U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000100050003-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 25, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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February 25, 1984
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FROM George P. Shultz _A0.5
Attached is a highly sensitive paper which has been
forwarded by Bud McFarlane to the President. It will form
the basis for a meeting on Wednesday afternoon. Please
regard this paper as being for your personal use only and
keep it under your personal control.
Attachment: U.S.-Soviet Relations:
A Framework for the Future
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
State Dept. review completed
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U.S. - Soviet Relations
A Framework for the Future
What are the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations in 1984? What
should be our approach?
I. Premise
Chernenko's selection as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist
Party may provide an opportunity to put our relations on a more
positive track. Even before Andropov died, there were signs that
the Soviets were accepting the necessity for an intensified
dialogue. Now they have started to diminish their hostile
rhetoric somewhat and have indicated a readiness to examine
privately proposals for solving some problems.
As a Soviet leader, Chernenko has many initial weaknesses. He may
have come to power as the head of a relatively weak coalition, and
his freedom to maneuver may be severely circumscribed. His public
image is not strong, and he may well turn out to be only a brief
transitional figure. Nevertheless, he probably does not view
himself in that light, and we can assume that he will attempt to
consolidate his power and put his own stamp on history. In that
effort, an ability to improve relations with the United States
would be an important asset to him, and to be seen publicly
dealing with you as an equal would bolster his image greatly in
the Soviet Union. In short, he needs you more than you need him,
and he knows it.
This does not mean that he can sell the store. Crucial strategic
decisions will continue to be made'by a collective--essentially
the same collective which ran things under Andropov. But it is
likely that this collective had already begun to recognize the
need for the Soviet Union to adjust some of its policies before
Andropov died, and Chernenko's'accession could hasten that
process. The change of the face at the top could make it easier
to adjust policies, implicitly blaming past failures on the
"previous administration."
To say that these things could happen is, of course, not the same
as saying that they will, or even that the odds favor them
happening. The Soviets still harbor a deep and fundamental
hostility to your Administration, are tough and cynical
bargainers, and will be reluctant to do anything that they believe
would facilitate your reelection and vindicate your policy of
strength.
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Your reelection is of strategic importance for the United States
in establishing an effective long-term policy for dealing with the
Soviet threat. This means that we must stress in public your call
for dialogue and your desire to reduce tensions and solve
problems. Tangible progress and a summit that produced positive
results could be helpful if the Soviets decide to bite the bullet
and adjust their policies sufficiently to make this possible. But
if-they continue-to resist realistic negotiation, you must be in a
position by late summer or fall to make clear that this is their
fault, not yours.
For the next few months, however, we should carefully avoid
raising public expectations for a summit or any specific accords
with the Soviets. To do so would gravely weaken our negotiating
leverage with the Soviets, and leave a public impression of
failure if they refuse to deal with us realistically. In private,
however, we should promptly begin to explore the possibilities for
moving ahead in some important areas, and to test Chernenko's
willingness and.ability to meet at least some of our legitimate
concerns. If we play our cards right, we may well be able to
induce Chernenko to pay something in advance for the improvement
in relations and summit which would be very helpful to him
personally.
On the Soviet side, one principal argument against meeting our
concerns in some important areas is likely to be that your policy
is so hostile that no accommodation is possible, and any attempt
to negotiate seriously would only result in Soviet concessions
without a deal. It is, therefore, in our interest to make it
clear that we will negotiate seriously if the Soviets are willing
to meet our legitimate concerns. Such a posture would not only
maximize whatever chances exist for major agreements in 1984, but
would provide a sound basis for rapid progress in 1985, if the
Soviets are unable to get their act together until then, or if
they hold back for fear of helping you get reelected.
We should not, of course, attempt to stimulate their interest by
making prior concessions of substance. This would only encourage
them to continue on their track of trying to get concessions from
us without making any of their own. Indeed, our aim should be to
obtain some prior concessions from them, particularly if you are
to agree to a summit. In this regard we should recognize that
there are doubtless limits on what Chernenko can deliver; he can-
hardly pull Soviet troops out of Afghanistan or make major
decisions of strategic significance. But he can deliver on such
matters as human rights cases and Jewish emigration if he wishes.
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All of this suggests that we should move rapidly to put more
content into the dialogue; and to search for more efficient
modalities. We should stick to the broad agenda set forth in your
January speech, but need to concentrate particular attention on
issues where the Soviets can find a direct interest in responding.
