U grctir Eoxes, the 120
hors~~--gnd milliona of bees and Che grgin they grow--the kolkhozniks, accord-
ing to Schneider, "wallow in plenty."
The nnnual turnover of the people of Podaosttovo ig 3 million rubles (9
million deutsche marks). After deducting coste, there ~~maine more than 3
million deutache marks. What is to be done with the "profit" ie decided
collectively, the villages deciding themselvea whether to buy grain or cattle,
erect new agricultural premises or pour out increaged bonuseg.
Ninety-~`ive percent of families have their own house--sometimes with more
than seven rooms. Their own homes stand on land of 5,000 square metera
made available to them by the kolkhoz for an annual rent of 66 deuteche
marks. A hous~, built without the benefit of an archit~ct, costs the
settler ab~~ut 15,000 deutsche marks. Of this amount 3,000 to 6,000 deutsche
marks are loaned by the kolkhozes to their members without interest over
periads of 10 ye~rs or longer.
~ The steppe Cermans oE Podsosnovo live much better today than most other
Soviet citizens. But that has not always been so. Three hundred years ago,
C~therine II fetched their ancestors to Russia in order th~t they might
colonize the unpopulated expansea. Many settled on the Volga, others -
l.~ter moved on to Siberia. There, each of them was allowed to take as -
much land as he was uble to work. But the work was rugged as can be, with
tem~eratures oE 40 below Celsius in the winter and 40 above in the sua~ner. .
In 1902, Volga Cermans founded Podsosnovo. At tha[ time they dwelt in tents -
or smnil log cabins and hardly had anything to eat--only what they could
get from nature. They went fishing and hunting. But gradually they managed
to maintain themselves as farmers.
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,
1~Utt C1~1~' iC;1 AL l(SL t1NLY
Aft~~r Ilitlr.r'H Ir~vr~Hfc~ii nl' thc� 5~ivit~t Unlnn, thc� "Autciiu~mduy ;+~cii~ll~e Sdvi~~t
ltEpubl.ic ~iE Va.ikn GE~rmni~N" f~und~d wui~r L~nln wn~ Ji~~~lv~d, with iC~
p~pulr~tiun b~ln~ d~p~~rCed to Sihcrin 7nd KnzE~khsrAn. Many took r~Euge tn
pddg~~nnvo, r~n~i~,~ in wirh r~l.~eiv~~ or di~~pp~r~rin~ E~mdng propl~ witt~ Che
~nm~ n~:m~e, they ccmtributed Co th~ we11~U~~ing of thp kolkt~nz,
~lie be~,t knawn cieir.en ot P~d~~Annvo ~tind an~ af th~ mdst influ~ntial p~npl~
~tnx~ng th~ ~ milliott G~rmy~iy living in the SnvieC Union tocl~y I~ tl?e tr~in~d
e~ronomiqt ~ri~drich ~riedrlchnviCh Schneid~r, our hnge, t~iy p~r~nrs c~m~
Erdm th~ Vdlga, frum the v11.l~yg~ nf. TenntinE, n: n~t ~v~n SchnEider know~
wh~r~ htg nnceetors lived iti Germuny. Ni~ glighC Swabi~n aCC~nt indicne~g
Swnbiu ag th~ original homelnnd. Ne enik~ ~ G~rmgn-ttus~ian hntChnotch~
"The ShoEferc~ (clir~uff~urp) drnvp m~" c~r "nogovaritis (~gre~d), we wi11 me~C
xt n~on tomorraw." 'Ct~e "cumrndeq" meeC in Cti~ gtreet. When they wnnC tn
buy plane riCkety, ttx~y b~7hb~L: "I w~nt rickc~tg on a 5amaler," To rel~x on
A~OIICFI nt home nnd wnt~h televigion gnund~ like chi~: "Rcpt I do at hom~~
dn ~ div~n, whQn t take n look in c~leviznr~"
Schn~id~r i~ thc undiyputed bdgg in E'odgn~nuvo. Shepherd Jaknb Jaknblevirh
I~~ qnys ,ynkingly nbo~t his comrc~dc who i~ the head of the vill~ge: "There
ig ~ gc~d in Che wnrld, ~nd nne here in the villa~e." 'Ch~ kolkhnznik~ ~lsn
occaglnnalty c~ll Cheir vilinge "Schnciderlnnd."
