THE GREAT SUPERPOWER SPY WAR KGB VS. CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000201190016-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 29, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP90-00845R000201190016-8
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Money, blackmail, sex-no holds
are barred. Question: Who is
winning this battle between
Soviet and American "moles"?
With the arrest of the first. FBI agent ever
accused as a Soviet spy, the public is getting a
rare look at a high-stakes war being waged by
t vo old adversaries-the espionage agencies
of America and the Soviet Union.
Fought with sex, money, blackmail and even violence,
this spy war has a goal that goes far beyond theft of plans
for a new gun or an advanced piece of technology. The
stakes are the most closely held secrets of the intelligence
services whose operations are crucial to national security.
Amid a deepening chill between the superpowers, the
prospect of penetration is an ever present concern. Both
sides are waging a relentless campaign to plant operatives
within one another's spy services. For America, the chief
target is Moscow's Committee for State Security-the KGB.
For the Kremlin, it is the Central Intelligence Agency.
In this shadow world of lies, deception, double crosses and
double agents, no one can say for certain which side holds the
upper hand. Both powers can lay claim to major victories, but
both have suffered costly and embarrassing defeats.
For the U.S., the latest setback came from an unlikely
quarter-the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an agency
that has long boasted a blemish-free record. Its spyproof
image was shattered in October with the arrest of Richard W.
Miller, 47, a 20-year FBI veteran accused of acting as an
agent for the Soviet Union in the bureau's Los Angeles office.
The charge against Miller: Peddling secrets to a Soviet
emigre named Svetlana Ogorodnikova, 34, a self-proclaimed
KGB major who allegedly lured him into a personal relation-
ship, then offered money for classified documents. The
government claims the debt-strapped agent, married and
the father of eight children, sought $65,000 from the KGB.
Although the actual damage is unclear, Miller admits to
giving Moscow a 25-page classified document that officials
say would provide the KGB with a detailed picture of U.S.
intelligence activities, techniques and requirements. The
document did not, however, spell out names of active
agents or details of current operations.
In the never ending spy war, both sides have found willing
double agents. A KGB "mole" spent years working inside
Britain's code-breaking center, diverting supersecret U.S.
intelligence data to Moscow. America had a man inside Polish
intelligence, blowing the cover on Soviet spy operations in
the U.S. as recently as 1983.
CIA Director William Casey boasts that his
agency last year helped give the KGB the
worst setback in its history, aiding in expulsion
of some 135 Soviet spies worldwide. Yet some
critics in a position to know fear that U.S.
services-particularly the CIA-are being
placed at a disadvantage in the competition
with their Soviet rivals.
"Today, the CIA is reluctant to mix it up
with the KGB," asserts a knowledgeable U.S.
official. "It's a dicey game. Lots of things can
go wrong. They are not out there in every nook and cranny
trying to roll up the KGB."
Moscow's Quest for "Moles"
STAT
The prospect of a Soviet mole's burrowing into top U.S.
intelligence echelons has haunted America ever since the
defection of H. A. R. "Kim" Philby, one of Britain's most
senior intelligence officials, to Russia some 20 years ago. U.S.
jitters worsened when Heinz Felfe, a senior West German
counterspy, surfaced as a KGB plant in the '50s.
The CIA itself was thrown into turmoil in the late 1960s
and early 1970s by counterspy James Angleton's suspi-
cions-which he never proved and which many ridiculed-
that a KGB operative had penetrated the upper reaches of
his agency. Angleton left the CIA in 1975.
The Kremlin devotes vast resources to infiltrating other
spy services. Thousands work for the KGB, under the com-
mand of Marshal Viktor Chebrikov. Still more are em-
ployed by the military-intelligence arm known as GRU.
They are supported by East European spy agencies.
By itself, the KGB is said to have 10,000 espionage officers
assigned strictly to foreign spying-including 500 in the U.S.
on diplomatic missions. Says a senior FBI official wryly: "We
are blessed with the best agents the KGB has to offer. They
are smooth and Westernized. They cultivate relationships
with everyone from clerks to company presidents."
The clearest penetration of the CIA came to light in late
1980 with the arrest of David Henry Barnett, who remains
.the only member of the CIA's officer ranks ever to be
publicly unmasked as a KGB operative.
After working under cover for the agency in Indonesia
through the 1960s, Barnett, now serving 18 years in prison,
resigned in 1970 to start a private business in Jakarta. In a few
years, his venture collapsed and financial losses mounted.
In 1976, Barnett-$100,000 in debt-turned to the KGB
for help. In Vienna and Jakarta, he delivered American
defense information, including data about a secret CIA
operation, to the KGB. He disclosed the names of Indone-
Continued
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP90-00845R000201190016-8