Regarding modalities, we need channels which permit off-the-record
frankness and which are isolated from leaks.
While concentrating on communicating with the leadership (whoever
that may be at a given moment), we should also expand
opportunities for more broad and effective contacts with a wider
public, particularly persons now in their forties and fifties (the
successor generation).
II. The Substance
It is difficult to predict where on our four-part agenda progress
might be possible. In 1983 the Soviets sent a signal in the human
rights field by. releasing the Pentecostalists; this year it could
be somewhere else. So we should keep pushing on all fronts, while
keeping public expectations low unless and until something
concrete materializes.
A. Regional Issues
In our dialogue with the Soviets on regional issues, it will
be difficult at this stage to strike direct deals. Thus, our
near-term objective would be to engage them in a frank interchange
regarding the dangers of given situations. Such a discussion
would massage Soviet amour propre by treating them as equals (of
sorts). It might also serve to alert us and them to particularly
delicate aspects which should be taken into account in policy
making. Being seen in consultation with.the Soviets on these
issues helps allay public anxieties and can increase leverage
with other parties. Conceivably, the process could lead to
reciprocal unilateral actions which might defuse particularly
dangerous aspects of regional conflicts, although this is likely
to occur only if relations in other respects improve.
The regional issue most likely to attract genuine Soviet interest
is the Middle East -- Lebanon specifically. At this stage, we
should steer away from tactical discussions and asking them to do
favors, i.e., UNIFIL. Our objective should be to use a larger
strategic discussion to stress the danger of events spiraling out
of control of either of us and producing an Israeli-Syrian
confrontation which would have serious dangers for both of us.
There is also room for a broad discussion of European issues,
where we could drive home some of the dangers for Soviet policy of
their present "splitting" tactics. And in general we believe our
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emphasis on greater Soviet restraint in unstable regions indicates
more routine, substantive-exchanges among experts on various
regions.
B. Arms Control
Strategic arms limitations represent the central arms
negotiations between the US and the USSR. However, for the last
three years, INF issues have set the mood for a number of
negotiations. Having threatened to walk out of negotiations and to
deploy "countermeasures," the Soviet Union is now following
through.
Sufficient face-saving formulas exist for the Soviet Union to
return when they wish, although they will be very reluctant to
return to INF. We should not make concessions to bring them back
to START and INF, nor should we create obstacles to their return.
Resumption of talks will be accelerated if our allies are firm,
major defense programs proceed, walkout is not rewarded, and
domestic pressures are cont'r'olled.
Nevertheless, the United States can and should take steps
designed to enhance the prospects for arms control "windows ' of
opportunity." Resumption of more normal negotiations is most
likely in multilateral fora or in low key bilateral negotiations
such as the "Hotline" upgrade talks, especially if the United
States is not perceived as gaining significant public diplomacy
advantages. This is consistent with the current Soviet effort to
keep political pressure on the Alliance and this Administration.
If, however, the new leadership in Moscow should decide that
a major US/USSR arms control initiative might be in their
interest, then START is the most likely arena for movement. Prior
to the Soviet walkout from START we had indicated that we had some
flexibility in basic approaches to trade-offs between areas of US
and Soviet interest. Clarification of approaches to these
trade-offs could play an important role in creating the climate
for agreement in principle or a resumption of negotiations.
Although the Alliance is adamant that we should not make
concessions in order to get the USSR to return to the INF talks,
Moscow's unwillingness to discuss Soviet LRINF systems presents it
with a political vulnerability. The United States and its allies
should continue to press on this issue. As long as the Soviet
Union believes that it can put the West on the defensive with the
public in areas such as INF deployments and space arms control, it
will see less incentive to negotiate on other issues.
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MBFR is important not because an agreement is likely this
year or next, but because we have an opportunity to demonstrate
that we are serious in our negotiating intent. Our opening
position at the next round is thus crucial in conveying the
overall message that we are prepared to negotiate seriously.
The CDE, the CD in Geneva and bilateral talks on CBM's such as the
hot line will have a higher profile than hitherto.
