THE MARINE SPY SCANDAL: IT'S A BIGGIE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706970005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 6, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706970005-1
ARTICLE AFOOM
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The Marine Spy Scandal: "It's a Biggie"
Two guards accused of betraying the Moscow embassy to Soviet agents face espionage charges
I n Moscow as in other foreign capitals,
the trim, blue-clad Marine is as much a
fixture of the U.S. embassy as the flag. He
stands in the reception area, resplendent
in crimson-trimmed trousers, his hat
bearing its gold corps insignia, a .38-cal.
revolver at his side-the very emblem of
U.S. security and uprightness. His duties
bespeak the nation's belief in his incor-
ruptibility: after hours at major U.S. em-
bassies, he and a Marine buddy go
through the empty building securing clas-
sified documents that may have been left
out, locking safes and disposing of the
"trash," often top-secret papers, in the
diplomatic "burn bag." They also check
on each other. In the 38 years since the
U.S. began posting Marines to guard duty,
the system had seemed infallible.
Alas, it was not. Last week Cor-
poral Arnold Bracy, 21, a former
guard at the Moscow embassy, be-
came only the second "ambassador
in blue" ever to be arrested on espio-
nage charges. The first was Sergeant
Clayton Lonetree, 25, Bracy's ac-
complice at the Moscow embassy,
who was apprehended three months
ago. Lonetree is charged with 24 fel-
onies involving security breaches,
including two counts of espionage,
which carry a possible death penal-
ty. Bracy is being held in a Quantico,
Va., brig until the accusations
against him are clarified.
The Marine Corps charged last
week that, as buddies on embassy
night duty from July 1985 to March
1986, the two guards regularly let
Soviet agents into the empty embas-
sy late at night "to peruse" sensitive
areas, including the embassy's com-
munications center, for up to
four hours at a time. Bracy, the
corps' charge sheet claims,
served as lookout and shut
down security alarms set off by
the Soviets. "These guys actual-
ly escorted the Soviets around
the building," said a Pentagon
official.
Following Bracy's arrest,
the case rapidly spiraled into a
spy scandal of major propor-
tions. "It's a biggie," said one
White House official. "A real biggie." So-
viet penetration of embassy communica-
tions has been so extensive, officials fear,
that U.S. negotiating positions were com-
promised before the Reykjavik summit
last October. The security damage has
also seriously hampered preparations for
Secretary of State George Shultz's trip to
Moscow April 13-and could cast a pall
over prospects for a summit this year.
President Reagan was sufficiently
concerned to order two briefings on the
case, including a high-level Friday after-
noon meeting that included Cabinet
members. Shultz did not even wait to con-
sult with Reagan before taking the un-
precedented step of shutting down all sen-
sitive electronic communications with the
Moscow embassy. U.S. diplomatic posts
around the world are now transmitting
Moscow-bound traffic to Frankfurt,
where select courier teams are on call to
hand-carry material to the Soviet capital.
Within the embassy, secretaries have
been forbidden to use any machine that
emits electronic signals, including electric
typewriters and word processors. Even
the Xerox machine has been shut down.
Shultz has already asked Congress for a
special $25 million appropriation to re-
6 April 1987
Lonetree, left, and Bracy
allegedly escorted Soviet
agents into the building
place the security systems for the embas-
sies in Moscow and Vienna, where Lone-
tree also worked.
The Administration has launched
what State Department Spokesman
Charles Redman called a "full-scale
counterintelligence investigation." All 28
Marines assigned to Moscow are being re-
placed. State Department security offi-
cials will accompany the new guards on
their rounds. Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger and the House and Senate in-
telligence committees ordered broad in-
vestigations into the entire 1,400-man
Marine Security Guard battalion to which
Bracy and Lonetree belonged.
Among other charges, the Marine
Corps alleges that Lonetree and Bracy
provided the Soviets with the names, ad-
dresses and telephone numbers of "covert
U.S. intelligence agents" in the Soviet
Union. They offered embassy blueprints,
floor plans and office assignments to the
Soviets, turned over the contents of confi-
dential burn bags and lied to security per-
sonnel about why alarms had been acti-
vated in the communications center.