Thr. Heru c~f Lnbor ts ~e~ter Off th7t~ Iv~n~ the Norm~l Consumer _
'I'I~e 52-ye.7r-old kotklioz ch~~irman 5rhneider has ~ccomplished eomething only
Eew pec~ple in the Sovtet Unton can ever nccomplinh. Ne ig depuCy nf th~
5uprcme Soviet .~nd ha� been ~w~rdeJ the highest decor~tion of the worker-
and-pu~7snnr st~~te--"tiern nf ~~c:iFilist labnr." ~f~e Cerman Earm~:rs' leader
gnt tt~c high order, c~E purc gold, far "outyC~nding butlding efforts, plnn
fulfillment and p.toneer work." A rige in the stands~rd of living gnes along
wich the honor. (?nce a ye~nr tie can travel gratis by plane, ship or train
to any vacation spot in the Snviet Union. He c~n use all municipal trans-
port gratis and p~yg tess for housing than ivan, the normal consumer.
Sixty Year~ oE Atheism--But the Bible Is Also Sti11 Itight ~
in contr~gt witt~ other ethnic mtnoritieq oE the Soviet Union, Schneider's
k~~lkt~uzniks ci~~ not ii~rvc ~ Cermxn qchool. Ttie language of instruction in
Ru:?~t~n. tiut From the second grade on, Germsin ig C~ught as a second
language ~i hours n weck, and from the sixth grade ott 5 hours a week.
Sci~neider is optimistic: "No one forgets t}~e dialect here; anly now we
also try to learn stnnd~rd Germ~n." Classrooms are decorated with quata- ~
~ tions from great German writers suitable for a communist-ruled village--
ltke 5chiller'a "I embrACe yot~, millions" or Cnethe's "Only one who has
worked his whole life with body and soul can say, 'I have lived."'
Even Walter Ulhr[cht, meanwhile also forgotten in the GDR, still gets his
due in Chc Cerman villH~e: "Be bold in your thinking, purposeful in your
work ~nnd c~refree in your ri~y."
zs
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'Ch~r~ i~ no church in th~ vill~g~, ~lfheugh m~ny inh~bittlnt~ gr~ ~ti11
bgptiz~d Lutheran~ or Cathol~e~. "The littl~ uld wom~n," eanf~~~~~ ~
Lurh~ran," neverthel~~~ hav~ thpir church ~ervic~--~t hnm~." D~~pit~ 6U
yeara of offi~iai athei~m, th~ Bible is etili th~ mo~t wid~ly r~ad p~bli-
c~tinn smong the d1d p~ep1~~
Rpgardlp~~ ~f their f~ith, th~ G~rman~ in Ptldsosnovo ~tick engpther, bue
they no lnnger hav~ ~ny ~ontget with C~rmany. My mother tongu~ i~ G~rman, .
but th~ 1~ng~age of my country ig Ruesi~n," ~ay~ Jdhann Uip~~ndorf, 62,
who fnu~ht again~t th~ G~rm~r.~, ~nd w~$ wound~d, in the R~d Army.
Fnr ynung ~rrtic fox breed~r ~riedrich Gugtnvovich Mpiger, 31, who likewi~~
has ~erved in the Red Army, in 'Ceghkent, Germany m~~ng h~rdly mor~ thnn
"M ~liya" or "FrentsiyA" (Engl~nd or Frnnce)~ thnugh he merri~d a Mi~e
K~ller from the village. Bos~ Schneider gr~phirnlly explain~ Wher~ one
fpels ~t hnme, saying: "A r~bbie feelg at t~om~ wherev~r it ha~ itg food."
Wtiil~ th~ milkm~id Schnpid~r would rath~r visir G~rr~ny thgn, ~ay, It~ly
("aEt~r nil, I knoW th~ l~nguage"), no one wantg to migrate tv thp FitG,
b~enuse~there are neithQr fri~ndg nor rplative~ in th~ We~t. Sny~ 5~hneidert
"Our Germnny ie here."