C. Human Rights
While the Soviets will continue to make any discussion on
human rights difficult, we should persevere. Last year the
Soviets did move on the Pentecostalists in the context of improv-
ing relations, and we are once again hearing from official Soviets
that they see some improvement. We should continue to focus on
major cases like Shcharansky, Sakharov and Orlov, and on the need
to reopen Jewish emigration. This is an area where deals may be
possible if arranged through private, off-the-official-record
contacts. If movement in other areas indicate that a summit would
be useful, we should push hard for human rights improvements as a
precondition.
D. Bilateral
In the bilateral area, Secretary Shultz' meeting with Gromyko
opened up a number of possibilities. Gromyko responded positively
to the need to examine specific measures to prevent another KAL.
Since then, the Soviet representative at ICAO has proposed a
US-Japan-USSR group to look at such measures. We have developed a
set of specific measures. Our objective should be to reach
agreement on these measures this year.
We also should-take steps which improve our direct communication
and contact with the people in the'Soviet Union -- to give
practical effect to your own stress on talking directly to the
people in your January 16th speech and again in the State of the
Union. That is the objective of a consulate in Kiev (strongly
supported in recent letters to the Congress and the Administration
by Ukrainian-American organizations) and a cultural exchanges
agreement.
By moving forward ourselves in these two areas now, we can help to
channel in sensible directions the upsurge of interest across the
country in greater people-to-people contacts and limit
exploitation by the Soviets. Also to avoid naive groups
dominating this area, we should try to establish a mechanism for
better guidance and coordination of private efforts. This could
be used to encourage those with a tougher-minded track record in
dealing with the Soviets, i.e., the American Council of Young
Political Leaders.
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Some in Congress are interested in inviting a delegation of
Supreme Soviet members this year. This could be a way for us to
meet possible successors to Chernenko, such as Gorbachev.
However, we will want to weigh carefully the risks of negative
exploitation.
In other areas of possible bilateral cooperation, the Soviets have
not responded formally to our space rescue proposal but informal
indications are not promising. There are a variety of other areas
of cooperation which could be pursued should we decide to do so.
III. Channels
There are a number of channels we should be utilizing.
We should continue the correspondence with Chernenko, but
recognize that it is unlikely that he will be candid, both out of
fear his letters will be leaked and in order to protect his
negotiating positions. Nonetheless, it is one means of being
certain that our views are getting through to the leadership
without distortion. And it could help to provide some momentum.
(At the moment the ball is in Chernenko's court, since you sent
him a letter with the Vice President.)
We also should hold early and regular exchanges between Secretary
Shultz and Dobrynin and between Hartman and Gromyko on the full
range of our concerns.
On the critical START issue, in the absence of negotiations in
Geneva, the Secretary's talks with Dobrynin will be the main
channel. As a parallel process we should consider intensifying
unofficial informal discussions. Brent Scowcroft is going to
Moscow in March and would be able'to set forth our views more
fully and directly than passing through Dobrynin.
If there is sufficient movement, we should consider another
Shultz-Gromyko meeting.
Finally, we should consider some other forms of dialogue. As
noted earlier, on regional issues like the Middle East our
specialists should meet. In addition, we should consider sending
a group of middle-level policy officials to Moscow to cover a
broad range of subjects and touch base with key Soviet organiza-
tions, including the Central Committee. And military-to-military
discussions are a possibility: discussion of such matters as
strategic doctrine or comparison of each other's threat assess-
ments might be useful topics.
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IV. Timetable
The following timetable is possible:
--Shultz/Dobrynin within a week to 10 days: further on START
framework and propose some of other consultations.
--Hartman/Gromyko: propose Middle East discussion by specialists
and/or discussions by policy planners.
--Scowcroft: Brief him on our approach to use privately during
his planned trip to Moscow beginning March 8.
--Another Shultz/Gromyko meeting: we should not push for this yet
but wait and see how other issues develop. If the Soviets seem
interested, we could try to arrange a meeting in May or early
June. We also should consider whether to invite Gromyko to
Washington to see you when he is here in September for the UNGA.
V. Bureaucratic Preparation
If the Soviets do begin to deal more seriously in areas of
interest to us, we must be able to move rapidly in order to
sustain momentum. This may require some adjustment of our
bureaucratic procedures to make quick decisions possible. It
would be useful to clarify as many immediate issues as we can, and
to "pre-position" approved negotiating plans, to be used as
developments warrant. A list of the more important U.S.-Soviet
issues with summaries of their status is attached.
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