In addition, the Marine Corps
charges that Lonetree provided Soviet
agents with the floor plans of the U.S. em-
bassy in Vienna. Lonetree's lawyer
says his client will "absolutely deny
these allegations."
Lonetree, who is from St. Paul,
arrived in Moscow in September
1984, and allegedly started working
for the KGB soon after he began a
love affair with an embassy transla-
tor. She later introduced the Marine
to her "Uncle Sasha," an operative
known as Aleksei Yefimov. The
scandal began to unfold when Lone-
tree, feeling pressure from the Sovi-
ets, surrendered to U.S. authorities
in Vienna last December. Bracy, a
native of Queens, N.Y., is said to
have had a sexual relationship with
one of the embassy's Soviet staff, a
cook. Both of the women who be-
came involved with the Marines
were attractive; it is well known that
the KGB uses such women-"swal-
lows," in the trade-to lure con-
tacts. "We're not talking about bag
ladies here," said a White
House aide.
The U.S. suspects that when
Bracy and Lonetree shared
night watch, Soviet agents were
able to bug the most secure of
the embassy's communications
equipment and place intercept
devices in highly sensitive cryp-
tographic information, enabling
them to read State Department
messages before they were put
in code. "There's lots of grounds
for assuming the worst case in this in-
stance," explained a White House source.
Based on what Bracy and Lonetree have
revealed, U.S. officials are convinced that
for more than a year, beginning in mid-
1985, the Soviets read every important
classified communication issued by the
embassy; the assumption is that the inter-
cept devices are still functioning. The se-
curity penetration could have other
long-term consequences: the Soviets
may have planted "trap doors" in the
Continued
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equipment that could cripple American
communications with the embassy in the
event of a crisis.
The two Marines have confirmed that
KGB agents were easily able to open nor-
mal embassy safes, -often in less than half
an hour," according to one investigating
officer. The Soviets also gained access to
the two most sensitive areas in the embas-
sy: the bubble and the vault. The bubble, a
supposedly bugproof structure hung in-
side a standard room, is routinely used forI
top-secret conversations. The vault is a
highly secure area, enclosed with heavy
steel and special locks, in which CIA offi-
cers operate. Navy investigators were dis-
mayed to learn that Soviet agents cracked
the locks on both bubble and vault in un-
der two hours.
In retrospect, the security breach
seems to explain some of the Soviets' re-
cent diplomatic behavior. During last
fall's summit in Iceland. U.S. negotiators
were disturbed by the Soviets' uncannily
well-prepared responses to U.S. points.
"We thought at the time that they were
remarkably sophisticated in anticipating
our positions," says a State Department
official. Now, says another, the U.S. real-
izes that throughout Reykjavik, "we
played poker with the Soviets, and they
were looking at a mirror over our shoul-
ders." Government sources are equally
convinced that the Soviets had inside in-
formation last August during the crisis
surrounding the Kremlin's arrest of U.S.
Journalist Nicholas Daniloff.
The arrests come at a particularly
awkward time for the State Depart-
ment. The situation casts a cloud over the
upcoming arrival in Moscow of new U.S.
Ambassador Jack Matlock. Even worse is
the effect on the Shultz trip. A new bubble
is being built in the embassy in anticipa-
tion of the Secretary's arrival April 13, but
communications technicians are not sure
that security can be guaranteed.
Low-level security breaches are noto-
riously difficult to detect and control, as
the Navy learned from the Walker spy
case, when a yeoman aboard the aircraft
carrier Nimitz also stole classified materi-
als from burn bags. Indeed, it is by no
means certain that the Moscow operation
ended with the departure of Lonetree and
Bracy. Investigators wonder how the two
Marines could have carried on love affairs
unnoticed within the embassy's close con-
fines. They suspect that the relationships
were known but tolerated by others who
may have had similar experiences. In
fact, Bracy was demoted from sergeant to
corporal for violating rules that specifical-
ly forbid fraternization with Soviet
citizens.
The technological damage that Lone-
tree and Bracy reportedly wrought will be
extremely difficult to remedy. Repairing
the damage that has been done to the pride
and spirit of the Marine Corps could prove
no less difficult. -By Amy WAentz
Reported by Bruce van Voorst/Washington
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706970005-1