When th~ penple of Pod~ogndvo bui!~ house~, they h~lp th~ir "rumrndeg" on
weekends. Next to the hausE~, therp ~re stables everywhere in ahich aheep,
Cntcle, chickeng and pig~ are kept privately. In emall greenhouge~ there
grow "privat~" cucumbers~ tom~toes and l~ttuce.
~oss 5chneider Mey Check Any Private Savings Account
But ehe sdci~list stnce sees tn it thgt in Podeosnovn too there ig a limit
to everything and that the industrious fnrm~rs dn not get too rich. Privat~
holding~ of cattle are curefully regulated: no family can have more than
20 sheep, 3 pigs and 1 cow. Chickens, geese, bees and rabbits are not in-
cluded in the etate count, however. ~
Mer~t, skins and honey may be sold by the kolkhoznikg at so-called free
k~lkhoz markets, where~ ag in che Weat, prices are reguluted by gupply and
demnnd. Md what they g~t is two or three times as much as at atate pur-
chastng eatablist~ments. Thus the self-suppliers get family incomeg a� up
to 3,000 deut~che marks--n proud sum by 5oviet standards.
Thc well-ta-do inhabitant of Podsosnovo is alsa motorized above avergge,
witt~ 70 privacely owned r.~~rs--"Maskoviches" or "Zhigulis"--negotiating
higl~wnys and ice roads. "t think that if we got faster delivery of cars.
every Eamily here would have one," says Johannes H~inrichovich Neimbuch.
Boss Schneider, who has the right to check any oE Ct� gnvings accounts,
with }iis monthly income of noc quice 700 rubles plus 100 rubles' deputy's
per diem, is not by any means the richest man in the village. Nor does
he own I~is own home. His sole luxury is a medium-size Volga car.
2
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~na ~~~~tr,tnL U~3~ t)NLY
p~liCi~H ~x~ af litele ~c~ncern t~~ th~ villr~ger~. fli~put~~ dr~ r~r~, ctnJ
mindr ~ff~nsep ar~ puni~h~d by CCf1~.~CC~VE c~urt~ with ~mnll fin~~~ Tt�
cnuYt df ~uri~di ct i~n !,g i~cgt~d tn rli~ n~2~r~~t tdwn. a~1~n~ider g~y~ t"Hut
in n~ir wl~ale hiqeory, t~anp df u~ haq ~v~r ~pp~~red bafare eha Court."
nn ehhir daye dEf tf~e p~nplh nf ~ndg~ldn~vn gpn~ra~ly w~rk nn their ftou~e ~r
in th~ g~rcl~n nr tend cn their hrivnlr r~tet~.
riig G~14bretivn~ ~~n~rfilly tnkp p1c~c~ on.ly nn Snvi~t holidgy~~ euch M~y
Day nr the anniv~r~nry di the UCt~ber ~evnlutinn. On thn~~ ncctatdions th~
multipnrp~r~p hall ue~d for ~pore~, eultural ~v~nt~ ~nd ~~tt~~rt~inment~ with
it~ m~r~ thAn 1,C100 qe~~ts, is cnmpl~e~ly filled~
t~nrtiCUlnrly during the tdng wint~r ~venings th~ kolkhoznik~ ~it tngett~er
tn rl~~ir pf~rlor~, drinkin~ vodkq nnd win~ (a~ y~t th~r~ te nd ba~r, n
brew~ry b~tng nnty in the pl~nning ~tage), E~~tin~ pdrk Rnd b~c~f m~aeballg
drippin~ witl~ fnt nnd ginging th~lr Eavorite ~ong, "eur hymn": "0 beauCiful
pod~nenavn lnnd, Whn know~ if we will m~et ng~in. Md when we 1ouk, wh~n
w~ look over ch~ g~t~, ov~r the g~t~, ae ~ee P~d~nsnovo land, ~nd wh~n wp
ppep nnJ p~ep thrnugh th~ hnl~~, che hole~, we gee t~odengnovu l~nd." ,
COPYRICHr: 1919 Grun~r--Jahn AC b Co
8790
CSO: 1826 ~:NA
:
~
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